



g Accuse!

BY A GERMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES



GIFT OF
Larry Laughlin



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

I ACCUSE!

(J' ACCUSE!)

BY

A GERMAN

TRANSLATED BY

ALEXANDER GRAY

*"A pitiable wretch is he
Who knows the truth and yet can silent be?"*

NEW YORK

GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY

Copyright, 1915,
By GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
PUBLISHED BY
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
NEW YORK

PREFACE

J'Accuse, a work recently published anonymously in Lausanne, has deservedly attracted much attention on the Continent on account of the independent standpoint of the author, the penetration shown in his analysis of the critical events of last year, and the vigour and clarity which characterise his presentation of the case.

The German edition is prefaced by the following note:—

“The book *J'Accuse*, written by a German patriot, and entrusted to me, is herewith presented to the public.

“I regard this work as an act which can only confer a blessing on the German people and on humanity, and I accordingly assume responsibility for its publication.

“DR. ANTON SUTER.

“Lausanne, April 20th, 1915.”

A further note is added in the following terms:—

“Having regard to the situation arising from the war and the conditions of the censorship, certain passages in the manuscript have for the present been omitted. These passages are indicated by blank spaces.”


In the present translation the censored passages have been indicated in the same way.

The very few explanatory footnotes added in the course of translation are indicated by square brackets.

I desire to express my indebtedness to Mr. T. Lindsay for his assistance in the work of revision and correction of proofs.

July, 1915.

A. G.



CONTENTS

I

GERMANY AWAKE

PAGE

Can the Victory of Germany and Austria be expected?—	
The economic position of belligerent countries—The po-	
litical and military position of the belligerent countries—	
The situation in France—Partie Remise—The question	
of guilt	11—34

II

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME

Our Imperialists: Bernhardt and Co.—Have we been attacked	
or were we going to be attacked?—The head of the War	
Party—The Imperial War—The place in the sun—The	
chosen people—Germany's brilliant development—In-	
crease of population and the colonies—Our true colonies	
—What advantage has France drawn from her colonies?	
—The Germans abroad: France, England, America—The	
place in the sun for us, the place in the shadow for the	
others—The fear of Germany—Diplomatic success of the	
Triple Alliance—Austria's Balkan policy—The Crown	
Prince and the war party—The policy of encirclement—	
England and Germany: The first Hague Conference—Be-	
tween the first and second Hague Conferences: The	
English Liberal Government—Second Hague Conference:	
England and Germany—English proposals for a political	
understanding and for a naval agreement with Germany	
—What are we fighting for?—The freedom which <i>they</i>	
mean—The end of peace: Security?—Did France mean	
to attack us?—Did Russia mean to attack us?—The	
Triple Entente a defensive alliance—Giolitti's revelations	
—The change of front in Berlin; the war party	26—141

III

THE CRIME

	PAGE
A. Austria	146
B. Germany	170
C. England	245
D. Russia	289
E. France	295
F. Appendix: The Austrian Red Book	315

IV

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED

How beautiful to die for the Fatherland!—Prestige—Proletarians of all countries, massacre each other!—Political morality—Moral politics—*Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi*—Dreams of world power—Who will pay the cost of the war?—*Quousque tandem?* . . . 353—385

V

THE FUTURE

What should peace bring us?—The system of armed peace—
 A covenant of peace between free nations—Is this a
 Utopia?—The coercive force—What will peace bring us?
 —Should it happen otherwise—The twilight of the Gods
386—419
 EPILOGUE 420—423

APPENDICES

Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, August 4th, 1914	424
Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 2nd, 1914	430
Circular note of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 24th, 1914	440

I ACCUSE!

I ACCUSE!

I

GERMANY AWAKE!

LA VÉRITÉ EST EN MARCHÉ.

IF there were in Prussian-Germany a system of ministerial responsibility, such as exists in all other countries with effective Parliamentary Government, and such as has been held out with many other fair promises to the Prussian people for more than sixty-four years, the Imperial Chancellor and President of the Prussian Council, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, would have to be arraigned and

condemned.

It might be allowed in his favour, as an extenuating circumstance, that he was not the driving force of the war, but that he was driven to it—driven from above and from below. But a Minister, who yields himself as the tool of those who instigate war, who covers those who are irresponsible with his responsibility, who accepts the despicable task of representing to his nation and to all the world as a war of defence the

offensive war which was prepared long in advance, who by this falsehood unchains the most fearful disaster which has ever fallen upon our globe, and which is inflicting on his Fatherland, whether victorious or defeated, wounds which will be incurable for generations to come; who delivers over to death and to mutilation

hundreds of thousands of his countrymen in the flower of their age, annihilates at a stroke the arduous labour of half a century, suddenly wrenches asunder the bonds of culture between civilised nations, and transforms prosperous regions of Europe into ruinous wastes—such a man must bear the punishment which is due to his crime.

In gathering together in the following pages the various points in the indictment which reveal the exclusive guilt of Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, in provoking the universal war, I am well aware of the fact that I will expose myself to the disapproving criticism of a large section of the German public, which proclaims it to be a patriotic duty to shut one's eyes to the truth, or if the truth be recognised, to conceal it in silence for the duration of the war.

Only by bearing in mind these two points of view is it possible to understand the present frame of mind of such a highly intelligent people as the German nation. The "State of War" (*Kriegszustand*), proclaimed on the 31st July, which placed the intellectual life of Germany under the supervision of Generals, and which even

to-day, after more than six months have elapsed, carefully keeps watch on the frontiers lest there should penetrate into the country so much as a suggestion of the intellectual life or of the views of foreign countries which might disturb the unity of Germany, or of foreign information or evidence which might illumine the German people—this “state of war” has produced the result that nine-tenths of the whole German people have blindly followed the dexterously coined phrases about the “state of defence which is forced upon us,” about “the struggle for our freedom and culture against aggression and oppression.” “The French and the Russians have already pressed over our frontiers”; “The Fatherland is in danger”; “They mean to humiliate us”; “In the midst of peace the enemy falls upon us”; “The existence of our Empire is at stake”; “We are called upon to defend our holiest possessions, our Fatherland, our very hearths against an unscrupulous attack”; “We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future.” These and similar phrases (all taken from official documents) have been used with the *conscious intention* of deceiving the German people, of inflaming its patriotism, and of inspiring it to unutterable and incalculable sacrifices in wealth and in life.

“The few, who here have aught of Truth divined,
Yet foolishly revealed their inner heart,
Who showed the mob their feeling and their mind—
The cross, the stake have always been their part.”¹

The few who, after the first days of intoxication, gradually returned to their senses, and who were able

¹ “Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt,
Die töricht g’nug ihr volles Herz nicht wahrten,
Dem Pöbel ihr Gefühl, ihr Schauen offenbarten
Hat man von je gekreuzigt und verbrannt.”

to procure foreign documents and representations behind the backs of the military censors, and by careful study and comparison of these slowly arrived at the truth,—these had to shut the truth within them, since it was and is considered unpatriotic to give expression to it, since every utterance in word or in writing would be suppressed by the military authorities, and the offender would expose himself to the risk of punishment.

It is to escape this fate that those who know the facts have kept, and still keep, silence. Those, however, who do not know the truth, or do not wish to know it, cry out all the more loudly, and as a work of illumination scatter broadcast the foolish products of their minds throughout the world, where no one believes them, even if they were to repeat the German lies a million times. What are we to say when Germans of the highest eminence, from Bode to Dehmel,¹ from Haeckel to Hauptmann,¹ from Liszt to Sudermann, from Laband to Liebermann,² (in all nearly a hundred of them), distribute in foreign countries an appeal, which immediately after the opening words contains the following sentence:—

“Germany on the other hand made every effort to avoid war. The incontestable evidence in support of this fact

¹ Decorated on the Emperor's birthday 1915, Fourth Class of the Red Eagle.

² Wilhelm von Bode, General Director of the Royal Museum, Berlin, a leading authority on art, Richard Dehmel a distinguished poet, Ernst Haeckel, the celebrated Professor of Zoology at Jena; Gerhardt Hauptmann, perhaps the most eminent of contemporary poets; Franz von Liszt, Professor of Jurisprudence at Berlin, a leading criminologist; Hermann Sudermann, the novelist; Paul Laband, Professor of Jurisprudence at Strassburg; Max Liebermann, a distinguished painter.

are open to all the world. . . . Only when the overwhelming forces of the enemy, who had long been lying in ambush on our frontiers, fell into our country from *three* sides (!), only then did the German people rise like one man."

And with such robber-stories as these about the enemy lurking in ambush—one thinks involuntarily of Lederstrumpf and Ali Baba—they dare to humbug such highly educated, cultured nations as, for instance, the Italians (among whom even a street-porter has to-day a better knowledge of the historical truth about the war than a Harnack has among us), among a people whose Government, with the approval of the whole country, declared that the war was an offensive war on the part of Germany and Austria, and rightly and of necessity so declared unless it wished to charge itself with faithlessness and the breach of its own word.

It is to these men a self-evident fact that we are the leading culture-people of the world, and consequently (such is the logic of these gentlemen!) we are called upon to impose our culture forcibly on the other inferior races and even on neutrals by means of bombs and grenades, by fire and devastation. Such is the mission which Providence has pointed out to us, as it called upon the Crusaders to fight against the Crescent (which now we have gained as an ally in the struggle against Christian nations), and as it instigated the Catholics in the Thirty Years' War to cast out of the Protestants by fire and sword their new-won faith. In the view of our leading spirits, in place of the wars of religion there has suddenly arisen since the 1st August, 1914, a culture-war, in which the nations are fighting for the equal privileges or the supremacy of the various "hostile cultures." *Has ever a greater madness than this been conceived?* In 1870 when France was defeated and crushed,

did we suppress, did we so much as touch, the culture of that country? Did the foreign domination of Napoleon wipe out even a trace of our German spiritual culture, which just then had reached an incomparable height? When the Romans conquered Greece did they at the same time overthrow Greek culture? Precisely the opposite took place. The captor was made captive. The mind of Greece, the art of Greece, subdued Rome. And we find the same thing in the history of Christianity. In the end was it not the small province of Galilee that imposed its spirit on the world-empire of Rome? How indeed is it possible for anyone to speak of the present struggle as a struggle of cultures when what we really have before us is merely a struggle of anti-cultures, of barbarisms, against each other,—a struggle which from day to day becomes more bitter, more cruel, and more murderous,—a struggle in which all the principles of international law and of humanity are more and more forgotten, if indeed it is still possible to speak of humanity in face of this inhuman massacre? *What has all this got to do with culture?* Do we intend in any way to suppress the culture of England and France, of Russia and Belgium? Do we mean to renounce Shakespeare, Darwin, Newton, and Spencer, Tolstoy and Dostoiewsky, Voltaire, Rousseau, Zola, Goncourt, Rubens, Van Eyck, Meunier, and Maeterlinck, or do we mean to rid the world of their achievements? With what right, then, do we impute to the others intentions against us which we do not have against them, and to which we could not give effect even if we entertained them? If we had not read it daily in print, we would not have believed that the intellectuals of Germany could have persuaded themselves and the German people that German culture is in danger, and that it must be defended with Zeppelins and with 42-centimetre artillery.

The “neurosis of war” has indeed become epidemic,

like St. Vitus's dance or flagellantism in the Middle Ages. As the Dervishes in the East for hours at a time utter the same formulæ of prayer and go through the same contortions with their arms and legs and their bodies until at last they fall down foaming at the mouth and overpowered, so now we have seen the learned men of Germany repeating for months past the same patriotic litanies, the same unproved assertions (assertions indeed of which the contrary is proved); at all times reaching upwards with their arms and their legs and indeed their whole body, until in their opinion they and their people surpass all other nations of the earth, and if they do not become like to God, they at least become the chosen people of God. They overpower themselves with their own phrases, until they foam at the mouth from sheer patriotism and fall down in adoration of themselves. . . . But they will in time awake from their stupefaction, and the wild intoxication will be followed by the terrible discomfort of returning sobriety.

* * * * *

The purpose of this book is to hasten this awakening. This *I* regard as a patriotic duty; for the longer the intoxication lasts, the worse will be the consequences for the German people, and the process of awakening will be more difficult and more terrible. It is only a better knowledge of the origins and objects of this war, a recognition of the guilt and responsibility for this war, that can bring about a change for the better.

CAN THE VICTORY OF GERMANY AND AUSTRIA BE
EXPECTED?

THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

To-day it is no longer permissible to imagine the possibility of the victory of the Allied Empires. The financial and military superiority of the countries allied against them is so great that they cannot be counter-balanced by military efficiency on the part of Germany, nor even by the greatest sacrifices in life and well-being. No declamatory statements about "holding out till the last breath," no false and dazzling promises about the economic resisting power of Germany can in any way alter this fact. The balance of gold in the imperial bank is no proof that the economical position is still tolerable; for indeed nearly all the gold in circulation has flowed to the bank, and the notes for the hundred and fifty million pound sterling issued by the loan fund have been covered not by gold but by unrealisable goods and effects. Manufactures find employment only in so far as they are engaged for the internal needs of the country and for military purposes. The money required for the supply of military stores is, however, raised from the German taxpayer, and as it represents an unproductive investment it must be entered in the books as a pure loss. *One* class at least has nothing to complain of; I mean the agrarian class. It is they who have sounded the call to the battle, who have stirred up war, the imperialists and the chauvinists, whom the German people have to thank for this hideous war. From their ranks come the colonels and the generals, the Bernhardis and the Frobeniuses, who prescribe to the German Empire its historical mission, "world-power or downfall," and who announce to it its "hour of destiny." These

are the men who possess the ear of the highest in the country, and who instil into them the poison of their selfish ideas. These are the men who at the same time are making the best profit out of the war. They and their comrades must of course also bleed, but what they lose in blood flows back to them in gold, gold in the form of gold-lace and in glittering coins. They are also making a career for themselves, and the more officers fall, so much the better for the younger men. They are, too, succeeding in business more brilliantly than they could ever have done in time of peace. The prices of their produce, grain, potatoes, and cattle, would have risen immeasurably if the Government had not in the end seen the necessity of fixing maximum prices. But even these maximum prices are already enormously above the prices ever paid in times of peace.¹

The workmen and the middle classes however perish and decay. The longer the war lasts, the more surely will German trade, the German system of finance and German manufactures, be deprived of their connections with foreign countries. The seas of the world are open to our enemies, England and France, as well as to neutral States, and it would be a surprising fact if they did not gradually usurp our place in markets abroad. The exports and imports of Italy and of Holland must necessarily show an upward tendency after Germany is ruled out of account. The longer the war lasts, the more successful will be the efforts of England to drive our trade out of America, Asia, and Africa, and in any case decades will pass before we again reach the position we occupied before the war. And while the economic life of Germany is thus advancing to a stage at which it will slowly bleed to death, this process can only

¹ Bread has meanwhile become constantly scarcer, and the monopoly of grain and the distribution of bread by the State has already been introduced.

be accelerated by the necessity of producing the enormous stores of materials required for the maintenance of our armies of millions, and for the conduct of the war. It has been estimated by an expert that the cost of maintenance per man per day may be reckoned at 10 marks, and this estimate takes no account of the wear and tear of materials, the ammunition used up (a single shot from our 42-centimetre guns is said to cost thousands of marks), or the loss of all kinds of instruments of war. If we maintain five million soldiers under arms, the war will cost us in ready money paid out of our pockets two and a half million pounds sterling a day; it will cost monthly 75 million pounds, it will cost in a year 900 million pounds sterling. If we include in our estimate the sums indicated above, for ordinary wear and tear, for material used up or lost, it will be impossible to estimate the yearly cost of the war at anything less than 1,250 million pounds sterling, that is to say 250 millions more than the sum-total of the debts of the German Empire and of the individual States in 1912.

Further, the justice of this calculation is more or less confirmed by the war-loans which so far have been asked and approved in the German Empire, amounting to 500 million pounds, to which the war contribution of 1913 amounting to 50 millions must be added. These war loans were intended to reach until somewhere about the end of the financial year, that is to say until about 31st March, 1915, but doubtless they are not intended, and are not sufficient to provide for a complete current renewal of the material of the war which has been lost or used up. If we add the sums necessary for this purpose we will arrive more or less at the sum estimated above, as that required for the conduct of the war for a year, that is to say 1,250 million pounds sterling.

The countless millions of pounds which the war is costing and has already cost our economic life, surpasses

all estimation. The Exchanges are closed. No one knows to-day what he possesses. In any case nearly all effects are as good as unrealisable; and without the cunningly devised system of loan-funds, a system in essence supported on feet of clay, without the protective laws of the 4th August and all the other conceivable measures which were passed, intended partly to stave off the malady and partly to conceal it, the collapse of our German economic life would within a short time become an accomplished fact.

At the same time England is abused in every key because she avails herself of the advantages conferred on her by her geographical and economical position. Had we been in England's place would we have behaved otherwise? "A la guerre comme à la guerre." Everyone defends himself to the best of his ability, and if the English, apart from their land forces and their navy, can make use of their economic superiority to defeat us, who has any right to reproach them with the fact? Are we not speculating on the possibility of Mohammedan risings in English colonies, behind which we stand as *spiritus rector*? Are we not levying from the wretched and desolate Belgium, the prey of penury and soon to be the prey of famine,—a country which after all is only defending its independence and freedom (a war of liberation in the true sense!)—are we not levying from this exhausted country and from its wholly or partly devastated cities many hundreds of millions of marks as a so-called "war contribution"? From my own points of view the economic war which England is waging against us is far preferable to the warfare of blood which we have brought upon the world. The war of blood involves the loss both of human life and of economic values; the war of trade demands only economic sacrifices, but spares that which in the end has the greater value, the life of men. In this it to a certain

extent approaches the conditions of peace which exist between countries whose relations are not regulated by treaties of commerce; in this case also we find economic struggle without loss of life. Here there is indeed opened to our vision a prospect of the form which struggles will assume in the future configuration of human society. It will no longer be a struggle with weapons forged of steel and of iron, but a struggle of the nerves and of the brain, a more refined struggle between civilised men, who will become more and more removed from the brutal bodily struggle of wild beasts and of barbaric nations, among whom Europe to-day assumes the first place.

It is of course a feeble consolation that the other belligerent countries are also exhausting themselves. A country so economically undeveloped as Russia, whose exports and imports, in spite of her 180 million inhabitants, amounted in 1912 only to 300 million pounds sterling, need scarcely be considered in such a comparison. The more developed the economic life of a country is, the more extensive its trade and its industries, the more sensible is it to the effects of war. So far as England and France are concerned, these countries are in the first place much more wealthy than Germany, and in the second place, as we have already observed, after the disappearance of the few German commerce raiders all the seas of the world are open to them, so that they can export their produce and bring back again from foreign countries the necessary raw material, the means of subsistence and any other articles that may be required. It is at once foolish and pernicious when the German Press and the public opinion of Germany seek to deceive themselves and others on this point.

The credit of the countries at war with us, so far as France and England are concerned, has so far scarcely

suffered in any way. In foreign countries French and English notes have maintained their rate of exchange almost unaltered, whereas German notes are constantly sinking in value. A 100-mark note can already be purchased abroad for 112 francs (instead of nominally 125 fr.), whereas English £1 notes cost at the same time 26 francs (instead of nominally 25 fr.).

The German 5 per cent. war-loan was issued at 97 per cent. whereas the English $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. war-loan was issued at 95 per cent. If the wealth and credit of the German Empire were equal to that of England, the German 5 per cent. imperial loan would have been about 40 per cent. more valuable than the English $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and instead of being issued at $97\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. it could have been issued somewhere about 135 per cent.

In this enormous difference there is clearly revealed the comparative economic strength and the power of resistance possessed by the two countries. No patriotic talk, no stifling of the truth, will help us here. Hard facts are the best arguments. The more we ignore the facts, the worse will it be for us. We do not succeed in throwing sand into the eyes of others, but in lying to ourselves, we lull ourselves in hopes impossible of fulfilment, we become ever more stiff-necked in the pursuit of the unholy struggle, and in the end we will accomplish our own destruction.

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION OF THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

The political and military aspect of affairs is precisely similar to the economic aspect.

The whole of our Colonies, built up by the expenditure of many hundreds of millions of marks, and tended with something of a mother's love, have been lost. Austria has lost Galicia and part of Bukovina, and Hun-

gary is in danger of being overrun by the Russians. On the other side, Belgium and the eastern corner of France are occupied by the Germans and a small part of eastern Poland is occupied by the allied German and Austrian forces. But we must not forget that French troops are still in Upper Alsace and that until a few days ago Russian troops were still in East Prussia.¹

Thus we see that both sides have in their possession a number of objects of barter which at the end of the war should be mutually returned as is done in the case of prisoners. The longer the war lasts and the more extensive it becomes, the more other countries unite themselves to the belligerent parties, the more will the number of these objects of barter increase. While the Turks are pressing forward towards the Suez Canal, the English are making progress in Persia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia; here also it may be presumed that territory will be seized on both sides, which on the conclusion of peace will have to be exchanged.

The world-war, notwithstanding the fearful daily impacts and loss of blood, is, as it were, being conducted in such a way that the opponents pass each other by, and it would be the best, because the most humane solution, if the impacts were to become constantly less, and, on the other hand, the possession of territory belonging to the other side were to become constantly more extensive. The result would be the same as now, only with less loss of blood. For from the military, just as little as from the economic, point of view no one can still entertain the illusion that the war may end with a victory of the allied empires.

To-day the possibility of such an issue must already be regarded as completely excluded. The battles in the

¹This book was completed in February, and cannot therefore take account of later events; these, however, cannot affect the final result of the war.

East are essentially no more than a defensive, unsuccessfully conducted so far as Austria is concerned, but hitherto maintained with success by Germany after the first blows fell. What does the occupation of Lodz, and even, so far as I am concerned, the conquest of Warsaw mean against such a colossus as the Russian Empire? Will Russia be defeated when we get possession of the half or the whole of Poland? It will be nothing but a new object of barter given into our hands, but will it mean the conquest of Russia? Not in the slightest.

And what about the situation in France? What difficulties have we to overcome to gain possession of even the small north-western corner of Belgium! What unspeakable sacrifices does that involve! How many thousands of poor, deluded, heroic soldiers have miserably perished in snow and in ice, in the trenches and in the canals, in mud and in mire, on their lips a last whisper of farewell to wife and child and mother, in their hearts a last thought of peace and home! And why? To gain possession of a few square metres of inundated and impoverished country with ruined towns and villages, and then on to the pursuit of the great illusion: on to Calais! on to England! All this reminds me of a picture by Spangenberg entitled "The Pursuit of Happiness," which thirty years ago was rightly the subject of much admiration in the Berlin Art Exhibition. A beautiful naked woman was represented hovering over a shining iridescent ball of glass before a troop of wild horsemen who, with gestures of passion, are seeking to reach the crown of laurels which she holds aloft in her right hand. She entices them on with her ensnaring eyes; her golden yellow hair flutters in the wind, almost reaching the horsemen who are nearest to her. But the crown, the object of their passionate desires, ever eludes their longing grasp. An abyss yawns in front, crossed

only by a narrow bridge, just broad enough to ensure a passage for the Ball of happiness and the goddess who hovers above it, but which means inevitable death for the warriors in pursuit. The first is already tottering into the chasm, the others will follow, and the vision of happiness dissolves, never to be seen again.

So will it be, I fear, with the invasion of England, which since the beginning of the war has been held out to the German people as a seductive magic picture. Near as the other side may appear, we will not succeed in getting over, "the water is much too deep." Hundreds of thousands of men might perish in the effort, were the venture risked, and even if we were over there, a war of the people would be let loose, and our troops, deprived of their connections with the home country, would be crushed by the enemy. What every German for months back has been whispering to his neighbour in desire and in hope appears to me to be nothing but a daring flight of the imagination, which will break miserably on England's unbroken sea power.

Notwithstanding all the admiration we may feel for the achievements of our heroic navy, it would be foolish to close our eyes to the fact that the gigantic superiority of the English fleet cannot be equalised by means of Zeppelins and submarines—of which latter, be it observed, England possesses a greater number than we do (in 1912, 85, to which must be added 90 French). And in all this we have to bear in mind the fact that the English fleet would be the assailant; the German fleet would be the fleet assailed, in so far as it managed to press forward to the Channel. The German fleet would, however, have to protect not only itself, but also clumsy cargo-boats, incapable of self-defence, on which there would have to be transported to England a number of army corps, with the appropriate light and heavy artillery, cavalry, trains, pioneer troops, automo-

biles, and air-craft material. Is such an attempt at all conceivable? Is it possible that there are human beings who are prepared to expose to destruction at a blow, on such a scale as this, hundreds of thousands of their fellow men,

It should be enough for us to have those mountains of corpses and of mutilated bodies which to-day already cover the battle-fields of Europe, Asia and Africa, and which for centuries, in virtue of their fertilising properties, will be an advantage to agriculture. Must even the bottom of the sea also be covered with human bodies? Are the thousands of brave mariners, who have already found death in a watery grave, not sufficient? Must whole army-corps at one stroke be swallowed up in the waves?

And even assuming that we were on the other side, would the war then in any sense be won, would England thereby be defeated? Will the English nation allow terms of peace to be dictated to them by the Germans in London, as one can daily hear from every babbler and every seer of visions in Germany? Will the English colonies then fall into our possession? Nothing of the sort will happen. I should like to see how Canada, India, Australia, and New Zealand would acclaim the German conqueror, who, as the Chancellor has so beautifully expressed it to an American journalist, is destined to bring freedom to the world. Charity begins at home. He who imposes bondage in his own house cannot bring freedom to the world. What country

politically is so undeveloped and so gagged as Prussian Germany, if we except Russia and our illustrious ally Austria-Hungary? What country has as little understanding as Germany of the art of assimilating to itself foreign nationalities, of allowing them to live according to their own habits and customs, according to their own culture and language, of making them happy and therefore making them faithful? Our policy towards the Poles and the Danes, and towards Alsace-Lorraine, speaks volumes on this point. All opposition to this species of Germanisation has exhausted itself without fruitful result. Zabern is the illuminating zenith of this policy in the West. The Polish laws with their compulsory expropriation of land possessed by inheritance, laws which have uselessly cost us hundreds of millions of marks, and which have only produced the opposite effect of that intended, will remain a perpetual memorial of this policy in the East. In the North against Denmark things are no better. At present, of course, in the necessity of war, this vexatious policy is being mitigated. The Poles have now suddenly become the good child of the family. If formerly they protested that they had no sympathy with efforts hostile to Prussia, and that they were only urged to join the opposition in defence of their speech and of their nationality, their protests were constantly answered by new coercionary measures, and by an extension of the Polish laws. Since there cannot be a Parliamentary opposition in the miserable Junker-Parliament of Prussia, all warnings of the left wing were constantly scattered to the wind, and a courageous advance was made along the false and the costly path of Germanisation.

And is it supposed that this Germany, conducted on Prussian principles, is endowed with the gifts necessary to assume England's position as a world-power, the position of England which owes its world-power not

merely to the cold pursuit of her interests in the course of the centuries, but above all to her genius in understanding how to link foreign nations to her world empire, without oppressing them, without even wishing to assimilate them?

The English language does not know the word "Anglicisation," because the idea is absent in English politics, as indeed language, at least in politics, ever halts behind the "*thing*," and only gives expression to what already is. Here the saying of Goethe does not hold:

For where the understanding falters
A word steps in to take its place.¹

In politics the reverse is the case. The word is discovered, when the idea exists. The word culture-struggle (Kulturkampf) arose only when this struggle had already broken out.

And so the English colonies will fly to us and hail us as liberators, should we ever succeed in penetrating to England? Far from it. They also will defend themselves to the last ship and the last man, before they give up English freedom and independence, and surrender to German bondage and oppression.

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

So far as can be foreseen, the war in France also will lead to no result which could be regarded as a victory for Germany. A war of offence which ends in the trenches has in advance failed in its purpose—in trenches whose amenities have been enjoyed by our brave troops for more than five months, in wind and weather, in rain and in snow, in a monotony destructive of the body and

¹ Denn eben wo Begriffe fehlen,
Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein.

of the soul, a monotony however agreeably interrupted from time to time by bombs, shells, and airmen's darts. On the eastern frontier of France the line of fortifications Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and Belfort still stands almost unshaken, so little affected by the besieging German armies that the French ministers and the President can undertake continuous tours of inspection from one fortress to the other. Fortunately for a long time nothing has been heard of the victor of Longwy, the "heroic son," as the Emperor Francis Joseph called him in his telegram to the Emperor William. The famous saying of Count Häseler, passed from mouth to mouth in Berlin, that he intended to breakfast on Sedan day in the Café de la Paix in the Place de l'Opera has not proved true. Perhaps the Field Marshal has postponed his breakfast until *next* Sedan day, unless indeed, as I fear, he has had to postpone it *ad calendas teutonicas*. The French Government and the entire diplomatic circle are back again in Paris, and it does not look as if they had any intention of making a speedy return to Bordeaux. As every honest observer of the situation must admit, the war with France has come to a standstill, and here, if anywhere, a standstill amounts to a withdrawal.

The plans of our General Staff, weighed and matured for years in advance, contained as the cardinal point of the long-intended European war the rapid overthrow of France, followed by a violent attack on the Russian Colossus, with our liberated forces united with those of Austria. Providence—almost involuntarily one falls into the jargon of the German despatch—providence has ruled otherwise. After seven months of fearful conflict France is *not* overthrown. Our victorious career has been unexpectedly checked by the brilliant strategy of Joffre, the French Moltke—(the uncle, be it observed, not the nephew, who at present is being medically

treated at Homburg for biliousness)—and our conquering army has been forced to a fortification war in the trenches. The fluctuations of this fortification war, which for the most part oscillate over advances or withdrawals of kilometres or half-kilometres, are so insignificant that a decisive turn of events is scarcely to be expected, unless our leaders resolve to throw aside every consideration for human life, unless they call our brave German soldiers from the trenches and expose them in frontal attacks to the devastating fire of the hostile rifles, machine-guns, and artillery. In a few places this has already happened,¹ and to judge from the views and sentiments of those in our leading circles (has not the telegram of the German Crown Prince to Colonel Reuter, so full of wit and taste, “hammer away,” become the catchword and the watchword of the nation of poets and thinkers?) the generals will soon lose all patience

And if these further incalculable hecatombs in human blood and human happiness are sacrificed, shall we *then* have gained the victory? In no way. Even if we should succeed with all these sacrifices in making a consider-

¹ Just before this book went to press I read the official report of the General Staff of January 15th, 1915, in which it is pointed out with pride that in the battles around Soissons from 4,000 to 5,000 French bodies had been found on the field of battle. And how many German bodies were there? And how many wounded on both sides? The Germans as the attacking party will certainly have suffered as severely as the defenders. So altogether there would be 10,000 dead. To this, as experience has shown, there must be added at least three times as many wounded. There would thus be 40,000 soldiers sacrificed in one battle!

able advance, we shall only have gained what in the war of 1870 we had achieved in four weeks. Without doubt the French have made use of the five months' standstill to increase still more the strength of their fortifications and their possible lines of retreat. Constant reinforcements of English and French Colonial troops, of which the end cannot be foreseen, fill up the gaps and increase the number of the troops in the field. With every week which passes in the indecisive trench warfare, the difficulties of our victorious advance are increased. Even in the Boer war the English showed how many troops they could raise in the event of war, in spite of their small standing army. Then they carried out the long-distance transport of troops to South Africa; to-day they have only to cross the narrow Channel. Our opponents continue to increase, and to-day we have with luck already got as far as the second levy of the Landsturm.

PARTIE REMISE

How is it to end? In the most favourable circumstances as *partie remise*,—with a conclusion of hostilities which for both sides will mean a complete exhaustion in men and in wealth, but which will mean for neither side a victory.

According to my sure and earnest conviction that is the most favourable result which Germany can still expect. The possibility of an issue which could more or less be designated as a victory, I regard as wholly excluded. And the longer the war lasts the less chance will there be of this relatively favourable issue, the greater will be the probability of a development, which if not a decisive defeat of Germany, would yet represent an overwhelming exhaustion of her resources in comparison with those of her opponents, and which would therefore inevitably lead to the conditions of peace being

framed on less favourable lines than would now be granted.

Austria has already reached the limits of her strength. In the case of Germany it is not yet possible to speak of any decisive weakening. We still stand erect; we can still offer everywhere a bold forehead to the enemy. Our resources in men and in money are not yet exhausted. *But this condition of "not yet" cannot now endure for long.* It is foolish to pursue an ostrich policy. No matter how dexterously, following the watchword that has been issued, we hide our head in the sand, the enemy still sees the weaknesses which shake the body of our people, they still see the seeds of that malady which must lead to our destruction.

We can still ask for an honourable peace. If we from our side freely ask it we will atone for a small part of the wrong which we have committed by conjuring up this world catastrophe, the wrong which has drawn upon us the hatred and the loathing of the whole civilised world, not of our enemies merely, but also of neutral nations.

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

That we have forfeited the sympathies of the world is not due to malevolence, envy, and lies; our own actions must bear the responsibility for this. Foreign countries, and above all those which are neutral, know better than the German nation the development of events, they know who bears the guilt of the world catastrophe. Foreign neutral countries know well enough our political conditions. They know that under a mask of constitutionalism we are in fact ruled absolutely. Recently they observed how an Imperial Chancellor of Germany, against whom Parliament by a three-fifths majority passed a vote expressive of its lack of confidence, could

yet continue to hold office unshaken, secure in the support of the Court and the military circles,—an occurrence which, apart from Russia, is no longer possible in any other civilised country. They know that the Prussian people are politically without rights, and that they are governed by a small clique of Junkers who have taken in fee all the high offices in the Government and in the army.

Above all neutral countries know—and now I come to the cardinal points in what I have to say—

that the plans and the preparations for this war have long been made by Germany and Austria not only from a military but also from a political point of view;

that for long it had been resolved to represent this offensive war to the German people as a war of liberation, because it was known that only thus could the necessary popular enthusiasm be awakened;

that the object of this war is an attempt to establish a hegemony on the continent and, as a later sequel, the acquisition of England's position of power in the world according to the principle "ôte-toi de là que je m'y mette."

For these facts and endeavours there is in existence evidence of so convincing a character written by ourselves in the German language, that it is a task as infatuated as it is hopeless to try to combat the conviction of the whole world by the untenable publications of those who take it upon themselves to "enlighten" the world about Germany.

II

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME

OUR IMPERIALISTS: BERNHARDI AND CO.

THE writings of Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, of Frobenius, *The German Empire's Hour of Destiny*, the books of Treitschke, *German History and Politics*, are as well known abroad as in Germany, and they have in part been translated into foreign languages. The imperialistic tendencies of a political clique have never been more distinctly expressed than in these writings, and, in the view of their originators, justified.

A few quotations from Bernhardi may suffice. This man is a Prussian Cavalry General, and, if I am not mistaken, has been entrusted with a command in the East, and he has already been decorated with the Iron Cross of the First Class. That he is competent and authorised to give expression to the views of authoritative German circles can scarcely be disputed.

On page 255 of his book we find ¹:

"The Government will never be able to count upon a well-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or necessity, if it calmly looks on while the war-like spirit is being systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the same note, and continually to emphasise the maintenance of peace as the object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an imperial policy.

¹[References are to the English translation (popular edition). Edward Arnold, London.]

"It must continually point to the significance and the *necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and civilisation* together with the duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country."

Page 257:

"The soul of our nation is not reflected in that part of the Press with its *continual dwelling on the necessity of upholding peace*, and its denunciation of any bold and comprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness.

"On the contrary, an intense longing for a *foremost place among the Powers and for manly action* fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again and again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with him."

Page 258:

"Such a policy (*i.e., a military policy*) is also the best school in which to educate a nation to great military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards high aims they feel themselves *compelled to contemplate war bravely*, and to prepare their minds to it:

"'The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims.' " . . .

. . . "We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilisation to perform than the Greek Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can *only fulfil it by the sword*."

"Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military duty?"

On page 275:

"A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without taking chances and facing risks. It must be conscious

of its goal, and keep this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above all things, it must be ready to seize the psychological moment, and take bold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibility of realising political ambitions or of *waging a necessary war under favourable conditions.*"

Pages 275-6:

"'Old Fritz' must be our model in this respect (*i.e., in disregarding historical rights*), and must teach us with remorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the political world may be favourable for us, and that we *do not miss the golden opportunity.*

"It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatise that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist policy."

On page 277 the author points out that the military and political preparation for war must go hand in hand in order to make it possible to *strike at the moment which from the military point of view is the most unfavourable.*

"The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister and the Head of the General Staff must be kept *au courant* with the all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, and are *entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military situation is peculiarly favourable.*"

Page 280:

"The disadvantages of such a situation (*i.e., the war on two fronts*) can only be avoided by a policy which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to *overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere.*

On this initiative our safety now depends just as it did in the days of Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face."

On the same page our diplomacy is entrusted with the task of so "shuffling the cards that we may be attacked by France." The author then continues:

"This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. *Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests.* So long as we shrink from attack they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows, and as the issue of the Balkan crisis will probably also demonstrate.

"If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, *we must initiate an active policy*, which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England, that both these States would feel themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and in Europe."

That is plain enough, is it not? Not only the tendencies of German policy are revealed without any disguise, but the manner in which these tendencies are to be realised is prescribed with the minutest detail. The Chancellor, it must be admitted, has been an apt pupil of the General and has fulfilled in a masterly fashion his task of so shuffling the cards that out of the offensive war there has been created a war of liberation. At least that is how it appears in the eyes of the simple Michael,¹ for the rest of the world has long ago seen through the gigantic fraud.

But let us hear further how Mr. Bernhardi chatters out of school.

¹[Michael, a name commonly given to the German people, somewhat analogous to John Bull. The chief features of the German Michael are simplicity and honesty, amounting almost to stupidity.]

Page 286:

"The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the *deep rift* which has been formed in consequence between the *Government and the mass of the nationalist party*, the loss of confidence among large sections of the nations, extending even to classes of society which, in spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this *weakening of public confidence*, which is undisguisedly shown both in the Press and in the Reichstag, lies in my opinion the great disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding."

Bernhardi would naturally have preferred that we should even have allowed a European war to break out on account of the Morocco dispute, but he consoles himself with the thought that all chances are not yet past.

Page 285:

"We need not, therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable to revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, the *advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France.*"

That is the Record: an International treaty which has prevented a world-war, meets with the conditional approval of the author, only because it offers new sources of friction, and so, *it may be hoped*, will soon lead to the world-war which he desires.

Particularly instructive is his discussion of our relations to England and of the negotiations then being conducted in Berlin by Lord Haldane. These negotiations along with the previous and subsequent English proposals with a view to arriving at a political and naval understanding with Germany deserve a special chapter, in which it will be clearly shown that England

constantly and in the most earnest manner took the initiative in these negotiations, but that these were always wrecked on the refusal of Germany or on the impossible conditions which she sought to impose. Perhaps on this point also they were following the prescription of Bernhardi, which runs:

Page 287:

"Even *English attempts at a rapprochement* must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay *the necessary inevitable war*, until we may fairly imagine we have some *prospect of success*."

In the concluding apostrophe of his book the author emphatically exclaims:

Pages 287-8:

"If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite, before we once more face the question *whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any case wait. . . . The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever.* England, too, is in a most difficult position. . . . The disturbances in the Far East will probably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer in sympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sighted German policy can utilise in order to influence the general political situation in the interests of our Fatherland.

"If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard *the honour of Germany* and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the future of our country and our State . . . we need not fear to fight *for our position in the world*, but we may, with Ernst Moritz Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God:

'From the height of the starry sky
 May thy ringing sword flash bright;
 Let every craven cry
 Be silenced by thy might!'

In conclusion I should further like merely to draw attention to the headings of the chapters of Bernhardi's book, which afford so clear an insight into the tendencies of the author, that it might appear almost superfluous to read his work.

Chapter 1. The right to make war.

Chapter 2. The duty to make war.

Chapter 3. A brief survey of Germany's historical development.

Chapter 4. Germany's historical mission.

Chapter 5. World power or downfall.

Chapter 6. The character of our next war.

Chapter 7. The next naval war, &c.

I wish once more in as emphatic a manner as possible to draw attention to the fact that Bernhardi expressly excludes an offensive war on the part of the Triple Entente, and he indicates that the only method of arriving at the desired world-war, and at the same time at world-dominion, is that *Germany must act as an agent provocateur and must so shuffle the cards that the other side will be compelled to attack.*

This of course does not prevent Bernhardi and his comrades in the faith, especially Frobenius, from speaking elsewhere of the aggressive intentions of the Triple Entente, and from depicting the dangers to which Germany is exposed, unless she anticipates these intentions.

HAVE WE BEEN ATTACKED OR WERE WE GOING TO BE
 ATTACKED?

This is the same logic as we hear to-day in every corner of Germany, if indeed what is heard in Germany

can still be designated as logic. The official version states that the Triple Entente *has* attacked us. "We have to protect our holiest possessions, the Fatherland and our own hearths against a sudden ruthless attack." (The appeal of the Emperor on the 6th August to the German army. "The sword must then decide. In the midst of peace the enemy falls upon us, therefore to arms! Every hesitation, every delay, would be treachery to the Fatherland. The existence of our empire is at stake—the existence of German power and German character.")

Such is the official version which crops up in a thousand various forms from the Chancellor down to the last street-sweeper.

Semi-officially however and in the confidence of secrecy many Germans can be heard asserting that we *were* not, it is true, attacked, but that we *would have been* attacked later, if we had not now begun the war at a moment favourable for us. Should we then ask for evidence in support of this hypothesis, most of those who maintain this view have nothing to say, or else they declare that the intention of the enemy to attack us was so obvious that any proof would be superfluous. "What did they mean by their enormous preparations?" is what they most frequently say. And what about our preparations? I reply, which were certainly greater and more comprehensive than in any other country in the world. Did ever any country in time of peace act as we did in 1913 when we suddenly raised the strength of our army on a peace footing by 140,000 men, that is to say, from 720,000 to 860,000, and when we rose to an extraordinary war tax of £50,000,000? "What was the meaning of the Entente, the celebrated policy of 'encirclement' (*Einkreisung*), if they did not mean to attack us?" is what they next say. And what, I reply, was the meaning of the Triple

Alliance which involved even stricter obligations than the Entente, and in spite of this, according to our assertions, was defensive in its nature? "Yes, but think of the Pan-Slavs!" is urged as an objection against me. And what about the Pan-Germans? I venture to answer. Are our "Alldeutschen," our national party, our Pan-Germans of the school of Treitschke and Bernhardi, in any way better or less aggressive than the Pan-Slavs? Such "Pan-tendencies" are to be found in all countries. They are harmless, so long as they do not advance to action. The decisive act was however taken by our Pan-Germans, when they drove us into this horrible war—a war desired and openly proclaimed by them.

THE HEAD OF THE WAR PARTY

And they had and still have friends and patrons in high places. They have gradually acquired more influence in our authoritative circles than ever the Pan-Slavs exercised at the Russian court. I need not mention by name the person who for years has been the influential head and the battering-ram of this movement against the originally peace-loving mind of the Emperor. Everyone knows to whom I refer. The Zabern telegram, the message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars, the open demonstration from the tribune of the Reichstag against our Morocco policy, which was at the time still peaceful in intention—these and countless other occurrences and suggestions leave not the slightest room for doubt as to the quarter and the camp from which the inciters to war have discharged their destructive missiles over Germany. One has but to wander along the streets of Berlin to see in all bookshops the work of Frobenius entitled *The German Empire's Hour of Destiny*, with the commendatory telegram of the exalted gentleman on the outside. In his recommendation he expresses the

desire that this "distinguished book" which he has "read with the greatest interest" will find the widest circulation among the German people. And this Frobenius is a comrade in thought of Bernhardi, and the whole purport of his book is that we should strike before it is too late; since the others mean to attack *us*, we must anticipate them and attack *them*. Of course no proof, not the shadow of a proof, is advanced in support of this premise, which in reality is but a pretext, and which is denied by Bernhardi himself in the passage quoted above (page 280).

But that does not inconvenience these great minds; they do not recognise the defects of their logic. They do not see that of the two assertions only one can be true. Either we *have been* attacked, in which case we are conducting a defensive war, or else we were *going to be* attacked, and in that case we are conducting a preventive war. If the second statement is true the first must be untrue; and in that case all official utterances from the Imperial speech from the Palace on the 31st July down to the speech of the Chancellor on the 2nd December are branded as lies.

If the assertion that it is a defensive war is true, the idea of a preventive war is at once put completely aside, and it is superfluous to discuss further whether the presuppositions of a preventive war in fact existed, or whether such a preventive war politically and morally can be defended. Bismarck, who after all knew something about politics, emphatically answered this latter question in the negative, in stating that "even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development according to one's own calculation."¹

¹ Bismarck *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* [Vol. II. p. 102 of the English translation. Smith, Elder and Co.]

This dictum of the great man of the past appears to have fallen into oblivion. While monument after monument has been erected to his memory, this sentence might have been inscribed in brass and in marble in the walls of the palaces of kings and of governments in places where it would at all times have been visible; then perhaps the German people and the world might have been spared this most terrible of evils. Bismarck also after 1870 was repeatedly urged by Generals and by the instigators of war to undertake a new campaign against France in order to crush once for all and to make harmless for all time the country that was again raising its head. All such efforts he constantly rejected with unyielding energy, and the idea of initiating a war because it must come sooner or later, he declared to be "criminal" and "insane."

The saying is apposite, and those whom it fits will not be able to escape its application.

THE IMPERIAL WAR

THE PLACE IN THE SUN

It will be obvious from all that I have so far said that I regard the present war neither as a defensive nor as a preventive war. *This war is purely a war of conquest, born of imperialist ideas and serving imperialist ends.* It is nothing else.

It is a war for the celebrated "*Place in the sun*," which it is supposed is being refused us, and which we must take forcibly with the sword in our hand.

What is the meaning of the "Place in the sun"? No one says clearly what it is, and everyone understands the phrase in a different sense.

The idea is so alien to the people that it may be presumed that they would not have allowed themselves to

have been sacrificed, if it had been said to them: "You must gain for us a place in the sun."

For the initiated however it is the magic spell which unites their imperialistic desires. "Only thus relying on the sword, can we gain the place in the sun, which is our due, but which is not voluntarily accorded to us" (Crown Prince Wilhelm). With this inscription, and with the motto "pro patria et gloria," the photograph of the German Crown Prince is sold in German bookshops.

THE CHOSEN PEOPLE

The place in the sun is the world-power which is due to us, as to the *chosen people of God*. From the point of view of the psychology of the nation it is remarkable how the old Jewish idea has mastered the good, Christian, Protestant, anti-semitic Empire, and how it has ousted the true teaching of Christ, that all men are brothers.

We change our religious ideas, like our uniforms, according to our needs and our circumstances.

The God, whom in war we invoke every day, whom we entreat to grant that we may destroy as many of the enemy as possible, and to whom we give thanks when he fulfils our prayers is the old Jewish God, Jehovah, the God of battles and of vengeance, to whom no sacrifice appears too great, if it is to serve the power and the dominion of his chosen people. The Christian God, however, and his "only-begotten Son," who wandered about on earth preaching love and sacrifice, whose kingdom is not of this world—they have nothing to do with this shedding of blood, which is entirely contradictory to the doctrine they taught.

The observations of Kant in his essay on *Everlasting Peace* are entirely in the spirit of the Christian religion.

"On the conclusion of peace at the end of the war it might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which to invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human race are guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit (in their relations with other States) to a law-governed constitution, preferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the barbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle what is wanted, namely, the right of each State in a quarrel. The feasts of thanksgiving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns which are sung—to use the Jewish expression—'to the Lord of Hosts,' are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of a father of mankind; for, apart from the indifference these customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish their rights—sad enough as it is—these rejoicings bring in an element of exultation that a great number of lives, or at least the happiness of many, has been destroyed."¹

That is true Christianity, and at the same time it is the true crown of German culture. Those same people, however, who profess that they are drawing the sword on behalf of this culture trample its finest products in the dust, and rattle over it with their cannons.

If it were known in certain places in Germany how educated men and religious people throughout the whole world judge these continual blasphemous appeals to God,

¹ [*Perpetual Peace*. English translation by Miss Campbell Smith (George Allen and Unwin), p. 136-7. Later references to Kant's essay are also adapted to this edition.]

Luigi Luzzatti, one of the most distinguished politicians and most important thinkers in Italy, who, as is well known, has more than once been Prime Minister (he it observed a strict Jew—this I mention as an example to Germany whose mission is to “bring freedom,” although in time of peace it does not go so far as to promote a Jew to be a Second Lieutenant), Luigi Luzzatti has recently published in the *Corriere della Sera* a remarkable article bearing the title “The abuse of the name of God,” from which I quote some sentences:

“From the day on which this fearful war broke out Princes (not the people, it must be said) have bored everyone by the use and abuse of the name of God. In the telegrams which were recently exchanged between the Austrian Emperor and the Sultan the Almighty makes his appearance. The matter would take on an ironical tinge if up in Heaven the conquerors and the defeated of Lepanto and the soul of John Sobieski were to hear of it. One could have wished that at least on this occasion they might have felt enough shame to induce them to leave heaven in peace out of the question! . . . Fortunately God has not yet appeared

in the telegrams exchanged between the monarchs of England and Japan. And indeed it would have been a difficult matter to reconcile in the same fearful uproar of war Jesus and Buddha, a religion without God and a religion which rests on a personal God and Saviour. We are reminded of a bitterly ironical saying of Voltaire, who observed 'Since God created man in his own image, how often has man endeavoured to render a similar service to God.' . . . Let us save God from such profanation! Let us leave in peace the Father of all mankind who punishes guilt and rewards virtue, and who gives no one the right to represent Him on earth, and to claim for himself His omnipotence in this tragedy of war."

Such is the judgment of serious men abroad on certain German peculiarities and on the presumption of Germany to be the chosen people of God.

The place in the sun which is due to us as the chosen people, thus represents the true object of this war, even if it is not admitted to the nation that this is the object.

GERMANY'S BRILLIANT DEVELOPMENT

If anyone seeks a place in the sun, and seeks it sword in hand, it must be assumed that hitherto he has stood in the shadow. Is this so in the case of Germany? I maintain that the opposite is the case, and in support of this assertion I rely on those very people, who have pressed the sword into our hand to enable us to seek a place in the sun. In the chapter entitled "Financial and Political Preparation for War" (p. 260 *et seq.*) Bernhardt gives a comprehensive view of the brilliant and unprecedented economic development of Germany since the Franco-Prussian war. He points out, and supports his assertion freely with statistics, that the increase of wealth continues on an ascending scale, and that the advance in trade and industry since the founda-

tion of the Empire has been extraordinary. He quotes a lecture delivered by Professor Dade before a general meeting of the Finance and Tax-Reformers held on the 22nd February, 1910, from which we gather that the value of German imports and exports in the last years before 1910 had increased from 300 million pounds sterling to between 725 million pounds and 800 million pounds. In 1912 German imports and exports reached a value of approximately 1,200 million pounds sterling. The value of the import of raw material for industrial purposes rose from 75 million pounds in 1879 to 225 million pounds; the import of manufactured goods rose from 30 million pounds in 1879 to 62½ million pounds in 1908, and the export of manufactured goods during the same period rose from 50 million pounds to over 200 million. The amount of coal raised in 1879 was only 42 million tons; in 1908 it was 148½ million tons, and the value of the coal raised increased from 5 million pounds to 75 millions. The production of iron ore rose from 6 million to 27 million tons, and in value it rose from £1,350,000 to £5,950,000. From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany increased by 127 per cent., as against only 59 per cent. in England. The production of pig iron in Germany in the twenty years mentioned above rose 172 per cent., as against only 27 per cent. in England. Similar figures, according to Dade and Bernhardt, can be adduced in all other spheres.

At the same time there took place a continued growth in revenue and a progressive capitalisation. From 1892 to 1905 an increase in national wealth of about 100 million pounds sterling has taken place annually in Prussia alone. In the grades of the Property Tax ranging from £300 to £5,000 the number of those taxed and the number of properties on which taxes are paid has increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., whereas

from 1905 to 1908 the increase was 11 per cent., that is to say, in the first period the yearly increase was 2 per cent., but in recent years 3 per cent.

An even greater increase has taken place in the case of the large fortunes. In the grades of the property tax ranging from £5,000 to £25,000 the increase in the numbers paying, and the properties on which payment is made has been about 44 per cent., that is, on an average of the fourteen years, 3 per cent. annually; in the last three years however it has been 4·6 per cent. The higher the grades of the tax, the greater is the increase; in the grades from £300 to £5,000 the increase per head of the population has been £32 10s.; in the grades from £5,000 to £25,000 there was an increase per head of £320, and in the grades above £25,000 there was an increase of £3,522½ per hear per year.

Emphasis is further laid on the increase of wages, on the decrease of unemployment and of emigration as signs of our economic prosperity, and statistics are adduced in support of these contentions. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants left our country, whereas in the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain. The investment of capital in State railways amounted at the end of March, 1908, in Prussia to £494,400,000 and at the end of 1911 to £552,500,000.

This brilliant picture of our industrial development, which could be supported by a series of other figures, is naturally of use to General Bernhardi, only in so far as it enables him to represent as tolerable a further increase of military burdens. He forgets, however, that in thus demonstrating our continuous increase of national wealth, and in particular in emphasising our increasing advantage over England, he cuts from under his own feet the ground on which there should be erected the edifice of his Imperialism. If we already have

such a sunny corner in the sun, *what is still lacking? What more do we want?*

If in many respects we, the most recent industrial State in the world, the growth of scarcely more than two generations, are already placing England, the oldest industrial State, in the shadow, we certainly cannot complain of any deficiency of sunshine.

What about extension of territory? What about Colonies? Does the happiness of nations depend on the number of square miles which they possess, or does it depend on their Colonies? If that were the case, small countries like Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway would necessarily be poor in comparison with Great States, whereas as a matter of fact the opposite is the case. The highest figures for imports and exports per head of the population are shown by Holland, followed by Belgium, Switzerland, and Denmark, and then only *after* these the great Powers. The Belgian 3 per cents. stood at 96 when the German stood at 83 per cent. The Norwegian 3½ per cents. stood at 102, when the Russian could be had at 81. Similar figures may be adduced in every sphere of economic life. *The greatness of a country, and in particular the extent of its Colonial possessions, has no relation to the prosperity of a country.*

The best proof for this fact is found in Germany itself. No one, not even the most fanatical nationalist, will or can dispute the fact that the increase in prosperity of Germany in the last forty years, and in particular in the twenty-six years which have elapsed since the present Emperor ascended the throne, has been without precedent in the history of the world. On the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the accession of William II. a compilation appeared under the title, *Social Culture and the Well-being of the People during the first 25 Years of the*

Reign of William II. This work describes, and supports with statistics, the prosperity of Germany in all branches of human culture during this period. It is superfluous to reproduce here these well-known figures. Only a few need here be cited. The population has increased from forty-eight millions in 1888 to sixty-seven millions in 1914. The yearly increase due to births amounted in 1911 to 11·3 per thousand inhabitants, and was only exceeded by Russia with 17 per thousand. The production of pig-iron (estimated in thousands of tons) rose from 4,024 in 1887 to 17,853 in 1912, that is to say, by 343·6 per cent., whilst the production of Great Britain in the same time only increased by 17·6 per cent., namely, from 7,681 to 9,031. The production of America in pig-iron increased in the same time by 363·2 per cent., that is, from 6,520 to 30,203, and thus America still takes the first place in this field of production, while Germany has advanced from the third place in 1887 to the second place in 1912, thereby outstripping England and attaining a percentage of increase twenty times as great.

A development on exactly similar lines is shown in the production of steel, which (also estimated in thousands of tons) has risen from 1163·9 in 1887 to 17,302 in 1912. Here also we have advanced from the third place to the second in the production of the world, and have considerably outstripped England, whose production has only increased from 3,196·8 in 1887 to 6,563·3 in 1911. Estimating the increase by percentages, Germany here takes the first place, and leaves far behind both of her competitors, America and England. The increase in percentage amounted in the twenty-five years mentioned in Germany to no less than 1,377 per cent., in America 835 per cent., and in England only 105 per cent.

The net tonnage of our German mercantile fleet has

increased from 1,240,182 in 1888 to 3,153,724 in 1913, and at the same time it is specially to be noted that the commercial value of the individual vessels has been enormously increased by the transformation from sailing ships into steamships. The net tonnage of steamships alone has almost increased six-fold in the period mentioned; it has risen from 470,364 in 1888 to 2,655,496 in 1913.

The increase of the national income and the national wealth correspond to the commercial and industrial development of Germany. Dr. Karl Helfferich, Director of the German Bank,¹ in his contribution to the compilation mentioned above, summarises his conclusions in the following words:

"The German national income amounts to-day to 2,150 million pounds annually as against from 1,150 to 1,250 million pounds in 1895.

"Of these 2,150 millions about 350 millions, that is to say a bare sixth, are applied annually for public purposes; from 1,350 to 1,450 million pounds are used privately, and about 400 to 425 millions, which may be raised by the automatic increase in value of wealth now in existence to 500 million pounds, grow as an increase of the wealth of the nation as against a sum of from 225 to 250 millions 15 years ago.

"The wealth of the German people amounts to-day to more than 15,000 million pounds, as against about 10,000 million pounds about the middle of the 'nineties of last century.

"These solid figures summarise, expressed in money, the result of the enormous economic labour, which Germany has achieved under the government of our Emperor."

That is the place in the sun which we occupy, which no one has disputed, can dispute, or means to dispute, a place in the sun for which we are indebted to the spirit

¹ Now Secretary of the Treasury.

of enterprise, the pertinacity and the skilful methods of our merchants and our manufacturers, but not to the braggart company of our nationalists, and just as little to the sword of our Generals or the plans of campaign of our General Staff.

It is exclusively the work of the German merchant and his motto "My field is the world," exclusively the result of the long-enduring condition of peace, which, to judge from the experience of the past, the longer it lasted would have more and more promoted the prosperity of the German people.

INCREASE OF POPULATION AND THE COLONIES

The objection is advanced that it is indeed precisely the increase of the German people, the yearly accession to our population of about 800,000 souls, which necessarily demands such an extension of territory. Where, it is asked, are all these new people to find sustenance and a home? The objection is as insecurely founded as all the others. If Germany were too small to support its increasing population, the emigration statistics would show a constant rise. The opposite, however, is the case. The number of emigrants from 1881 to 1890 amounted yearly to 134,200, from 1891 to 1910 to only 52,800 yearly, and in 1912 only 18,500 people emigrated from Germany.

On the other hand, the number of immigrants has increased. Whereas, formerly, immigrants were considerably fewer than emigrants, in the last fifteen years or so they have exceeded the latter so that the stream of emigration is on the point of flowing towards instead of away from Germany.

From these figures it may be deduced that Germany, so far from not being in a position to give employment and nourishment to its increasing population, offers, on

the contrary, increasing opportunities of employment and nourishment, not only for its own population, but also for those persons who stream to it from abroad. At the same time wages show a constant, although by no means a sufficient, rise.

And this fabulous development took place at a time when other countries, and particularly France, were substantially extending their Colonial possessions, while our Colonial possessions remained limited to the few places in Africa, East Asia, and in the Pacific which could still be acquired by a Germany which arrived too late on the scene. *What has the importance of these Colonies been in connection with our economic development* in the last forty years? In this they have played no part, not the slightest. If we add together the sums which our Colonies have cost us directly and indirectly (in the indirect cost we must allow for the increase of the fleet abroad rendered necessary for their protection), and if on the other side we reckon the financial advantages obtained from these Colonies, we shall find as the result that we have made a miserable bargain.

In this respect also Bismarck saw much further than his successors. He resolved on the first steps towards a colonial policy, only when subjected to strong pressure and almost against his will, and he constantly remained aware of the fact that this policy is one that cuts both ways; he realised that it would afford our enemies new points of attack, while furnishing us with no corresponding advantages.

The present occurrences have proved the justice of his foresight. Our Colonies have delivered into our enemies' hands objects of exchange, which are indeed materially of no value to us, but in our imagination, seeing that we have once possessed them, they have for us a certain worth, which our enemies will make us pay dear for on the conclusion of peace.

Materially they have no value for us. Will anyone venture to assert that our economical prosperity (which I have supported with figures quoted above) would have been diminished by one iota if we had never possessed either South West or East Africa, Kiao-chau, or Samoa? The total white population of our Colonies amounted in 1913 to something over 27,000, that is to say, about 3·5 per cent. of the *annual* increase of the population of Germany. Would there have arisen in our country any question of over-population or of a scarcity of food if these 27,000 people had remained in Germany? Would this increase, or rather this non-withdrawal, have exercised the slightest effect on our economic life, on the life of 67 million people?

Further, the entire commercial intercourse of Germany with her Colonies in imports and exports amounts to-day to something over £5,000,000. The total imports and exports of Germany in 1912 amounted in round figures to £1,000,000,000. The trade with the Colonies thus amounts to 0·5 per cent. of our total foreign trade. If this 0·5 per cent. fell away, would Germany economically so much as feel the effect? But indeed this percentage would not fall away, if we did not possess these Colonies. If the Colonies need our products they would buy them just as much if they were not our possessions, but were either independent, or were subject to the rule of another people. We have indeed no monopoly of trade with our Colonies, but they belong to the territory of the German Empire, and are bound to the commercial treaties concluded by Germany. In spite of the fact that we possess our Colonies, we meet within them the competition of all industrial countries, regulated by commercial treaties; it follows that even if we were not the owners, they would still buy from us those of our wares which we could deliver better and at a cheaper rate than others could.

OUR TRUE COLONIES

*Our best customers are in fact precisely those countries which we have never possessed, and which we never can possess: England, Russia, France, Italy, America, Brazil, the Argentine—these are our true Colonies; these are the countries which, in the enormous developments of exchange in the modern world of trade, make us rich by the purchase of our manufactures, while we draw from them as an equivalent the raw material which we need, as well as manufactures of foreign origin. These are the countries which open to the German merchant inexhaustible fields of activity, where in free competition with the trading nations of the world he can spread his pinions and can make his efficiency felt. These are the gigantic sponges which absorb millions in the form of German produce transferred thither by German merchants settled abroad, and there distributed through all the industrial channels. Throughout the whole world huge German trading firms, either enjoying a position of independence or acting as the branches of the central house, may be seen flourishing and developing their strength in the struggle with English and American competition. That is the biological struggle for existence which to-day rules the world, not the armed struggle of barbaric times. That is the struggle that will always remain, the struggle of efficiency against inefficiency, the struggle of skill against stupidity, the struggle of endurance against slackness, above all the struggle which in reality produces the flower of the higher modern type of humanity, the *spiritually* higher which on the firm basis of a wellbeing embracing all circles of the people can rise even to higher levels of morality and of culture.*

Those who speak for our imperialist party naturally know nothing of this struggle; for them the merchant will always remain a term of contempt, no matter how

glad they may be to take home in marriage to their noble castles the daughters of wealthy merchants. The officers and the junkers still remain the highest caste in the country. They remain the props of the throne and of the altar, of discipline and of morals. They would not care a brass button if, as a consequence of their militant undertakings, all that the merchant has through long generations built up as a result of arduous daily labour should perish at a stroke. For them the economic prosperity of a country exists only in so far as it prepares the means for military undertakings: these are the true aims of national existence, and its prosperity is of use only in so far as it assists in the fulfilment of this end.

WHAT ADVANTAGE HAS FRANCE DRAWN FROM HER COLONIES?

Let us however come back to the question of colonies. We have seen that the lack of important colonies has not injured Germany; it has not hindered our enormous boom of prosperity. *What is the position in the case of France?* Has the acquisition of her North African Colonial Empire, of her East Asian possession, of Madagascar yielded her any profit or furnished her with any advantage over the German Empire? None whatever; the reverse is indeed the case. The economic development of France has in some branches remained at a complete standstill; on others it has shown a progress which is out of all proportion less than in the case of Germany. The entire foreign trade of France amounted in 1912 to only 580 million pounds sterling, although her foreign possessions contain more than four times the superficial area of those of the German Empire. Her population of about forty millions has, as is well known, remained almost stationary. Above all we should ex-

pect, according to the theory of our imperialists, that the establishment of a great Colonial Empire would result in an enormous increase in the mercantile navy. Nothing of all this has taken place. The tonnage of French commercial vessels has indeed fallen (expressed in thousands of tons) from 1,492 tons in 1885 to 1,462·6 in 1911, whereas in the same period, as shown above, the tonnage of German vessels has risen from 1,275·5 to 3,023·7.

The production of pig-iron which, as shown above, rose in Germany in twenty-five years by 343·6 per cent., rose in France in the same period only 210·7 per cent. The production of steel in the same twenty-five years rose in Germany by 1,377 per cent. on 17,302 (estimated in thousands of tons), whereas the French production rose by only 727 per cent. on 4,078·4 (in thousands of tons).

Similar figures can be adduced in nearly all branches of economic life. *Where, then, I ask, is the advantage which France has drawn from her Colonial Empire?* She would probably have done better if she had left the yellow and the black and the brown inhabitants of her Colonial possessions to themselves, and if she had kept in her own pocket the enormous expenditure involved in the military acquisition and the civil administration of these wide territories. Above all, she would then have had no Morocco dispute, no Agadir incident, and in consequence no foaming of the imperialistic beast in Germany, and very probably no war to-day. After all, the dead Archduke has only had to wipe out the "discomfiture" of Agadir.

The French people were instinctively right when they constantly moved their Colonial conquerors on a step and threw them into the lumber-room. So it happened to Jules Ferry the man of Tonkin, so it happened to Joseph Caillaux the man of Morocco. This is indeed a

peculiar irony of history! The French drive away in disgrace those who have gained for them their Colonies, and in our country the national party spits out fire and destruction because France has snapped up these wonderful Colonies from under her nose. In this the French gentlemen have at least the excuse that they have accomplished their extension of territory without drawing the sword in Europe (the modern man scarcely speaks of the lives of the natives), whereas we consider these same seductive corners of the world of sufficient value to pour out on their account oceans of the best blood of Europe and to pile up for their sake hecatombs of corpses.

Truly, we may exclaim with Ulrich von Hutten, "It is a pleasure to be alive," or better still with Nunne in *Ulk*¹: "Nowhere do things happen so funnily as in this world."

THE GERMANS ABROAD: FRANCE, ENGLAND, AMERICA

When on the occasion of the Agadir incident someone observed to a witty Parisian: "Have you heard that the Germans are at Agadir?" he replied quite coolly, "I don't care; they are in the heart of Paris, at the Champs Elysées; that is what matters."

And in fact, that is what matters. Not only in countries beyond the ocean, but above all even in European countries, in those now neutral as well as in those which are now at war with us, everywhere the Germans sat in the heart of trade and commerce until the outbreak of this fearful war—in Germany it is called the "Dawn of the Great Time." Everywhere they conducted important undertakings of their own, or represented German firms, or they managed banks, manufactories,

¹ [*Ulk*, a weekly humorous paper, published by the *Berliner Tageblatt*.]

or trading concerns which belonged to foreigners. The Paris Bourse, the high finance of Paris, is full of German names; Rothschild, Heine, Seligmann, Porgès, Schickler, and all the rest of them control the French money-market. German breweries have effected a revolution in the restaurant life of France, and with their sumptuous beer-palaces have driven out more and more the fine intimacy of the French eating-house in honour of which we older people may at least shed many a tear of joyful-sorrowful remembrance. The same holds good of countless other fields of activity in France, in which Germans play an authoritative *rôle*.

This holds, however, with even greater truth in the case of England. It is well known how great a section of the trade and the industry of Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham and other industrial centres is in German hands, and how Germans occupy a leading position in leading English firms as well. Anyone who is ignorant of this should read the reports of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry which was appointed to devise measures against the threatened dispossession of Englishmen in their own country, not forcible measures, it is true, for the Englishman is far too much a practical man of business not to know that any forcible measure would cut into his own flesh. Measures were aimed at whereby the young Englishmen would acquire German education, German methods, German adaptability—qualities which it was supposed would enable them to withstand the competition of young Germans in their own country.

not to speak of North or South America. The difference between the two Americas consists chiefly in the fact that the Germans in the United States to a large extent assume a new nationality, whereas those in South America for the most part hold firm to their Ger-

man nationality. Both are of use to the Fatherland, and it is one of the many conventional lies to assert, as is repeatedly done, that the German who assumes a new nationality is a loss for the German Fatherland. The opposite is nearer the truth. The German who is naturalised in the United States does not by any means lose his German character. He remains German in blood, in language, in culture, and in thought. Who will dispute this fact? Are not the artists, writers, and learned men of Germany who tour the American towns received everywhere with enthusiasm by millions of German colonists—indeed, often with most exaggerated and unjustifiable enthusiasm? Even the *minores gentes*, who in Germany have fallen more or less out of the running, endeavour to rehabilitate themselves by the naïve undistinguishing national enthusiasm (which of course they promptly telegraph home).

The Germans in North America, whether naturalised or not, are politically and economically an enormous gain for our Fatherland. The intimate political relations between the two countries rest in no small degree on the strong percentage of naturalised Germans included in the American population. The whole American culture may be designated as a German-Anglo-Saxon mixture. A section of the American newspapers, which is not without influence on public opinion, appears in the German language. The export of German books to America is enormous. As in democratically-governed countries the representatives in Parliament and the Government must consider the views of the electors more than in our country, a policy directed in principle against Germany would over there be impossible.

We are ourselves to blame for the fact that we have destroyed the favourable attitude of the American people by this war, the blame for which is rightly put upon us by all Americans, almost without exception, from

Roosevelt down to the last newspaper scribbler; and this fact represents a new and important entry in the negative side of our books, in balancing the results of the war.

The economical advantages which Germanism in America creates for us is so obvious and so universally known that a more detailed discussion may be regarded as superfluous. In the high finance of New York, as in that of Paris, naturalised Germans play a distinguished part. We need but mention the names of Ladenburg, Thalmann, Warburg, Speyer, Ellissen, Kuhn, Loeb and Co., Schiff, &c. The enormous imports and exports of the two countries, which in union with England occupy the leading place in the trade of the world, is to a large extent conducted over there by German merchants who almost without exception have assumed American nationality—presumably because the political conditions there suit them better than those in our country, a fact which indeed is not to be wondered at. The greatest American breweries are in the possession of Germans, for example, the brewery of Pabst in Milwaukee, and of Peter Dölger in New York. In connection with the brewery of Pabst there are benevolent institutions on a large scale as well as schools in which the children of the employees receive, along with the children of the proprietors, instruction in the German and English language. The greatest toyshops, for example, those of Schwarz in New York, are in German hands and they naturally obtain their goods from Germany. A very considerable section of American doctors are German by birth, and thus they not merely spread German science in America, but also obtain from Germany their instruments and their medicinal supplies.

The greatest warehouses in New York, the American Gorringer or Peter Robinson, are in German hands. They bear such names as Altmann, Strauss, Gimbel, Blumen-

daal, &c. It is natural that all these German "captains of industry" should make use of their knowledge of German sources of supply which they took over with them, and should thus take their wares from the German contractor, so long as he is in a position to compete with the foreigner. The German contractor thus learns, in his turn, to know the requirements of the market there, he adapts himself to the circumstances, and thus there naturally arises from the German origin of the American firm a lasting connection between the German producers and the German-American customer.

Whether the latter remains a German or becomes an American is naturally a matter of complete indifference. It is part of the complete ignorance of our nationalist brawlers that they constantly repeat the foolish assertion—false assertions as is known do not become more true by frequent repetition—that Germans who are naturalised abroad are lost to the Fatherland.

The exact opposite may be maintained and proved by reference to the example of South America. Whereas in North America the transition to foreign nationality represents the rule, it is in South America the exception. The Germans in Brazil, in the Argentine, in Chile only in exceptional cases become Brazilians, Argentines, Chilians; in most cases they remain Germans. They are thus subject even in times of peace to the disadvantage that they must return to Germany for military training—many of them are officers of the reserve and of the Landwehr—and thus they are obliged to interrupt their mercantile activities. When however a war breaks out as has now occurred, and suddenly calls them without any preparation to the home country, they have frequently to pay for their adherence to German nationality by the complete ruin of their business, even if they should return alive and unmutilated. This ruin is accelerated by the fact that, as is well known, the

South American people, like the rest of the neutral world, brand us as the disturbers of the peace, and rightly hold us responsible for the severe blow sustained by their economic life, and thus they are without exception sympathetic to the other side. Owing to the excitable temperament of the Spanish population of South America this attitude against Germany manifested itself so strongly against Germans living there, that frequently even those who were not called to arms packed up their knapsacks and returned to Europe.

This judgment is based not on newspaper reports but on my personal observations. About the end of August while travelling from America to Germany I had an opportunity of speaking to many Germans returning by Genoa from Brazil, Argentine and Chile. They painted to me the condition of affairs in these countries in the manner indicated above; they were naturally glowing with patriotic enthusiasm (they could not be expected, in South America in the month of August, to guess at the gigantic lie about the war, which *to-day* professors in Germany have as yet failed to recognise), yet they all admitted that everything which they had laboriously built up in the course of many years, in many cases in the course of decades, had been destroyed at a blow by the outbreak of war. Young men, who had crossed at an early age, and who had slowly worked their way up by industry and efficiency in the great German export-houses, had been obliged to leave their situations to defend their Fatherland "threatened" by Russians and Frenchmen, to defend the freedom and existence of the German people.

But even without the order of recall they would probably have lost their situations, since their firms under the effects of the war, which in these countries has produced an almost universal condition of bankruptcy, would have had either to close their doors, or at

least to restrict their business as far as possible. Older people who through many trials and difficulties had acquired a position of independence were obliged to give up the conduct of their business in consequence of the war and the antipathy felt towards them by the population, and had to struggle back to the homeland with wife and child. These also were the innocent victims of their adherence to their German nationality. On the long fifty-two-hours' railway journey from Ala to Munich it was moving to listen to all these stories of broken existences, of shattered hopes, and to observe the quiet spirit of surrender with which all these active pioneers of Germanism abroad, yielding themselves to the inevitable, laid down on the altar of the Fatherland their success and their hopes, built up with so much labour.

The inevitable! So they believed these good, trusting people. If they had but known, and *if they only knew how little there was of the inevitable in all this!* If they only knew that they were but the marionettes, directed by invisible wire-pullers, to pay with their lives and fortunes for the selfish interests and the insane dreams of world-power and Pan-Germanism which these men entertain; if they had but known that all this was arranged and prepared by criminal and ignorant men, who seek to achieve by fire and blood, by murder and devastation, what can only be obtained by the patient, peaceful labour continued through generations of the merchant and the manufacturer, the man of science and the man of knowledge—if these vigorous men had but known all that—men who even across the sea had not forgotten German dreams and German idealism, and who had not lost the confidence that the cause for which the German draws the sword must necessarily be a just cause—had they but known the truth, they would scarcely have crossed the sea; they would not

have left the soil, which had given to them and their families a second home.

They were all agreed that the thought of rebuilding their existence in South America could not be entertained, and that the years and decades laboriously spent by them there were merely thrown away.

Which German then is of most use to the Fatherland? He who assumes a foreign nationality, as in North America, or he who remains by nationality a German, as in South America? The former, in my opinion. If we survey the collapse into which our business relations with South America have fallen, and if we transfer this phenomenon to the gigantic proportions of North America, we may congratulate ourselves on the fact that the Germans of North America have for the most part not remained Germans, but have become Americans. What would have been the result if the effects of the war had revealed themselves in North America in a way similar to that in which they have been manifested in South America, if nearly all Germans, those subject to military service as well as those exempt from service, had had to leave North America, their adopted Fatherland, their positions and their business? An irreparable economic disaster for Germany would have resulted. As we shall in any case gradually bleed to death if the war endures for any length of time, in consequence of the breach in our business relations with belligerent countries which must remain for many years, such a blow from the neutral country of North America might well have been for us the finishing stroke. Thank God that our German-Americans have always been more sober and more reasonable in their thoughts than our Pan-Germans. By giving up their German nationality they have rendered Germany the best service.

This again disposes of one of the theories on which territorial expansion is supported, one of the theories

productive of constant friction between civilised peoples. *Our true colonies lie where we do not possess a square metre of territory:* in North and South America, in England, France, Russia, and Italy, in North and South Africa, in Canada, and Australia.¹

Our commercial intercourse with England amounts to about 185 million pounds sterling, with France about 77½ million pounds sterling, with both countries together about 262½ million pounds sterling, that is to say, to more than a quarter of our total foreign trade. At the same time we sell more to these countries than we buy from them. We sell to them in round figures to the extent of 162½ million pounds, and we buy from them 100 million pounds. The value of our exports thus amounts to more than 50 per cent. above our imports. About 44 per cent. of German foreign trade, that is to say, about 425 million pounds, is accounted for by all our enemy countries taken together. What is the significance of these figures when we contrast them with the miserable scraps of country—in part wild and unfertile, uninhabitable by Europeans—over which diplomatists wrangle, nations are incited against each other, money is uselessly squandered in gigantic armaments, and for which in the end, since the bomb must explode sooner or later, the bloodiest of all wars has been conjured up?

When will the peoples of the world at last comprehend the madness of this situation? When at last will they call aloud to their rulers, and above all when will the Germans exclaim to the rulers of Germany: "*We have indeed already got the place in the sun.*" Only leave us alone in peace and quietness to warm ourselves in the sunshine and to do our work. Do not for ever oppress us with burdens too grievous to be borne. Free

¹ These ideas are developed in an admirable manner in *The Great Illusion*, by Norman Angell (William Heinemann, London).

yourselves at last from the geographical monomania, whose ambition is to devour square miles, but which has already almost devoured us poor nations."

THE PLACE IN THE SUN FOR US—THE PLACE IN
THE SHADOW FOR THE OTHERS

In reality our imperialists are seeking to achieve something quite different. They also know, even if they do not say it to the stupid people (and Bernhardt's book proves that this is so) that we have indeed the place in the sun, that no one seeks to dispute it, and that if anyone were to seek to do so, he would necessarily fail. But it is something else that they want. They want *the exclusive place in the sun; they are striving for the world-dominion of Germany, and that at any rate is what the others are not prepared to yield to them.*

The German Wehr-Verein, in a meeting held in the House of Representatives, has quite recently expressed this with all the lucidity that can be desired. In this manifesto we find the following words:

"We need room and air for the further development of our German nationality. The time for moderation is past. Relentlessly thinking only of our interests, we must and we will dictate peace. Only one peace can be thought of, a peace which assures the permanent leading world-position of Germany. . . .The criminal breakers of the peace . . . England, France and Russia, must be so weakened that in future they will cease to be a danger to the peace of the world."

Thus we find, on the one side, breakers of the peace, and on the other a permanent leading world-position! Explain this to me, Count Oerindur! Here we find truth and falsehood mingled in a most dexterous manner. On the one side the true aims of the war-party are

openly proclaimed, and yet on the other the pretence that the peace was broken by the other party is boldly maintained. Nevertheless, these gentlemen do not succeed in their sommersault over logic. If to extend our nationality we must obtain for Germany the permanent *leading* position in the world, that is equivalent to saying in other words that we must compel the others to subject themselves to our leadership, since to-day we already enjoy equal privileges with others, but not a leadership. If, however, we do this, it is *we* who are the breakers of the peace, and not the others.

In reality that is the position of affairs, as I will point out in the second section of this book. It is none the less of great value that these gentlemen, even while they attempt to deny this, yet admit it against their will.

THE FEAR OF GERMANY

It is leadership that we seek, not merely equal privileges with others. It would be nonsense to say that we seek the latter, since we already possess in the fullest measure such equal privileges. If we are not, as a German professor has expressed it, "morally and intellectually beyond all comparison superior to all other nations,"¹ there is at least *one* superiority which has willingly been granted to our Prussian Germany by the rest of the world for a century and a half. I refer to our military superiority. While *we* need only fear God, but nothing else in the world, Germany has been feared by all—almost more than God Himself. Even Tacitus long ago pointed out that the defectiveness of the German frontiers was made good by fear of the Teutons: "A Sarmatio Dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus separatur." The fear of Germany produces the effect that our word weighs heavily in the council of the nations

¹ Professor Lasson.

despite all "encirclement," and despite the wretchedness of our diplomacy.

On a certain occasion recently the most important conditions of peace were being discussed in a lively conversation. Frenchmen, Germans, and Englishmen living abroad were taking part in the discussion seated round the common table, and in the end they almost arrived at an agreement as to the terms of peace. Then, however, the German observed in jest, "One more condition; you French must take over *en bloc* our German diplomatists." The Frenchman sprang up in indignation and broke off the peace negotiations, exclaiming, "Ah ça, non! Ca c'est trop. Nous continuerons à combattre." And with these words he left the restaurant.

DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

The lack of dexterity shown by our diplomacy—where could all the high-born Borussen and Saxo-Borussen be expected to learn skill in business!—the defects of our diplomacy are constantly made good by the weight of the army, standing in the background. For long the Triple Alliance was indeed only a sham, but it looked quite well from the outside, and it worked almost like a being of flesh and blood.

Thus in all the conflicts of recent years Germany, in union with Austria and Italy, has come out quite well in the end, and her allies, relying on the power of Germany, have been able to bear home spoil, with which it would scarcely be proper to compare the acquisitions of the Triple Alliance. Was Austria not able in 1908 to bag Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fat morsel of more importance than twenty Moroccos? Was Italy not able to appropriate without a European conflict Tripoli and the Ægean islands—acquisitions which it can scarcely be expected to disgorge again? In addition to

the open door in Morocco, which is of more value than any costly rights of possession demanding the expenditure of blood, have we not got into the bargain a considerable piece of the French Congo—an exchange which cost Caillaux, the Minister responsible for it, his prestige and his position, and which almost cost his wife her life? Did we not, acting with our ally Austria, achieve in her interests the great feat of gracefully turning the Montenegrins out of Scutari, which they had purchased with streams of blood, and of introducing there an international garrison? Was not the creation of that mannikin-kingdom of Albania, that “vile abortion of filth and fire,”¹ accomplished exclusively in the interests of our allies Austria and Italy? Were we not able to complete with England and Turkey an agreement that was favourable to us in connection with Asia Minor and the Bagdad line?

This list of successes could be considerably lengthened. I need not emphasise the fact that, from my point of view, many—indeed nearly all—of these diplomatic bickerings, these alterations and annexations of territory have not the slightest connection with the real interests of the nations. When we reflect that a European war, like that raging to-day, almost broke out in 1912 on the question whether Serbia should receive her celebrated “window on the Adriatic”—when we reflect that nearly every one of the questions mentioned above brought Europe for the time being to the verge of an armed conflict, while these so-called “vital questions” frequently had not in any way decisive importance for the well-being, in the true sense of the word, of the States immediately concerned, we are constantly constrained to admire anew the lamb-like patience of the nations and the craziness of the diplomatists, and to concur in the saying of the good Oxenstjerna in con-

¹ Spottegeburt aus Dreck und Feuer—*Faust*.

soling his son who professed himself unfit for the post of Swedish Ambassador, "*An nescis, mi fili, quantilla prudentia mundus regatur?*"

AUSTRIA'S BALKAN POLICY

What advantage has Austria derived from her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina?—One more worry added to the many by which she was already plagued. Would it not have been better for Austria and for the whole world if the Empire had remained content with an occupation such as had existed since 1878 on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin? The Great-Serbian movement was fanned into more vigorous life than ever before by the formal annexation in 1908, and notwithstanding the propitiatory declaration of Serbia in March, 1909, it continued to take its course. National movements in fact cannot be suppressed. The practical politician must deal with them as facts, and if he desires to conduct them in the desired direction, he must endeavour as far as possible to satisfy their demands which rest on community of race, of language, and often of religion, demands which are thus healthy and justified. Therein lies the skill of the English, and the true basis of the colonial greatness of this people. They subdued the South African republics, but almost immediately after their subjection they gave them self-government within the framework of the great South African Union, and placed at the head of the Union General Botha, their most distinguished military leader. They have acted in the same way towards all their other colonies throughout the world as soon as these were sufficiently far developed for self-government. Under the flexible suzerainty of Britain, Canada and Australia are independent States enjoying merely the advantages which spring from their connection with the world-

empire, while suffering no disadvantage from this connection. This is the source of the attachment shown by all these colonies to the Mother Country, even by the one most recently acquired by force of arms. This explains the complete failure of Germany's speculations on rebellions or secessions, which might create difficulties for the English, and drive their colonies into the arms of the Germans,—these same Germans who even to-day, before they have yet annexed Belgium, can find nothing better to do than banish the French language from the streets of Brussels and Antwerp and from public life by command of the military authorities.

If Austria, instead of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina to the accompaniment of the rattling sabre of her German ally, had accepted the Serbian national movement as a natural fact, and had made reasonable concessions to it on the principle "*naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret*," we would to-day—this can be definitely asserted—we would to-day have had no world-war. But clearly the Austrians understand these things better. They consider it right to treat all their foreign nationalities, Italians, Croats, Slavonians, Rumanians, Serbians, according to the principle:

"A brother's love, sir, ere too late!
Or with this stick I'll break your pate."¹

How far they have got with this we see to-day, not only on the Serbian, but also on the Italian side, and how long will it be until we see, on the Rumanian frontier as well, the effects of this extreme reactionary policy of oppression!

But the worse Austrian policy has been, the more astonishing are the diplomatic successes which in recent

¹"Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein
So schlag ich dir den Schädel ein."

years she has everywhere been able to gain, relying on the armed force of Germany. Germany and Austria have indeed no reason to complain that European diplomatists have constantly trodden on their corns. Apart from the Morocco question, the questions which have cropped up in recent years were all what are called "vital questions" for Austria, if indeed it is possible to speak of vital questions in the case of a corpse. With this corpse the dexterity of German diplomacy has linked for weal or for woe (unfortunately more for woe than for weal) the German national organism, in itself healthy and vigorous. This is in the interest of the "Germanic races in central Europe," to use the beautiful expression of our White Book. Does anyone feel inclined to laugh at this? Austria, as is well known, consists only so far as a fourth part is concerned of inhabitants of the Germanic race, yet with this idea of "race-protection" we have fortunately advanced so far that these Eastern questions, which to a Bismarck were not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, are likely to cost us the bones of many hundreds of thousands of our countrymen in the prime of their life, and rob us of the labour of many generations.

This is indeed a sorry transaction, yet it is one which would have succeeded brilliantly, if it had been left in the field of *diplomacy*, like all similar transactions in recent years, and if it had not been transplanted to the battlefield. The diplomatic success which was attained on the evening of the 25th July in the Serbian answer to the Austrian Note was one of the most brilliant in the whole diplomatic history of Europe. Austria had gained everything of importance which she had demanded apart from a few points, and these not decisive, on which Serbia expressed her readiness to negotiate further; moreover, what she had won exceeded anything that ever one State had obtained from another inde-

pendent State by diplomatic means in time of peace. Further, the humiliation of Serbia was at the same time a humiliation of Russia, and the prestige of Austria at the moment when she insolently and without any grounds recalled her ambassador from Belgrade, stood higher in the Balkans than it had ever done before, and certainly higher than it will ever stand hereafter. This success she owed entirely to the unflinching support of her German ally.

Why, notwithstanding this, the situation was allowed to lead to war, or rather why war was intentionally produced, can only be explained by reference to German policy and the tendencies in Berlin, as I will demonstrate by documentary evidence in the second section of this work. For the present discussion it is enough to establish the fact that the assertion constantly repeated in Germany that the Triple Alliance was always left in the cold or beaten over the ears by the diplomacy of the Entente, rests on a falsehood, and that on the contrary the policy of the Triple Alliance on *all* occasions—even at the very last in July, 1914—was brilliantly victorious.

THE CROWN PRINCE AND WAR PARTY

Everyone in Germany constantly speaks about the "policy of encirclement" (*Einkreisungspolitik*), to which the present catastrophe is attributed. Here also we naturally meet with the same phenomenon as in the whole campaign of justification, which seeks to represent Germany as the innocent lamb and England as the ravening wolf. Those who are initiated, however, know quite well how the matter stands, and if the Crown Prince were to meet Bernhardi or Frobenius in the field, these comrades in the faith would smile to each other like Roman augurs. They know quite well

that it is no foreign policy but our own will—or rather their will—that has urged us into this war, and if they were to deny it, now that they see the fearful consequences, their own writings would rise up against them as bloody witnesses.

What do we find in the introduction to the Crown Prince's book, *Germany in Arms*?

“To-day, indeed, we live in a time which points with special satisfaction to the proud height of its culture, which is only too willing to boast of its international cosmopolitanism, and flatters itself with visionary dreams of the *possibility of an everlasting peace throughout the world*. *This view of life is un-German and does not suit us*. The German who loves his people, who believes in the greatness and the future of our homeland, and who is unwilling to see its position diminished, dare not close his eyes in the indulgence of dreams such as these, he dare not allow himself to be lulled into indolent sleep by the lullabies of peace sung by the Eutopians. . . . Germany has behind her since the last great war a period of economic prosperity, which has in it something almost disconcerting. Comfort has so increased in all circles of our people, that luxury and claims to a certain style of life have undergone a rank development. Now certainly we must not thanklessly deny that a wave of economic prosperity brings with it much that is good. But the shady side of this too rapid development often manifests itself in a painful and threatening manner. Already the appreciation of wealth has gained in our country an importance, which we can only observe with anxiety. . . . The old ideals, even the position and the honour of the nation, may be sympathetically affected; *for peace, peace at any price, is necessary for the undisturbed acquisition of money*. But the study of history teaches us that all those States which in the decisive hour have been guided by purely commercial considerations have miserably come to grief. *The sympathies of civilised nations* are to-day, as in the battles of antiquity, still with the *sturdy and the bold*

*fighting armies*¹; they are with the brave combatants who, in the words which Lessing puts in the mouth of Tellheim, are soldiers for their country, and out of the love which they bear to the cause for which they are fighting. . . . Certainly diplomatic dexterity can, and should, postpone the conflict for a time, and at times disentangle the difficulties. Certainly all those in authority must and will be fully conscious of their enormous responsibility in the grave hour of decision. They must make it clear to their own minds that the gigantic conflagration, once enkindled, cannot be so easily or so quickly extinguished. As, however, lightning is an adjustment of the tension between two differently charged strata of the atmosphere, so the sword will always be and remain until the end of the world the decisive factor. . . . And therefore everyone, to whom his country is dear, and who believes in a great future for our nation, must joyfully do his part in the task of seeing that the old military spirit of our fathers is not lost, and that it is not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. For the sword alone is not decisive, but the arm steeled in exercise which bears the sword. Each of us must keep himself fit for arms and also prepared in his mind for the great solemn hour when the Emperor calls us to the standard—the hour when we no longer belong to ourselves, but to the Fatherland with all the forces of our mind and our body; for all these faculties must be brought to the highest exertion, to that 'will to victory' which has never been without success in history."

That should be sufficient, but there is something better to come. The royal author describes a regimental manœuvre of the guards on the field at Döberitz:

"The steel helmets glitter in the sunshine; in the galloping exercises every individual horseman endeavours to keep on to the man in front, and to keep the right direction—no easy matter when there is dust, and the ground is rough. Many a one stumbles, and away past him gallops the company of

¹ This has now been shown to be true.

riders. What does it matter! When you plane wood, shavings must fall. . . . And there the call resounds over the field, clear and quivering amid the uproar of the galloping mass, 'Front!' The reins whirl round, and as if by a stroke of magic, the line is formed again, with a front of five impetuous squadrons of the guards,—and then comes the signal 'Charge.' Then the last ounce is taken out of the horses, and with bodies strained forward and with lances in rest with a 'hurrah' we ride to the attack. . . . For anyone who has taken part in such attacks, there is nothing fairer in the world! . . . And yet to the true horseman there is one thing which appears more beautiful: if all that were the same, but if only at the end of the rapid charge, the enemy were to ride out against us, and the struggle for which we have been drilled and trained, *the struggle for life and death*, were to begin. How often during such attacks have I heard the yearning call of a comrade riding behind: '*Donnerwetter! if that were only the real thing!*' . . . O horseman's spirit! All who are true soldiers must know and feel: '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*'"

The same spirit of the attack finds expression in the message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars. The young war-hero becomes sentimental, because he can no longer ride through life at the head of his Hussars. Already he is "bearing his youth to its grave," but he is consoled by the thought:

"It is indeed possible for me to be separated from you; but my heart and my spirit remain yours. If some day the King calls, and the bugle sounds the signal 'Charge,' then I ask you to *think on him whose most ardent wish it has always been to be allowed to share at your side this, the supreme moment of a soldier's happiness.*"

This moment has now come. It is now, *donnerwetter!* the real thing. The deathhead-hussars have charged into death; they have been mown down like stalks of

corn. But where at this moment was the gallant colonel of cavalry? Why did he, who still to-day wears the effective uniform of his hussars, not put himself at their head with a "hurrah" against the enemy? Why did he allow to pass ungarnered the supreme moment of a soldier's happiness?

"What are the real merits of this young gentleman?" asked Bebel in the Reichstag on the occasion of a discussion on the Crown Prince's demonstration, and this young gentleman might be left quietly to himself, to his conscience, and to his further self-education, had he not unfortunately been advanced to the position of a national hero in the course of this war for which he and his friends bear the chief load of guilt.

For long he has been the undisputed head of the German nationalist party and of the chauvinists, and his views give the key to the German National Orchestra. Great is the Crown Prince, and Liman is his prophet.¹ In fighting against him we are fighting against the tendency which without any provocation, without any practical attainable end, has dragged Germany into this unfortunate war, and which, if we do not repent in time, will irredeemably lead to our destruction.

It is the misfortune of kings that they are unwilling to hear the truth. But Truth is stronger than they. With stern finger it knocks at their doors. With reverberating sound it pierces their ears, and if Germany, as the Chancellor says, cannot be crushed, still less is Truth capable of being thus dealt with. It tears asunder the veil, with which it is sought to shroud it, and in triumphant nakedness it advances to meet the light of day.

¹ *The Crown Prince: Thoughts on Germany's Future* by Dr. Paul Liman (Wilhelm Köhler, Minden).

THE POLICY OF ENCIRCLEMENT (*Einkreisungspolitik*)

The policy of encirclement is one of the veils with which it is sought to shroud the truth. What do we mean by the phrase: a policy of encirclement? Everyone uses the expression, and no one connects with it any clear idea. If it is supposed to have any meaning, it can only mean a policy which seeks to enclose Germany and Austria, the central Powers, by an opposing alliance of the peripheral Powers. That is to say it is a *geographical* idea.

What specially aggressive tendency is to be found in the fortuitous geographical situation of the Powers of the Entente? Are aggressive intentions in any way determined or proved by geographical situation? Would it not have been equally dangerous, or perhaps even more dangerous, for Germany and Austria, if Italy in place of one or other of the Entente Powers had belonged to the opposing alliance? Or perhaps even America might have been a member. In the case of Italy or America could we have spoken of an "intention to encircle"? At the most we could have done so in the sense in which Fusilier Kutschke maintained that "he had alone and without assistance surrounded a whole company of the enemy."

It is clear that geography has nothing to do with the danger of war or with the intention to make war. Just as the Triple Entente is called an encirclement, the Triple Alliance could be called an "excirclement" (*Auskreisung*), since indeed Germany, Austria, and Italy form a sort of central block, from which the Powers of the Entente are excluded. The one is just as much defensive or aggressive as the other. The geographical constellation is a mere *fortuitous consequence* of the chronological development of the alliance. Had Italy still been free when King Edward trans-

formed the Victorian policy of splendid isolation into a policy of alliances, he would probably have introduced Italy rather than Russia into his system of alliances. Without doubt he would have preferred the democratic Italy, with which he had no conflicting interest, but merely interests in common, to an ally whose political backwardness as well as her conflicting interests in Asia must necessarily make her a very unwelcome friend for England. The grouping of the six Powers in Europe has arisen from *historical* circumstances and from communities of interest. Their geographical position is purely accidental, and has nothing to do with the character and the tendency of these two groups.

It is thus as false as it is superficial to regard the circumferential situation of the Powers of the Entente as merely in itself a danger for the Empires. He who asserts that aggressive intentions exist is under an obligation to prove their existence, and further to do so on grounds other than the geographical situation of the Powers concerned. These other grounds, however, are completely lacking. In Germany no matter how much we inquire, no one is in a position to give a definite answer. England is said to have been envious of our commercial development. Envy is an attitude of mind, but not an action. Just as I can compel no one to love, so I cannot forcibly drive out of anyone envy and hatred. I must rest content if he does not transform his evil thoughts into actions, just as I also on my side would not submit to be called to account by my neighbour merely on account of my disposition. Thoughts indeed are duty-free, and even in reactionary Prussia every citizen, according to the constitution, has the right not only to think as he will, but to give expression to his thoughts "in word, writing or printing." Criminal law punishes not the mere will to do the act, but (with few

exceptions) only the *attempt* to do the act, which it defines as the "first step in the commission of it."

Where, how and when has England ever attempted to transform her envy of Germany into action? In other words, when has she sought to attack Germany? Never at any time. Not *one* action of England can be pointed out, from which the intention to make a military attack, in common with her Allies, on Germany could be deduced. You may say that she gave diplomatic support to France on the occasion of the Morocco dispute. But England had a right to do so and indeed a duty, based on the Anglo-French agreement with regard to Egypt and Morocco. And did our ally Austria not adhere to us in this conflict? Have we not adhered to Austria in all Eastern questions? Why should diplomatic support extended to a friendly or an allied power in the one case be defensive, in the other aggressive? Is England not free in diplomatic negotiations to judge of her own interests and obligations according to her own standard, as we ourselves do with regard to our interests and obligations? Again I ask: *where is the proof of aggressive intentions on the part of England against us?*

Objection will be taken to what I have said on the ground of the military and naval agreements which England had concluded with France, and which she was on the point of concluding with Russia. Have we then concluded no military agreements with Austria regulating the support to be given on either side in a European war down to the last cannon and company? Have not visits and conferences constantly been taking place between the two General Staffs? If our much stricter military agreement with Austria had no aggressive character, why should there be an aggressive character in the much looser adjustments between English and French experts, which scarcely extended beyond the

scope of a discussion?¹ These discussions were, as is documentarily established, entirely of a noncommittal character, because they did not rest on any obligation imposed by the terms of an alliance to afford to each other mutual military support. The Anglo-French Entente did not contain such obligations, but left it to each party in any given case to decide freely according to her own judgment whether she should or should not afford military support to the other.² Even in the event of an unprovoked attack by a third Power this freedom remained, and it was only in the case where both Powers freely decided to co-operate that the discussions of the military experts were intended to have practical consequences.

The relations between England and Russia were, so far as general European politics are concerned, much looser even than those between England and France. The adjustments between Russia and England were concerned exclusively with territorial interests in Asia, and contained no obligations with regard to Europe. England had so little concern in the Franco-Russian Alliance that it was not even acquainted with the wording of the terms of the Alliance.³

Apart from any obligation or intention to attack us there was also, so far as England was concerned, a complete absence of any *inducement* to do so. *What advantage could England hope to gain from a war against us?* We who constantly have on our lips "the English shopkeeper-spirit," and contrast the cold calculating business-sense of the Englishman with our patriotic enthusiasm, should really not attribute to this nation of shopkeepers the insanity of *desiring to kill their best cus-*

¹ See Grey's speech in the House of Commons of August 3rd, 1914.

² See Grey's letter to Cambon, November 22nd, 1912. English Blue Book, No. 105.

³ See Grey's speech August 3rd, 1914.

tomer in order to improve their business. Such a hare-brained course of action is indeed possible in a nation in which cavalry-colonels and generals and the opponents of the trading classes have the decisive word, but not in a nation of merchantmen in which even the leading politicians in part have their origins in the world of trade, and in any case are without exception fully acquainted with the ideas of the modern commercial spirit.

The fact is that England has *never had aggressive intentions against us*; she has never concluded an alliance with aggressive intentions against us, and she has never done anything whatever to urge on others to attack us.

Anyone who maintains the contrary is obliged, according to general rules of procedure, to prove it. I have hitherto looked in vain in German speeches and writings for the submission of this evidence. Everywhere there is the empty assertion, without the shadow of a proof.

So far, however, as this assertion is advanced in our country by official quarters, that is by people who are acquainted with the diplomatic history of the last fifteen years, the assertion is made against their better knowledge, that is to say it is a *lie*.

These last fifteen years, since the first Hague Conference of 1899, are nothing but a *continuous series of attempts on the part of England to arrive at a political entente with Germany, and on the basis of this to effect a limitation of naval armaments on both sides*—attempts which on every occasion have been wrecked on the lack of judgment or on the evil will of the German Government.

It is well known, and does not here require any detailed demonstration, that England on the occasion of the Fashoda incident, when her relations to France were

becoming ever more strained and were almost impelling her to a conflict of arms, endeavoured to give up her "splendid isolation," and to conclude an entente with us. Our far-seeing politicians, as so often happens, did not seize the opportunity. They allowed to slip past them the favourable moment in which, without ruinous preparations, without drawing the sword, and in the enjoyment of a lasting security, they might have promoted our further prosperity in industry and in culture, and gained for the world an enduring peace.

ENGLAND AND GERMANY

THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE

On the 28th of August, 1898, there appeared in the Petrograd Official Journal the celebrated Peace Manifesto of the Tsar. On the mention of this manifesto our war-brawlers smile and point in contempt to the "Tsar of blood" who has now let loose the second fearful war since that message of peace.

We shall see later how far Russia is concerned in letting loose the present war. How far Russia was to blame for the Japanese war is a chapter by itself, which should scarcely be allowed to end with the condemnation of Russia alone. The intention of the manifesto was in any case correct and honourable, and the aims proposed to the nations of Europe: true and enduring peace, and the limitation of armaments which even in peace slowly lead nations to their economic destruction,—these aims will be, and must continue to be, the unalterable rule of conduct governing the efforts of all who guide the destinies of European States. Even the present war, unless it is to be nothing but an insane and purposeless shedding of blood, can have no other aim than this.

What was the attitude of England towards this manifesto? What was the attitude of Germany? While in England public opinion in harmony with the Government hailed the manifesto with the greatest sympathy, and the English Foreign Minister could report to Petrograd this unanimous approval, there developed in Germany also a popular movement in favour of the ideas expressed by the Tsar. But the Government maintained a frigid attitude, and only the social democratic party recognised the epoch-making significance of these ideas—ideas which they had constantly advocated, but which now for the first time received expression in high places. That the idea was Utopian, that it was but a chimæra—these were the least reproaches thrown at the originator of the manifesto. In conformity with the customary tactics which have since been constantly followed, many rose to the crazy heights of asserting that Russia only desired to entice other States to a limitation of armaments in order that she herself might be able to pile up in secret still greater armaments and thus with greater security pursue her Pan-Slav efforts.

The record in malicious attacks was naturally achieved even then by a German professor, Stengel, the lecturer in international law at Munich, who prophesied in advance the most dismal results of the Conference which at the time had not yet assembled. In recognition of this, he was straightway sent by the Foreign Office to the Hague Conference as one of Germany's representatives.

After the epoch-making memorials of the Russian Councillor Von Bloch, the Conference owed its origin chiefly to English influences. As early as 1891 the English Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, had had a statement of the cost of European military preparations compiled, and had transmitted this confidential document to the German Emperor without, it is true, achieving any

success. The efforts of Lord Salisbury met with success only when they were emphasised by the inter-parliamentary conference of 1896. On that occasion Lord Salisbury in a remarkable speech in the Guildhall regretted the ruinousness of constantly increasing armaments, and in the end, through the instrumentality of Count Lambsdorf, laid the whole of the material bearing on the question before the Tsar.¹

The preludes played by Germany and by England were in harmony with the performances given by these two States at the Conference itself, which in spite of all hostility assembled at the Hague on the 18th of May, 1899, under the participation of twenty-six States. Throughout the whole proceedings of the Conference we find the same picture, that, namely, of England leading in all efforts the aim of which was to diminish the intolerable burdens of armaments and, in an ever-widening degree, to place the differences arising between civilised nations on a legal basis. On the side of England there were France, Russia, America, and naturally all the smaller States. On the other side, however, there constantly stood Germany with her true ally, Austria-Hungary.

The opposition of Germany to all progressive efforts was at times so pronounced that if the others had not repressed their desires, the whole Conference would have broken up. So it was on the question of armaments; so also on that of arbitration.

By way of introduction to the discussion on armaments the German Emperor delivered a speech in Wiesbaden in which he declared that the best pledge of peace was the "sharp, gleaming sword." In the course of this discussion we shall have occasion to observe that it is a part of the German system to furnish on every occasion an introduction to the concert of the

¹ See Fried. *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung*, Vol. I, p. 204.

European pipes of peace by blowing a war-fanfare on the Prussian bugle.

The Russian proposal was to the effect that the strength of the Army on a peace basis and the military estimates should not be increased in the next five years, and that in the case of the navy this respite should be fixed for three years. This proposal, which was brilliantly defended by the Russian military plenipotentiary —(he emphasised above all the incontestable fact that the competition in armaments was futile, since the relative strength between the various States still remained constant)—was energetically rejected by the German military plenipotentiary General Gross von Schwarzhof. If the French plenipotentiary Léon Bourgeois, who represented the restriction of armaments as a requirement of civilisation and a *duty* imposed on all States, had not succeeded in uniting the votes of the commission in support of a resolution formulated by him (a resolution, it is true, wholly without effect in practice) the negotiations of the Conference on this point would have been completely wrecked.

The resolution ran: "The Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind."

The recognition of this fact has not prevented European Governments, under the leadership of the German Empire, from inflating their armaments to such an extent that in the end the balloon, distended to the bursting-point, was bound to explode and set the whole world in flames.

Even worse was the fate of the Russian proposal for the establishment of international arbitration. This proposal, indeed, was modest enough in what it contemplated; *obligatory* arbitration on principle was, it is true,

to be introduced, but this was to be excluded in all cases affecting vital interests or the honour of a State. As each State was to remain its own judge as to what it should regard as a question of honour or of vital interests, the Russian proposal cannot be said to have had a revolutionary character, a matter to be regretted, for the most important steps forward in the history of mankind are achieved by revolutions and not by warfare as is maintained by those who pay homage to war. The proposal, then, secured the approval of almost all taking part in the Conference; on this point also Germany alone raised objection on the ground that subjection to a court of arbitration was not, as Professor Zorn maintained, "in conformity with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy."

The opposition of Germany was so violent that negotiations came to a dead stop, and they had to be postponed for a period of fourteen days to enable Professor Zorn to receive new instructions from Berlin. The Conference very nearly proceeded without the co-operation of Germany. But here again, rather than allow the whole proposal to be wrecked, it was resolved in the end to yield to the will of Germany and in all cases to allow optional in place of compulsory jurisdiction.

Here again Germany had the undisputed merit of having barred the way to a decisive step forward in the peaceful organisation of the nations.

The establishment of a perpetual court of arbitration at the Hague was similarly refused by Germany from the outset, and it was admitted only when it was made optional and not compulsory to summon this court. Thus the first Hague conference ended, *in spite of* Germany and Austria, and owing to the active exertions of France and England in support of the efforts of Russia for peace, with a final result which after all represented a first important step towards the aim of an organisa-

tion of States based on law and of a gradual liberation of the nations from the intolerable oppression of their armaments.

BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCES:
THE ENGLISH LIBERAL GOVERNMENT.

Between the first and the second Hague Conferences—the second was held from July to October, 1907—the development of events in the different European countries was highly characteristic of the attitude of these countries and of their governments towards the problems of the Hague, and the occurrences during this period serve to emphasise in the sharpest manner the difference between England and Germany.

Even before the first Conference was held, Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking on behalf of the English Conservative Government, made a definite declaration on March 9th, 1899, in favour of a regulation by treaty of the system of armaments. This declaration was confirmed in July, 1903, by Mr. Chamberlain, a member of the Government, with the observation that it was still regarded as binding on the English Cabinet.¹

When in 1905 the Liberal party came into power and Campbell-Bannerman, a convinced pacifist, became leader of the Ministry, the English Government at once began to display an energetic and untiring activity on the same lines as the efforts which at the first Hague Conference had, chiefly in consequence of the opposition of Germany, produced only very modest results.

This activity of the English Liberal Government was on so large a scale and was so comprehensive that it is impossible within the limits of this work to emphasise all their individual acts. In Parliament, at inter-Parliamentary Conferences, in speeches at clubs and at the

¹ See Fried. *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung*, II, p. 767.

Guildhall, in diplomatic negotiations with other Powers, in newspaper and magazine articles, English Ministers never grew weary of laying stress on the perniciousness for all nations of the competition in armaments by land and by sea, and never flagged in their efforts to devise remedial measures for this ruinous situation. These same men who are to-day represented to the deluded and infatuated German people as men refined in the preparation and instigation of war, whose personal honour German historians dare to deny, men like Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George, Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, and the others, these men devoted themselves with the utmost zeal to these problems, which, as they well saw, affected the vital nerve not only of England, but of all European states. "A policy of huge armaments," exclaimed Campbell-Bannerman in his programme, "keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences."¹

"I wish," Haldane, then Minister for War, declared in the House of Commons on March 8th, 1906, "we were near the time when the nations would consider together the reduction of armaments . . . only by united action can we get rid of the burden which is pressing so heavily on all civilised nations."²

On the occasion of a banquet on September 26th in the same year the Prime Minister expressed the hope that the understanding then reached with regard to Morocco (the Algeciras Convention had been completed on April 7th) would lead to a possibility of reducing the oppressive military expenditure, and he declared that England would put itself at the head in this matter.

To this intention the English Government gave effect. The outline of the Russian programme for the second Hague Conference, published in spring, 1906, contained

¹ [Albert Hall speech December 21st, 1905.]

² [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 153, 8, 674.]

nothing on the problem of armaments, presumably because the Russian Government had gathered from the attitude of Germany at the first Conference that any discussion of this question would be useless. The English Liberal Government now made the most determined efforts to secure the inclusion in the programme of the Conference of the question of armaments as well as the question of arbitration. A proposal on this point, put forward in the House of Commons by the Labour member, Mr. Vivian, was accepted unanimously amid applause, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, associated himself with the resolution on behalf of the Government.

"I do not believe," said Grey, "that at any time has the conscious public opinion in the various countries of Europe set more strongly in the direction of peace than at the present time, and yet the burden of military and naval expenditure goes on increasing. . . . *No greater service could it (the Hague Conference) do, than to make the conditions of peace less expensive than they are at the present time.* . . . It is said we are waiting upon foreign nations in order to reduce our expenditure. As a matter of fact, we are all waiting on each other. Some day or other somebody must take the first step. . . . I do, on behalf of the Government, not only accept, but welcome such a resolution as this as a wholesome and beneficial expression of opinion."¹

When in July, 1906, the Interparliamentary Union, including 620 representatives from twenty-three countries, met in London, the Prime Minister, Campbell-Bannerman, made a memorable speech in opening the proceedings: "Insist, in the name of humanity," he exclaimed to the members, "that your Government should go to the Conference at the Hague with the firm intention with which we ourselves are going, with the inten-

¹ [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 156, 78, 1414-5.]

tion of diminishing the burdens of the Army and Navy Estimates."

The American politician, William Jennings Bryan, who also was present, expressed himself in the same sense. A resolution, corresponding to the views then expressed, was carried unanimously.

In the following year, some months before the opening of the Conference, Campbell-Bannerman spoke even more strongly in a meeting of the House of Commons on March 5th, 1907, in support of the idea of a common restriction of armaments. He declared that it was the duty of England to bring this matter forward for discussion before the second Hague Conference, "holding the opinion that there is a great movement of feeling among thinking people in all the nations of the world in favour of . . . some restraint on the enormous expenditure involved in the present system so long as it exists. . . . We have desired and still desire to place ourselves in the very front rank of those who think that *the warlike attitude of Powers as displayed by the excessive growth of armaments is a curse to Europe*, and that the sooner it is checked, in however moderate a degree, the better."¹

The leading men in the other countries of Europe and of America also gave expression to views similar to those of the English Ministers. Léon Bourgeois in Paris, Tittoni, then Foreign Minister in Rome, Roosevelt in his message to Congress, all expressed themselves in favour of an agreement with regard to armaments, and a discussion of this question at the Hague Conference.

Only Austria and Germany made once again a vain-glorious exception. In reply to an inquiry on the subject Count Gulochowski gave in the Austrian Delegations only an evasive answer. In Germany the mere idea of an international discussion of these questions

¹ [Hansard, 1907, Vol. 170, 78, 675.]

was at once enough to let loose the devil of nationalism. Behind the efforts of the other Powers they scented, as usual, a cunning trick to deprive Germany of her defences, and they professed to see the danger of war threatening them in the inclusion of such a point in the Hague programme. "The nearer the Peace Conference approaches," so wrote the *Tägliche Rundschau* in a leading article on April 9th, 1907, "the clearer it becomes that it is expressly characterised by tendencies inimical to peace." Herr Bassermann, a representative in the Reichstag, did not venture to hope for a more peaceful situation until after the Hague Conference had been safely got over. The Prussian Minister of War ostentatiously emphasised Germany's readiness for war. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, a representative in the House, concluded a patriotic Pan-German speech in the Reichstag with the courageous words: "Let them come." And last, but not least, Prince Bülow did not allow himself to hope for any results from the discussion of the problem at the Hague, and publicly expressed his intention of "leaving the discussion to be conducted by those Powers alone who hoped that any success might result from it."

That was the answer which Germany gave to the English proposal for an international agreement on armaments.

SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE: ENGLAND AND GERMANY

The negotiations which took place at the Conference corresponded to the very promising way in which it began. Matters took pretty much the same course as at the first Conference. England wanted a discussion of the problem of armaments; Germany, however, declined it. To avoid a conflict a way out was sought and found. The first representative of England, the Lord

Chief Justice, Sir Edward Fry, delivered a speech in which he elucidated the problem from every point of view, and proposed a resolution which declared that it was eminently desirable that Governments should resume their study of the question. This resolution was unanimously adopted, since according to the arrangement made no discussion could take place.

Once more we see that Germany scored a brilliant success; once again a pathway to progress was barricaded!

When a member of the House, Bebel, interpellated Prince Bülow in the sitting of the Reichstag of November 21st, 1907, with regard to the attitude of the German delegates, the Imperial Chancellor could truthfully reply that the German delegates had taken no part in a discussion on the question of armaments, because such a discussion had not taken place. But he forgot to add that this exclusion of a debate *had been dictated by Germany*.

In England there was naturally universal disappointment over the failure of the noble-minded efforts of leading Liberal Ministers. A few months before his death Campbell-Bannerman gave expression to this disappointment in the words: "We had hoped that a great step forward might be made in the direction of putting a stop to the increasing competition of armaments. We were disappointed."

They were disappointed but not disheartened. After this failure to arrive at the desired end along the path of international agreement *the method of private negotiations* with Germany was adopted. We shall see later with what success.

Apart from the problem of armaments the question which chiefly engaged the attention of the second Hague Conference was naturally that of international arbitration. The problem before them was to give to the torso

of 1889 a firmer and more harmonious form. It was intended that the compulsory element, which had miscarried owing to Germany, should be inserted in the earlier resolutions. In order not to encounter once more the opposition of Germany a very complicated proposal had been prepared, which, it is true, made it compulsory for the contracting Powers to submit to arbitration, but only subject to the exclusion of all questions which affected important interests or the independence of the parties to the dispute.

Even this limited element of compulsion encountered the determined resistance of Germany. The proposal was remodelled in every direction in order to meet Germany; but not even this watery proposal gained the approval of Germany, which voted against it along with Austria, while the great majority of States, including England, France, and Russia, accepted the proposal by 32 votes to 9.

But even then the path of tribulation of international arbitration was not ended. The proposal was put forward that the agreement accepted by so great a majority should be binding at least on those Powers which had concurred in it. But the German representative, Freiherr von Marschall, protested against this as a violation of the principle of unanimity, and no other course **was** open to the Conference than to be content on this **question** also with a declaration which, indeed, expressed the platonic inclination of the Powers to the principle of compulsory arbitration, but, in practice, "preserved for each of the Powers represented the maintenance of its own standpoint."

Thus the number of Germany's successes increase! Our title of glory, that of being everywhere a drag on the peaceful understanding between the nations, will remain undisputed, but it can scarcely contribute to making us loved throughout the world.

ENGLISH PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING
AND FOR A NAVAL AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY.

Scarcely had the sound of the peaceful concluding words of the President of the Conference died away in the Rittersaal at the Hague when the English Ministers began to turn their attention to devising new ways whereby they could attain the object that hovered before them—an end equally advantageous to all the nations. After all outstanding questions between England and France had been disposed of by the Convention of April, 1904, and the conflicts of interest between England and Russia had likewise been overcome by the Agreement of 1907, the Liberal Government, which, after the death of Campbell-Bannerman, was now under the leadership of Asquith, regarded it as the most important task of its foreign policy to establish its relations with Germany on a basis calculated to exclude, as far as possible, the occurrence of conflicts. There were no real conflicting interests or occasions of friction between England and Germany, or at most these only existed to a very small extent. The difficulties in East Africa had been regulated by the treaty concluded in 1890 by Salisbury and Caprivi whereby Heligoland was handed over to Germany, and in return concessions were made to England in East Africa. Questions arising in Asia Minor scarcely offered enough material for a serious conflict, and the treaty concluded in the early summer of 1914, notwithstanding the tension in the political situation, shows that the peaceful demarcation of spheres of interest between England and Germany involved no particular difficulty where there was mutual good will.

“What, then, is the object of this competition in naval armaments, which constantly grows more fatal for both sides?”—this was the question which the English Government and English public opinion was bound to ask.

If both countries desired peace, why should they ruin each other in armaments? If, however, one side proposes limitation of armament by treaty, as England did at the Hague in 1889 and 1907, and the other side constantly declines any such limitation, is it not, in these circumstances, a justifiable suspicion that the party which declines entertains unconfessed intentions against the party which makes the proposal?

The English public were logically bound to propound such questions to themselves, and they might quite rightly put the further question: *What would Germany, what would the whole of Europe say, if England, the leading Power on sea, were suddenly to begin to create a force by land, which sooner or later might become equal to the German in strength?* Would not this rightly be regarded as a threat against the Power competing against her on the Continent? The German naval law and the constant increases in naval strength effected at short intervals of time, whereby Germany, in the course of twenty years, has become the second naval Power in the world, was bound to place the English Government before the alternative of either answering Germany's naval armaments by a corresponding increase in their own or embarking on the attempt to make good, by a *private* agreement between Germany and England, the general arrangements which had been wrecked at the Hague. Mr. Asquith's Government chose in the first place the latter way, which was thorny enough in view of Germany's opposition in principle to restrictions of armaments of any kind, imposed by way of a treaty.

This disinclination must, indeed remain entirely incomprehensible to the ordinary man. It is probably a part of the superior insight of those who govern by the grace of God to be in a position to dispute the correctness of the following simple calculations. The English say to the Germans: "We consider that the present re-

lation in strength of our two fleets, sixteen to ten, is a suitable one, and in any case, since we do not possess an army of any importance, we consider ourselves under an obligation to stick to this proportion for the maintenance of our power and for the protection of our trade and of our over-sea possessions. If you, Germany, agree to this proportion being fixed, so much the better for both of us; further construction will then be useless, for the relative strength of the one compared to the other will always remain the same. If, however, you do not agree, so much the worse for you. We on our side will then lay down two ships for every ship which you lay down; the relation of sixteen to ten will thus be at once changed to your disadvantage, absolutely as well as relatively. When you have built ten new ships, that is to say, when you have got as far as twenty, we will have built twenty new ships, and will have reached thirty-six, etc. The absolute distance between our two fleets will thus constantly increase, and the relative position will constantly become more unfavourable for you. In the end we will ruin each other, and will be like the Kilkenny cats which ate each other up until only the tails were left. It is for you to choose. If you decide on our first proposal, in ten years' time you will be in as safe a position as you are to-day, and you will have spared your money and your people. If you choose the second proposal your security will be diminished every year, and at the same time you will be gradually ruining yourself; and it will be but a small consolation to you that you are at the same time bringing us to the verge of ruin also.

One would have thought that a ragged schoolboy, who had just learned the first elements of the multiplication table, would have understood this calculation, and would have been overjoyed to accept the first proposal. The German Imperial Government could not rise to this

height, and so the wearisome negotiations constantly renewed from the side of England—they might be called the seven years' armaments war of 1907-14—collapsed without result. Indeed, it may be asserted that the failure of the negotiations, the constant increase of armaments caused thereby, and the increasing tension in the political situation due to the increased armaments, are to a considerable extent responsible for the fact that a real war has at last grown out of the war of armaments.

The responsibility for this is exclusively Germany's, as a short account of the relevant events will reveal.

At the seventeenth World Peace Congress, which met in London in July and August, 1908, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, advocated with passionate words an understanding between England and Germany, and lamented "that it should be necessary in the twentieth century of the Christian Era to hold a meeting in a civilised country to protest against the expenditure by Christian communities of 400 millions a year upon preparing one nation to kill another." Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the Lord Mayor's banquet in 1908, gave the assurance that England would "not be reluctant to grasp any hand that is extended to us in good will and in good faith." On March 16th in the following year Mr. Asquith stated to the House of Commons that the question of a mutual reduction of expenditure for naval purposes had more than once formed the subject of communications between the two Governments, but unfortunately without result.¹ This utterance of the English Prime Minister led, in the last days of March, to a discussion in the German Reichstag, in the course of which various speakers urgently besought the Government to grasp somewhat more energetically the hand offered by England. Bassermann, a

¹ [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 72, 8, 1,459.]

member of the House, felt, of course, all kinds of scruples, and prepared the way for Prince Bülow, who in the first place denied that any definite proposal had been made by England, and on the general question "held out no hope of any effective results from negotiations with reference to the limitation of naval construction."

These utterances of Bülow occasioned a new discussion in the English House of Commons, in the course of which the Foreign Secretary, Sir E. Grey, delivered a highly important speech on the naval competition between England and Germany. For England, declared the Foreign Secretary, the Navy was what the Army was to Germany. The superiority of the English Navy must be maintained, but on the basis of this superiority an understanding might very well be arranged between the two countries. Grey let it be seen that England might be prepared to alter her attitude with regard to the question of the capture of an enemy's private property at sea, if this would be accepted as a starting-point for a diminution of naval expenditure.¹

In introducing the Navy Estimates in 1909 Mr. McKenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking in the House of Commons on July 26th, declared that "the British Government not only expressed its desire, but by something much stronger than words showed its determination to give the lead in restricting armaments, and for three successive years the British Government did its utmost to convince the world of the futility of its race in armaments, and of the desirability of curtailing construction."² After enumerating all the previous endeavours of England, which unfortunately had proved fruitless, Mr. Asquith also declared that even then the door was still open and that they were anxious and even

¹ [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 3, 61.]

² [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 859.]

eager to come to some arrangement with other Powers.¹ Every indication that the German Government desired to enter into such an agreement would meet with the heartiest reception from the English Government. In answer to a question of a member Mr. Asquith answered shortly and definitely: "We have taken the initiative."

The more the English Ministers revealed their endeavour to arrive at an understanding with Germany on the question of naval armaments, the more did they become an object of attack and suspicion to the German chauvinist press. On July 14th, 1910, Mr. Asquith was obliged to declare that the German Government had evaded further inquiries, stating that they were bound by a law, and that a modification of this law would not have the support of public opinion in Germany.² On the following day Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at a banquet, denounced in passionate words "the epidemic of prodigality which seems to be sweeping over the world and sweeping to destruction."

In reply to these earnest and uninterrupted efforts of the English Ministry the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, offered in December, 1910, a few platonic observations which must have acted like a stream of cold water: England, he said, had indeed made suggestions, but had submitted no positive proposals; Germany in the *pourparlers* had constantly started from the idea that an open and unrestrained discussion leading to an understanding with regard to their interests on both sides was the surest means of overcoming any distrust due to their relative strength by land and by water. "The mere continuance of a free and unrestrained exchange of thought on all questions connected with these matters is a guarantee for the friendly intention . . ." &c.

As Thoas says in "Iphigenie":

² [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 879.]

¹ [Hansard, 1910. Vol. 19, 645.]

"A flood of words is useless in refusing;
The other hears in all the one word: 'No.'"¹

This "No!" resounds again with full distinctness in the following year. In the House of Commons on March 13th, 1911, Grey had once more emphasised the necessity of arriving at an agreement with Germany and of restricting the continuing increase of the expenditure on armaments. He foresaw that if this tremendous expenditure on, and rivalry of, armaments continued, it must in the long run break civilisation down. The burden of armaments was a greater danger than war itself, since it involved a bleeding to death in time of peace.²

This speech of Grey formed the subject of the debate in the Reichstag on March 30th, 1911, in which the Imperial Chancellor—now quite plainly and without any concealment—declared that the question of an agreement as to armaments was insoluble so long as men were men and States were States.

Thus the decisive word was now spoken, and in view of Parliamentary conditions in Germany little significance could be attached to the fact that the Reichstag passed a resolution calling upon the Chancellor to enter into negotiations with other Powers with regard to the limitation of armaments should the occasion arise. According to German political law of the Bismarckian tradition the Imperial Chancellor is, as is well known, merely the servant of his lord, and is not obliged to pay any attention to Parliamentary resolutions.

But the English did not yet relax their efforts. Events in Morocco had led to the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir, and to negotiations arising out of this between the Powers affected—negotiations which put a

¹ "Man spricht vergebens viel, um zu versagen
Der andere hört in allem nur das Nein."

² [Hansard, 1911. Vol. 22, 1,985-6.]

severe strain on the peace of Europe. In the autumn of 1911, the negotiations at last arrived, through many perils, at the goal, with the result that the disputes between France and Germany with regard to Morocco were finally composed, and as an equivalent for France's freedom of action in Morocco a portion of French Congo was ceded to the German Empire. Scarcely had this cloud passed away from the political horizon when Sir Edward Grey emphasised anew, in the English Parliament on November 27th, 1911, England's urgent desire for the establishment of better relations with Germany. The existing friendships of England did not constitute a hindrance to the conclusion of new friendships. England had co-operated in securing a peaceful solution of the Morocco crisis, the air was now purified, and he would gladly welcome any wish on the part of Germany for better relations with England.¹

In the beginning of February, 1912, the English Government sent Lord Haldane to Berlin, not as an official plenipotentiary, but with the task of sounding the ground in conversations with the Chancellor and the Emperor, with whom Haldane was a *persona gratissima*, and if possible of preparing the way for the political and naval agreement which had been so long sought. The prelude to Lord Haldane's activity was not exactly encouraging; two days before his arrival in Berlin the Emperor, in opening the Reichstag, had announced great increases both in the Army and in the Navy. The increase in the Navy was to extend to no less than three capital ships, many submarines, and fifteen hundred men. On this Lord Haldane put to the Chancellor and to Admiral von Tirpitz the very proper question: What would be the use of negotiations aiming at friendly relations between the two Powers, if Germany was going at the same moment to increase her battle fleet as a precaution

¹ [Hansard, 1911. Vol. 32, 43-65.]

against England, and thereby compel England to a corresponding increase on her side? Negotiations with a view to friendly relations accompanied by increases in the Navy would provoke worldwide derision. The German representatives indicated that a naval agreement without a simultaneous political Entente was purposeless, but they also at once emphasised that even in the event of a political understanding, there could be no question of a reduction in the naval programme, but that at the most a certain *retardation* in carrying it out might be approved.¹ The promise of a possible retardation in naval construction was even further limited in that it was to be an "understanding and not a written agreement."

Thus, while on the one hand the aim pursued with untiring zeal by the Liberal English Government for seven years, the aim of arriving at a cessation of naval armaments on both sides, remained unachieved—since the proposed retardation, which was not even of a binding nature, would result neither in such a cessation nor in a saving of expenditure—Germany, on the other hand, demanded, as an equivalent for these so-called concessions, political conditions which it was simply impossible for England to fulfil. The attitude assumed by the German Government in connection with all Anglo-German negotiations is in itself sufficiently remarkable, namely, that an equivalent could justifiably be demanded in return for a concession, which, after all, did not represent a sacrifice on one side, but was a duty implicit in the vital interests of both. With just as much right an equivalent could have been demanded by England, who was equally ready to bind herself.

¹ These and the following facts are taken from Sir Edward Cook's pamphlet entitled: *How Britain Strove for Peace. A Record of Anglo-German Negotiations 1898-1914. Told from authoritative sources.* (Macmillan and Co., London, 1914.)

But, to pursue the question, what was the equivalent demanded by Germany? Germany demanded neither more nor less—and here it revived a demand already formulated in previous years by the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg—than the *obligation for Britain of unconditional neutrality* in the event of any European conflict in which Germany might be involved. England was thus to free herself from her engagements to the Entente and was to withhold herself from every co-operation in European questions. In view of the close alliance with Austria it was scarcely possible to conceive a conflict in which Germany might not be involved, either on account of her own interests or on account of those of Austria, yet everywhere England was expected to remain an inactive spectator, and to allow Germany and her ally full freedom to rule the roast on the Continent. Even treaty-obligations to protect neutrals would have been abolished had England concurred in the German proposal of an unconditional neutrality in all disputes affecting Germany.

It is, therefore, not surprising that this suggestion, which had already been rejected between 1909 and 1911, should again have been rejected in 1912 after Haldane's visit; indeed, it amounted to no more than a *demand that England should simply renounce her position as a European great Power*. This demand would in any case have been monstrous, even if its fulfilment had been sought to be purchased at a high price. But what was the price offered by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg? An unbinding, unwritten, temporary retardation, which involved no reduction in naval construction on the basis of the most recent increase of the fleet in 1912.

This suggestion was really rather strong, and postulated a high degree of simplicity on the part of the shrewd English men of business. What, indeed, would German diplomacy have said if it had been suggested

that Germany should sell the birthright of her position as a great Power in Europe in exchange for the mess of pottage of an English retardation in naval construction?

Sir Edward Grey was obliged to decline the German proposal; he did not, however, content himself with merely declining it, but he repeated again on this occasion what he had said in previous years in public as well as in diplomatic negotiations; that is to say:

1. That England could not agree to an unconditional obligation to observe neutrality, such as Germany demanded, but, on the other hand, she would always be ready, as she had hitherto been, to work in common with Germany in the interests of the peace of Europe;

2. That the Triple Entente was not based on general political formulæ, but on a settlement of specific questions affecting the interests of the Entente Powers, and that only indirectly by the settlement of these questions and by the removal of causes of friction had relations of friendship resulted;

3. That these relations had neither an exclusive nor an offensive character against Germany and that there was no reason why Germany should not enter into similar relations with England.

In order to give as precise a form as possible to these ideas the English Cabinet resolved to express them in a short formula, which was handed by Sir Edward Grey to the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, and which was intended to serve as a basis for further naval negotiations. The formula ran as follows:—

“The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will *neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany*. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a

party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object."

England thus promised that she would, for herself, make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and that she would not share in any such venture; she further declared that an attack upon Germany was neither contemplated nor permitted by any treaty or convention to which she was a party. Lastly, England promised that she would never be a party in any such treaty or agreement. *This was thus a promise of non-aggression in the widest sense of the word.* What more could Germany reasonably ask? Germany was secured against every attack on the part of England, and with this security any reason or pretence for naval competition collapsed, unless—and there's the rub!—unless Germany herself had aggressive intentions against her neighbours, England's friends in the Entente, and thus indirectly against England. Here we have the salient point, on which the year-long negotiations between the two countries constantly and necessarily came to grief.

England offered the assurance that she would not attack. Germany, however, asked for security to be able to attack undisturbed. The English offer had little value for Germany, since the German Government knew quite well from the attitude of the English Liberal Cabinet since 1905 that there was no ground to fear an attack from the side of England. The only point that mattered to Germany was that she should be able to count on English neutrality, under all circumstances, in all Continental conflicts, even if they were provoked by Germany or her ally, and even if they affected the independence of neutral countries, and thereby directly or indirectly affected English interests. *By isolating England, Germany desired to make her path secure, in the first place, to a hegemony on the Continent, in order later on to rise from this advantageous position to the*

perpetual leadership of the world at the cost of England. This idea also dominates, as we shall see, German's diplomatic preparations for the war in the last days of July, 1914.

"The thought is clever—devilishly so!

Apart from that, it might be called damned silly."¹

Neither at an earlier nor at a later date did the English allow themselves to be entrapped by this line. The negotiations of 1912 failed, like all other negotiations before and after this, on Germany's demand for neutrality.

But one last English attempt, again along different lines, was still to be made. After the new German navy increase of 1912, after Haldane's visit had passed without results, and after the last negotiations between Grey and Metternich, the British Government resumed an attempt—already undertaken under Campbell-Bannerman in 1906—to induce in the other side a better insight into the interests of both parties through the measures actually adopted by them in connection with the Navy, without having recourse to any diplomatic negotiations. Although in spring, 1906, the German navy programme of 1900 had again been increased by six large cruisers, the English Government announced in July of the same year that the programme laid before Parliament in March for the construction of new ships would be reduced by 25 per cent. in the case of battleships, by 60 per cent. in the case of destroyers, and by 33 per cent. in the case of submarines. The reason for this one-sided voluntary reduction was, as the Government expressly declared, on the one hand, to announce to the whole world, before the meeting of the second Hague

¹ "Wär' der Gedank' nicht so verwünscht gescheit,
Man wär' versucht, ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen."

Conference, England's firm intention to reduce the burden of armaments, and, on the other, to induce other Powers to follow the same procedure. This second object was of course not realised in the case of Germany; rather the contrary effect was produced. On three different occasions—to the English Ambassador, Sir F. Lascelles, to the English Under Secretary of State, Sir Charles Hardinge, who accompanied King Edward to Germany, and to the English Minister of War, Mr. Haldane—the Kaiser in the late summer and in the autumn of the same year personally expressed strong disapprobation of any attempt to bring the question of armaments before the Hague Conference, and declined to allow the German delegates to take any part in this superfluous and futile discussion. There could, as a matter of course, be no question of the English example being followed on the part of Germany.

In spite of this failure a similar attempt was made in 1912-1913 by Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty. New negotiations with Germany after recent experiences appeared futile, but as an alternative method Churchill declared, in introducing the estimates in the two years mentioned, that he *pledged himself that any retardation or reduction in German construction should be followed by this country in full proportion*. If Germany decided to take a naval holiday and build no ships in any given year, England would at once follow suit and drop her programme for the year likewise. In this way "without negotiations, bargainings, or the slightest restriction upon the sovereign freedom of either power" relief might be obtained for both nations.

This declaration of Churchill, which as we have observed was officially repeated on two different occasions, *remained unanswered and unreciprocated by Germany*, presumably because here also she was awaiting "positive proposals," which would then of course have been an-

swered or reciprocated to no greater purpose than had been done on previous occasions.

This is the history of the Anglo-German negotiations extending over many years, of the vain wooing of England for Germany's favour—a wooing which was unattended by success, since the coy beauty would sell her favour only at a price which the wooer could not pay unless he were prepared to sacrifice himself. Once more it appeared, as if in this case also circumstances were stronger than the will of man. The work of peace pursued in common throughout the Balkan crisis, the success achieved in maintaining peace, attributable exclusively to the co-operation of the two Empires, had quite automatically given a more friendly form to the relations of the two countries to each other. The delimitation of the spheres of interest in Asia Minor held out the promise of a further favourable development of these relations, but unfortunately this did not touch the kernel of the question; the constantly increasing danger involved in the competition in naval armaments, occasioned by Germany's infatuated refusal of every agreement.

What would the world have looked like to-day if Germany had accepted the last proposal put forward by Grey in 1912? The security from every attack on the part of England and her Allies would not indeed have diverted Germany from her imperialistic ambitions, which in their nature were bound to be aggressive, but it would have deprived the German Government of the *pretext* which has enabled them to represent their war of prestige and expansion as a war of defence, and without this pretext it would have been impossible to have urged into so fearful a war the German people, the great majority of whom are attached to peace. The truce in naval armaments would in addition have created a more friendly atmosphere between Germany and Eng-

land, and as a consequence between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. It may be presumed that in Germany the last enormous increase in the army and the measure providing for the raising of millions of pounds would not have come into being. France would not have introduced her system of three-year service, and the Austro-Serbian dispute—which, as we shall see later, any child could have solved—would not have led to the universal war.

WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?

If Germany really had no other objects than those constantly advanced in all Imperial and princely speeches and in all speeches by the Chancellor, "Security from attack, free development for her forces, unhampered attention to her culture," how could all these possessions have been obtained more surely or more cheaply than by accepting the English proposals?

"We will persevere until we have the assurance that no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in which we will care for and develop German character and German strength as a free nation,"—with these words the Imperial Chancellor concluded his speech on the 2nd of December. A few days later the Emperor delivered an address on the Eastern scene of war to the delegates of the German and Austrian divisions: "We are fighting," he exclaimed, "for a just cause, for freedom, for the right of our nation to exist, for a long future peace." His Majesty might have been respectfully answered in these words, "May it please your Majesty, what we are supposed to be fighting for *we had before the war began*. We had our freedom, the right to our national existence, which no one disputed, and we had had a long undisturbed peace. *Why then, your Majesty, are we fighting?*" And one might have added: If Germany be-

lieved herself to be imperilled—which is not proved, and which cannot be proved—why then did she not gain for herself the greater security offered by England? The security, which was then offered in peace, can never again be achieved by victory on the battlefield. It could not only have been obtained at less expense—for then it would have cost neither life nor treasure—it would also have been more enduring and more tenable. According to the dictum of Sallust, Kingdoms can only be maintained by the means by which they were created, and in the same way an international treaty, which is intended to regulate the relations of nations in peace, is more surely cemented by peaceful than by military means. Treaties of Peace after war always contain the tacit clause, *rebus sic stantibus*, which Kant, in his first preliminary article of his work *On Perpetual Peace*, regards as a hindrance to an enduring condition of peace. Treaties of peace, however, established in time of peace, which arise out of common interests and which do not bear on their forehead the remembrance of death and destruction, of hatred and vengeance, like the mark of Cain, such treaties hold *acere perennius*, and like all good things carry in them the seeds of further good.

So I again say that *what we are supposed to be fighting for, we already possessed*. We possessed it more securely than we will possess it for generations even after a victorious war, and anything that we lacked we could have obtained without war by a treaty in peace.

THE FREEDOM WHICH "THEY" MEAN.¹

But as we have said the questions at stake are quite different from security, freedom, and the right to exist. The word "freedom" is to-day very often heard in the

¹ [The title of this section is an adaptation of Max von Schenkendorf's song: "Freiheit, die ich meine."]

mouths of men who formerly crossed themselves thrice on hearing the forbidden word from any other quarter. We have all, without exception, become lovers of freedom over night,—above all those who previously extolled the “state of dependence willed by God.” We have become so enamoured of freedom that we mean to bring it not only to our nation, but also to all the other nations in the world. (See the explanation of the Imperial Chancellor to the American people.) We simply no longer know how far the impulse to freedom will carry us. . . .

“Be embraced, ye countless millions!
With the wide world’s ardent kiss.”¹

Social democrats, clericals, progressives, Poles, Danes, Alsatians—all who were formerly enemies of the Empire are now pressed by the Prussian Junker to his sensitive heart—that is, on the assumption that they keep the “peace within”² which, as is known, consists in thinking, speaking, and writing as the Junkers think, speak, and write. The transaction, however, is not a mutual one, it is a *societas leonina* in the worst sense of the word. Anyone who allows himself to think, or write, or speak otherwise than is pleasing to the governing class is suppressed, punished, or if need be, shot dead. That is the freedom which *they* mean.

The German people will in time realise to what bondage these apostles of freedom are leading them. After every period of exaltation of the German people a period of bitterest bondage has always followed. It was so after 1813, after 1848, and after 1870, when the first years of the intoxication of victory had passed away.

¹ [“Seid umschlungen, Millionen Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt.”]

² [*Burgfrieden*. The jurisdiction of a castle, the peace within the castle, hence almost equivalent to the “civil truce.”]

It will be precisely the same after 1914. The soldiers and the Junkers, who in essential matters form *one* class, feel themselves entirely in their element in war! It is quite to their liking to suppress the freedom of the Press, to suppress the right of free assembly, to throttle trade and industry—the representatives of which had already taken up too much room at the Imperial Court. “Certain barriers of Court etiquette”—we find in Liman, the apostle of the Crown Prince—“still make inaccessible to wealth certain pathways which are only open to the sons of the old agnati of the kingdom and to officers; otherwise the millionaire has carried off the victory, and the society of the Court jostles in the salons of lucky speculators or their heirs. The nobility of wealth grows up, a new Junkerdom, which never saw a battlefield; it is even spreading to the country, and already the capital of the Empire is surrounded with a golden girdle of luxurious estates. The list of guests invited to accompany the Emperor on his northern tours shows the names of numerous financial magnates. The new aristocracy carries instead of the sword the dividend warrant, instead of the shield the company prospectus, and it bears as its weapon the bill of exchange. The nobility of the sword, however, withdraws into the background; the sons of those men who once won the battles of the Hohenzollerns sit embarrassed on their fathers’ acres. And capital increases in the hands of a few until it assumes gigantic proportions, and with it respect for money whether it has been inherited or graspingly acquired.”

These are the thoughts of authoritative circles in Prussia and in Germany on the subject of trade and industry. The dividend warrant and the bill of exchange are for them the contemptible emblems of these ranks of the nation on which Germany’s greatness and her position in the world are built, and which in the end

must provide the means of satisfying the military megalomania of her "nobility of the sword." *And is it likely that those who entertain these thoughts will bring to the German people freedom and equal privileges?* When the Moor has done his duty, he will be allowed to go,¹ just as after 1813, 1848, and 1870. Even to-day, during the war, the smelling-out of demagogues has begun. Everywhere good Prussians are ferreting about for suspicious people who do not think like good Prussians or good Germans. This can be seen at home, and even more among Germans abroad. *A military and a Junker reaction will set in* after the war such as the present generation has never seen. And that is called fighting for freedom, for German culture!

THE END OF PEACE. SECURITY?

The trend of thought of these circles will be noticeable and will make itself felt on the conclusion of peace. While German professors are bending over their maps at their study-tables and are elaborating international plans for the future formation of Europe, these men of action are laughing at the crazy ideas of the Utopians, just as they described the negotiations of the Hague Conference as "chatter about everlasting peace" (General-Major von Deinling) and the English proposals for agreement as lies and deception. For them there is only *one* end of peace: oppression and security—security, with the same brilliant success as has been secured for us by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; that annexation which, so far, has brought us only difficulties and no advantages either of a political or of an economical nature, which has, indeed, from a military point of view, been directly injurious to us, since it led to the

¹ ["The Moor has done his work,—the Moor may go."—

—Schiller, Fiesco.]

creation of that new, and apparently impregnable, line of fortresses, before which we have now been sitting for more than five months. *Security of our frontiers*: beyond this the train of thought of our authoritative circles does not go, but with security they include, of course, expansion in and outside Europe. They mean security at any cost, without respect to the rights of nationalities, the free destinies of nations, which after all we pretend that we are defending, and without respect to the fact, revealed by experience, that such a brutal policy of security constantly bears with itself the germs of new wars.

This security we could have had at a cheaper rate and with a better prospect of permanence by an agreement with England. France and Russia were as far from entertaining aggressive intentions against Germany as England was. He who maintains that such intentions existed is bound to produce evidence to prove their existence. He who denies their existence is not obliged to prove the contrary.

DID FRANCE MEAN TO ATTACK US?

So far as England is concerned I have been able to produce conclusive rebutting evidence. With regard to France I may be allowed to deal with the matter briefly, since there is scarcely anyone in Germany—apart, of course, from the Government—who seriously maintains the assertion that France intended to attack us. That France is not abused, but that, on the contrary, regret is expressed that she was drawn into the war, innocently and against her will, is one of the few remaining sympathetic traits in the public life of Germany of to-day. As a matter of fact, anyone who should advance the assertion that the French Republic of 1914 entertained even the remotest idea of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine by force of arms, would merely prove that he knows nothing

of the history or of the tendency of thought of modern France, and that his judgment is based on impressions, which may have been correct forty-four years ago, perhaps even thirty-four or twenty-four years ago, but which in the last twenty years have more and more faded into a phantom.

In framing this judgment I do not rely on newspaper articles, but on personal impressions gained in France during many periods of residence there, extending over many years. Until about the middle of the 'nineties the wound of Alsace-Lorraine still ached; from that time it healed more and more, and about the beginning of the new century scarcely a trace of the old wound remained. The end of Boulangism rang in the end of the *revanche* idea; the worst of the noisy patriots, Déroulède at their head, were condemned or banished from France. The result of the Dreyfus affair, with the victory of the party of illumination, purified the atmosphere from the powers of darkness, from the forces of political and clerical reaction, which in France were favourable to a policy of war, as they are to-day in Germany. Convinced friends of peace like Jules Simon, Frédérick Passy, the Senator Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, and, above all, Jaurès, gained more and more influence on serious public opinion, and pressed into the background the noisy patriots of the Boulevard. The intellectual relations between France and Germany constantly became more intimate. Politicians, writers, actors and actresses of distinction, learned men and artists, brought about this exchange in matters of the mind on this side and on that, and by the reciprocation of visits succeeded in establishing personal relations between the countries. Coquelin and Sarah Bernhardt were honoured in Germany and were received by the Emperor with marks of distinction. In the summer of 1901 two French officers of high rank paid an official visit to Berlin, and were in-

vited by the Emperor to a military banquet at which one of these officers, General Bonnal, proposed the toast of the German Army and their soldier-Emperor. Innumerable other phenomena could be cited to show the increasing understanding and friendship between the two nations. The speech of Jaurès in the French Chamber of Deputies, in June, 1902, was, however, epoch-making; in this speech expression was, for the first time, given, in clear words and from a responsible quarter, to the thought that it was at last time *to forget the ideas of revanche, to become reconciled with history, and to free the nations of Europe from the intolerable burden of armaments.* The speech of Jaurès found almost unanimous approval in the French Chamber and in the whole of the serious-minded Press. Certain chauvinistic rags, of course, which, like similar papers in our country, earn their daily bread by stirring up passion, expressed their discontent with Jaurès, but they could not alter the fact that the Socialist leader had given expression to the views of the overwhelming majority of the industrious and thrifty French nation. In a speech in November, 1904, Jaurès developed his train of thought and held up *an alliance with Germany based on a renunciation of all retaliation by force* as an end worthy of pursuit. A few months later the Morocco dispute began, when, in March, 1905, the Emperor William landed in Tangier, and in an address to the Envoys of the Sultan ran counter to French policy in Morocco. *Was France to blame for the tension which now arose?* Must France be held responsible for the fact that this challenging action on the part of Germany produced—as in the case of the Krüger telegram previously, and the ship sent to Agadir later—the opposite effect from what was intended? These theatrical coups are indeed no proper instrument for use in foreign policy. They are irritating rather than impressive, and since it is more diffi-

cult to effect an understanding between people in a state of irritation than between people who are not so irritated, it would be advisable to discontinue such theatrical coups and to convey our wishes to foreign Governments in a normal, business-like way. The atmosphere of irritation which since then has almost continuously governed our diplomatic relations with France must accordingly be attributed to us and not to France.

Notwithstanding all this it was, as is known, possible to arrive at a definite settlement of the Morocco confusion by means of three treaties in 1905, 1909, and 1911. France, again, is not to blame if we came out of this worse than France did. Success in diplomatic negotiations depends not solely on military strength, but even more on the diplomatic dexterity of the Governments negotiating. There can be no doubt that, from a military point of view, we are stronger than France. There can be equally little doubt that we are diplomatically the weaker. And this, indeed, need cause no surprise when we consider the manner in which we recruit and train the scions of our diplomacy. In the list of French representatives at European Courts the names which occur are those of middle-class families only; in the list of German representatives there are exclusively Barons, Counts, and Princes. This, of course, does not imply that a nobleman may not be as competent in business as an ordinary citizen. Since, however, the percentage of the nobility among the German people is quite insignificant, whereas the members of the nobility claim 100 per cent. of the diplomatic representatives, the suspicion is justified that it is not their competence in business, but their title of nobility which is the decisive consideration in filling appointments in our diplomatic service. Diplomacy is a business, like any other; if it differs from others, it differs only in the exceptional responsibilities involved, and in the most stupendous con-

sequences which may be entailed by errors committed. If even a merchant chooses a clerk without regard to whether he is of high birth or an officer in a cavalry regiment, how much more is the State in filling these responsible offices under obligation to ignore these qualities, which may be decoratively beautiful, but which are practically worthless. If the German Empire had acted from this point of view, the Morocco negotiations, which, indeed, in the view of our opponents, were not entirely unfavourable to us, might have borne even richer fruit. Those who are not satisfied with the result should seek for the cause where it really is to be found, not in England or in France, or in anyone beyond the German frontier. They may beat the breast and cry aloud "*Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!*" In any case, however, the German people does not appear to me to be under any obligation to pay for the failures of its diplomatists by the sacrifice of its blood and its well-being. Here there appears to me to be clearly a lack of proportion between the offence and the expiation, especially since it is not the guilty but the innocent who is called upon to bear the punishment. *Let us make better diplomatists, voilà tout!* That is the only practical conclusion which a reasonable nation can draw from any diplomatic checks which it may have suffered. There is, however, not the slightest occasion for patriotic anguish and for bellicose shrieks for revenge.

Where, then, is the evidence for the assertion that France was evilly disposed towards us? What evidence is there for supposing that, apart from the alleged diplomatic defeats, she intended to inflict on us military defeats as well? I seek, but I find none.

DID RUSSIA MEAN TO ATTACK US?

The position is similar in the case of Russia. For a century and a half there have been no conflicts of in-

terests between Germany and Russia, and such conflicts could, indeed, scarcely arise, since the pressure exercised by the two countries follows quite different lines which nowhere intersect. As we have no ambitions, or at least have hitherto had none, on the Russian Baltic Provinces—a Prussian Irredentism fortunately does not exist—so Russia never thought of appropriating East Prussia, West Prussia, or Posen. Russia is large enough to be able to do without our provinces. The pressure of her expansion follows a direction which touches neither our property nor our interests.

The tension between Russia and Austria I here leave intentionally out of the question. It was *we* who declared war against Russia while she was still living in full peace with Austria, and was, indeed, still conducting her negotiations which held out a rich prospect of success. The war between Austria and Russia only broke out on August 6th, whereas we delivered the declaration of war at Petrograd on August 1st. We began the war asserting that Russia meant to attack *us*, and we have succeeded in persuading the German people that she *had* already attacked us.

I am, then, justified in asking: *Why did Russia attack us?* What end did she have in view? What did she want from us? It is no sufficient answer to this question to refer to Pan-Slav efforts. Did Russia wish to make us Slavonic? Did she wish to suppress German culture in favour of Slavonic culture? No one will seriously maintain such a foolish assertion. Russian culture in the last generations has, quite apart from this, exercised a strong influence on our German spiritual life; it would be difficult to mention a German poet of the last fifty years who has given an impulse to the literature and to the intellectual tendencies of Germany similar to that received from Tolstoi. On the other hand, not merely the intellectual but also the political

and military life of Russia was everywhere permeated by German elements, and everywhere in Russia men of German name occupied leading positions. This, moreover, need cause no astonishment, for the Romanovs are themselves of German blood and their wives have nearly always been of German stock. It may, indeed, be asserted that there were scarcely any other two European countries which were more intimately connected than Germany and Russia by means of peaceful penetration on both sides, thus constituting a league of peace which was crowned by the traditional friendship of the two ruling houses, and sealed by the comradeship in arms of a hundred years ago.

What, then, is the source from which there has suddenly sprung "*the hatred of Germany nourished on Pan-Slav ambitions,*" of which the Chancellor spoke on December 2nd? Do we suffer from Russophobia? Had this hatred of Germany not to be expressly constructed in order to give a psychological basis for the alleged Russian attack? What facts are adduced in support of this hatred of Germany? Out with them! I fear we may have long to wait before these facts are produced.

In any case, the hatred of Germany entertained in Russia does not appear to be insuperable. Already we begin to hear the views of well-meaning people who speak of peace at an early date with Russia, and who are anxious to gather all our forces against the chief enemy, England. On the other hand, there are those who declare that Muscovitism and the absolutism of the Tsar are our chief enemies, and who emphasise our community of culture with Western Nations. *Where is the truth to be found? What are we really aiming at? Against whom, and for what are we fighting?* These are all questions which are answered differently by different people, producing a gigantic confusion of the mind, an ocean of lies and of perversions, an ocean.

unfortunately, dyed in blood, which threatens completely to sweep away German happiness and well-being.

This confusion is to be attributed to the fact that there is, among those who know, a tacit conspiracy not to speak the truth, but that they have overlooked the necessity of arriving at a complete agreement as to what is to be established in the place of truth. So everyone tells lies on his own, and the lies impinge on each other, like the electric sparks from two stations which are differently charged; one saying cancels the other; one lie drives another out of the field. Swift, in his old age, was indeed right when he said: "As universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems, it is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection even by those who are most celebrated in that faculty."

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE

Not only is there thus a complete absence of evidence in support of the assertion that the Triple Entente intended to attack Germany, but the *exact opposite* has been proved in the preceding discussion. The leading spirit in the Entente was undeniably England. We hear this asserted daily in every possible key, and quite recently it was emphatically advanced by the Chancellor in the meeting of the Reichstag on December 2nd; the statement, moreover, rests on the truth. If, however, this leading spirit has for almost a decade striven only for peace and an understanding with Germany, if the other two Entente Powers have never in the slightest degree shown, by word or by action, their intention to hamper or suppress the initiative taken by their political friend in the direction of peace, if, on the contrary, they also have given unmistakable expression to their desire for peace by conciliatory behaviour on great and small

diplomatic conflicts (Morocco, the Balkan War, the Potsdam Agreements of 1911, etc.), it would not be a bold conclusion to infer *that the Triple Entente has been a defensive alliance, and that it has in no way whatever had aggressive intentions*. He who asserts the contrary must submit proofs in support of his statement. These proofs the Chancellor himself was unable to submit in his two speeches in the Reichstag. The Entente Powers are reproached on account of their evil disposition towards Germany, but no actions are instanced which have proceeded from such a disposition. We celebrate in our enemies such beautiful qualities of the heart as envy, hatred, race antipathy, the lust of vengeance, but they cannot be reproached with a single action in which they have endeavoured to translate these dispositions into deeds. So long as Germany is not recognised as the educator of the world—something after the style of “Rembrandt as the educator” of the Germans—we must be content to leave other people in possession of their dispositions, as, indeed, they on their side have neither the wish nor the power to suppress ours.

We must rest satisfied with combating their dispositions only when these manifest themselves as actions. We are not the rulers of foreign nations as Ahlwardt was the ruler of all the Germans. We are scarcely called upon to give moral instructions to others so long as we ourselves need such instruction more than they do. The hatred, the envy, and rage for revenge which has been produced in our country—formerly by a small section of the people of no intellectual standing, but since the beginning of the war by the greatest and best part of the German nation—surpass in volume and intensity all that has been produced in the three other countries taken together.

But if there were no aggressive intentions, *what was it that brought the Entente together and cemented them*

more and more closely to each other? It was the fear of Germany and the distrust of Germany's imperialistic efforts. It was this fear that united them and gave increasing compactness to their alliance. The more they saw Germany increasing—not our trade nor our well being, which indeed benefited their trade and prosperity also, but our military power and our warlike disposition—the more they saw the danger of German nationalism raising her head and appearing above the steps of the throne, the more distrustful and apprehensive they became, and the more closely did they draw together for the purpose of common defence.

Everything combined in recent years to increase their apprehensions: the enormous naval armaments which, in spite of English proposals for agreement, were piled up with constantly increasing acceleration, the sudden increase of our land army, quite unprecedented in military history, the policy of the mailed fist, which in all international questions affecting the interest of Germany or Austria struck on the table and compelled the others to give way, above all, however, certain facts, which did not take place in public, but which were well known to European Governments. These facts have only recently received publicity, but must, at an earlier date, already have received from the Entente Powers the attention they merited.

GIOLITTI'S REVELATIONS

It is known that, soon after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Austrian Government proposed to take military measures against the growing Great-Serbian movement, which had been produced as a result of the annexation. This was an act of criminal insanity on the part of Austria; it was a crime, because here the violator intended to punish the violated because he re-

sisted violation; it was insane, because national tendencies cannot be suppressed by force of arms. But the wise men of Austria thought otherwise. Serbia was threatened with war, and only through the submission of Russia and the mediation of England and Germany was it possible to prevent, by means of a propitiatory declaration on the part of Serbia, the European war which even then threatened to break out. That was in March, 1909, and is known to everyone. What, however, was not known, and has only become known by the revelations of Giolitti on December 5th, 1914, in the Italian Chamber, is the fact *that Austria entertained in August, 1913, the same intentions as in 1909, and was prevented from giving effect to these intentions only by the opposition of Italy.*

These revelations of Giolitti have rightly been regarded in the whole of the foreign Press as epoch-making, because they revealed in an incontestable manner the aggressive intentions of Austria. But precisely for these reasons the German and Austrian Governments have preserved, with regard to these revelations, a silence as of death. There is therefore all the more reason why I should in this place once more awaken the dead to life.

In midsummer, 1913, after the second Balkan War, the relations in the Balkans between those States immediately concerned were regulated by the Treaty of Bucharest. Austria-Hungary was not satisfied with the arrangement to which effect was given, since in her view Serbia had got too much and Bulgaria too little. She aimed at accomplishing a revision of the Treaty and in view of Serbia's opposition resolved to give effect to her desires by arms. For this purpose she naturally required the support of the Powers of the Triple Alliance and above all of Italy, who had always claimed the right to make her influence felt in the settlement

of the Balkan question. The concurrence of the allied Powers in military action against Serbia was, however, regarded as necessary by Austria chiefly, because the Austrian Government was even then fully aware of the fact *that a war with Serbia must lead to a European struggle*. Austria consequently addressed inquiries to Italy with a view to ascertaining what her attitude would be in view of her duties under the Triple Alliance in the event of a Serbian, and, should it arise, a European war. As a result of the Austrian inquiry the following exchange of telegrams took place between the Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, and the Prime Minister, Giolitti, who was then absent: "Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *casus fœderis* of the Triple Alliance, *which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable*. I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the *casus fœderis* arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve."

Giolitti replied to this: "If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a *casus fœderis* cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account *since there is no question of defence inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her*. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure (*pericolosissima avventura*)."

On this occasion success, in fact, attended the task of

restraining Austria from a war against Serbia, but whether this was due to Germany's efforts or to Italy's opposition is not known. What, however, is to-day of the highest interest is the fact that, even a year before the outbreak of the present war, Austria was firmly resolved to initiate, without any urgent reason, a military conflict with Serbia, for there was then no question of the death of an Archduke, nor had a specially dangerous Serbian propaganda been developed against Austria, since Serbia had been sufficiently engrossed by the war against the Turks, and later against her own ally, Bulgaria.

This fact is of the greatest importance in judging the question of guilt in the present war. But there is one other point which may be learned from the events of 1913; first, that the danger of a European war as a consequence of an Austro-Serbian war was even at that time clear to the minds of the politicians of the Triple Alliance, and, secondly, that it was possible to exorcise this danger by dissuading Austria from the perilous adventure, and by refusing to furnish her with assistance. If these lessons of the past had been observed a year later the present war would not have broken out. Italy has observed these lessons, and her attitude is morally and legally incontestable. Germany, however, did not desire to do so, and she cannot, therefore, object if her attitude is described in terms which are exactly opposite to those applied to Italy. The fact that Germany in July, 1914, neglected to exercise on Austria the moderating influence which she had successfully brought to bear on her a year before is capable of a simple explanation. Germany *at that time* did not desire a European war, or more correctly expressed, she did *not yet* desire it, whereas in 1914 she *did* desire this war.

THE CHANGE OF FRONT IN BERLIN. THE WAR PARTY

The tendencies in Berlin which led to this change of front are placed in a most interesting light by the French Yellow Book.¹

If these French Reports were the only sources of information available for this period of contemporary history they might be regarded with distrust. As, however, they are in accordance with all the facts, which have been distinctly manifested in the political life and in the politico-military literature of Germany,² these French Reports on the state of opinion in Germany must be recognised as entirely accurate, and, indeed, the clear analysis of German conditions contained in them can only evoke admiration.

I have already in an earlier passage dealt with the dangers involved in the efforts of the war party whose exercising ground was exclusively in North Germany and whose headquarters were situated at the Court of Berlin. The leaders of this party were for the most part Generals who devoted the pensioned leisure of their retirement to the creation of something approaching a military organisation of their forces, and both by the spoken and the written word prepared the German peo-

¹ Report of the French Ambassador, Cambon, dated the 17th March, 1913, enclosing two reports of the Military and Naval Attachés; further, a report of Etienne, the Minister of War, to Jonnard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd April, 1913, with enclosure; a report of Cambon to Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 6th May, 1913, a report to the same Minister dated 30th July, and a report of Cambon dated 22nd November, 1913.

² After this book was finished a very interesting dissertation came to my notice, entitled "*Der deutsche Chauvinismus*," by Professor Dr. O. Nippold, Stuttgart, 1913. The book contains a survey of the chauvinistic literature of recent years, and earnestly points out the dangers of this movement.

ple for the war, which they, because *they* wished it, declared to be inevitable. In addition to the existing naval league they founded, in 1912, a "Wehrverein," the object of which was to combat the tendencies in favour of peace to be found in the German nation, to create a public opinion in favour of an increase in the land forces, and gradually to accustom the nation to the thought of a European war. The natural auxiliary forces of these gentlemen were their social and professional companions, the territorial and the military nobility who from remote times have controlled the Prussian State, and have regarded the King of Prussia as their supreme head. The increasing democratisation of Germany, which had already advanced so far as to pass a vote of no confidence in an Imperial Chancellor and a Prussian First Minister, and to extend protection to the civil powers in Alsace against the military authorities, the constant increase in the vote of the social democratic party, and of their representatives in Parliament, the increasing industrialisation of Germany, which threatened more and more to repress the economic and the social importance of the territorial nobility—all these phenomena were an abomination to the Prussian Junkers, and had produced in the circles which they frequented a state of mind which can be expressed in the thought: "Things cannot go on like this in Germany, and since an amelioration in the sense we desire cannot be achieved in peace, we must be assisted in our need by a lively and jolly war" (*ein frischer, fröhlicher Krieg*).

At all times the Junkers have formed the kernel of the Prussian war-party. More recently, however, they have been joined by various auxiliary forces, colonial enthusiasts who pursued the foolish madness of territorial expansion as an outlet for our economic and human surplus, ideologists in whose narrow outlook Ger-

many marches at the head of civilisation and who therefore consider that German culture has a claim to rule the world, diplomatists still grieving over their own failures and calling aloud for revenge for Algieras and Agadir, but chiefly, as a matter of course, the cannon kings and the manufacturers of armour plate, who with the wealth at their disposal can support the venomous Press not only at home but abroad. All these elements, some of them interested and some deluded, the deceivers and the deceived, formed a compact force which, under military leadership, fell into line with true Prussian discipline on the word of command, and steadfastly advanced to the end in view. The war-party formed only a minority of the German people. The great majority was distinctly devoted to peace. The great mass of the labouring population, the industrious middle classes, the banking and manufacturing circles, the national groups of Poles, Alsations, etc., the South of Germany not yet entirely Prussianised, all these sections of the German people without doubt desired peace and quiet progress along the path by which Germany had arrived at her present height. *But these, the forces of peace, were not organised.* They were merely individuals; they did not form a compact body. They did not consider it necessary to organise themselves as a peace-party to oppose the war-party, because until midsummer of this year the latter were regarded as a *quantité négligeable*; a European war with all its horrors was regarded as an impossibility; no one realised how far the instigators of war with their powerful patronage had already undermined the ground of peace. In the middle of July any one who had asserted in Germany that on August 1st we would be face to face with a European war would have been in danger of being shut up in an asylum. The people of rabid views were known, but their outpourings were looked upon as harmless, and any

counter-organisation for the protection of peace was regarded as a superfluity.

It is true that disappointment over the Morocco agreement had affected even wider circles. The supposed diplomatic defeat was regretted, but this was not regarded as a reason for crying aloud for vengeance in blood. The diplomatists were criticised, but Generals were not demanded. Criticism was naturally directed in the first place against the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who bore the sole responsibility; it did not, however, stop there, but ascended as far as the Emperor himself. The policy of peace, which the Emperor William had taken as the guiding line of his conduct after the first stormy days of his youth, had for long ceased to find favour in certain circles. He was not merely criticised, but the attempt was made—not without success—to procure for him what was nothing short of unpopularity.

A zealous and well-organised Press praised the son at the expense of the father and increased the dissensions between the two which had found open expression in a number of well-known serious disputes. With diabolic dexterity they succeeded in playing upon the most sensitive chords in the Emperor's soul, his personal vanity, his thirst for popularity, his ambition to be the first amongst his people, living in no man's shadow, the consciousness he had of his authority, which had led him to adopt as his motto the dictum *suprema lex regis voluntas*. Like the poison poured into the ear of Hamlet's father the poisonous thought was instilled into him that the times demanded deeds, not words, that only a purifying war could drive away the sultry heat and restore

to the German Empire and to its Emperor the old prestige within and without.

In the end a continual dropping will wear out a stone. It is interesting to observe the gradual change in the Emperor's views during the last three years, from 1911 to 1914. In 1910 the Emperor William could still discuss with the French Minister, Pichon, the idea of a union of all civilised States and express his approval of the idea. In the previous year, in 1909, speaking at Cuxhaven, he emphasised that peace was needed in equal measure by all civilised nations "to enable them to discharge undisturbed the great tasks of culture involved in their economic and commercial development."¹ In 1911 he emphasised, in a speech delivered in Hamburg, that economic competition between nations could not be fought out by one party striking at the other, but only by each nation straining their capacity to the highest point. On New Year's Day, 1911, in an address to the diplomatists, he still eulogised the peaceful understanding existing between the nations, which was more in accordance with their interests than the conduct of dangerous wars. But in his speech at Hamburg on June 18th, 1912, a different note is already sounded: "Not inconsiderately must we raise the standard where we are not sure that we shall be able to defend it." This speech was delivered six months after the Morocco Convention, and anyone who can read between the lines may already detect the influence which the criticism of the Emperor's peaceful policy had begun to exercise on the thoughts of the Emperor; he no longer rejects war under all circumstances, but if war must come, it is to be, according to the saying of Clausewitz, a continuation of policy by other means—that is, of course, on the assumption that the standard can be defended, in other words, that we are

¹ Fr. Fried: *Der Kaiser und der Weltfriede*, Berlin, 1910.

stronger than the other side. In the next year, at the boisterous banquets in commemoration of the War of Liberation of 1813, this military note more and more suppressed the notes of peace. An intoxication appeared to have seized the whole of Germany—a new intoxication of freedom—from what bondage no one knew. This drunkenness was artificially produced by the fiery beverages which an unscrupulous patriotic Press had for many a year and day poured out to the German nation. Even those occupying the highest positions were unable to escape this condition of intoxication. A true epidemic of patriotism broke out, setting high and low, young and old, in a fever of ecstasy. No one any longer inquired as to the grounds or the object of this popular movement prepared long in advance and skilfully staged by the Nationalist wire-pullers, a movement in which the Emperor and the Chancellor were at first victims carried away by the stream, a movement in which later they were voluntary participators, and of which in the end they became the conscious directing leaders.

Herr von Bethmann certainly made a long resistance before capitulating to the war-party. But in the end he was obliged to yield, that he might not fall a victim to the Camarilla of the Crown Prince and to the company of Generals. Even in 1910 and 1911 he vigorously defended himself against his opponents, who more and more were digging the ground from under his feet. When he was accused in the Mannesmann affair of showing excessive pliability towards foreign countries he exclaimed to his critics in the Reichstag: "I will never make myself a party to a policy of breaking treaties." When the great debate took place in the Reichstag on March 30th, 1911, on the question of armaments, Bethmann turned almost in supplication to the representatives of the German people and urged them

to protect the German people against irresponsible Press agitations, to which, unfortunately, it often weakly succumbed. "A counterpoise against all these and similar influences," exclaimed the Chancellor, "cannot be otherwise than desirable, and if international labour succeeds in creating such a counterpoise, I will be the first to extend it a hearty welcome." But, as we have said, the elements which might have formed such a counterpoise against the war-movement were too few. The opposition of the Chancellor, as previously that of the Emperor, was soon borne down, and the great military law of 1913 was the first beacon-signal of the victory of the enemy along the whole line.

That war was not, in accordance with Austria's desires, brought about as early as the summer of 1913, rested no longer on grounds of principle, but merely on motives of opportunism. The occasion for striking the blow which Austria believed, or professed, that she had—a regulation of the frontier between Bulgaria and Serbia, and similar matters—was too threadbare to justify to the German people a murder of the European nations, and too little designed to enkindle patriotic enthusiasm. "Wars which are not supported by popular sentiment are no longer possible in our time"—to this extent the political thought even of these reactionaries had already advanced. The question whether this or that place with an unpronounceable name situated somewhere in the south-east of Europe should be governed by Serbian or Bulgarian officials was of too little importance for the German people to permit of it being stamped as a war for the holiest possession of the nation. Thus the word went from Berlin to Vienna: "Not yet."

Moreover, military considerations were clearly decisive in favour of this "Not yet." We were not yet sufficiently prepared. We were, it is true, considerably

superior to all others, but this superiority had to be increased still further by bringing into force the new law of defence, which had just received preliminary approval from the Reichstag. The extension of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which was intended to provide unhampered movement from the North Sea to the Baltic for even the largest ships of war, was not yet ready. The newest instruments of death were probably still awaiting the hour of their birth. Zeppelins and submarines had still to be built, and in many other ways our military preparations had still to be carried to the stage of perfection. In a word, we were not yet ripe for striking the blow, *which in principle had even then been decided upon*. We were only waiting for the next favourable opportunity, and for a condition of perfect preparedness, to be able to make use of this opportunity with success. Meanwhile, the change in the views of the Emperor made further progress; his entourage, with von Moltke, the head of the General Staff, as their leader, the Minister of War, the Crown Prince, and his influential adherents, all laboured—although still to a certain extent in opposition to the Chancellor, who had, it is true, taken part in the whole development, and covered it with his responsibility, but who was now still shrinking from the decisive step—all laboured for the one end—that of bringing about the “inevitable” war as speedily as possible, and of gaining the entire support of the Emperor for their efforts. “We must put on one side,” said General von Moltke on one occasion, “all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. *When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one’s favour*. Success alone justifies war.”¹

What success had attended the activity of the War Party is seen in Cambon’s report of November 22nd.

¹ French Yellow Book, No. 3.

1913, to the Minister, Pichon. Cambon tells of a conversation which the Emperor William had in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff with King Albert, an account of which was communicated to the French Ambassador "from an absolutely reliable source." King Albert found a complete change in the Emperor, whom he had formerly known as an honourable lover of peace. He had given up his pacific tendencies, and had made the ideas of the war-party his own. War now appeared to him inevitable, and he agreed with his Chief of the Staff when the latter declared that this time the matter must be settled, and that the Emperor could be sure that his people would follow him with irresistible enthusiasm. The thoughts of the Emperor were directed chiefly against France, and King Albert made fruitless efforts to convince him of the peaceful intentions of the French Government and of the French people. Cambon also confirmed from his own observation the altered train of thought of the Emperor, which he attributed to the increasing impatience of the soldiers, to the influence of the Pan-Germanists, and to a certain extent to jealousy at the popularity acquired by his son in these circles. "The Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly foreign to him"; with these words Cambon concludes his report. It is impossible to deny that the shrewd Frenchman was a careful observer. Scarcely eight months later the consequences of the change in the views of the Emperor were revealed. But even in the critical days which preceded the outbreak of the European War, the forces of good and of evil, of Ormuzd and Ahriman, still struggled with each other in the soul of the Emperor. Now that the portentous decision had to be taken which was to set the world in flames and bring upon mankind unprecedented evils, now that the project which had been so long prepared

and resolved upon was at last to be transformed into an act, the Imperial hand shrank from the decisive stroke of the pen, and as in a mist the old ideals of peace and of the happiness of nations once more arose in the soul of the monarch. To this must be attributed the oscillations of the last days, the continual change in the actions of the Emperor, fluctuating to and fro between the desire for peace and the threat of war, between intimidation and sincerity, pursuing so long the policy of the mailed fist, until gradually all policy disappeared and only the mailed fist was left.

III

THE CRIME

THE detailed discussion in the previous chapter of the antecedents of the war was necessary in order to understand the rapid development of events which in the ten short days from July 23rd to August 1st, 1914, led to the greatest war in the history of the world.

The whole attitude of Germany from the first Hague Conference onwards, her consistent refusal of all restrictions of naval or military armaments, her opposition to the formation of a court of compulsory arbitration, her constantly renewed efforts to secure for herself the neutrality of England, without on her part giving up in any way her own freedom of action, the gigantic increase in her land and naval forces, the toleration shown for years to a criminal chauvinist movement, and the approval extended to this movement at a later date—these all indicate that for long Germany had reckoned on the European war as a matter of fact, and that she had resolved to bring about the “inevitable” in the moment most favourable for her.

The antecedents of the war down to 1914 must give rise to what in criminal proceedings would be called a *prima facie* case, that Germany, in common with her ally Austria, desired a European war sooner or later—Germany, in order to give effect to her plans of world power; Austria, in order to improve her position in the Balkans.

Such a *prima facie* case, however, does not amount to a certainty. The probability which may be inferred

from the antecedents of the war is not in itself a proof of guilt. This proof of guilt can only be deduced from the circumstances of the case, that is to say, from the diplomatic documents which place before us the historical origins of the war.

The indictment to be brought against the Empires of Germany and Austria is that in the summer of 1914 they *intentionally* brought about the war which they had long prepared and desired, because they thought that the moment was specially favourable for striking the blow. This time the occasion of the dispute was not, as in previous years, a paltry territorial question in the Balkans, a squabble about a harbour or a stretch of sea-shore, questions which could neither arouse public interest nor kindle the enthusiasm of nations. The issue raised on this occasion related to the murder of an Arch-Duke and his Consort, a tragic event which was bound to awaken the indignation of the whole world, and, so they calculated, could not fail to enlist universal sympathy on behalf of the Powers who appeared as the avengers of such a crime.

Thus, in the first place, the *moral* advantage was on their side. But they believed that they could also rely on a similar military advantage. Certain matters just about this time had come to light which were regarded as proving the disorganisation of the French and the defective preparation of the Russian army. The revelations of Senator Humbert had just made public the existence of serious defects in the French Army, and it was believed that the Russian Army, quite apart from its defective equipment, was still required to cope with internal unrest and weakened by civil dissensions. England's neutrality was still hoped for, in spite of previous failures in this direction, and the Italians were thought to be foolish enough to draw the chestnuts out of the fire in the Balkans for the hated Austrian, and to risk

their whole national existence "pour le roi de Prusse."

All this was a complete miscalculation. But as the art of calculation was not understood in Berlin and Vienna, it was thought that the moment was favourable for striking—and they struck.

This is the accusation which is now to be proved.

*

* *

The events connected with the assassination of the Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort are in their main features universally known, and do not here require any detailed discussion. For my purpose it will be sufficient to examine critically the diplomatic transactions, and to emphasise those points which are of decisive importance in considering the question of the guilt and the responsibility for this war. The demonstration which I will submit will rest only on official documents, and reference will chiefly be made to the five volumes of diplomatic correspondence which have been published in white, blue, yellow, orange, and grey by Germany, England, France, Russia, and Belgium respectively. A book in red has not yet appeared; it is left to the nations to write this volume in blood.

Other diplomatic documents which have appeared apart from these books will also be considered.

At the very outset surprise is occasioned by the meagre contents of the German White Book and by the fact that Austria, unlike all the other belligerent countries, has not considered it advisable to publish a volume of diplomatic correspondence. The telegrams exchanged between the German and the Austrian Governments are, further, almost completely absent from the German White Book, whereas those between the Entente Powers are reproduced in their publications with the utmost detail. The German White Book contains only 36 documents; the English Blue Book, on the contrary, contains

161; the Russian Orange Book, 79; the French Yellow Book, 161; and the Belgian Grey Book, 79. The statements of our opponents are thus far more detailed than those of the two allied Empires, one of which has until to-day maintained a complete silence. This fact is in itself very illuminating.¹

The historical investigator is frequently obliged to complete the gaps revealed in the German White Book by reference to the comprehensive accounts of the Entente Governments. There is, however, general agreement between the various publications in their reports as to fact, and it is only from the spirit of the narrator that they assume varying complexions. In my critical discussion I will completely ignore these different complexions. It will be sufficient if I restrict myself to the bare facts reported by all parties alike, facts which indeed are in themselves eloquent enough. One cannot, of course, assert that of the various publications some are more deserving of credence than others. Diplomatic documents are merely documents, and they are all equally credible. Moreover, they are mutually supported by each other, and taken together they form so complete a chain, each link so fits into the other, that the truth appears clear and incontestable.

I will deal in succession with the various points which are decisive on the question of guilt, and I will take each State separately. Each State will receive its own debit and credit account, and each account will be closed with a balance which will show the guilt or the innocence of the State in question.

¹ An Austrian book has just appeared in the beginning of February when this work was in the press, that is to say, six months after the beginning of the war. I will discuss this book in a separate appendix.

A

AUSTRIA

At 6 o'clock on the evening of July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government handed to the Serbian Government a Note, in which the Government presented a series of demands, with reference to the Great Serbian propaganda which it was suggested had reached its highest point in the assassination of the Grand Ducal couple, intended to bring about the suppression of these efforts which, as was alleged, were tolerated by the Serbian Government. There were contained among the ten demands made by Austria some (and, indeed, a considerable number) of a character such as had never before been presented to an independent State, and such as hitherto had only been imposed on subject nationalities. The Serbian Government were required to publish on a certain day on the first page of their official journal a declaration, the wording of which was prescribed. This declaration had in view the most rigorous suppression of every form of Great Serbian propaganda, and threatened with severe punishment the whole population, but more particularly those officers and officials who should in future take part in this movement. This threat was simultaneously to be communicated by the King to the Army as an order of the day, and published in the official bulletin of the Army. A series of detailed demands followed: the suppression of publications; dissolution of societies and the prevention of the formation of similar societies; elimination from school-books of all statements hostile to Austria; removal of all officers and functionaries guilty of the propaganda mentioned; arrest of certain persons compromised by the inquiry into the assassination; prevention

of illicit traffic in arms across the frontier; explanation regarding unfriendly utterances of high Serbian officials, &c. Under numbers 5 and 6 of the Austrian Demands it was exacted of the Serbian Government that they should "accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the Territorial integrity of the Monarchy," and further, that they should "take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of June 28th who are on Serbian territory." "Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government," it is further stated, "will take part in the investigation relating thereto."

A memorandum on certain conclusions of the inquiry at Serajewo on points 7 and 8 was added to the Note, and an answer was required within forty-eight hours, that is to say, before 6 o'clock in the evening of July 25th.

The Note was communicated to the European Powers on July 24th—without the addition of the evidence in support of the accusations—and on July 25th it was published in the European Press. It is well known that the unusual contents and the abrupt form of the Note created excitement everywhere, not only in Governmental circles, but also among the general public. Everyone expected an abrupt refusal on the part of Serbia, followed by a war between Austria and her neighbouring kingdom, the intervention of Russia in the conflict, and in further sequence a European war. Ever since a Balkan question had existed the close relations between Russia and Serbia were known to everyone. From time immemorial community of race and religion, political traditions and interests, had united the two countries, and had created a kind of relationship extending far beyond the framework of the usual "spheres of interest." Russia had during and after the Balkan War

officially declared that any attack by Austria on Serbia would lead to her intervention.¹ On this occasion also it was announced in the official journal that Russia could not remain indifferent to military action on the part of Austria.²

At the same time, however, Russia, England, and France made the most urgent endeavours:

(1) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meeting the demands of Austria.³

(2) To obtain an extension of the time limit from Austria, which would enable the Powers to study the documentary material promised by Austria, and thus to exercise a moderating influence in Belgrade.⁴

The extension of the time limit was sharply refused by Austria,⁵ although England and Russia rightly pointed out that the communication of the Note to the Powers was purposeless and contradictory to international usages if they were not allowed time and opportunity to study the documents, and to intervene at Belgrade. Herr von Jagow had from the beginning expressed "doubts" as to whether Austria could concur in the extension of the time-limit.⁶ Count Berchtold was at Ischl. *No grounds were given for the refusal.*

Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian influence in Belgrade succeeded in obtaining from the Serbian Government an answer which caused throughout Europe even greater astonishment than the Austrian Note itself. Serbia concurred in nearly all the demands of the neighbouring monarchy. She declared herself ready to hand over for

¹ Blue Book, No. 139, and p. v. [popular edition.]

² Orange Book, No. 10.

³ Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 22, 30. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 40, 92. Yellow Book, No. 26.

⁴ Blue Book, Nos. 13, 17, 26. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 16.

⁵ Orange Book, No. 12.

⁶ Orange Book, No. 14. Blue Book, No. 18.

trial, without regard to his situation or rank, anyone whose complicity in the assassination should be proved. She pledged herself to publish the desired declarations in the official journal and to the Army, to introduce new criminal laws and an amendment of the Constitution to facilitate the prosecution and confiscation of hostile utterances in the Press. She promised to dissolve hostile societies, to revise the instruction in schools in the sense desired by Austria, to punish guilty officers and officials, to prevent the illicit traffic of arms, &c.

Only on two points did the Serbian Government permit itself in all submissiveness—the tone of the whole Note is, in fact, that of a subject to his over-lord, not that of one independent State to another—only on two points (5 and 6 of the Austrian Note) did the Serbian Government permit itself to raise a few modest objections. In reply to point 5 it observed:

“The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning of the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their Territory, but they declare that they will *admit such collaboration* as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.”

In reply to point 6:

“It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry

of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases, *communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given* to the Austro-Hungarian agents."

The conclusion of the Serbian Note runs as follows:—

"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the *International Tribunal of The Hague*, or to the *Great Powers* which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909."

The Serbian Note was handed to the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade on the afternoon of July 25th. Two hours later the Ambassador with his staff had left the Serbian capital. The Serbian answer appeared to the Austrian Government to be insufficient. Diplomatic relations with the neighbouring country were broken off by Austria.

Why? European diplomacy—apart, of course, from that of Germany—was confronted with a riddle for which only one solution was possible, the assumption that Austria, under all circumstances, desired war with Serbia. And as the Austrian Note was unique in its exorbitant demands, both in form and substance, so the Serbian Note also was unique in its essential and formal

submissiveness. *Never in time of peace had an independent State allowed itself to be dictated to in this way; never had an independent State submitted to similar intrusions in its internal life.* Education, the army, administration, justice, the Press, the right of association—all were to be trimmed to meet the wishes of Austria, and even where it was not possible to comply with these wishes to the last iota without being debased to the position of a vassal State—even then Serbia did not resolve on a bare refusal, but humbly asked for further explanations, and professed herself ready to go to the limits permitted by international law, and in these few points still in dispute she submitted herself to the *decision of the International Tribunal at the Hague or of the Great Powers.*

What more could Austria desire? Why did she refuse to give the explanations asked for? Why did she not accept decision by arbitration in questions which, according to the transactions and the resolutions of the Hague Conference, were in a peculiar sense suitable for reference to the Court of Arbitration—questions, namely, of law and of interpretation?

On July 27th the Austrian Government published the Serbian answer with observations in such a form that the text of the Serbian Note is throughout broken up by the Austrian observations. Even the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* only published the text broken up in this way. The intention of this mutilation was obviously to preclude an appreciation of the submissive form and the extremely conciliatory contents of the Serbian answer by the insertion of the Austrian observations. The pedantic nature of these observations was described by the Italian Minister, Di San Giuliano, as “quite childish.”¹ The expression is indeed much too mild, when one reflects that the fate of Europe, and indeed of the

¹ Blue Book, No. 64.

world, depended on these discussions. A hedge-lawyer would be ashamed to produce in the paltriest case quibbles such as those to which Austria descended in order to find grounds to justify her dissatisfaction with the Serbian answer. It is not worth while to discuss the details of this composition, which is miserable even in style. In part, the Austrian observations amount to an assertion that misunderstandings, more or less intentional, existed on the side of Serbia. Point 5, for example, was said to have nothing to do with international law or criminal procedure; it was rather "purely a matter of State police which must be settled by way of a separate agreement." Point 6, it was stated, was concerned only with the collaboration of Austrian officials at the preliminary police investigations, not in the judicial proceedings. In these two points then, the only ones in which Serbia had made any reservations—all the other points were in essence agreed to—in these, the only points still at issue, there were, according to the assertion of the Austrian Government itself, misunderstandings (due to the want of clearness in the Austrian Note), but these misunderstandings were of such a nature that they could have been removed in half-an-hour's discussion between experts, or, at the worst, they could have been submitted to the decision of a court of arbitration. *Why did Austria not take steps to bring about such a discussion or such a decision? Why did she at once have recourse to a measure as sharp as any that could have been adopted in the event of a flat refusal of her demands—to a rupture of diplomatic relations?*

This was the third incomprehensibility in the course of three days—an incomprehensibility, that is to say, except on the assumption that *Austria intended under all circumstances to begin a war against Serbia*, even at the risk of a European war. The Note itself was in

reality nothing but a declaration of war in disguise. No one, least of all Austria herself, could have expected from Serbia that she should give to demands so humiliating as those contained in the Note more careful attention than she did in fact devote to them. That Serbia, nevertheless, considered these suggestions, and, indeed, concurred in most of the Austrian demands, was a sign of an extraordinary devotion to peace on the part of this country, exhausted by two wars, and was at the same time the effect of the energetic summons to assume a compliant attitude issued by the Entente Powers with Russia at their head. The appeal for help which Alexander, the Prince Regent of Serbia, addressed on July 24th to the Czar Nicholas emphasised the readiness of Serbia to accept everything that was compatible with her position as an independent State, and asked Russia for advice as to the course to be pursued.¹ The advice thus elicited led to the Serbian Note of July 25th, that is to say, to a humiliation unprecedented in the history of diplomacy. *This in itself is enough to prove beyond all doubt the desire for peace which animated Serbia and Russia.* On the other hand, the facts that Austria regarded the Serbian Note as a negligible quantity, and that she did not even consider it of sufficient value to be accepted as the basis of further discussion, and flatly broke off diplomatic relations, prove that Austria under all circumstances desired war. Her intention to provoke a war is manifest in the first three acts of the tragedy: in the Austrian Note, in the refusal to extend the time-limit, and in the recall of the Ambassador.

The compliance of Serbia which the whole world longed and hoped for, and which the diplomacy of Europe—again, of course, with the exception of Germany—had endeavoured to bring about by all possible

¹ Orange Book, No. 6.

means, was for Austria the greatest of disappointments. In Vienna they had desired and hoped for a flat refusal, which would have justified a breach of diplomatic relations and a declaration of war. It was precisely for this reason that the Note had been couched in such sharp terms, in order that it might provoke a refusal. These expectations were disappointed because the love of peace on the part of Serbia and Russia was greater than the desire for war on the part of Austria. The authorities in Vienna thus found themselves in straits, since the expected ground for war had failed, and they saw themselves obliged to construct artificially a ground for war by seeking to transform the patent submission into a refusal by means of pettifogging and sophistical quibbles.

Until the Serbian Note was known to the public, everyone believed in a Serbian refusal, which was universally regarded as the only possible answer to the veiled declaration of war made by Austria. When, however, the European chancellories and the general public became acquainted with the Serbian Note on the 26th and 27th of July everyone was amazed at the attitude of Austria, for which no other explanation could be found than that she intended unconditionally to provoke a war, and everyone looked with horror to the approaching danger of a European war.

Sir Edward Grey was the first who sought to meet this danger. He proposed a conference of the ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his presidency in London with the object of devising ways and means of arriving at a settlement of the differences between Austria and Serbia. France and Italy at once accepted the proposal of Grey with great alacrity, and Russia also declared without hesitation that she regarded a conference of the ambassadors of the four Powers not directly concerned as the best method of maintaining

peace, and that she herself would accept the decision of this conference.¹ In fact, the composition of a conference consisting of two representatives of the Alliance and two of the Entente guaranteed an impartial examination of the questions at issue, which, in view of the Serbian answer, were reduced to a minimum, and were easily capable of solution in the shortest possible space of time. If it is borne in mind how incomparably more difficult problems had been successfully solved by the Conference of Ambassadors at London during the Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference, which, apart from arriving at a decision on many other questions affecting land and sea, race and nationality, had to undertake the task of bringing into the world nothing less than a whole kingdom.

But the idea of a conference of ambassadors encountered the opposition of Germany and Austria, precisely because it would have been such an easy matter to arrive in this way at a solution of the questions at issue. If the representatives of the four Powers not directly affected had sat down round a table in London to compare the verbal differences of the two Notes and to explain the misunderstandings, it was *absolutely certain* that they would have been successful in arriving at a solution, and Austria could not then have withdrawn from the proposals decided on by the ambassadors when Russia, speaking both for herself and on behalf of Serbia, had in advance expressed her readiness to accept these suggestions. Such a course would have frustrated the war, and for this reason it was unaccept-

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 17, 24, 35, 36, 42, 51, 53 (Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy).

able to Austria. For this reason Germany was in the first place entrusted with the task of stepping forward with the objection that they "could not call Austria before a European tribunal."¹ And when this objection was reduced by Grey to an absurdity with the observation that "it would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement,"² Austria came out with the flat declaration *that she must decline the English proposal*.³

This was the fourth action within five days whereby Austria, with the support of Germany, had brought to failure the efforts of the other Powers to preserve peace. The Austrian refusal was all the more glaring inasmuch as it was expressly intended that the conference should only discuss those points which affected Serbian sovereignty and independence, and since Austria had from the very beginning given assurances that she did not desire to touch the sovereignty or the independence of Serbia. The proposal thus, in fact, related only to an investigation from the point of view of public law into the question of *the extent to which* the Austrian demands, especially those in Articles 5 and 6 of the Note, were compatible with the sovereignty of the neighbouring State. The voluntary acceptance of the result of such an inquiry—which was not in any way an arbitration—could have done as little damage to the prestige of Austria as is done to the honour of a private citizen when in a civil action he accepts a compromise on expert advice. But Austria did not *desire* any settlement, and thus the idea of a conference failed.

¹ White Book, p. 409 [The references to the White Book are adapted to the reprint in the *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the outbreak of the European War*].

² Blue Book, No. 67.

³ White Book, p. 409.

Simultaneously with her objections to the conference of ambassadors, Germany had proposed direct discussions between Austria and Russia as the best method of preventing the Serbian question from developing¹ to a European conflict. This proposal was readily concurred in by England, Russia, and France, and Grey was at once prepared to withdraw his proposal for a conference of the four Powers until the direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd had led to a result, whether positive or negative.² If the result were positive, the conference would then be superfluous. If it were negative, the conference could still seek to attain what direct discussions had been unable to achieve.

So here again there was a new ray of hope! But unfortunately here again they reckoned without Austria. It is scarcely credible, yet it is true—the documents incontrovertibly prove it—*Austria declined the direct discussions with Russia, proposed by her ally Germany*, and Count Berchtold declared to the Russian ambassador Schebeko, who had impressed upon him in the most friendly manner the desirability of a free discussion in Petrograd, that Austria could neither “recede nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note.”³

Here there is either a lack of harmony between Berlin and Vienna, or else we have an instance of preconcerted collusion. Since a lack of harmony, for the existence of which there is no evidence, cannot be accepted, there only remains the other alternative, that of *preconcerted collusion*. The matter is all the more suspicious because, as already observed, the correspondence between Berlin and Vienna has not so far been published, and may

¹ Blue Book, No. 43. White Book, p. 409.

² Blue Book, No. 45.

³ Blue Book, Nos. 61, 74, 75, 78, 81, 93. Orange Book, Nos. 45, 50. White Book, p. 409.

therefore be presumed to contain things which it is desired to keep silent. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who every day of his life publishes all possible kinds of unofficial documents—extracts from the archives of Brussels, intercepted letters, and so on—would certainly have published long ere now his correspondence with Vienna if it had contained any confirmation of the truth of his ever-repeated but ever-unproved assertions, that he earnestly pressed for moderation in Vienna and carried this labour to the “utmost point.”

In any case the fact remains that the direct understanding between Austria and Russia, proposed by Germany, came to nothing in consequence of Austria's refusal. On July 28th, the same day as that on which the decisive conversation between Berchtold and Schebeko took place, Austria declared war against Serbia, and on the next day the bombardment of Belgrade began.

This declaration of war made the European situation almost desperate. Austria's intention to crush under all circumstances the inconvenient neighbouring State, regardless of the European conflagration which must result, had now revealed itself in action, and it appeared that all further attempts to quench the fire or to prevent its extension would be void of any prospect of success. Austria had mobilised, not only against Serbia, which could be regarded as a matter of course, but *against Russia as well*. The views vary as to the extent of her mobilisation towards the north and north-east. The Russian reports maintain that more than half of the Austrian army had been mobilised,¹ whereas the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of August 4th admits *the mobilisation of only two army corps “against the north.”*² In any case it is clear that on July 28th

¹ Orange Book, No. 49.

² The Collected Documents, p. 937.

Austria was the only great Power which had mobilised, and that its mobilisation was directed, not only against her small neighbour, but also against the great Russian Empire.

This fact was bound to compel Russia to take counter-measures, the necessity for which was based not merely on the military measures taken by Austria, but even more on her systematic frustration of all attempts to bring about an understanding. The Russian Government on the 29th of July officially communicated to foreign Governments that they had ordered mobilisation in the army districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kasan, and that this was designed as a protective measure against Austria's mobilisation and without any aggressive intentions against Austria or Germany.¹

Simultaneously with these events, renewed efforts were being made by Russia and England to find a formula whereby a settlement could be arrived at between the conflicting interests of Austria on the one hand and of Russia on the other. War had now broken out. The question to be discussed was no longer that of inducing Austria to withdraw, but only that of bringing about a *cessation* of military operations, of leaving to Austria as a pledge any Serbian territory which she had meanwhile occupied, and of making an attempt on this basis to satisfy as far as possible the demands of Austria.

In this direction Grey and Sazonof showed indefatigable activity, and were most energetically supported by Viviani, the French Prime Minister. The first formula in this sense was proposed on July 29th by Grey to the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. It amounted to the suggestion that *Austria should express herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory*

¹White Book, p. 409. Orange Book, No. 51. Blue Book, No. 78.

settlement of her demands, and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.¹

This proposal of Grey was insistently urged on the Emperor in the telegram despatched on July 30th by King George to Prince Henry of Prussia, and the hope was expressed that the Emperor would apply:—

“his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.”

The Secretary of State, Sir E. Grey, exerted himself with the same zeal as the King to move the Powers to the acceptance of his proposal, which, in fact, offered satisfaction to all, and a way of escape from the dangerous confusion which had resulted.

Meanwhile the Russian Minister, Sazonof, had also dictated to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, a formula as the basis of a settlement, which was directed to the same objects as Grey's proposal. The formula runs:—

“If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, *Russia engages to stop her military preparations.*”²

This proposal of Sazonof dates from July 30th, that is to say, two days after the Austrian declaration of

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 76, 88, 90, 98. White Book, 410.

² Orange Book, No. 60.

war against Serbia, and after the bombardment of Belgrade and the invasion of Serbian territory had already begun. The proposal contained *no obligation on the part of Austria to cancel the military action* taken by her; it merely imposed on Austria the requirement that she should leave untouched the sovereign rights of Serbia, that is to say, an obligation which could well be accepted by Austria, if she desired honourably to observe the declaration given by her at the beginning of the crisis.

What, however, took place? The Russian Ambassador at Berlin, Swerbeiev, on July 30th handed to von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, the proposal made by Sazonof, which had simultaneously been telegraphed to the Foreign Office through the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès. *The answer of Jagow was a flat refusal*: "it was impossible for Austria to accept the proposal."¹ This refusal, be it noted, was given at once, without any previous inquiry in Vienna. Herr von Jagow obviously regarded himself as the guardian or man of business of the Austrian Government, which, since the declaration of war against Serbia and her refusal of any kind of discussion, no longer stood in any direct relation with Petrograd.

One more attempt thus ended in failure! But even this further failure did not deter the English and Russian Governments from making renewed attempts to bring about an understanding. There were two formulæ in the field, that of Grey of the 29th of July and that of Sazonof of the 30th of July. The latter had been refused by Jagow without any reasons being given, whereas the former was still awaiting an answer. The English Ambassador in Berlin constantly pressed for an answer, and was repeatedly put off with empty phrases. Owing to the Austrian refusal of all direct discussions, diplomatic intercourse was rendered ex-

¹ Orange Book, No. 63.

traordinarily difficult. All inquiries had to go *via* Berlin, and Berlin was never able to give a positive answer, since, as was professed, an answer had not been received from Vienna. Whether the agent in this case was honest or dishonest cannot be proved with full certainty. But in any case the suspicion in favour of the second alternative is overwhelming—a point with which we shall deal in greater detail later in stating the grounds for the indictment against Germany. The peacemakers were put off from day to day. On one occasion Jagow had received no answer from Vienna; on another, Bethmann regrets that he had pressed the button so vigorously in Vienna that he had perhaps gone too far and produced the opposite effect from what was intended. On a third occasion, when Goschen was still urging that an answer should be given and was recommending that an even more violent pressure should be applied to the button in Vienna, the only answer which he got from Bethmann was that Count Berchtold would take the wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph in the matter next morning.¹

Thus three complete days, from the 29th to the 31st of July, glided unprofitably into the past *without any answer being received from Austria in reply to Grey's proposal* which the English King had so fervently urged on the Emperor William. Three days glided unprofitably into the past while Europe in suspense and in horror watched the approach of the dreaded catastrophe. The diplomatists of Germany and Austria were in no haste. They knew what they wanted, and with complete composure they prepared the drama behind the scenes, while in front everyone was running to and fro in agitation, calling aloud in terror for the fire brigade.

Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani persevered, notwithstanding all their failures, in the earnest endeavour to prevent

¹Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 112.

the outbreak of the conflagration. Scores of telegrams flew backwards and forwards between London, Paris, and Petrograd. Night and day men laboured in the Chancellories of the Entente Powers to preserve peace. Since Sazonof's proposal had been declined, and no answer had been sent in reply to Grey's proposal—*even to-day no answer has been received*—an attempt was made to devise a third formula which would represent a middle way between the first two formulæ. This third formula—the result of the zealous action taken by Viviani in the cause of mediation¹—went even further to meet the wishes of Austria than the first proposal of Sazonof, and thus appeared to offer every prospect of a favourable result. It was communicated by Sazonof to the Great Powers of Europe on the 31st of July, and runs as follows:—

“If Austria consents to *stay the march of her troops* on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude.”²

This formula, which now represented the utmost extent to which it was possible to go in meeting Austria's wishes, and could only have been suggested by Russia's decisive desire for peace, *has never received an answer from Austria or Germany*. While Sazonof in a despatch to London still expressed the hope that a peaceful issue to the situation had been found,³ while Grey in

¹ Yellow Book, No. 112.

² Orange Book, No. 67.

³ Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71.

his despatches to Berlin most urgently recommended the acceptance of the second formula of Sazonof,¹ Germany and Austria maintained an unbroken silence. In place of the Serbian question, which *was in danger* of being amicably settled, another question was put forward, which was bound to lead inevitably to war—the question of the Russian mobilisation. Germany appeared no longer as Austria's man of business, but took her place as a party to the case in her own name. The understudy assumed the leading rôle. Austria's book of guilt was closed, and a new book of guilt for Germany was opened.

The Russian general mobilisation undoubtedly took place on July 31st. On this all the diplomatic publications agree.² *It was, however, occasioned by the previous Austrian general mobilisation.* This fact requires to be decisively emphasised, since in Germany an intentional silence has been preserved on this point officially and unofficially. This silence is only natural, for the guilt of Russia would hopelessly collapse like a house of cards if it were proved that the Russian mobilisation not only followed the Austrian in point of time, but was also its necessary consequence; not merely because of the military measures of Austria, but equally because of the whole *diplomatic* attitude of the two Empires in the days between July 23rd and 31st.

I have already shown that the first of all the mobilisations was the Austrian partial mobilisation against Serbia and against the Russian frontier. This mobilisation, according to Russian and French reports, comprised against Russia more than a half of the entire Austrian army, and according to Bethmann's admission at least two army corps. The precise time of the complete mobilisation of Austria is differently given; according

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 111, 120, 121, 131, 132.

² White Book, p. 412.

to the report of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna it had already taken place on July 28th.¹ According to French and English reports it took place at 1 o'clock in the morning on July 31st.² To be on the safe side, I will assume that the latter date only is proved. Of the correctness of this date there can be no doubt in view of the reports of Dumaine, the French Ambassador in Vienna, of de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vienna, and Bertie, the English Ambassador in Paris.

The Russian general mobilisation was ordered, at the earliest, towards midday on July 31st, that is to say, *after* the Austrian mobilisation.

On the same day—the exact hour is unknown—the “threatening danger of war” (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*) was proclaimed in Germany. In the evening about 7 o'clock the ultimatum to France was delivered in Paris, and about midnight the ultimatum to Russia was delivered in Petrograd.

An eventful day! But the most remarkable occurrence was contributed by Austria, when, in the course of the same day, unperturbed by general mobilisation, the state of war (*Kriegszustand*), and ultimata, she suddenly gave simultaneous expression in Paris and Petrograd to her *readiness to enter into negotiations with Russia and the other Powers with regard to the contents of her ultimatum to Serbia*. Austria thus at last declared herself ready at the eleventh hour to do something which up till then she had most energetically refused to do, that is to say, “to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers.”³ In Paris, London, and Petrograd this final *apparent* conversion of Austria was received with feelings of intensely pleasant surprise. Everyone hailed what was

¹ Orange Book, No. 44, 47.

² Yellow Book, No. 115. Blue Book, Nos. 113, 118, 126, 134.

³ Yellow Book, No. 120. Orange Book, No. 73.

regarded as a new ray of hope. Grey and Sazonof at once seized the opportunity of guiding the apparent goodwill of Austria into paths which held out the guarantee of a happy issue.

As a shopkeeper spreads out before a fastidious customer all his available wares in the hope that she will in the end find something to suit her taste, so Grey and Sazonof submitted to Austria, even at the eleventh hour, every possible proposal in the hope that at least one would gain the approval of this fastidious customer. Grey promised to support in the capitals of the other Powers *any reasonable proposal of peace* put forward by Germany and Austria. He offered to support in Petrograd a proposal which would satisfy all Austrian demands without exception, in so far as the sovereignty and integrity of Serbia were not thereby impaired.¹ In answer to the Austrian overture, Sazonof not only declared himself ready to discuss with Austria the substance of the Austrian ultimatum, but he made the further proposal—in order to guarantee as far as possible that the discussion would have a chance of success—that the proceedings should take place in London under the “participation” of the Great Powers. He added that it would be *very important* if Austria, during the negotiations in London, were to put a stop *provisionally* to her military action on Serbian territory.² “It would be very important,” he it observed; it was not made a *conditio sine qua non*. This represents a further substantial concession to Austria as compared with previous proposals which had made the cessation of military action a *condition*.

But all these proposals made in the last hour remained without success. They were bound to be fruitless, because the assumption underlying them, namely,

¹ Blue Book, No. 111.

² Blue Book, No. 133. Orange Book, No. 69.

that Austria was honestly prepared to come to an understanding, was illusory. Why did Austria in the critical days between the 23rd and 31st of July refuse all discussions on the facts of the Serbian dispute? Why did she with unyielding obstinacy constantly declare only what she did *not* intend against Serbia, but never furnish any explanation as to what she really *did* intend? She did not intend to touch the integrity and independence of Serbia. This negative declaration she constantly repeated. *But what did she mean to do positively?* Even to-day we have no information on this point. The German Emperor himself did not know when he telegraphed to the Tsar on July 29th:—

“According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds.”

Herr von Schoen also, the German Ambassador at Paris, knew just as little as his Imperial Master how to furnish Viviani with a positive answer to the question as to what Austria really did want.¹

What precisely was the nature of the guaranties of which the Emperor William speaks, and of which the German White Book is constantly making mention? Were they contained in the Austrian Note, or did they go beyond the Austrian Note? If they were contained in it, then they were conceded, apart from the demands contained in Articles 5 and 6, with regard to which Serbia was prepared to negotiate. If, however, they were not contained in the Note, then they extend still further the scope of the Austrian demands, which apart from this were in all conscience sufficiently far-reaching. If this extension of the Austrian demands were to be

¹ Orange Book, No. 55.

made the subject of negotiations, it should clearly have been stated in precise language; but until the evening of the 31st of July this had not been done, and even to-day we are no further forward.

How then, I ask again, are we to explain this sudden change on the part of Austria? I can find no other explanation than this, that the readiness of Austria to negotiate, which if expressed *at an earlier date* would without doubt have led to a peaceful settlement, was, in the moment when it was finally expressed, completely harmless. A peaceful solution was no longer to be *dreaded*; by the independent lead assumed by the Cabinet of Berlin war was already *completely assured*.

Here, again, the question arises whether there was a divergence between Berlin and Vienna, or whether the events which took place are to be attributed to preconcerted duplicity. The paths followed by the two Cabinets apparently led in opposite directions on the evening of July 31st. Austria, in virtue of her readiness to negotiate, was moving in the direction of peace. Germany with her "threatening danger of war," with her Imperial speeches, and the speeches of the Chancellor to the people of Berlin, advanced consciously and intentionally in the direction of war. It is impossible to believe that there was any divergence between the two Cabinets. Had such a divergence existed it must have revealed itself at an earlier date than the 31st of July. The coincidence in time between the two apparently opposed actions, the sudden overnight conversion of Austria as though by an illumination—in individuals as in States such sudden illuminations are highly suspicious, and only slow conversions inspire confidence—the conversion of Austria calculated to take effect at the moment when it could no longer lead to salvation—all these circumstances raise to a certainty the suspicion that here there was *preconcerted duplicity* between the

two Governments intended to shift the guilt of the war from themselves to Russia.

It must and had to come to war. The further discussion of the question will completely convince anyone who has so far been able to entertain doubts of the truth of this assertion. All diplomatic negotiations were thus bound to remain fruitless even if they resulted in the whole of Europe being forced to her knees before Germany and Austria. It was not enough to achieve a diplomatic victory; a military victory had to be added in order to assure the supremacy of Austria in the Balkans and to pave for Germany a path to the stars where she dreamed that her destiny was written.

The indictment which I bring against Austria may be summarised in the following sentences:

(1) Austria, after having already planned an attack on Serbia in August, 1913, presented to Serbia in July, 1914, a Note containing demands of such an exorbitant nature that a war with Serbia, and as a further consequence a European war, was to be expected.

(2) She refused the prolongation of the forty-eight hours' time-limit which was sought for by the Entente Powers.

(3) She recalled her Ambassador, and declared war against Serbia, although the Serbian Government had submissively conceded nearly all the Austrian demands, and so far as the others were concerned declared herself ready to negotiate and to submit the outstanding points to arbitration.

(4) She flatly refused every discussion with Russia and with the other Powers on the contents of the Serbian Note, and only expressed her readiness to take part in such discussions on July 31st when it was too late.

(5) She refused the proposal of Grey to accept mediation, or at least advice, from the four Powers not di-

rectly concerned, although Russia had agreed to this proposal.

(6) Notwithstanding repeated urgent requests from England, she left unanswered the formula of agreement proposed by Grey.

(7) She declined, through Herr von Jagow, the first formula of agreement proposed by Sazonof.

(8) She gave no answer to the second formula of agreement proposed by Sazonof.

(9) The last proposals for an agreement made by Grey and Sazonof were also not considered worthy of an answer by Austria.

(10) In so far as she furnished any explanations, she restricted herself to saying what she did *not* wish, but she never said what she *did* wish.

(11) She was the first of all the Great Powers to begin mobilisation and military operations; she preceded all the other Powers, first with her partial and then with her general mobilisation.

These points in the indictment are proved, and justify the judgment:

"Austria is guilty, either alone or in common with others, of having provoked the European war."

We shall now see who the others are.

B

GERMANY

The guilt of Germany is even easier to prove than that of Austria, since Germany has composed her own bill of indictment. Properly read, the German White Book contains almost the whole of the accusations which can be brought against Germany, and I will undertake to

produce overwhelming proof of guilt by means of the contents of the German White Book taken along with the complementary official documents, so that it will be unnecessary for me to do more than emphasise her self-accusations.

These confessions are, of course, unintentional. They do not have the purifying intention and the force of self-accusations as known to Christianity, and as represented on the stage by the most Christian of all modern poets, Tolstoi. They are confessions arising from imprudence; he who is confessing believes that he is justifying himself, whereas he is really accusing himself. He believes that he is defending himself, and he delivers into the hands of his accuser priceless material for his condemnation.

Let us begin at the very opening passage in the White Book. After depicting the position of the Austrian Government towards the Serbian agitation and the impossibility of "viewing any longer this agitation across the border," the White Book continues:—

"With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval. *We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war,* in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. . . . *We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her*

action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations.”

What does this amount to? It means:—

(1) That the German Government gave the Austrian Government a completely free hand to take against Serbia whatever action might appear to her to be suitable in the circumstances, whether the means adopted were diplomatic or military in their nature.

(2) That Germany intentionally refrained from participating in the preparations for action in either of these ways; that is to say, she was prepared, in consequence of her duty as an ally, to follow blindly the lead taken by Austria.

(3) That Germany was *perfectly well aware* that military action on the part of Austria against Serbia might bring Russia into the field, and might therefore involve Germany also in the war, which, in consequence of the obligations imposed by alliances on both sides, was bound to assume the character of a European war.

Thus the German Government acknowledges that it bears the responsibility (dolus) for the European War, the ultimate responsibility (dolus eventualis) which, according to juridical and moral ideas, is placed on the same footing as the direct responsibility (dolus purus).

At the same time she further admits that she herself from the beginning regarded her effort to localise the military conflict between Austria and Serbia as having had *no prospect of success*. It follows that, in rejecting the promising proposals for arriving at an understanding put forward by the other Powers and in seeking to substitute for them one for localisation, Germany was proposing an expedient which, in her own view, could not lead to a successful issue. In other words, her desire was to produce the *appearance* that she was anxious to prevent the European conflict, but she re-

fused every method calculated *effectively* to prevent it, and in their place proposed a method which in her own opinion was completely unfitted to achieve this end.

The view that Russia would be brought into the field by an Austro-Serbian war, to which free expression is given in the White Book, was but too well founded. One can only be amazed that Germany did not credit, or pretended not to credit, the other Powers with the foresight with which she was herself endowed. Had it not become a commonplace in European diplomacy, and indeed a commonplace to everyone in Europe who thought about politics, that Russia, in view of the intimate bonds of blood and of faith and of the two hundred years of history by which she was linked with Serbia, could never be a silent witness of the establishment of an Austrian hegemony over that country, that she could never consent to it being crushed by arms, but would come to the assistance of her weaker brother? ¹ Russia's interest in the Balkans was known to all, and had been confirmed by the Russian Government in countless declarations and actions. After the first and the second Balkan War the opposition between the interests of Austria and Russia had once more, as on so many previous occasions, stood out in full relief. Russia's interest *on behalf of* Serbia and Austria's interest *against* Serbia had come into such violent collision that even then they almost occasioned a European war. The same danger existed in August, 1913, when Austria planned the attack on Serbia which has been disclosed by Giollitti. Even at that time the intervention of Russia was looked upon as a matter of course; otherwise the inquiry addressed by Austria to her ally Italy would have had no meaning. As late as May, 1914, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonof, in a speech

¹ See Blue Book, p. v. Grey called this "a commonplace in European diplomacy" in a speech in Parliament in March, 1913.

in the Duma, professed his adhesion to a policy of "the Balkans for the Balkan people," that is to say, to a policy which opposed any intention on the part of Austria to establish a hegemony, and which promised the support of Russia in the maintenance of the independence of the Balkan peoples. The question here was not a political one pure and simple; it was rather a question of national sentiment and of blood-relationship. This link between Russia and Serbia was an ancient historical fact, with which European diplomacy was bound to reckon, and with which it always had reckoned.¹ Germany and Austria also reckoned with it, as the White Book testifies.

And was it now supposed that these bonds were suddenly to be wrenched asunder? Was it expected that Russia would be a placid spectator while Austria crushed the small State connected with Russia by blood? Was Russia baldly to renounce her interests in the Balkans and her prestige among the Balkan nations in favour of Austria? This was a strong suggestion to make, if it were seriously meant. But the suggestion was indeed so strong that it *cannot* have been seriously meant.

Germany herself never believed, and never could have believed, in the possibility of localisation from the moment the conflict assumed a military aspect. My little brother annoys a strong man, who is on the point of striking him dead. I intervene to protect the little one against the superior strength of the big man. A third, who is even bigger, bars my way, saying that the conflict between the small boy and the big man must remain localised. Would I therefore restrain myself from protecting my brother? This was Russia's position.

Certainly it would have been a *good* thing if the conflict could have remained localised, and this would also

¹ See Blue Book, p. v.

have been quite *possible* if it had remained on a diplomatic basis. On this basis the great man had already obtained a complete victory over the small. But it was really too much to ask that the little one should be crushed after he had tendered copious apologies, and had humbly promised to behave better in future. It was impossible to ask this of Russia, and if such a demand were made it was known from the outset that it could not be satisfied.

Thus the only title to glory which Germany claims for herself in this diplomatic tragi-comedy falls to the ground. *No one believed in the possibility of localisation, least of all Germany herself.*

After this, the only proposal made by Germany, a proposal advanced by her in the full knowledge that it had no prospect of success, had, as a matter of course, failed, Germany's whole attitude during the critical days was one of perpetual passivity; if in any way she abandoned this attitude, she restricted herself to the frustration of all attempts to arrive at an understanding. The more the German Government assures us that it earnestly laboured "shoulder to shoulder with England" in the interests of mediation, the less support do these assurances find in the facts. The impartial inquirer sees only the one shoulder, that of England, pressing in the direction of peace, while the German shoulder, butting against the English, is seen pushing in the opposite direction.

Why did the German Government allow the Austrian Note to be despatched without being acquainted with its contents, without previously submitting these to examination? Among foreign Governments the suspicion had made itself manifest that Germany had already had a hand in the game when the Note was drafted. In particular, the Italian Government adduced as one of the grounds for her resolution to remain neutral that she

had not been informed of Austria's intentions and of the contents of the Note—in contrast to Germany, the other member of the Triple Alliance. The German Government promptly denied this. It assured foreign Governments that it had received no information with regard to the Note before the time of its delivery, and this assurance is repeated in the White Book.¹ It is open to anyone to believe or disbelieve this assurance. If it is true, it reveals an unprecedented levity, for which there is no adjective in the German language sufficiently severe. Here we have a Note which in itself almost amounted to a declaration of war, which would almost certainly lead to a Serbian, and in the sequel to a European war; are we to suppose that the German Government did not require such a Note as this to be laid before it previous to its delivery that it might have the opportunity of examining it, and of abating any excessive harshness which it might contain? If, however, Herr von Bethmann had knowledge of the Note, and notwithstanding allowed it to be delivered without demur, this affords proof that he saw clearly the possibility of war, and intentionally did nothing to prevent it. *Thus levity, irresponsible levity, or the commission of a crime*, are the alternatives which must be placed before Herr von Bethmann. It may be left to him to make the choice.

At the other stages of the negotiations the same alternatives have to be placed before him.

Why did the German Government not support the request of England and Russia for an extension of the time-limit? Why did Herr von Jagow content himself here, as on so many other occasions, with the platonic promise that he would transmit this request to Vienna, without being able to support it? Why did he at once express doubt whether Austria would be able to meet

¹ White Book, p. 406.

this request?¹ Was it not entirely reasonable that the Powers concerned in the cause of peace, who only received knowledge of the Austrian Note on July 24th, should have sought for a somewhat longer time-limit in order that they might be able successfully to exercise their influence on Serbia in the direction of securing compliance? Was it not reasonable that they should first of all desire to become acquainted with the Austrian documentary evidence, which was not annexed to the copy of the Note communicated to them, and which was only made accessible to the English Government on August 7th, that is to say, long after the outbreak of war?² What objection could Germany raise against the extension of the time-limit, a course which could only be serviceable to the interests of peace, if like the others she also desired peace?

If the Serbian answer, as up to the evening of July 25th there was reason to fear had amounted to a refusal, would not Germany have had to reproach herself with the fact that her failure to support the request for an extension of the time-limit had in part to bear the responsibility for the unfavourable answer?

The Serbian answer became known, and the whole world breathed more freely. No one had expected that Serbia would have so humiliated herself. Whereas the Austrian Note is rightly characterised in the English Blue Book in the statement that "No independent nation had ever been called upon to accept a greater humiliation,"³ the Serbian answer is accorded the well-merited testimony that "The reply went far beyond anything which any power, Germany not excepted, had ever thought probable."⁴ Russia and France were equally

¹ Blue Book, No. 18.

² Blue Book, p. v.

³ Blue Book, p. vi.

⁴ Blue Book, p. vii.

satisfied with the attitude assumed by Serbia. In a circular telegram of July 27th Sazonof describes the Serbian answer as follows:—

“It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, *unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Serbia.*”¹

All were agreed that just as the Austrian Note had surpassed the limits of what was permissible and had violated all precedents, so the Serbian answer surpassed in its spirit of compliance and submissiveness everything of which there was previous record. Germany alone was of a different opinion. The Austrian demands appeared to her moderate and justifiable; the Serbian answer, on the contrary, appeared insufficient, as it “showed in all essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the Monarchy.”² The German Government undertook to “*pass on*” to Vienna the request of Grey that Germany would use her influence in Vienna in support of a favourable reception of the Serbian Note, but they did not see their way to identify themselves with the request.³

Why was it impossible to support this request? Why was it not possible for Germany to exert her whole influence in Vienna in order to secure that negotiations on the basis of the Serbian answer would at least take place? Were the few reservations made, in the most conciliatory form, by Serbia of so great importance that on their account the whole answer had to be rejected, diplomatic

¹ Orange Book, No. 33.

² White Book, p. 406.

³ Blue Book, p. viii and No. 34.

relations broken off, and a war declared, the further consequences of which were distinctly foreseen by Germany? Did the Serbian answer really have the appearance of quibbling and procrastination? Was it not full of positive promises, the non-fulfilment of which had first to be waited for before the answer could be rejected as insufficient? *What else could Serbia do within forty-eight hours than promise everything*—everything with a few exceptions—asked of her? The intention to procrastinate could only manifest itself later, in the event of there being an undue delay in giving effect to the promises. *Why, then, did Germany tolerate the recall of the Austrian Ambassador, and later the Declaration of War?*

If the objection is raised that Germany could not have prevented it, I answer that she could, but that she was unwilling to do so. That she was *unwilling* to do this, or indeed anything else, in the service of peace may already be inferred from the preceding events, and is confirmed by all that follows. To assert, however, that she was *unable* to exercise a decisive influence on Austria's action is so ridiculous an evasion that it does not need to be seriously contradicted. *With regard to Austria, Germany was in a position to give effect to her every wish.* Austria was a cipher in the European international concert, in which Germany played the first fiddle. Only if Germany stood behind her could Austria run the risk of a conflict with Russia, which was bound to arise out of the Serbian conflict. A nod from Germany would have been enough, and Austria would have left her Ambassador in Belgrade, and continued to discuss the Serbian Note. It was unnecessary for Bethmann to say a word. A frown would have been enough to restrain Austria from declaring war against Serbia, an action which no Austrian statesman could have taken unless he had had in his pocket the previous concurrence of Germany.

All that England might have prevented by a timely declaration of neutrality in Petrograd and in Paris is constantly emphasised in the German Press, as also in the Chancellor's speech of December 2nd. This question I will deal with later in discussing the attitude of England. The other question, which lies nearer home, is, however, never raised: *What might not Germany have prevented if at the right time she had checked the impetuosity of her Austrian ally*, if she had moderated the terms of the Note, required that negotiations should take place on the basis of the Serbian answer, and had thus prevented the declaration of war? This is the crucial point in the whole question. Here lies the germ of the whole tragedy. Austria, blindly and without so much as the quiver of an eyelash, did whatever Germany wished. All the sugary phrases used by Bethmann and Jagow, that they could not expect this or that of Austria; that they feared that they had already gone too far in their suggestions; that they had pressed the button too violently, and that in so doing the opposite from what was intended might be produced; that they had gone to the utmost limit in Vienna, and so on, *all these statements are but empty falsehood and deceit*. I repeat, a frown would have been enough to restrain Vienna from measures not desired in Berlin. The question again reduces itself simply to this: What was and what was not desired in Berlin? I have already given the answer to this question.

Thus with Berlin's concurrence matters advanced to a declaration of war for which, as has been shown above, not the slightest ground could be advanced; with Berlin's concurrence, also, all the further developments took place. The attitude of Germany in the days between July 28th and August 1st was in conformity with that during the preceding days. The English proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London was, as we have

already seen, rejected by Germany on formal grounds without any inquiry being addressed to Austria.¹ The direct negotiations between Austria and Russia, proposed by Germany, in which Sazonof was ready to participate, were rejected by Austria with the observation that the suggestion, "after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the subsequent declaration of war . . . appears belated."² Here, again, is another charming expression: "Serbia had opened hostilities," and not Austria. The declaration of war against Serbia which had wantonly proceeded from Austria prevents this same Austria from negotiating with Russia in the interests of the maintenance of European peace! All this Germany passively endures, except in so far as she herself abandons her passivity in favour of an attitude of active rejection, as in the case of the conference of the four Powers. In essential matters Germany contents herself with the *rôle* of a postman, merely handing on the English proposals to Vienna, and with the muteness proper to a postman takes no further interest in the fate of these proposals. "We further declared ourselves ready . . . to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna."³ "We even as late as July 30th forwarded the English proposal to Vienna"⁴—such are the expressions we find everywhere in the White Book. It is indeed in general maintained that the proposals which were handed on received support, but nothing is adduced to prove the assertion. *The correspondence between Berlin and Vienna on which the proof of this rests is lacking.* The lukewarm observations uttered by Messrs. von Bethmann and von Jagow to Goschen, the English Ambassador, on the reception of each new English proposal do not indicate

¹ White Book, p. 409.

² White Book, p. 409 and Exhibit 16.

³ White Book, p. 409.

⁴ White Book, p. 410.

that they felt any very lively interest in these proposals. The negative results achieved in Vienna, however, incontrovertibly prove that they not only did not support the English proposals, but that in all probability they thwarted them. Any course which they earnestly supported in Vienna *was bound* to have been accepted there. If it was not accepted, this affords proof that they did not earnestly support it.

The evil intention of the German Government is clearly shown by the following occurrence. When on July 27th Sir Edward Goschen laid before von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, Grey's proposal of the conference of the four Powers, Herr von Jagow, as is well known, at once declined this "court of arbitration," and persisted in his refusal, even when Goschen explained to him that the question was not one of "arbitration," but that the object was merely "to discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation."¹ But Grey refused to be discouraged. He inferred from Jagow's answer and from a declaration made by Lichnowsky that Germany did not in principle refuse his proposal, but that difficulties were being advanced only against the *form* of a Conference. He therefore commissioned his Ambassador to request Herr von Jagow himself to suggest the form which would be agreeable to the German Government.² Viviani made the same suggestion to Baron von Schoen, and Sazonof to Count Pourtalès. All three Governments expressed themselves as ready to accept any form of mediation which Germany might propose, and Viviani, as well as Grey, emphatically added that the European situation had now become so serious that they dared not allow formalities or quibbles to wreck the peace of Europe.³

¹ Blue Book, No. 43.

² Blue Book, Nos. 46, 60, 68. Yellow Book, No. 81. Orange Book, No. 54.

³ Blue Book, No. 78. Orange Book, No. 55.

To-day Europe is still waiting in vain for Jagow's answer. Grey did not desist; he reminded Mr. von Jagow of the matter, and returned to it again and again, urging on him the desirability of at length suggesting the form agreeable to him, which had already been accepted by all in advance. It was all in vain. No answer came from the Wilhelmstrasse. The White Book expressly confirms the fact that the idea of Grey's proposal was approved.¹ It intentionally passes over in silence the fact that this idea could have been realised in any form desired by Germany, if Germany had put forward any proposals on the subject. *These proposals were never made. Is not this an overwhelming proof of guilt?* The fact is that the diplomatists of Germany, as I have already pointed out, had no wish to sit round a table in London with the diplomatists of other countries. It was known how easy it would be to find a solution of the Serbian question, and how much more difficult questions had been solved in London in 1912 and 1913. It was *feared* that a peaceful solution might again be arrived at in London, and for this reason, whatever might happen, the London Conference had to be prevented.

We now come to the history of the various formulæ proposed by Grey and Sazonof which aimed at bringing about a peaceful understanding between Russia and Austria with or without the participation of the Powers. I have already dealt with the fate of these proposals in the previous section relating to Austria, and I have also pointed out the *rôle* played by Germany in these negotiations. In the German White Book only one of all these proposals and negotiations, that of Grey, is mentioned, and this is done in such a superficial and ambiguous manner that without reference to the telegram from the English King to Prince Henry of Prussia one could

¹ White Book, p. 409.

scarcely realise how far-reaching and how rich in prospect was the peace proposal in question. Here, again, Germany restricted herself to the discharge of a postman's duties. She handed on the English proposal to Vienna. The White Book contains not a word of recommendation, nor even of criticism.¹ It contents itself with adding, "we had to assume that Russia would accept this basis," and in another place it speaks of a proposal of mediation "whose tendencies and basis must have been known in Petrograd."² That is all that is said. *Nothing is told us with regard to the fate of the proposal*, and it is only from the English Blue Book that we learn that Grey's proposal, like so much else that was calculated to serve the cause of peace, was simply buried in silence. In this case also events took exactly the same course as had previously been followed with regard to the question of the form of the conference of the four Powers, the only difference being that on that occasion Germany alone was responsible for the failure to give an answer, whereas here the responsibility for the absence of an answer was pushed on to Vienna. "He has up till now received no reply"; "they had not had time to send an answer yet"; "no answer had yet been returned."³ Such were the answers given by Jagow to Goschen in the critical days in which the fate of Europe depended on hours, and indeed on minutes.

The sentence in the White Book which speaks of the

¹ White Book, p. 410. [The translation of the White Book used in the text is that officially published by the German Government, reproduced in the *Collected Diplomatic Documents*. There is, however, a slight difference in the meaning between the official translation of this passage: "We thought that Russia would accept this basis," and the original German which has here been followed in the text: "Wir mussten annehmen dass Russland diese Basis akzeptiren würde."]

² White Book, p. 411.

³ Blue Book, Nos. 28, 107, 112.

consent of Russia to Grey's proposal as an indefinite assumption only, and which is thereby designed to make it appear as if the fate of this proposal was uncertain on the other side also—this sentence can only rest on *mala fides*. The German Government knew quite well that Sazonof also, as well as Grey, had energetically sought for a formula to serve as the basis of agreement, that a first formula of this kind, as I have already stated, had been dictated by Sazonof himself to Count Pourtalès on July 30th,¹ that Germany had refused this proposal on the ground that it was "impossible for Austria to accept it,"² and that Sazonof, at Grey's suggestion, had forwarded to the German Government an even more conciliatory formula.³ All this was, and is, known to the German Government. It is, however, hidden in silence from the German public. It may be said generally that the German Government has, consciously and intentionally, maintained silence with regard to all the efforts for peace made by Russia and France, because these do not suit their case and would lead to the collapse of the whole of the laboriously constructed edifice of the Russian-French attack. The second formula of Sazonof experienced the same fate as Grey's proposal. *No answer has in fact been given*. And the last desperate efforts of Russia and England on July 31st and August 1st have also not been considered worthy of any kind of an answer from Germany.⁴

Germany acted according to the principle:

"Words, words, enough have now been bandied

At last the time has come for deeds."⁵

¹ Orange Book, No. 60.

² Orange Book, No. 63.

³ Orange Book, No. 67.

⁴ Blue Book, Nos. 111, 120, 121, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139. Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71, 73.

⁵ Der Worte sind genug gewechselt
Nun lasst uns endlich Taten sehen.

The decision to act had already been taken on July 29th, on the third day after the return of the Emperor from his tour in the north. To judge from the telegrams exchanged between the Emperor and the Tsar there appears to me to be no doubt—justice requires that this should be placed on record—that the Emperor at the moment of his return had not yet personally resolved on war. His first telegrams to the Tsar despatched on July 28th and 29th,¹ and especially the former, strike a tone of friendship and of an inclination to peace which scarcely leaves room for doubt that they were honourably intended. I have already shown that a large and powerful party at the Court and in the country had for long striven for war. I have also endeavoured to prove that the Emperor had *in principle* been won over to these efforts. But there is a long step between entertaining a conviction on principle and translating this conviction into action. The step is greater the more responsibility attaches to the act, the more serious the consequences to which it may give rise. It need, therefore, cause no surprise that days of inner and of outer struggle had to pass before the resolution to act came to fruition. The inner struggles are reflected, easily recognisable by the psychologist, in the telegrams which were sent by the Emperor between July 28th and August 1st to the Tsar and the King of England.²

At the outset the Emperor recognises the difficulties for the Tsar and his Government of “stemming the tide of public opinion in Russia.” On the other hand, he defends the action taken by Austria against Serbia, and promises to use all his influence in bringing about a direct understanding between Austria and Russia. As the exchange of telegrams advances we see more and more the

¹ White Book, Exhibits 20 and 22.

² White Book, pp. 412, 413, pp. 431, 432; Collected Documents, pp. 539, 540.

original subject of negotiation—the substantial difference between Austria and Russia—disappear, and the formal question of the menace involved in military preparations takes its place. In the telegram sent by the Emperor on the afternoon of July 29th there can be heard the first ominous notes of the menace of military preparations.¹ References to this question constantly increase until in the end the only subject of discussion is that of military preparations. On July 30th all discussion of the

¹It is surprising that in the German White Book there is no answer from the Tsar to this telegram. The White Book inserts immediately after the Emperor William's telegram of the 29th July (Exhibit 22), a further telegram of the Emperor of the 30th July (Exhibit 23). This gap has now been filled by an official publication of the Russian Government. The Tsar, in fact, answered on the 29th of July, in reply to the Emperor's telegram of the same day, in the following words:—"Thanks for your telegram which is conciliatory and friendly whereas the official message presented to-day by your ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. *It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague tribunal*, I trust in your wisdom and friendship." This telegram of the Tsar was omitted by the German Government, obviously because it contains the simplest and most natural proposal in the world—already made by Serbia in her reply—namely, that the question at issue should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. The excuse put forward by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, that the telegram had been omitted on account of its *unimportance*, is adapted to the present intellectual level of the German newspaper reader. It was omitted because, along with many other things, it was of decisive importance for the formation of a judgment on the attitude of the Tsar. *The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace*, and for this reason it was declined. As, however, it was impossible to give reasons for this refusal, the Emperor William was induced simply to ignore the Tsar's proposal, and to put forward in place of the Austro-Serbian problem the question of military preparation by means of which war could be brought about at will. The German Government is led by evil conscience to omit from the White Book the Tsar's telegram of the 29th of July. The telegram itself and its suppression affords a new proof that Russia desired peace, but that Germany desired war.

substantial issue had already completely ceased, and everything turned on the question as to which of the three Emperors had been compelled to mobilisation by the others. On July 30th the Emperor William maintains that Austria had only mobilised against Serbia—in opposition to the Chancellor, who admits that there had also been a mobilisation against Russia. The Emperor Nicholas, on the other hand, maintains that the partial mobilisation of Russia which took place on July 29th was only decided upon “for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria.” He promises to send “Tatisheff with instructions to-night to Berlin.”¹ In his telegram of July 31st the Tsar announces that the discontinuance of military preparations “made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation” was “technically impossible,” but he gives his solemn word that no provocative action will be taken so long as negotiations continue. The Emperor William again demands unconditional discontinuance of the military preparations of Russia, whereupon the Tsar submits that he may take the same measures *without war necessarily following*. The Emperor William, however, mobilises, and declares war.

This rapid development of events can only be explained by the fact that there must have taken place in the authoritative circles in Berlin a change of front leading from the oscillation which characterised the earlier days to a firm resolution to embark on war. In all probability this change of front took place on the evening of July 29th, on the occasion of the interview which the Chancellor had with the Emperor in Potsdam. The influences which drove the still-hesitating Emperor to re-

¹ What happened to this mission of Tatisheff? Did he arrive in Berlin? What message did he bring? Why did Berlin not delay her ultimatum until the arrival of the special envoy of the Tsar, who could not arrive at the earliest until the 1st of August? These, among other questions, will suggest themselves to the reader.

solve on war cannot be proved, but it is possible to guess at them. People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation *en bloc* if war were not resolved on.¹

What is certain is that the Chancellor on the same evening, after his return to Berlin, summoned Sir Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador, and fervently submitted to him a proposal *that England in the event of a European conflict should under certain conditions remain neutral*.² The conditions which Herr von Bethmann offered were as follows:—

(1) Germany in the event of a victorious war would aim at no territorial acquisitions in Europe at the expense of France. The Chancellor said he was unable to give a similar assurance with regard to the French Colonies.

(2) The neutrality of Holland would be respected by Germany so long as it was respected by Germany's adversaries.

(3) With reference to Belgium it would depend on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to undertake against Belgium, but in any case,

¹ We have less difficulty in understanding these events in Berlin when we bear in mind an observation which Count Pourtalès made, in passing, to Sazonof: measures of mobilisation were, he said, highly dangerous nowadays, "for in that event the *purely military consideration of the question by the general staffs* would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of control." The German Government takes very good care not to include in its White Book this self-confession, which throws a very characteristic light on the occurrences in Berlin in the last day before the outbreak of war. The Austrian Government, however, with less prudence reports the observation of Pourtalès in No. 28 of the Red Book.

² Blue Book, No. 85.

when the war was over, Belgium's integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

This proposal for neutrality made on July 29th is in the highest degree surprising, and is very illuminating.

What so far had happened, we may ask, to awake in Herr von Bethmann this urgent fear of a European war? Austria had opened hostilities against Serbia, and had partially mobilised against Russia. Russia had thereupon answered with a mobilisation of four southern army districts. At that time there was absolutely no question of a mobilisation against Germany. The White Book itself only dates this from July 31st. All the diplomatic forces of Europe—at any rate, with the exception of Germany and Austria—were active in endeavouring to relieve the tension between Austria and Russia. The proposal of the conference of the four Powers was still hanging in the air. Grey's formula of agreement had just been proposed to Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. Russia was then, as she had been previously, ready to treat directly with Austria, and was waiting to begin negotiations. France was supporting in the most energetic manner the efforts for peace made by Grey and Sazonof. In short, all forces were labouring at the task of maintaining peace, and it only required that Germany should energetically intervene to move Austria to adopt the conciliatory attitude demanded by the European situation, and peace would have been assured. And in such a moment as this, when everything depended on the peaceful intentions of Germany alone, the Chancellor was thinking merely of *how best to make his position secure in the event of war!* There is only one explanation for this bid for neutrality made at this juncture. The Chancellor regarded peace as in danger, and could not do otherwise than regard it as in danger, because he knew, as the other Governments could not then know, *that war had been decided on in Berlin.* The war was

bound to come, since this was the wish of Germany. And since it was bound to come, only one thing gave Herr von Bethmann cause for anxiety, the task, namely, of fashioning the chances of war as favourably as possible for Germany, and of excluding England for the present from the ranks of her enemies, in order to be in a more secure position to defeat her on the next favourable opportunity. The "*policy of the free hand on the Continent*," which the Chancellor had unsuccessfully pursued with regard to England in 1912 forms the basis of the bid for neutrality of July 29th, 1914.

The English answer was as negative in its nature as that given two years previously. The significant importance of Bethmann's overtures were at once realised in London. In return for the prospect of a future agreement of neutrality with Germany, vaguely held out, the English Government refused to allow itself to be eliminated for the present from European politics and to be obliged to stand aside an inactive spectator while France was crushed or Belgian neutrality violated. In the opinion of Grey (and it must be admitted that in this he is right) such a bargain would be bound to break the friendly relations existing between England and France, would be inconsistent with the duty of protecting Belgium imposed on every signatory of the guarantee of neutrality of 1839, and would imperil, not merely the interests, but also the good name of England. Grey instructed his Ambassador to add most earnestly to this refusal of the German proposal that the *one* way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany was that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if this were successful, the relations between the two countries would be, *ipso facto*, improved and strengthened. The English Government in any case was ready to work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill. It is impossible to omit

reference to the concluding paragraph in Grey's instructions to his Ambassador, a passage which must be regarded as of the deepest significance in arriving at a judgment with regard to the attitude of England and Germany in this struggle. The Ambassador was to communicate with the Chancellor in the following sense:—

“If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement *to which Germany could be a party*, by which she could be assured that *no aggressive or hostile policy* would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible *some more definite rapprochement between the Powers* than has been possible hitherto.”¹

The significance of this declaration of Grey is obvious. It contains a moving appeal to common action in the cause of peace, such as had been maintained throughout the Balkan crisis to the advantage of the world and of the two countries, who in pursuing the same high aim had without compulsion approached each other and become more intimately connected. The vision of the future outlined by the English Minister nevertheless went far beyond anything attained in the past; an agreement was to be concluded, with the participation of Ger-

¹Blue Book, No. 101.

many, which would afford Germany and her allies formal guarantees against any aggressive or even hostile policy on the part of the Entente Powers—in other words, *a Treaty which would guarantee the peace of Europe*, which could draw together the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, and would have substituted for the dangerous system of the balance of power a general alliance of peace.

How did the Chancellor receive this proposal? When Goschen had read to him Grey's words in the form of a memorandum he received the communication "without comment," and only expressed a desire to receive a copy in order that he might reflect upon the matter at leisure. The copy was handed to him. *No answer has ever been given.*¹

What would Europe have looked like to-day if Herr von Bethmann had concurred in Grey's proposal? It is superfluous, and indeed too painful, to allow our imagination to conjure up such a picture to-day. Everything that Germany is supposed to be struggling to achieve in this war—the security of her existence, freedom for her development, unhampered progress in culture and wellbeing—all these things were magnanimously offered. In reality these possessions had never been in danger, but Grey's offer destroyed every possibility of believing that they were in danger and every pretext for persuading others to this belief. The alliance of peace proposed by Grey was merely a first step out of the atmosphere of enmity, distrust, and tension towards that of friendship, confidence, and composure. This first step would certainly have led to other advances. The feeling of confidence thus revived and strengthened would have rendered it possible to diminish the costly precautionary measures, which based merely on universal and mutual distrust. Agreements on the subject

¹ Blue Book, No. 109.

of the cessation and gradual diminution of armaments would have become possible on the basis of an agreement of friendship. In short, the *way was opened to a new and a better Europe*, if Germany had but grasped the hand offered by England.

But Herr von Bethmann thought otherwise. Having placed the memorandum in a pigeon-hole, he quietly chuckled to himself at the stupidity of the Englishman who, with his insular restricted vision, still believed in the peaceful intentions of Germany. We have over again the same performance as in 1912. England desires the *peace of Europe*; Germany, however, desires the *neutrality of England*, in order to be able to disturb this peace at her own sweet will. And this same Chancellor, who knows this and innumerable other similar occurrences of an earlier and of a later date, dares to burden the English Government with the "inner responsibility for the European war"! We shall see later that in making this statement he comes into violent conflict, not merely with facts, but also with his own official publications. For the present inquiry it is sufficient to make it clear that the resolution to go to war had already been taken in Berlin on the evening of July 29th. Only on this assumption is it possible to explain Bethmann's bid for English neutrality and his failure to take any notice of Grey's proposal.

On the same day on which Herr von Bethmann received without comment Grey's proposal for a permanent European state of peace, the "threatening danger of war" was proclaimed in Germany, and the Ambassadors in Petrograd and Paris were instructed to deliver ultimata to the Governments to which they were accredited. From Russia it was demanded that she should "stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notify us definitely to this effect." From France a declaration

was required within eighteen hours "whether she would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war." The ultimatum was delivered in Petrograd about midnight; that in Paris about 7 o'clock in the evening.

When the news of these ultimata became known in and outside Germany, the report was at first generally disbelieved, since no one could adduce any ground for such drastic action at that precise moment. The diplomats were even more astonished than the public. What, then, could have taken place to drive Germany to this extreme step, which without doubt would inevitably lead to war? Was it not just on July 31st that the diplomatic negotiation between the Powers had apparently reached so favourable a point that the whole world once more began to entertain hope, and looked forward to a peaceful settlement at an early date? On July 30th Count Berchtold had expressed in the most friendly tone to the Russian Ambassador, Schebeko, his willingness to agree to a resumption in Petrograd of the negotiations which had for some time been discontinued between Austria and Russia.¹ These negotiations had, in fact, begun on July 31st between Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador, Szápáry, and this time they promised a greater measure of success than on any previous occasion, since Austria for the first time had professed her readiness to submit for discussion the contents of the Note addressed to Serbia. Sazonof himself, in a communication addressed to London, expressed the hope that a peaceful issue out of the crisis might yet be found. The French and the English Governments were agreeably surprised at the final change in the attitude of Austria, and Grey expressed the hope that it "may lead to a satisfactory result."² In Grey's despatch to

¹ Yellow Book, No. 104. Blue Book, No. 96.

² Blue Book, No. 111. Orange Book, Nos. 66, 69, 73. Yellow Book, Nos. 114, 120.

Goschen it is possible to trace in every word the sincere satisfaction which he felt in consequence of the new turn of events. He at once redoubled his efforts to shorten the pains of childbirth, and to bring speedily into the world a healthy child of peace. Austria was to receive "*full* satisfaction of her demands on Serbia," all Powers were at once to suspend further military preparations, Germany and Austria had only to make "*any reasonable proposal*," and he would support it. If, however, Russia and France would not accept such a reasonable proposal, the British Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences. Sazonof at once outlined a formula of agreement which went further to meet Austria than that first formulated.¹ He proposed a discussion in London, under the participation of the Powers, in which he represented a cessation of Austrian operations in Serbia, not as a condition, but merely as "*very important*."² Everywhere there was activity, hope, and the zeal to save. Then suddenly the German ultimata exploded like a bombshell, and at a stroke all hopes were annihilated.

What induced Germany to take this step? Professedly it was due to the Russian mobilisation. What are the facts bearing on this point? I have already pointed out that the Russian mobilisation was merely the consequence of two facts; firstly, the Austrian mobilisation which had preceded it, and secondly, the more than equivocal attitude assumed by Germany and Austria throughout the crisis.

Both grounds were completely sound, as I believe that I have proved. The Russian mobilisations were in no way kept secret; they were carried out with complete publicity, the partial mobilisation in the four southern

¹ Orange Book, No. 67. Blue Book, No. 120. Yellow Book, Nos. 113, 120.

² Yellow Book, No. 120. Blue Book, No. 133.

Governmental districts on July 29th, the general mobilisation on the morning of July 31st.¹ The Austrian partial mobilisation had already taken place before the declaration of war against Serbia, that is to say before July 28th. The general mobilisation was ordered *at the latest at 1 o'clock on the morning of July 31st*; indeed, according to the report of the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, it took place as early as July 28th.² The Russian partial mobilisation was officially communicated to Berlin on July 29th, and the general mobilisation was publicly proclaimed in Petrograd on July 31st.

The story of the false Russian words of honour is itself a falsehood. According to the account given in the German White Book, no fewer than two Russian gentlemen are assumed to have broken their word of honour, the Russian Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff. In addition to these, it is known that the Russian Emperor, the "most sincere and devoted friend and cousin" of the Emperor William, also broke his word ("betrayed Germany's confidence," as it is expressed in the official English edition of the German White Book). These insinuations of broken words constitute, along with many other features, a pleasant method of distinguishing between the German publication and those of other countries. This also provides for people abroad a "culture-barometer" indicating a position which is in no way specially favourable for Germany.

But if only the assertions were at least true! They are, however, untrue. The Russian Minister of War declared on July 27th to the German Military Attaché that no order to mobilise had as yet been issued, but that preparatory measures only were being taken; if Austria were to cross the Serbian frontier the four military districts directed towards Austria would be mobi-

¹ White Book, pp. 409, 412.

² Yellow Book, No. 115. Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49.

lised, but not those on the German frontier, since "peace with Germany was desired very much."¹ This communication of the Minister for War was in full accordance with the truth. The alleged "declaration of the state of war" in Kovno referred to in the telegram from the Imperial Consulate on July 27th,² is not the same as mobilisation. This should be known in Germany at least, since we also expressly distinguish between a "state of war" and "mobilisation."

The mobilisation of Kiev and Odessa, which is presumed to have taken place on July 26th, is reported by the German military attaché only in a very vague form, and cannot therefore be regarded as established. The military attaché "*deems it* certain that mobilisation has been ordered" in the two districts.³ His assumption may, however, be false, and may be based on the receipt of erroneous information, not an improbable occurrence in view of the great distance between these two districts and Petrograd. Nevertheless, it is possible (and indeed it would have been more than reasonable) that Russia on July 26th, that is to say, on the day after the rupture of diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia, should have made *preparations* for mobilisation. The Minister for War expressly acknowledges this. It is thus as audacious as it is unjust to reproach the Russian Minister of War with a breach of his word of honour on the ground of such evidence.

The second guilty person is the Chief of the General Staff, and the accuser is again the military attaché. In this case the conversation took place on July 29th, and the statement made by the Chief of the General Staff is reported to have been to the effect that "everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two

¹ White Book, Exhibit 11.

² White Book, Exhibit 8.

³ White Book, Exhibit 7.

days ago," that nowhere had there been mobilisation. For this he gave his word of honour in the most solemn manner, but he "could not assume a guarantee for the future."¹

The Chief of the General Staff did not say this, and *cannot* have said this, for on the same day, July 29th, the Russian Government *officially informed Berlin that they had mobilised four army districts*. It will be seen how much the love of truth is involved in the composition of the German White Book. On the same page, page 10,² there is printed, at the top the official communication of the mobilisation, and below the official denial. What purpose is the Chief of the General Staff supposed to have had in view when he uttered this lie, seeing that at the same moment the Russian Ambassador was informing Berlin of the truth? What, on the other hand, must we think of a Government which in a matter of life and death manifests such levity in the compilation of official documents?

What the Chief of the General Staff really said is indeed quite clear. He confirmed the mobilisation against Austria, and denied that against Germany. This agrees with the official communication made in Berlin, and also with a report despatched on July 30th by Paléologue, the French Ambassador.³ The military attaché had either failed to understand the Chief of the General Staff, or else he intentionally reported what was not true.

Notwithstanding a diligent study of the evidence it is not clear to me in what point the Russian Emperor is supposed to have lied. The whole of these questions of

¹ White Book, p. 410.

² [Pages 409 and 410 in the collected English correspondence.]

³ Yellow Book, No. 102: "gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria."

mobilisation and of mutual recrimination stand for the most part on such an uncertain foundation that it is hazardous to utter censorious judgments in this matter. The Emperor William, for example, telegraphs on July 30th to the Tsar: "Austria has mobilised only against Serbia." In opposition to this, the Imperial Chancellor admits in his speech of August 4th that Austria had also mobilised against Russia. It is impossible to ascertain the truth with regard to this or that mobilisation, since measures of mobilisation are different in different countries, and, since further, even without an official mobilisation it is possible to carry out a secret mobilisation. In French reports, for example, it is maintained, and the assertion is supported by facts, that Germany had begun to mobilise as far back as the recall of the Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade.¹ The proclamation of the "danger of war" is a German specialty, which, as a matter of fact, conceals the most serious measures of mobilisation.

Where and when, however, is the Russian Emperor supposed to have lied on the subject of his mobilisation? In his telegram of July 30th he acknowledges "the military measures now taking form," which were being carried out "for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria." In his telegram of July 31st he declares that a discontinuance of his military preparations was "technically impossible"—an expression which it is remarkable to note occurs in almost the same words in the telegram of the Emperor William to the King of England on August 1st: "For technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts—east and west—must proceed according to the arrangement made." In his last telegram of August 1st the Tsar in no way denies the mobilisation on the German frontier, with which he is

¹ Blue Book, No. 105 (Enclosure 3).

reproached by the German Emperor, but, on the contrary, he leaves it open to the latter to mobilise also, asking only that the Emperor should give the same guarantee as he himself had given, namely, that "*these measures do not mean war,*" and that both rulers should continue to negotiate in the interests of peace.

I do not find anything in these telegrams which can even in the slightest degree throw doubt on the honour of the Russian Emperor. On the contrary, I see in the whole exchange of telegrams—above all, in the suppressed telegram of July 29th—the most honourable inclination to peace on the part of the Tsar, as contrasted with the ultimatum-policy of Germany which, in spite of all the German Emperor's peaceful assurances, was necessarily bound to lead to war.

The conclusion at which I arrive is, then, that *the Russian mobilisation was justified*, since it was occasioned by the Austrian mobilisation. *It was not kept secret*, but was officially communicated to foreign countries, and was publicly proclaimed within the country. There is no manner of proof for the assertion that it was aggressive in character. With as much reason, and indeed with more reason, an aggressive character could be ascribed to the previous Austrian mobilisation and the German mobilisation concealed under the name of the "State of War." The attitude of the various Governments up to the moment of mobilisation, and their subsequent behaviour, can alone show these military acts in their true character. From this point of view the Austro-German mobilisations which were in full swing even before the proclamation of the "state of war," have a much more aggressive character than the Russian, because the Austro-German mobilisation served an aggressive policy, whereas the policy which called forth the Russian mobilisation was defensive in its nature.

The aggressive character of the German attitude is in particular confirmed by certain events which took place on the western frontier against France, before the despatch of the two ultimata. As early as July 30th German troops were concentrated at Thionville and Metz. Garrison troops from Metz were pushed up to the frontier, reinforced by troops from Trèves and Cologne. The frontier-defences were strengthened and fortified. From July 25th railway stations were occupied by the military classes of the reserve (1903-1911) recalled by individual summons, roads on the frontier were barricaded, and the circulation of motor-cars forbidden. Most important of all, as early as July 29th German patrols had in two instances penetrated into French territory. The French Government had officially announced that, in order to avoid collisions on the frontier, a zone of territory extending to 10 kilometres would be left unoccupied. The German Government did not issue a similar declaration, but pushed forward their advance-posts to the French frontier. We shall later have occasion to notice other occurrences, even more provocative, which took place between the 1st and 3rd of August.

From the political and military events previous to the despatch of the ultimata one thing emerges with certainty, namely, that the Franco-Russian military preparations furnished no support for the view that aggressive intentions existed on the part of these States, and that if aggressive intentions existed anywhere it can only have been on the side of Germany.

What right, then, had Germany to demand that Russia should demobilise? This demand was in itself unjustified, and, when addressed to a Great State, was a departure from the conventions usually governing international relations; the situation was, however, rendered more difficult by the conditions imposed by Ger-

many, specifying the manner in which it was to be carried out. The discontinuance of Russia's military measures was to take place:—

(a) Within twelve hours, and

(b) not only against Germany, but also against Austria.

The first request was "*technically impossible*," since a great State covering an enormous superficial area cannot within twelve hours put a stop to measures of mobilisation which have been initiated (see the telegrams of the Emperor Nicholas of July 30th and 31st, and that of the Emperor William to the King of England of August 1st).

The second demand, however, that demobilisation should take place against Austria as well, was *so monstrous that one is almost tempted to doubt the sanity of the people* who dared to propose it. Was Russia really expected to cancel her mobilisation against Austria, while Austria herself had been partially mobilised for over eight days, and had been completely mobilised against Russia and against Serbia since the early morning of July 31st, perhaps even from July 28th? Could Russia be expected to lay down her arms before Austria? This suggestion is all the more remarkable inasmuch as Austria herself had no idea of addressing such a suggestion to Russia, but, on the contrary, she renewed negotiations with Russia on July 31st, the same day on which both States carried out a general mobilisation.

Germany thus was "more Austrian than the Austrians." *Speaking generally, what right had she to make demands on behalf of Austria?* Did she intervene as Austria's guardian, was she clothed with the powers of a plenipotentiary, or on what other legal title did she rely? In any case, the situation which arose from this arrogant tutelage was—I can find no other word

for it—an abortion of madness. Austria found nothing to astonish or inconvenience her in carrying on negotiations with Russia under arms. And, as a matter of fact, it was not the first time that negotiations had taken place between the two countries under these circumstances. During the Balkan crisis both Powers had remained mobilised for months at a time, and nevertheless negotiations had been successfully carried on. Germany, however, whose interests were not involved in the present negotiations, who participated in the whole dispute merely as the ally of Austria, believed it to be her duty to afford more protection to Austria than Austria herself considered that she required, and she demanded from Russia a demobilisation to which the Double Monarchy attached no importance whatever.

The complete madness of the whole situation may be gathered from the following hypothesis. If Russia—as, indeed, theoretically might have happened—had agreed to demobilise so far as Germany was concerned, but had declined to do so with regard to Austria—what would have been the position? The German ultimatum would then have partially complied with and partially declined, and *Germany would have declared war against Russia because Russia had not demobilised against Austria*. But Austria had in no way asked her to demobilise!

We see by what kind of men Germany is governed. How long will the people still submit to this condition of affairs?

But to go further. Is then mobilisation in itself a hostile or a threatening act against which a neighbouring country is justified in taking action by means of an ultimatum? In no way. Mobilisation in itself is nothing else than the process by which the military forces of a country are prepared against the contingency of a conflict arising with another country. It is a meas-

ure of security and foresight, which can only assume a threatening character by simultaneous or antecedent political measures taken by the Power mobilising. *What political measures had Russia taken which could attach to her mobilisation the suspicion of aggressive intentions?* None. The aggression, the general initiative to the whole conflict had issued from Austria, with the approval and support of Germany. Russia was politically acting on the defensive when she gave expression to her legitimate interests in the Balkans. She was bound to support this political defensive by military measures of security, since the aggressor also had made military preparations.

This is the situation viewed from the abstract standpoint of international law. In the concrete case before us we have seen that Russia up to and even beyond the day of her general mobilisation had, in union with England and France, done everything to maintain peace, whereas Austria and Germany had done everything to disturb it. Thus the concrete circumstances of the case also prove that the Russian mobilisation—which in theory was no menace to Germany—could also in this practical case contain no such menace. To this must be added that Russia, as we have already seen, had no recognisable *interest* in attacking Germany or Austria. Her interest was exclusively confined to guarding herself against being checkmated by Austria in the Balkans; the question was one of defence, not defiance.

That mobilisation in itself is in no way a hostile act can be proved even from the testimony of an Austrian witness. Count Forgach, the Austrian Foreign Under-Secretary, declared, on July 31st, to de Bunsen, the English Ambassador, that "*mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side.*"¹

Nevertheless, it suited Germany to represent the Rus-

¹ Blue Book, No. 118.

sian mobilisation as a menace, and, indeed, as a menace against Austria and Germany alike. What was announced as the consequence which would fall upon Russia if she did not comply with the demands contained in the ultimatum? Mobilisation in Germany was also to take place. In the telegram sent by the Chancellor to Count Pourtalès on July 31st we read: "On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the 'threatening state of war,' which does not yet imply mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not,"¹ &c., &c. Up to this point the matter is still quite logical if it is admitted that the despatch of the ultimatum was justifiable or necessary (which is, however, an erroneous assumption).

If this is madness, there is, at any rate, method in it. Germany says to Russia: "You have mobilised; if you do not draw back, I will mobilise also." This is, indeed, the course which the Tsar advised the Emperor William to adopt: that there should be mobilisation on both sides, but without war or intention to make war, and that negotiations with the view of arriving at a peaceful understanding should go quietly forward. That such a course is possible requires no proof. That it has happened countless times is a historical fact. What reason was there for supposing that it could not happen on this occasion? Indeed, there were now stronger reasons than ever before, since greater interests were at stake, and greater composure and prudence was therefore required on the part of all concerned. If Germany had remained content with the mobilisation which she threatened, and had given full scope to the apparently hopeful negotiations taking place in Vienna and Petrograd, if she had only waited for a day or two—mobilised like the others—it is certain that Europe would have

¹ White Book, Exhibit 24.

been preserved from the gravest of all catastrophes. As de Bunsen, the English Ambassador, states in his report to the English Government¹: "A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history."

The mobilisation of Germany would indeed have given a new impulse to the negotiations; for everyone feared us. Up till then there was no one who had seen us in arms; no one would have dared to quarrel with a Germany ready for battle.

The fact that it is possible to be mobilised and that negotiations may nevertheless be carried on without war resulting is confirmed, quite apart from countless historical incidents, by the events which took place in the beginning of August, 1914. Germany and France mobilised on the afternoon of August 1st; notwithstanding this, the Emperor William and the Chancellor in their telegrams to London on August 1st expressed their readiness to delay crossing the French frontier until 7 o'clock in the evening of August 3rd.² As a matter of fact, war was only then declared against France; the two countries were thus mobilised for three days without being at war with each other.

A much more striking and even humorous example of this kind is presented by the relations between Austria and Russia. These, the two leading parties in the quarrel, had been mobilised since July 31st, and war did not break out between them *until August 6th*, when the state of peace was ended by the declaration made by Austria. For days after the outbreak of the war between Russia and Germany the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors remained quietly in the capital of their enemies, and, who knows, may even have continued negotiations. In any case the mobilised condi-

¹ White Book, No. 161.

² Collected Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 540.

tion of their armies did not disturb them in the enjoyment of the comforts of peace. Surely nothing equally insane—I can again find no other expression which is applicable, and there is no reason why I should refrain from calling a spade a spade—has ever occurred in diplomatic history. The two chief duellists have not yet crossed swords, but the second of one party has already attacked the other. If in the six days between the 1st and the 6th of August Austria and Russia had after all succeeded in arriving at an agreement—a consummation which at the time was still hoped for by the whole of Europe, and which could easily have been realised but for the provocative intervention of Germany—where in that case would have been the sense of Germany's war against Russia? It would have been a sort of war in the air, a tilting against windmills in the manner of Don Quixote, a war without any substantial ground. I will again merely ask: *How long will the nation continue to tolerate such a Government?*

An answer to this peculiar ultimatum does not appear to have been received from the Russian Government, although a reply was received personally from the Tsar in the telegram despatched by him about noon on August 1st, and received in Berlin about 2 o'clock in the afternoon.¹ This is the telegram quoted above, in which the Tsar states that he regards the German counter-mobilisation as reasonable, but expresses anew the desire and the hope that it will not lead to war, but that "with the aid of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood."

Three hours later the declaration of war was handed over in Petrograd by the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès.

Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its

¹ White Book, p. 413.

commission been denied with greater effrontery and hypocrisy.

“The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilisation, menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the European Cabinets, just as it was on the point of succeeding. The Russian mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial shows clearly that Russia wanted war” (*see the German White Book, page 412*).

Nothing of this is true:

The Russian Government did *not* menace the security of the German Empire by its mobilisation.

It did *not* destroy the action at mediation of the European Cabinets just as it was on the point of succeeding.

It did *not* deny its measures of mobilisation.

It did *not* want war.

Everything that is here flung as a reproach at the Russian Government was, in fact, committed by *Germany*.

Germany wanted war, and brought it about by her ultimatum and by her declaration of war.

This declaration of war is a Cabinet paper in a class by itself, both in substance and in style. We have already considered the view that must be taken of the “part of mediator” played by Germany, and of “the grave and imminent danger” threatened from the side of Russia. The contents of the document would not merit any special discussion, if it were not necessary to emphasise a point which is as yet completely unknown in Germany. Germany—it is incredible, but true!—delivered the declaration of war *with an alternative text* in the passage of most importance, leaving it to Russia,

so to speak, to choose which she preferred, and thus acknowledging that she herself did not know why she declared war against Russia. In the German White Book the words in question run: "Russia having refused to comply with this demand, and having shown by this refusal," &c. On the other hand, in the declaration of war as delivered in Petrograd the words run: "Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude) that her action," &c. You can see how they must have sweated in the Wilhelmstrasse in the dog days to concoct a formula for the declaration of war which would sound fairly well. As it was not known whether Russia would have to be reproached with a direct refusal or only with having ignored the demands contained in the ultimatum, as obviously no one knew very definitely by what name they were to call the gorgon child with snakes for hair and breath of fire, whom they were bringing into the world, they left it to the addressee to whom the monster was despatched to make the choice of his "name and description."

Why was war declared against Russia? According to the words used in the declaration of war, it was because Russia had declined or ignored the demands contained in the ultimatum. According to the memorial contained in the White Book it was *because Russia had begun the war against us*.¹ This last point is particularly to be noted because the assertion that Russia and France had attacked us forms the basis on which has been constructed the flimsy edifice of German popular enthusiasm. "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of defence (*Notwehr*)," exclaimed the Chancellor on August 4th, "and necessity (*Not*) knows no law." It is not only the war against our real opponents that is

¹ White Book, p. 413.

justified on the grounds of necessity, but also the violation of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium. "He who is menaced as we are, and is fighting for his highest possession, can only consider how he is to hack his way through." ¹

Menace and defence; these, then, are the watchwords. It is indeed quite true that even the highwayman is in a certain sense menaced, and in a state of defence, when he attacks a traveller and suddenly becomes aware that other well-armed men are hurrying to help the traveller who had looked so lonely. In such a case the highwayman also is fighting a life and death struggle for his freedom and his existence. In this sense Germany also was in a state of defence. She would not, however, have found herself in such a position of constraint *if she had not herself begun the attack.* To get rid of this disagreeable fact and to construe for the use of the people a real state of defence other facts were adduced which were supposed to fulfil this end, apart from the menace involved in mobilisation—which it was realised was insufficient to serve as a basis for this purpose.

It is asserted with regard to Russia and France alike that they had begun the war, that they had "*opened hostilities.*" ²

How did Russia begin the war? One single fact is cited in the memorandum. Russian troops had "already in the afternoon of August 1st" crossed our frontier and "marched into German territory." Be it observed; already on the afternoon of August 1st. Is there anything remarkable about this? Did we not at 5 o'clock on the same afternoon hand over a declaration of war in Petrograd? Was there not in consequence *a state of war between Germany and Russia as from 5 o'clock in the afternoon?* Were not Russian troops, therefore,

¹ Collected Documents, p. 438.

² White Book, p. 413.

perfectly entitled to cross our frontiers *after* 5 o'clock? If the Chancellor wished to construe an attack which would have been in violation of international law he should at least have been sufficiently astute to insert after the words "in the afternoon of August 1st" the further words "*before* 5 o'clock." Only in such a case would it have been possible to speak of an attack, and consequently of a state of defence. If the frontier was crossed only after the declaration of war, it was no longer an attack, but a natural and justifiable consequence of the state of war which we had brought about.

On this point also we can again dispose of the Chancellor by means of his own memorial. What he asserts, even if it were true—which is still to be proved—in no way supports the conclusions which he draws, and the theory of defence collapses miserably like a house of cards.

And in arriving at this conclusion I have left completely aside the question whether it is in any way possible from such collisions on the frontier to draw the conclusion that attacks have been intentionally made by the neighbouring State. Such inferences *cannot*, of course, be drawn. When nations are opposed to each other in arms, and, indeed, even in time of peace without mobilisation when there is merely a state of tension between neighbouring States, experience shows that crossings of the frontier, collisions between advance-posts, and similar incidents constantly take place. These are occurrences which reasonable men view as they deserve to be viewed, as unimportant incidents for which neither of the States concerned can be held responsible. The supreme military command is, in such a case, in no way responsible, for incidents of this nature invariably arise through the arbitrary action of subordinate officers without—indeed in most cases contrary to—the instructions of their superior officers. This is, indeed,

the first occasion in the history of war in which such a frontier incident has been interpreted as an intentional attack by a neighbouring State and the people have been deluded into the idea that they are in a state of defence. The most remarkable feature in the whole business is, however, as we have said, that there was not even an illegitimate passage of the frontier, if this only took place after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of August 1st.

Equally threadbare are the assertions which are advanced with the object of construing *an attack from the side of France*.

The declaration of war against France took place on August 3rd at 6.45 p.m. The letter from Herr von Schoen, containing the declaration of war, bases it on the following grounds: "A certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators, several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremburg." ¹

French military aviators who had "openly" passed over Belgium are thus in this case alleged to be the guilty persons. In the case of France it was impossible to suggest that the mobilisation amounted to a menace, since the White Book itself is obliged to admit that France mobilised at the same time as we did.² Since it was then of no avail to assert here, as in the case of Russia, the existence of a menace, it was necessary for the Government to restrict themselves, in the case of France, to saying that Germany had *actually been attacked*. According to the declaration of war, the actual

¹ Yellow Book, No. 147.

² White Book, p. 413.

attack was effected by military aviators, who were further perceived to have crossed over Belgium. How anyone can tell by looking at an aviator who drops bombs on Wesel, Carlsruhe, or Nuremburg that he came from Belgium remains a secret locked in the breasts of the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse. It is, however, very interesting to observe how Herr von Schoen's bomb-throwing aviators are transformed by Herr von Below-Saleske into "dirigibles" (see the memorandum of his interview on August 3rd with the Belgian Foreign Office¹), and how further in the Chancellor's speech of August 4th they become "cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments" breaking into the territory of the Empire.²

What, we may ask, really took place? Did the French merely send across aviators, as Herr von Schoen maintains, or dirigibles as Herr von Below-Saleske says, or companies and cavalry patrols as the Chancellor asserts? An English proverb which the Empress Frederick was in the habit of quoting tells us that "A liar should have a good memory." The German diplomatists lie, but unfortunately they have a bad memory. The contradiction between the statements of these three gentlemen is sufficient to prove that all these French attacks are imaginary. It is, in fact, the Germans who were the aggressors, not merely because they declared war against France—which even if a crime was, at any rate, within their rights under international law—but also because they had *violated French territory* days before the declaration of war. This fact is proved, not only by French assertions, the credibility of which might be disputed, but also by German confessions, which are of course unintentional. As early as July 30th and again on August 2nd the French Government lodged

¹ Grey Book, No. 21.

² Collected Documents, p. 438.

complaints in Berlin with regard to quite definite occurrences of this nature¹: at Delle, near Belfort, the French custom house was twice fired upon by German soldiers; north of this town two patrols of mounted Jägers crossed the frontier and advanced as far as the villages of Joncherey and Baron; their officer shot a French soldier in the head, and his men carried off some French horses. On the same day, August 2nd, German troops violated French territory at Ciry and Longwy, and marched against Fort Longwy, &c.

These are some of the French complaints. That there must be some truth in all this is clear from the Chancellor's speech of August 4th. Herr von Bethmann expressly admits one of the French complaints (crossing of the frontier by a patrol, and the occurrence of a conflict) on the ground of the report of the German General Staff.² One may reasonably suspect that other violations of the frontier "against express orders," as Herr von Bethmann puts it, also took place. This suspicion appears all the more reasonable, and indeed becomes a certainty, when we read the concluding sentence of the telegram sent on August 1st by the Emperor William to King George: "I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment *being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier.*"³ This telegram proves two things:—

(1) that France on August 1st had not yet become nervous;

(2) that the German troops on August 1st, that is to say *two days before the declaration of war*, would have crossed the French frontier, if they had not been kept back by telegraph and by telephone.

¹ Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 136, 139.

² Collected Documents, p. 438.

³ Collected Documents, p. 510.

The fact that they were thus kept back was caused by the negotiations which took place at the last hour with England. *Thus had it not been for these negotiations German troops would have penetrated into France en masse forty-eight hours before the declaration of war.*

What then becomes of the assertion of the Chancellor that France broke the peace, and that, in fact, she attacked us? The statement does not deserve credence because of the triple contradiction between the various statements constituting the charge, and in any case it remains unproved. On the other hand, the counter-assertion of France, that we were the aggressors and the violators of the frontier, is credible because it is in itself free from contradiction, because it specifies in the most detailed manner the time, the place, and the circumstances of the cases cited, because the German General Staff itself admits one of these frontier violations, and because the telegram of the Emperor admits that even violations of the frontier *en masse* were contemplated.

The French Government, on the other hand, have strictly denied the charges brought against them, and, above all, by fixing the ten-kilometre zone they gave proof of their sincere intention to avoid violations of the frontier.

In my opinion the objective investigation of the facts can lead only to the acquittal of France and to the condemnation of Germany. And this view is strengthened if the previous course of diplomatic negotiations and the attitude of the two parties is taken into consideration. May we not assume that perhaps the doctrine of Bernhardi was followed in the measures taken by Germany, that the cards had to be so shuffled that their opponents would be so provoked that a declaration of war was *bound* to come from their side? May it not be assumed that it was hoped in this way to achieve

the double advantage of moving the odium on to the shoulders of their opponents, and of bringing the case under the terms of the alliance with Italy?

One thing, at any rate, is certain: the assertion that we were attacked by France, and were therefore in a state of defence, is an *invention* fit to be placed alongside of the corresponding assertion made with regard to Russia. No one attacked us. No one placed us in a state of defence. *This war is but a pseudo-war of liberation.*

What took place *now*, after the outbreak of war with Russia and France, has no connection with the central question: "Who is responsible for the European war?" The European war was there, as soon as Germany and Austria on the one side stood opposed to France and Russia on the other. No one can become guilty of an act *after* it is committed. Guilt can, however, be increased in so far as the act committed may involve in its train the commission of other acts. The more portentous these further acts are, the greater and heavier will be the load of guilt.

THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE PARTICIPATION OF ENGLAND IN THE WAR

After having presented to Belgium on the evening of August 2nd an ultimatum in which a free passage through this neutral country was demanded and receiving a refusal, Germany invaded Belgian territory on the morning of August 4th.

The neutrality of Belgium was established by the Treaty of London of 1839, and guaranteed for all time by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Article 7 of the Treaty of London provides that Belgium shall be an independent and perpetually neutral State, and that it shall maintain its neutrality against all other

States. The first and most obvious duty of a neutral State is *to refuse to belligerent parties a right of passage through its territory*. This is one of the fundamental principles of international law, and it has been again formally confirmed, with the concurrence of all the Powers, by the Hague Conference of 1907. Article 5 of the Hague Convention on the rights and duties of neutral States prescribes that "A neutral State ought not to allow on its territory any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4." Article 2 provides that "Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or of supplies." Lastly, Article 10 of the same Convention declares that the fact of a neutral Power repelling, even by force, attacks on its neutrality *cannot be regarded as a hostile act*.

This is the legal position. Herr von Bethmann seeks to avoid the consequences which flow from the legal position by constructing in this case also the case of *Defence*, which he has already advanced against France and Russia.

I believe that I have proved that as against France and Russia the state of defence did not arise, but that it is merely a German invention. If this is correct, then there can also have been no state of defence against Belgium, for here at least it is not asserted that Belgium had attacked us by military aviators, infantry, and cavalry. The state of defence against Belgium stands and falls with the state of defence against the other countries already mentioned, and is thus to be denied on grounds of fact.

But even if Germany had in fact been in a state of defence against France and Russia, the wrong done to Belgium would not thereby have been diminished. The state of defence (*Notwehr*) against enemies in war would, it is true, in general justify an act of defence

(*Verteidigung*), but under no circumstances would it justify an act of defence involving injury to a third party, that is to say, a breach of neutrality.

The criminal code defines a state of defence as "that defence (*Verteidigung*) which is necessary to ward off from oneself or from another an actual attack in violation of the law." A transgression of the limits thus indicated can only claim immunity from punishment if the actor "in consternation, alarm, or terror exceeded the limits of defence (*Verteidigung*).'" As this definition of the state of defence is the only one which we possess in our laws, and as, moreover, it corresponds to all logical requirements, we may be permitted to apply the principles so enunciated to the actions for which the German Chancellor bears the responsibility. Thus even if we assume that Germany was in a state of defence, it was nevertheless open to her to take only such actions in her defence as were *unconditionally necessary*, not, however, such actions as were convenient or advantageous for her. Under no circumstances can the passage through Belgium be said to have been necessary for her, for indeed the whole of the eastern frontier of France from Verdun to Belfort stood at the disposal of the German army. It was, of course, more advantageous and convenient to avoid this strong line of fortresses, and to fall into France from the north. But advantage and convenience do not form the standard by which the limits of the state of defence are determined; on the contrary, the only test is *necessity*. If anyone wishes to maintain that we were in a condition of consternation, alarm, or terror, then the transgression of the limits of the state of defence would be forgiven to us. But I was under the impression that we Germans fear only God, and not the French. So that even this objection does not excuse us.

To this there must be added the further ground al-

ready pointed out, which must unconditionally lead to our condemnation: *the state of defence never excuses the violation of the rights of a third party*. The state of defence against France could not excuse the violation of the rights of Belgium.

From every point of view then we are in the wrong, on grounds both of fact and of law. Viewed from the political point of view, the matter is even worse for us. What is the meaning and the purpose of the neutralisation of a small State which an unrighteous Providence has planted in the middle of great States and made the natural cock-pit for their struggles? The purpose can only be to protect this State *in war*, not in peace, when it needs no protection. If, however, when war comes each of the neighbouring States is justified in falling into the neutral State, on the ground that it is in a state of defence—in a general sense, although not in a juridical sense, every war is a state of defence—then the whole process of neutralisation has no longer any purpose, and is, in fact, nothing but a “scrap of paper,” as the Chancellor said to Sir E. Goschen. *The dictum that “necessity knows no law” may be used to justify any crime*. The precise purpose of a treaty of neutrality is, however, that of making necessity subject to the commands of law. Its object is to replace the maxim: “*La force prime le droit*” by the contrary maxim: “*Le droit prime la force*.”

Now it is true that the attempt has been made to justify the violation of Belgian neutrality on two grounds. It is maintained:—

(1) that France would have invaded Belgium if we had not anticipated her, and

(2) that Belgium long ago concluded military agreements with France and England with the view of taking common action against Germany.

Both these arguments are entirely unsupported. There

is a complete absence of any proof that France intended to invade Belgium.

Sir Edward Grey is known to have addressed on July 31st an inquiry in identical terms to France and to Germany with a view to ascertaining whether, in the event of a war, they would respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violated it.¹ The answer of France was received without delay, and was an unconditional affirmative.² The answer of Herr von Jagow, on the other hand, was one of the many awkward excuses which this child of misfortune had throughout the whole affair to produce by command from above. He had to consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. He was very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all, since any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing.³ Herr von Jagow did not neglect even on this occasion to draw attention to a presumed hostile act of Belgium, namely, an embargo on a consignment of corn for Germany—an incident which is explained as perfectly correct by the Belgian Government in their Grey Book.⁴

This early hint on the part of Jagow of the hostility of Belgium was merely the prelude to the campaign which was later systematically pursued, and which reached its culminating point in the assertion of the Chancellor that a violation of neutrality had not in fact taken place, since Belgium, in consequence of military conventions with England and France *had already sacrificed her neutrality before the German invasion*. This campaign was opened after the conquest of Belgium,

¹ Blue Book, No. 114.

² Blue Book, No. 125.

³ Blue Book, No. 122.

⁴ Grey Book, No. 79, Enclosures.

and even to-day it is being continued with unabated energy.

On what is this charge based? It is, in the first place, a matter for surprise that the Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4th had not the slightest information about the sale of Belgium's soul. In this speech the violation of Belgian neutrality was explained exclusively by reference to the intended invasion on the part of France, and against Belgium herself not the shadow of a reproach was raised. On the contrary, Herr von Bethmann declared that the invasion of Belgium was a "wrong" which they would endeavour to make good later on. If the facts now asserted were true, is it not remarkable that they so completely escaped the notice of our Ambassador in Brussels? At least a suspicion ought to have arisen, and should have been conveyed to Berlin through the Brussels Embassy. Had this happened, the Chancellor would certainly not have failed to bring forward as early as August 4th this weighty argument in favour of our violation of Belgian neutrality; for in other matters he was certainly free enough with unproved assertions.

We may then assume as a certainty that in Berlin nothing was known of treacherous agreements of this character. It was necessary to ferret about among the Belgian archives after the capture of Brussels before it was possible to get on the track of the treachery of the Belgians. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* was then in a position to publish some documents from the archives of the Belgian General Staff which, in the view of the German Government, were supposed to reveal the fact that a plan of war against Germany had been concluded between Belgium and England. If the documents are authentic and complete—which has yet to be proved—it is true that they show that certain conversations took place between Belgian officers and English

military attachés on the co-operation which might ultimately take place between England and Belgium; on the other hand, they incontestably prove that this co-operation would only take place *in the event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality*. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* does not publish *in extenso* the documents which were found, in itself a suspicious circumstance, but only gives extracts from their contents. But even these extracts cannot conceal the fact that the disembarkation of English troops in Belgium was *only to take place after the violation of her neutrality by Germany*. An official Note of the Belgian Government issued from Le Havre on December 9th, 1914, incontrovertibly establishes the truth of this assertion.¹ The same procedure is thus adopted in this case as was done with reference to the military discussions between England and France; discussions to meet the case of an attack from Germany are denounced as a conspiracy for a common attack, defensive intentions are falsely represented as offensive. Germany, whose plans were known and feared by all, is represented as the innocent victim of the evil designs of others, whereas in fact the others were only concerned that they themselves should not fall a victim to German plans of aggression.²

¹ This note, which has been passed over in complete silence by the German Press, has been published everywhere in the press of foreign countries. The document of April 10th, 1906, published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, is entirely consistent with the contents of this note. It contains the express remark: "*The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.*" This in itself at once confutes all reproaches to the effect that an offensive agreement against Germany existed between England and Belgium.

² The Dutch "Agence Van Diaz" of November 17th, 1914, quotes the words of a speech which Broqueville, the Belgian Minister for War, delivered in January, 1913, in a secret session of the Belgian Chamber, and in which the German plans for the invasion of Bel-

Why did similar discussions not take place between Belgium and Germany to provide for the case of a French attack? The answer is quite simple. It was confidently felt that there was no need to fear a French attack. Experience has proved that the view so formed was correct, and that a just estimate both of France and of Germany had been framed.

The English Foreign Office has published a letter of Sir Edward Grey's addressed to his Ambassador at Brussels on April 7th, 1913, in which Grey dismisses every idea of being the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. No British Government would do so, and public opinion in England would never approve of this step. The violation of Belgian neutrality by England would be not only a wrong, but a great folly, since it would afford Germany a motive and a justification for following the same procedure. So long as the neutrality of Belgium or any other neutral countries was not violated by any other Power, England would never send troops into their territory. This letter was written fifteen months before the outbreak of war, and was therefore not written with the express purpose of creating a favourable position for England in the present controversy. It therefore deserves credence in every respect, and is, moreover, confirmed by the events of the last months.¹

After the German ultimatum had been handed to the Belgian Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock in the evening of August 2nd, the French Government on the morning

gium were revealed in full detail and put forward as the ground for new military requirements.

¹ For this and for all other matters affecting the Belgian question reference should be made to the work written by M. Emile Waxweiler, Member of the Royal Belgian Academy, *La Belgique neutre et loyale*—a volume distinguished both by its detail and its scientific objectivity. (Lausanne. Payot, 1915.)

of August 3rd offered to the Belgian Government, through her military attaché, the support of five French Army Corps. *Belgium, nevertheless, declined this offer of support*, although she had already rejected the demands of Germany, and must have been expecting every moment the violent entry of German forces. Particular interest attaches to one passage in the answer of Belgium to Germany. The German Government had explained their demand for a free passage by reference to the intention of France to attack Germany through Belgian territory. The Belgian Government decisively rejects the reasons thus assigned, and adds thereto:

“The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1st in the name of the French Government.

“Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations, and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader” (Belgian Grey Book, No. 22).

Belgium thus declares that she is prepared to *defend her neutrality against France with the same resolution as against Germany*, but that she considers that the possibility of a French attack is excluded in view of the formal declaration given by France. Does that sound like a secret alliance? Further, on August 3rd King Albert addressed to the King of England a telegram in which he made an appeal for *diplomatic*, not for military, intervention. Does that sound like a secret military convention?¹ Sir Francis Villiers, the English Ambassador, handed on August 4th to Davignon, the Belgian Minister, a Note, in which England declared

¹ Grey Book, No. 25.

herself ready *in the event of a German attack* to render Belgium joint assistance with France and Russia, "should Belgium so desire."¹

Should Belgium so desire! In making this limitation England indeed fell short of her international rights and duties. It is a recognised principle in international law, and is, moreover, a principle based on logic, that in the case of a collective guarantee, such as the Belgian treaty, each guarantor, in the event of neutrality being violated by another State, is at once entitled, *in her own right*, to assume protection of the neutral State, and indeed has a duty towards the other guaranteeing Powers to adopt this course (Bluntschli, *Völkerrecht*, VI., Nos. 432 and 440). Even without awaiting an expression of the desire of Belgium, England was entitled to intervene with armed force for the protection of the violated neutrality. In making her intervention dependent on the desire of Belgium, England manifested a measure of circumspection to which she was not pledged in international law, and she proved beyond dispute that there was no kind of previous agreement between England and Belgium directed against Germany.

It was not until August 5th that the Belgian Government issued to the Great Powers a formal appeal which led to their actual intervention.²

The weakness of the German reproach that Belgium had already sold her neutrality is thus completely proved. But even if the reproach were in itself justified, it would furnish no manner of excuse for Germany. The defence of the German Government is suggestive of that of a thieving murderer who seeks to excuse his action by asserting that the murdered man was a bad lot who had himself gained by theft the property which he had stolen. True, if he was aware of the depravity of his

¹ Grey Book, No. 28.

² Grey Book, No. 42.

victim before he committed the murder he might be allowed, not immunity, but the benefit of mitigating circumstances. But if he only learns afterwards what sort of a man he has murdered, his act morally remains the same, whether his victim was a devil or an angel. Germany invaded a neutral country. *Later*, she professes to have learned that this country was no longer entirely neutral; she cannot on these grounds be allowed the advantage of mitigating circumstances.

This is the moral aspect of the question. Let us now consider the practical side. Let us for the moment assume that Belgium, so far as the obligations of neutrality imposed upon her are concerned, had been "a child, no angel is so pure"; let us assume that she had never entered into even the slightest military defensive discussions with her neighbours. *Would this in any way have prevented our invasion of Belgium?* Would this have induced us to leave in their despatch-boxes the plans of our General Staff which had been ready for years? Would we in this case have felt constrained to take up our position in front of the impregnable line of fortresses from Verdun to Belfort? No one will venture to maintain this. All the declamations and publications on the crimes committed by Belgium thus merely represent so much waste of paper and printer's ink. We were resolved to overrun Belgium, either in kindness or by force of arms, whether she behaved well or ill towards us. That is the essential point. From this reproach no rain will ever wash us clean, and the more we blacken our victim after the event, the more damning will be the judgment which the world will pass upon us.

It would appear that the effect which our behaviour towards Belgium has exercised on the public opinion of the whole world, and is still exercising in a daily increased measure, is not yet properly realised in Germany. It is necessary to live abroad in order to see

and grasp this effect. It shows itself even more strongly in neutral foreign countries than in those countries which are at war with us. In particular, the small countries which are adjacent to great States, Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark, feel that the fate which befel the unfortunate Belgium might have been, or may in future be, theirs. The great neutral countries, however, throughout every rank of society, are seized with deep commiseration when they read of the devastations brought upon this prosperous small country, on these ancient and glorious homes of art, on these diligent and laborious centres of industry, when they see in their illustrated papers the fearful pictures of fire and destruction, of misery and homelessness, of smoking villages and towns, when they see families wandering about on the streets, who in hunger and penury beg for bread from the German soldiers. *The innocent country has fallen a victim to the barbarians.* That is how the world views the facts, and it only becomes more incensed when the authors of all this horror seek to excuse their actions by saying that once upon a time a Belgian officer had a consultation with an English military attaché with regard to the steps which might ultimately be taken to defend the country *in the event of a German invasion.*

And to commiseration there is added admiration—admiration for this small, heroic nation who, with sword in hand, courageously defends her independence and her honour against the superior forces of the intruder. “Belgium,” we read in the answer to the German ultimatum, “has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

“The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant

violation of international law. *No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.*

"The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

"Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

"If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights" (Belgian Grey Book, No. 22).

These are the proud words with which a free nation defends its honour and its independence.

Even Germany is not without an understanding of such heroism when it shows itself against the *other* side. When, on the same day as that on which German troops invaded Belgium, the Swiss Government informed the Governments of belligerent countries of its resolution to defend by all possible means its neutrality and the inviolability of its territory, the German Government in their acknowledgment expressed their sincere satisfaction and their confidence that the Confederation, "thanks to its strong army and the unconquerable determination of the whole Swiss people, will repel any violation of its neutrality."¹ What in the case of Belgium was a crime worthy of death, because it was directed against Germany, was in the case of Switzerland a highly meritorious proposal, because if ever the moment should come to give it effect, it could only be directed against France.

The attitude of the Belgian Army and the Belgian people was in conformity with the proud words in which

¹ Waxweiler, p. 52.

the Belgian Government had rejected the dishonouring suggestion of Germany.

The Belgians have defended their country and their fortresses with unconquerable courage and with gigantic sacrifices. To-day in the extreme west corner of Flanders they still continue to offer a desperate resistance, under the personal leadership of a King of German blood, married to a German princess—a King who exposes himself to all the dangers of the struggle. It is not surprising that such heroism should enkindle the admiring enthusiasm of the whole world. This is the *true* struggle for freedom and independence; not the counterfeit struggle which is instilled into the deluded German people.

To what has this German nation come—a nation which in the past, before the present corruption, had some understanding and enthusiasm for noble and heroic actions? Did not the work of liberation achieved by the Swiss *franc-tireur* William Tell inspire our greatest poet to his noblest drama? Were we not brought up in the admiration of the courage of the small against the great, of the struggle of the Spartans against the Persians, of the struggle against the Spaniards carried on by the Dutch, whose rising Schiller described with such deep sympathy and whom Goethe immortalised in *Egmont*? And what are we doing now, we Germans of 1914, who see and experience the same heroic struggle of the same people against us the oppressors? Not a word of sympathy is heard, not a word of admiration, not even of understanding. Instead of this we utter slanders and accusations intended to justify our crime. Let any one read the appeal issued to the civilised world signed by all Germans of distinction. Apart from the falsehood that Belgium had entered into a conspiracy with France and England, there is nothing but purely unproved assertions about the acts of *franc-*

tireurs, the mutilation of the wounded, the murder of doctors, and so on.

In the eyes of those gentlemen who, a few years ago, were stirred to enthusiasm—and rightly so—at the sight of the heroic struggle of the small Boer nation against the might of England, those Belgians who are now defending their Fatherland, if they do not happen to have uniforms, are but common criminals, who may be shot like mad dogs.¹ Have you quite forgotten, you leaders of the German spirit, our heroes of 1813 in whose honour you were still holding banquets and delivering enthusiastic speeches a year ago? Were not the men whom you celebrated like the Belgians of to-day, the *nation* in arms throwing themselves with and without uniforms against the intruder? Who will explain to the man from among the people the difference between a soldier and a defender of the Fatherland, between civilians and men in uniform, when the enemy is in the land, devastating farmyards and crops, driving away cattle and provisions, making women and children roofless? The man of the people sees only the enemy, the housebreaker, and when he seizes his rifle he does not care a brass farthing whether he is wearing a coat with shining buttons or the blue smock of a peasant. This is a point one ought to understand, and it is a point which we *did* understand in the past while we were still capable of enthusiasm in a good sense, so long as our enthusiasm had not been diverted into the cor-

¹ Cardinal Mercier, the Archbishop of Malines, in his pastoral letter addressed to the Belgian people on Christmas, 1914, states after "careful investigation" that in his diocese 13 priests, and in the dioceses of Namur, Tournai, and Liège, 30 priests were shot, and in all cases he gives their names, and their place of residence. In Aerschot, according to the findings of Cardinal Mercier, 91 civilians, and in Louvain and the surrounding district, 176 civilians were shot or burnt. These include men and women, people of advanced years, as well as children.

rupt morass of national pride and megalomania, which is constantly associated with contempt and barbarism towards others. Especially must this point be kept in view in thinking of a people like the Belgians who had never anticipated a war, had never believed themselves menaced by a war, and for a hundred years had never witnessed a war within their frontiers. These facts have to be grasped, bearing in mind that men are men, and that our actions must be framed accordingly.

The German soldiers were certainly free to protect themselves against underhand attacks, but they should have kept constantly before them the fact that their assailants were defending the highest things on earth, their house and their hearth, their home and their Fatherland. It was on this fact that they ought to have based their counter-measures, not on the *so-called law of war*, which they fashioned for themselves, which is nowhere committed to writing, and nowhere recognised. If in a village of a few thousand inhabitants and a few hundred houses some shots are fired from the windows, perhaps by concealed soldiers and not by civilians, by what right do we burn down the whole village, and place a number of the male inhabitants, innocent and guilty, against the wall and shoot them dead? If you believe it necessary for your protection—I cannot admit in this case a right of punishment—burn down if you like the individual houses, punish the individual civilians whom you recognise as guilty, but spare the village and spare the innocent. That is the least demanded by justice, if indeed we can speak of justice, in favour of the assailant and against the defender. What they are opposing to you is the *true* state of defence, the state of defence of the French and the Belgian citizens against the German, against the German intruder—the state of defence of Belgium and France against Germany. *Here* it may be said *with justice*,

"Necessity knows no law. He who is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through." This sentence of the Chancellor, in itself correct, but wrongly applied to Germany, is applicable to our opponents. Only, when applied to them, it is unfortunately inverted: he who is fighting for his highest possession is placed against the wall and shot dead.

I was able to observe in a picture palace in Berlin shortly after the outbreak of war the unspeakable confusion of thought which has spread throughout Germany. Since the military censor allowed only patriotic subjects, two war dramas were thrown on the screen one after the other. The first represented the rising of the Tyrolese in 1809 under Andreas Hofer, and the second *franc-tireur* scenes from the war of 1870. In the Tyrolese drama the whole nation was in arms against the French conqueror. Andreas Hofer himself, the leader and the hero (no general, but an innkeeper), and all the others were peasants, craftsmen, and servants, even the wives and daughters were armed, playing their part in the struggle, the whole nation kindled to a war of liberation. The sympathies of the author of this drama were, of course, entirely on the side of the Tyrolese. The French were shot down from hiding places, from behind houses, trees, and blocks of rock. And it ended, of course, with a victorious liberation of the nation. Then there followed the *franc-tireur* drama of 1870, and behold "the scene was changed!" The French defenders of the Fatherland have now suddenly become knaves and criminals. Their very visages reveal their evil instincts. They also shoot from ambuscades as did the Tyrolese in 1809, but what was then a fight for freedom is now crime and treachery. Punishment, consequently, does not fail to be meted out. German reinforcements rush into the village, fire is laid to the walls,

and amidst the lamentations of the women and children a dozen men and boys are placed against the church wall and, as it is beautifully expressed, shot according to martial law. Yes, indeed, that was quite a different story! Against the French we are shown a nation in arms; against the Germans they are gallow-birds! The same confusion of ideas is met everywhere from the highest summits of German intelligence down to the last producer of cinema films.

The effect of this intellectual perversion abroad may be imagined; it is the reverse of what is intended. In these six months of war the German professor has become a comic figure abroad, or rather a figure of tragedy-comedy as the Prussian Junker and lieutenant have been in the past. The sympathies which were formerly ours have been buried under ridicule and aversion, and have turned to our opponents, above all to the unhappy Belgians. Karl Spitteler, who is certainly not anti-German in sentiment, writes in his pamphlet *Our Swiss Standpoint*¹: "Belgium in herself does not concern us, but her fate concerns us very intimately. That a wrong was done to Belgium was originally openly confessed by the perpetrator. As an afterthought, in order to appear whiter, Cain blackened Abel. In my opinion it was a spiritual blunder to *rummage for documents in the pockets of the quivering victim*. It was amply sufficient to throttle the victim. To calumniate her in addition is really too much." These are the words of a Swiss. And everyone abroad, everyone without exception, writes and thinks to the same effect. Belgian artists, poets, and politicians are received with enthusiasm in Italy and America, in Switzerland and in Holland. They are acclaimed in gigantic assemblies such as we accorded in 1902 to Oom Paul and the Boers who accompanied him. *Belgium to-day is trump through-*

¹ Published by Rasher & Co., Zürich, 1915.

out the world. And woe to us if, after the war, we so much as touch a hair of a Belgian head! This trump card in the hands of our enemies will defeat us morally, even if we gain the victory in arms.

A part of the devastation we have accomplished in Belgium we explain by reference to the state of defence. The state of defence meets us everywhere; there is a state of defence when we invade Belgium, a state of defence when we set fire to the ancient cities of art. I will accept it as proven that shots were fired on German soldiers from the houses in Louvain. Does that justify us in destroying whole districts of the city by fire? Does that justify us in exposing the celebrated Town Hall and the Cathedral to the flames, and in doing them at least serious damage? Where is it written that shots from a rifle must be answered by arson? Where and when was such a law of war codified? That is the *Prussian* law of war, but it is not international law. When the Cossacks act in this way in East Prussia we speak of wild Muscovite hordes, but these hordes have at least this excuse, that in Stallupönen and in Neidenburg no centres of culture and of art are ruined. What, however, is the world to say of our handiwork in Belgium, the ancient land of culture and of art—in Belgium where every hamlet contains artistic jewels, Gothic cathedrals and town-halls and market-places surrounded by gorgeous patrician houses, with luxurious old-German Renaissance façades, adorned with gold? All these flowers of the creative power of man, which have afforded instruction and enjoyment to unnumbered generations and which should have served as a glory and as an example to generations yet to come—these have been ruined, destroyed, burned, because, owing to a *state of defence*, Germany was obliged to invade Belgium, and owing to a state of defence was obliged to apply the torch to the walls.

But let that pass. Let us assume that these things had to be. But is it also due to the state of defence that we have imposed contributions amounting to more than £25,000,000 on the State, the towns and the provinces of Belgium? How are we to excuse *this* act of violence? How are we to justify the enormous fines recently imposed on Belgian citizens, who, availing themselves of their right of free locomotion, preferred residence abroad to life under the German occupation? What justification have we for burdening the exhausted, impoverished country with further exorbitant sacrifices in money? What crime on the part of Belgium has merited this punishment? Was it the crime of having defended themselves against us, or, so far as I am concerned, even the crime of having prepared this defence with others? In either case we can allege only defence, not attack, for that Belgium meant to attack us no one in Germany has yet maintained.

I therefore ask again how do you explain and justify the contributions, amounting to a sum which you keep concealed in the silence of shame, but which, when everything is taken into account, considerably exceeds half a milliard marks (£25,000,000). Here your pretext of the state of defence no longer holds good. The accused who pleads in excuse a state of defence, but is found to be in possession of his opponent's purse, will plead in vain for immunity. Give back the contributions! That is the least that can be required of you, and is without doubt, when peace returns, the least that will be required of you.

The objection will be raised, and has in fact been raised: Why did Belgium not allow us a free passage, for then she would have been spared all the horrors of war? This is a noble question, worthy of the new German national psychology. "Why did you not submit to the insult?" exclaims the slanderer to the slandered;

"now you get in addition a blow on the head." Why did not Germany submit to the Napoleonic occupation? If she had remained quiet she would have been spared much bloodshed and the horrors of war. Why did not Leonidas and his Spartans allow the Persians to pass through Thermopylae? If they had done so they would all have remained alive. These and similar *questiones Domitiane* might be asked without number. They are not more foolish than the reproach which is raised against Belgium in Germany to-day. Belgium defended herself for the quite simple reason that her honour, her independence, and her international obligations compelled her to offer a defence. In summoning Belgium to allow Germany a free passage, the demand addressed to her was that she should sacrifice her honour and her independence, and scatter to the wind her international obligations.

These obligations rested on a basis not merely moral, but also to a very considerable extent practical. As soon as Belgium, by showing preference to Germany, took sides on her behalf, she would have destroyed for ever her neutral position, and would never again have been in a position to regain it. The other Powers could never again have trusted Belgium to remain neutral if on this occasion she had light-heartedly been faithless to the duties imposed by neutrality. Belgium would thus have fallen into a kind of dependence on her great neighbour Germany, who, it is true, promised to respect her independence, but certainly offered less security for the observance of this independence than was furnished by the guarantee of the collective Great Powers. Germany's designs on Belgium were not unknown in the world. Our politico-military literature had copiously contributed to the dissemination of this knowledge. General von Bernhardt expressed in general terms the view that the "conception of permanent neutrality is entirely

contrary to the essential nature of the State," and in particular he was of the opinion that Belgium, in adding to her small territory the vast Congo State, had already violated her own neutrality.¹ There was therefore a certain danger involved in trusting her voracious neighbour, in confiding in her grace alone, and in pushing aside all other protectors. The lamb can indeed feel no great confidence when the wolf promises to respect his independence.

Thus the attitude assumed by Belgium is attributable not merely to an idealistic point of view, but to extremely tangible and practical interests, and for these at least there should be some understanding in Germany, even if the nose is turned up in scorn at the idealism—of other people.

Precisely the same considerations which were bound to lead to Belgium's refusal to accord Germany a free passage through her territory would have caused her to reject any suggestion made by France or England that she should make common cause with them against Germany. No one in Germany takes the trouble to reflect for a moment what could have induced Belgium to give up her neutrality, and to sell herself body and soul to the Entente Powers. *What advantage could she expect from such behaviour?* Did Belgium entertain any designs to conquer the Rhine provinces? Did she wish to round off her territory towards Aix-la-Chapelle or Trèves? What in the world could she gain by assuming a hostile attitude towards Germany? Clearly she could gain nothing. On the contrary, by siding with the Entente Powers she would have exposed her position in Europe to the gravest danger. So long as Belgium continued neutral and discharged the duties imposed by her neutrality, she would have been quite independent of the issue of the war, and could have awaited the result

¹ Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, pp. 110, 111.

with composure, indifferent whether Germany or France emerged as victor from the struggle. The moment she sided with one of the parties, her whole future fate became dependent on her ally's success in war, and her fate would have been sealed with this ally's defeat. *Why should Belgium have run this risk?* Why should she have exposed herself to the vengeance of her powerful German neighbour, and make herself liable in the event of a defeat to be the first to pay the piper? For there could be no doubt that if Belgium were the ally of France, with obligations imposed on her by treaty, she would certainly have been annexed by Germany in the event of a defeat—a fate which, even as things are, is held over her head on the ground of her merely imaginary alliance. I therefore again ask: What reasonable ground could Belgium have had to expose herself needlessly to this danger, instead of awaiting the issue of events with a calm conscience under the sure shield of neutrality? No one can give a plausible answer to this question. Thus by the application of the simplest logic it is possible to demonstrate how weak is the foundation of the German accusations against Belgium.

As against Germany, Belgium has exercised her rights, fulfilled her duties, and protected her interests as she would have done had a breach of her neutrality been demanded from any other quarter. It is Germany that has acted wrongly, contrary to her duty, and against her true interests.

The imponderabilia which a Bismarck kept in mind in all his political measures count for naught with the leaders of the Germany of to-day, who "have exactly caught his manner of clearing his throat and spitting,"¹ but have not caught even a breath of his spirit. The imponderabilia in the case of Belgium were the respect due

[¹ Schiller. *Wallenstein's Lager.*]

to the rights of others and regard for the moral judgment of the world. The neglect of these imponderabilia will be bitterly avenged on Germany. It has already been avenged in so far as it has influenced the attitude of England in this war, and has thereby increased the coalition of our enemies to our disadvantage.

.

After this section was finished a manifesto of the Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, issued on December 24th, came to my notice. This document, written in answer to a speech of Viviani, once more achieves the utmost limits in perversion and in falsification, in order to shift the clearly-proven guilt of Germany on to the Entente Powers.¹ We should be doing this production too much honour if we were to bestow upon it any special consideration. Everything contained in it is contradicted by the diplomatic correspondence, by the German White Book itself, and by the earlier speeches of the Chancellor. The great feat whereby Herr von Bethmann endeavours to wash himself clean consists in confusing the sequence of events in time, in suppressing everything that does not suit his case, in advancing assertions which are in contradiction with the proved facts, and in ascribing to the Entente Powers motives which are inconsistent with their actions.

A few test examples may illustrate the love of truth which inspires Herr von Bethmann, and may at the same time indicate the shortness of his memory. He now maintains that, *to begin with, Austria had only mobilised against Serbia*, whereas on August 4th he himself admitted that a partial mobilisation—and that before the Russian partial mobilisation—had taken place against Russia as well. To take a further instance, this time of his tactics of suppression: he admits that Germany

¹ See Appendix III.

raised objections only against the *form* of a conference, but passes over in silence the important fact that Germany, notwithstanding repeated pressure from the Entente Powers, did not consent to suggest a form in which the Conference would be agreeable to her. Amongst much more that is ignored, he keeps silence with regard to the fact that up to the last moment (July 31st), when in consequence of the German ultimatum it was then too late, Austria declined the direct negotiations with Petrograd which Germany herself had recommended in place of the Conference. The whole of the document is thus, as is shown by these examples, nothing more than a continuous series of falsifications and suppressions of the truth.

I should only like to draw attention to one more assertion, which also deserves no other designation—an assertion which now appears for the first time, and which, for the sake of variety, ascribes to England the guilt of being the first to mobilise, a guilt which has hitherto been supposed to fall on Russia alone. What is the ground for this terrible accusation, which, even if it were true, would not dispose of Grey's continuous efforts for peace? It is based on the fact that the English Fleet was not disbanded on the conclusion of their normal manœuvres near Portland, but was kept together (July 27th). As a matter of fact, this had nothing to do with a "mobilisation," a "collection of the Fleet at Portland," a "military preparation on a great scale," as Herr von Bethmann asserts against his better knowledge; it was merely a *keeping-together*, a *non-dispersal* of the manœuvre-fleet, caused by the state of tension in the European situation, by the recall of the Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade, and the refusal of Austria and Germany to enter with the other Powers into any negotiations on the Serbian question.¹ Grey openly communi-

¹ Blue Book, p. xi. No. 48. Yellow Book, No. 66.

cated to Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador, the reason for not dispersing the Fleet, adding that there was no menace in what had been done but that it was merely a measure of security owing to the possibility that a European conflagration might be brought about by the incomprehensible manner in which Austria treated the conciliatory answer of Serbia as a blank negative. England took no other measure of security on sea or on land. Herr von Bethmann, however, makes out of this a "mobilisation on a great scale," which aimed at a "humiliation of the two Powers in the Triple Alliance," and which produced a militant frame of mind in France and Russia. Who is deceived by this? No one, Herr von Bethmann.

Turn over the Yellow Book and the Blue Book,¹ and you will find that from the morning of July 26th—that is to say, immediately after the expiration of the Austrian ultimatum—Germany had prepared her mobilisation, the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine were concentrated, the fortresses on the frontier were put in a state of defence, reservists were called in by individual summons, German ships were called back from Norway, officers on leave were summoned from Switzerland, and private automobiles were reserved in Baden for military purposes, &c. You will there find that Germany in Alsace-Lorraine, in Strassburg, and in Metz, and that Austria in Hungary and Galicia were already fully, if secretly, engaged on mobilisation as early as July 29th.

Read further on July 30th—that is to say, *before* the official announcement of the "state of war"—the German provinces on the frontier were already in fact in the last stage before mobilisation; how on the previous day the frontier had already been crossed by German patrols; how the whole 16th Army Corps, reinforced by part of

¹ Yellow Book, Nos. 58, 59, 60, 88, 90, 91, 106, 108. Blue Book, No. 105 (Enclosure 3).

the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, had already occupied the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg.

All this took place on July 30th, although France had voluntarily given an obligation to keep her own troops ten kilometres from the frontier,¹ and had observed this condition to the detriment of her own strategic interest. Compare these German military measures with the assurances of peace which the hapless Herr von Schoen had daily to deliver at the Quai d'Orsay. Read and compare all these things, and then on the strength of this solitary fact of the non-dispersion of the English Fleet, openly acknowledged by the English Government, dare if you still can, to draw the conclusion that England intended to break the peace. No, Herr von Bethmann, you would have shown greater wisdom if you had kept silent: *si tacuisses, philosophus mansisses*. You would have shown more consideration for your reputation as a "philosopher" if you had patiently borne the fate which you have brought upon yourself and your country instead of clutching nervously at straws which, after all, will not save you from plunging in the depths of universal damnation. Keep silence—for your own sake and for our sake—and rest content with the well-sounding testimonial which Professor Lasson has bestowed upon you, that you are "by far the most eminent among living men, knowing no motive other than those of truth, fidelity, and right."

.

The points in the indictment against Germany I summarise in the following sentences:—

1. Germany gave Austria a free hand against Serbia, although she was well aware that a European conflict must arise out of that between Serbia and Austria.

¹ Yellow Book, No. 106. Chancellor's Speech, 4th August. Blue Book, No. 105.

2. She allowed Austria to address to Serbia an ultimatum with exorbitant demands and, notwithstanding an almost complete compliance with these demands, she allowed her to recall her Ambassador and to declare war.

3. By suggesting a localisation of the war she sought to create the *appearance* of mediating in the interests of peace, but that this proposal had no prospect of success must have been known to her from the history of diplomacy, and from the recent evidence of the Balkan crisis; that as a matter of fact it was known to her is clear from the confessions contained in the White Book.

4. She declined the proposal for a conference of the four Powers.

5. She herself then advanced the proposal for direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd, but at the same time she suffered Austria to decline to take part in these discussions, and instead to declare war against Serbia.

6. She left unanswered the frequently repeated request of the other Powers that she should herself propose an alternative method of mediation in place of the proposal of a conference which she had declined.

7. She left unanswered and undiscussed the various formulæ for agreement proposed by Grey.

8. In part she refused and in part she left unanswered the formulæ of agreement proposed by Sazonof.

9. In spite of all inquiries, she never said what Austria wanted, but constantly restricted herself to saying what Austria did *not* want.

10. She made to England a bid for neutrality, and thus announced her intention of making war at a time when the Entente Powers were still zealously labouring in the interests of peace.

11. When at last negotiations on the Serbian Note were opened with a prospect of success in Petrograd

between Austria and Russia, she upset these negotiations by her ultimata to France and Russia, and made war inevitable.

12. In the ultimatum to Russia she demanded that demobilisation should also be carried out as against Austria, although Austria herself had mobilised the whole of her forces.

13. In place of the counter-mobilisation which she had threatened to carry out, she at once declared war without any ground, first on Russia and then on France.

14. As an afterthought she based these declarations of war on the fact that the powers opposed to her had begun the war, whereas, on the contrary, the first acts of war were committed by Germany.

15. She violated the neutrality of Belgium, and thus in addition brought about war with England.

These points in the indictment are proved, and justify the judgment: *Germany is guilty, along with Austria, of having brought about the European war.*

ENGLAND

The attitude of England, up to the moment when the question of Belgian neutrality arose, is so clear from what I have already said that it would be a vain repetition to deal with it again in this connection. From the beginning of the conflict Sir Edward Grey, the English Foreign Minister, took the leading part in all efforts to preserve peace, and did everything within the power of man to prevent war:—

1. He urged the Serbian Government to assume an

attitude of moderation, and in this succeeded in his efforts.¹

2. He endeavoured, although in this case without success, to obtain from the Austrian Government an extension of the time-limit.²

3. He thereupon put forward the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, which was accepted by France, Italy, and Russia, but was declined by Austria and Germany.³

4. He repeatedly called upon the German Government to propose, in place of the conference declined by them, any other form of co-operation of the four Powers not directly concerned. His request, however, remained unanswered.⁴

5. He endeavoured to promote the direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd which were proposed by Germany, but which, after the declaration of war against Serbia, were declined by Austria.⁵

6. He then proposed a formula of agreement, according to which Austria should occupy Serbian territory, including Belgrade, and should from there dictate her conditions. These conditions were to be communicated to the Powers, and in so far as they did not affect the integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, they were to be recommended to Serbia for acceptance. To this proposal no answer was ever received either from Austria or from Germany.⁶

7. He supported the first proposal of agreement advanced by Sazonof, and as it was declined by Germany as unacceptable, he obtained the consent of Saz-

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 16, 22, 27.

² Blue Book, Nos. 13, 26.

³ Blue Book, Nos. 17, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 51, 53, III.

⁴ Blue Book, Nos. 60, 68, 80, 84, 88.

⁵ Blue Book, Nos. 45, 74, 75, 78, 93, 106.

⁶ Blue Book, Nos. 88, 98, 103.

onof to a second formula of agreement, which went even further to meet the views of Austria. This proposal remained unanswered.¹

8. On July 31st he promoted with the utmost energy the negotiations which had begun between Austria and Russia, and sought to guide them to a successful issue by further proposals which contained full satisfaction for Austria. All his proposals contained the stipulation that further military preparation should be stopped on all sides.²

9. He ultimately declared himself ready to support in Petrograd and Paris any reasonable proposal of Germany or Austria which might serve to preserve peace, and, in the event of such a proposal not being accepted by France or Russia, he declared that he would withdraw from the negotiations. No such proposal was made, since in the meantime Germany had despatched her two ultimatata and declined further negotiations on the subject.³

10. On August 1st, the day of the German declaration of war against Russia, he despatched proposals, representations, and warnings to all the capitals in order to arrive at an agreement between the Powers even at the last moment before the outbreak of hostilities.⁴ The English Blue Book contains no fewer than seventeen telegrams from and to the various capitals dated August 1st, sixteen of July 31st, and thirty-three of July 29th and 30th.

Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the name of the "peacemaker of Europe," if there is still any meaning in the saying *in magnis voluisse sat est*.

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 97, 103, 120, 131, 132, 139. Orange Book, Nos. 60, 63, 67.

² Blue Book, Nos. 110, 111, 131, 133, 135, 137.

³ Blue Book, Nos. 111, 112, 121.

⁴ Blue Book, Nos. 126, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141.

His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and energy will remain inextinguishable in history.

Even Herr von Bethmann Hollweg will be unable to contradict this judgment of history. I mean the Herr von Bethmann of August 4th, not him of December 2nd.

What did he of August 4th say? Let us hear the White Book:

"On July 26th Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship" (p. 408).

"We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Serbian reply was sufficient or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations" (p. 409).

"Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured incessantly and supported every proposal," &c. (p. 411).

"We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Serbia, *i. e.*, after her march into Serbia" (p. 410).

"During the interval from July 29th to July 31st whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy," &c. (p. 411).

"Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation . . . could possibly have been received," &c. (p. 411).

"In the meantime, Great Britain tried to mediate between Vienna and Petrograd," &c. (Chancellor's speech of August 4th, p. 436).

These quotations from the German memorandum are

in agreement with the telegrams annexed to it, and in particular to the exchange of telegrams between the King of England and Prince Henry and the Emperor William. The most interesting point, however, is that even the solemn declaration of war against Russia contains an equally *solemn testimony to the efforts for peace made by England* in the following words:—

“His Majesty the German Emperor had undertaken *in concert with Great Britain* the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and Petrograd.”¹

So spake and so thought Herr von Bethmann Hollweg on August 4th.

But how did he speak and what were his thoughts—or, rather, what did he pretend that his thoughts were—on December 2nd?

“Where the responsibility rests for the greatest of all wars is to us clear. The external responsibility is borne by those men in Russia who inspired and carried out the mobilisation of the entire army. *The inner responsibility lies on the Government of Great Britain.* The Cabinet of London could have made this war impossible by declaring without ambiguity in Petrograd that England was not prepared to allow a continental war in Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. . . . England did not do so. . . . England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace London gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was taking her stand on the side of France and Russia.”

As many lies as words!

In the first place the Chancellor is contradicted by himself. In the case of Bethmann *v.* Bethmann the Chancellor of December 2nd is knocked out by the Chan-

¹ White Book Exhibit, 6.

cellor of August 4th. All the events which preceded the outbreak of war had taken place *before* August 4th, that is to say, before the day on which Herr von Bethmann laid his documentary evidence before the Reichstag. If England had in fact played the *rôle* which is ascribed to her by the Bethmann of December 2nd, the Bethmann of August 4th was bound to have known of it, and he could not have delivered his eulogies on England's services in the cause of peace. He praised England because she was worthy of this praise. He *knew* that she was worthy of this praise, because as the supreme conductor of foreign policy he had personally taken part in all that had happened. The account he gave on August 4th corresponded to the truth, and the only reproach, if any, which can be urged against it is that it does not disclose the truth in its full extent, and that it expresses in too moderate a form the praise due to the English Government.

Is it possible that the man who, under specious pretences, declined all the proposals for agreement advanced by England, or failed to answer them, or did not even send them on to Austria, who on July 31st when agreement between Austria and Russia appeared to be at hand, forced war by despatching ultimatums to Russia and France, who on July 29th had already resolved on war, and gave expression to this resolution in his bid for England's neutrality, who, however, received from Grey in reply that noble manifesto of peace which would have brought to the nations of Europe a sure prospect of a lasting condition of peace—is it possible that this man had the effrontery in contradiction of his own printed testimony to hold England responsible for this world-catastrophe, for which *he* alone bears the fearful responsibility? It is possible, for it has happened. But the world knows what view to take of his statements, and the lie goes home to roost.

According to the assertion of the Chancellor the English Blue Book itself proves the guilt of the English Government. It is supposed to show that England supported the war party in Petrograd, and that she declared at the outset that "*She was taking her stand on the side of Russia and France.*"

What, in fact, does the Blue Book prove? The exact opposite.

What is true is merely that Russia and France, correctly recognising Germany's aggressive intentions, endeavoured to induce Sir Edward Grey to assume, in the event of the conflict becoming acute, a decisive attitude in favour of her friends in the Entente. It was hoped in Paris and in Petrograd that by such an attitude on the part of England Germany would be restrained from her intentions to make war.

It was thus intended that England, in assuming this attitude, was to use her influence, *not in promoting war, but in preventing war*. Sir Edward Grey declined the suggestion, and in reply to their repeated endeavours he emphasised afresh that England was, and desired to remain, free from obligations. He even went further; he most earnestly warned his friends in the Entente not to rely on England making a declaration of solidarity with them.

As early as July 24th Sazonof, along with the French Ambassador in Petrograd, had represented to Sir G. Buchanan,¹ the British Ambassador, that in view of the provocative attitude of Austria, which could only be explained by assuming that she was supported by Germany, a declaration of solidarity of England with France and Russia was the best and the only means of preventing a European conflict; the tone of the Austrian Note, the exorbitant demands, the short period of time allowed, everything indicated that Austria desired war against

¹ Blue Book, No. 6.

Serbia, and this in itself constituted a danger that a European conflict would arise. Only by England taking common action with France and Russia could the European war which was threatening be prevented. The English Ambassador at once replied that, while reserving until a later date the official declarations of his Government on the subject, he personally saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from England; direct British interests in the Serbian question were nil, and a war on account of such a question would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. The only promise which Buchanan made was to endeavour to induce Austria to extend the time-limit.

Sir Edward Grey in his telegram of July 25th sent in reply to Buchanan¹ fully approved the declaration of his ambassador: "I entirely approve what you said as reported in your telegram of yesterday, and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government." In place of the desired declaration of solidarity, Grey at once proposed the exact opposite, namely, mediation by the four Powers not directly concerned—England, Germany, France, and Italy. During the whole of the further negotiations the English Government emphatically maintained this attitude against all wishes that they should act otherwise. On July 27th Buchanan explained the English point of view to M. Sazonof as follows²: It would be a mistake to assume that the cause of peace could be promoted if England placed herself on the side of France and Russia against Germany. The attitude of Germany would merely be stiffened by such a menace; only in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace could England approach Germany, and endeavour to exercise a moderating influence in Vienna through Germany.

¹ Blue Book, No. 24.

² Blue Book, No. 44.

On July 27th Grey declared to Prince Lichnowsky (still with reference to the four-Power proposal) that so long as Germany would work to keep the peace he would keep closely in touch with Germany.¹

On July 29th Grey had a lengthy discussion with the French Ambassador, Cambon,² in which he clearly pointed out the difference between the Morocco question and the existing Serbian difficulty. In the Morocco question the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and the dispute turned about matters which were regulated by a special treaty between England and France. None of this applied to the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Even if this conflict should extend to one between Austria and Russia, *England would not feel called upon to take a hand in it.* The question whether Teutons or Slavs should hold supremacy in the Balkans had always been of so little interest to England that she had never allowed herself to be drawn into a war on account of it. But Grey went still further in refusing an expression of England's solidarity; *even if France and Germany became involved in the struggle* the fact still remained that it was not France's own interests, but in the first place her duties under her alliance towards Russia which had been decisive in determining her action. *Even in this case England was free from any engagement,* and her action would only be decided by what British interests required her to do.

As the European situation, notwithstanding all the efforts for peace made by the Entente Powers, became constantly more strained, President Poincaré himself in a discussion with Bertie,³ the British Ambassador, on July 30th, returned to the proposal that England might

¹ Blue Book, No. 46.

² Blue Book, No. 87.

³ Blue Book, No. 99.

avert the danger of war by an unambiguous declaration to the effect that she would support France in the event of a conflict with Germany. France was pacific, and did not desire war; Germany, however, could only be restrained from her intention to go to war if England were to assume a decisive attitude.¹ Even Di San Giuliano, the Italian Minister, shared the opinion of Poincaré, and also suggested the effectiveness of an intervention by England on behalf of the Entente Powers.²

Once more Grey decisively rejected every obligation to intervene on behalf of Russia and France. In view of the importance of the declarations of Grey in forming a complete judgment on the attitude of England, I give at length a few sentences from the telegrams addressed by Grey on July 31st to Bertie, his Ambassador in Paris:—

“Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. . . . *We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war.* I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.”³

¹ Poincaré advanced the same reasons for a declaration of solidarity of England with France and Russia in a letter addressed directly to the King of England on the 31st July, and only published in February, 1915. Even this step of Poincaré was without success. The answer of King George avoided giving any precise answer on the chief point in the French letter, and the attitude of England, which was still continuously striving for peace, was made contingent on the development of events. The most sincere pacific intentions of the two Powers appear in both the letters, even if there were a divergency of opinion as to the path by which the goal could be reached.

² Blue Book, No. 106.

³ Blue Book, No. 116.

"Mr. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicholson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. . . . I said that we had come to the conclusion in the Cabinet to-day *that we could not give any pledge at the present time.* . . . Up to the present moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. . . . Mr. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement." ¹

On the same day, July 31st, Grey, as he had already so frequently done in the preceding days, directed to Prince Lichnowsky an urgent request that if Germany and Austria "could get any reasonable proposal put forward" he would support it at Petrograd and Paris, and if Russia and France would not accept the proposal, he would have nothing more to do with the consequences.²

This is the documentary evidence found in the English Blue Book, which according to Herr von Bethmann's assertion is supposed to prove "clearly and incontrovertibly" that London had given it to be understood that "she was taking her stand on the side of France and Russia." *The assertion of the Chancellor is exactly the reverse of the truth*, and we can but admire the courage of a man who asserts in the face of the whole world facts which, as is clear to everyone, are

¹ Blue Book, No. 119.

² Blue Book, No. 111.

diametrically opposed to the truth, and who appeals to documents which prove the reverse of his assertions.

Everything contained in the English Blue Book with regard to the attitude of England during the diplomatic negotiations is confirmed by the Russian and French publications. The refusals of Grey were directed, as we have seen, simultaneously to France and to Russia. The declarations made to the one Power held good as a matter of course for the other, and through the Embassies were conveyed to the other capital.

Parallel with Grey's line of conduct towards the Entente Powers was the attitude he assumed towards Germany. It is highly interesting to study this double action of Grey's which bears testimony to as much skill as integrity and true love of peace. When I read this series of documents, so dramatically tense, there always comes before me the picture of the old councillor of the district court, F., who thirty years ago used to preside in a court of minor jurisdiction in the Jüdenstrasse, in Berlin. As it was highly distasteful to him to proceed to a judgment he sought in every way, in season and out of season, to effect compromises, which would reduce his work. He used the most diverse means to attain this end. If he did not succeed in moving the parties to a pliable attitude by keeping them waiting for hours beside a baking fire in his office, he had resort to the following stratagem: he dismissed the defendant for a few minutes, and pointed out to the plaintiff the weakness of his case, which could only be expected to lead to its dismissal. Then he called the defendant before him and pointed out to him the weakness of his reply, and impressed upon him that he would almost certainly lose the case. When he had worn each of them out in this way by separate advice, he called them both before the bench, and, presto! in nearly every case a compromise was arrived at. Precisely similar was the course pursued

by Sir Edward Grey with regard to the European parties with the object of moving them to a peaceful compromise, and of preventing an armed conflict. He said to the French and the Russians: "Give way; do not count on my help!" And he said to the Germans and the Austrians: "Give way, do not count on my neutrality!"

As the former expected his help—not, be it observed, *for* war, but *against* war—so the latter sought his neutrality, the consideration of which naturally postulated the outbreak of war.

Grey never wearied in the task of warning the German Government against the delusion that England would, in any circumstances, remain neutral in a European conflict. He warned Prince Lichnowsky; he warned Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow through Sir E. Goschen, the English Ambassador. The English Blue Book is full of proofs for these statements.¹ The warnings continued throughout the whole of the critical days between July 27th and 31st, and reached their culminating point in the answer of Grey on the 30th of July, already mentioned on several occasions, a distinguished document which will always remain a title to glory for English diplomacy and an ignominy for German diplomacy. "We will have nothing to do with a neutrality which would only increase your lust for war, since it would make it more easy for you to succeed in war! Instead of this we propose a joint-labour in the cause of peace, now and for ever, a labour directed to the protection of Europe against all further catastrophes. We will have nothing to do with guarantees such as you offer; even if these guarantees were more far-reaching than they really are, England will have nothing to do with such guarantees, which would only protect you in your delight in war. *England wants peace for all, and if you break the peace, do not count on our standing aside!*"

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 87, 89, 101, 102, 111, 116, 119, 123.

Such are the thoughts which Grey in his Note of July 30th expressed so passionately and so convincingly.

Even on July 31st, immediately before the outbreak of war, he threatened both sides; he called on both sides to make reasonable proposals, and threatened each of them that he would leave them in the lurch if they declined the reasonable proposals of the offer.¹

We know that all his efforts were in vain—not through any blame attaching to France and Russia, but owing to Germany and Austria. The European war was there, as soon as Germany had declared war against Russia. All further developments were bound to follow mechanically according to the treaties of alliance.

The assertion of the Chancellor that England bears the responsibility for the European war is not supported by the English publication, as Herr von Bethmann believes, but is flatly contradicted by it. But there is another piece of evidence which the Chancellor has at his disposal: *the celebrated letter from the Belgian chargé d'affaires in Petrograd to the Minister Davignon*, which was seized in Berlin on July 31st and was opened at a later date. This letter is supposed to contain incontrovertible proof of the guilt of England. What does it really show?

The history of this letter and of its discovery is so remarkable, and there is such an air of Sherlock Holmes about the whole story, that some doubts as to its authenticity may well be allowed. It is extraordinary that the Berlin Government has always the luck to get possession at the right moment of documents which are compromising for others! The Belgian *chargé d'affaires* in Petrograd writes to his Minister under a covering address, and posts the letter, not in Petrograd, but through an intermediary in Berlin. All this is strange, passing strange! There is no official confirmation of the au-

¹ Blue Book, No. III.

thenticity of the letter. The signature of the letter-writer has neither been acknowledged nor proved to be genuine. In a civil action at law this document would not be admitted to have any force as evidence.

But let us assume for the moment that the letter is genuine; it contains the observations of the *chargé d'affaires* of a small State on events in which he played no part, and which he only knows from *hearsay*. The fact that the witness only reports *de auditu*, and not from his own direct observations, deprives his testimony of any value as evidence as against those witnesses who report *de facto*, that is to say, in the case now under consideration, against the official documents which give an account of the diplomatic events themselves. If the man who has been robbed testifies before the judge to all the details of the theft, and confirms his evidence by oath, the judge will from the outset refuse to listen to any witness who proposes to report from *hearsay* that the theft never took place at all. He refuses to accept his evidence, let alone give it credence.

From this it follows in the case we are considering that the facts proved by the diplomatic publications of England, France, and Russia, and also by those of Germany, cannot be disposed of by the evidence of the Belgian *chargé d'affaires*. Where there is a contradiction between the official publications and the Belgian report we must decide in favour of the former and against the latter.

Are there, however, contradictions of such importance between the official books and the Belgian report that the whole edifice consistently constructed out of the diplomatic publications may thereby be at once overthrown? No such contradictions exist. The report gives her due to each of the States concerned, like an old gossip who abuses everyone. The writer himself offers his apologies, so to speak, in saying at the very outset that the most

contradictory reports were circulated without it being possible to distinguish what was true and what was false as regards the intention of the "Imperial (Russian) Government." He then praises Germany, which has indubitably laboured in Petrograd as in Vienna to find some means of avoiding a general conflict. He then blames Austria, which has shown the firm determination "not to draw back a step"; he refers to the declaration of Sazonof that the mobilisation of Russia was not directed against Germany; he mentions that the Reservists have been called to the colours only in certain governmental districts, but maintains "quietly" as his own personal impression that mobilisation is going on everywhere. England, he says, has proposed arbitration; Sazonof has done the same. Austria, however, has rejected both proposals. To the proposal for a conference Germany had answered by a counter-proposal for a direct understanding between the Cabinets. With all these proposals and counter-proposals "one might in truth ask whether the whole world does not wish for war, and is not merely attempting to postpone the declaration of war to some extent in order to win time." England had at first openly declared that she would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. To-day, however, people in Petrograd were convinced, indeed they had assurances, that England would stand by France. "This support has an extraordinary influence, and has done not a little to gain the upper hand for the war-party." The Russian Army felt itself strong, but her navy could hardly be counted; this was the reason why the assurance of English support has acquired such great importance.

This document, to which greater importance is attached by the German Government than to their own White Book, was published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* with particular passages emphasised.

by heavy type. As a matter of fact, in appraising this document the result is entirely dependent on the passages chosen for emphasis in heavy type; according to the emphasis attached to the various phrases, this hotch-potch of tittle-tattle, which the writer must have gathered in the corridors of the various embassies, for he himself stood apart from all the negotiations, can be used to incriminate any of the great Powers. If we emphasise with heavy type that the Cabinet of Vienna had shown *the firm determination not to draw back a step*, that Austria and Germany *had rejected all proposals for a conference, arbitration, &c.*, that apparently the whole world wished for war and only sought to gain time for preparation, Germany and Austria will be revealed as the guilty parties. If, on the other hand, we rely on the observation that England had assured France that she would stand by her, and had thereby *strengthened the war-party in Petrograd*, the responsibility will fall at least in part upon England. The document thus proves as much against one side as against the other—only with the great difference that the observations directed against Germany and Austria are confirmed by all the diplomatic publications, and, above all, by the German White Book itself, whereas the observations against England are contradicted by all the publications of the European Governments, and especially by the German White Book.

I have already collected elsewhere the meed of praise which the German White Book accords to England's love of peace, and the efforts by her in the cause of peace. The White Book was closed on August 2nd, and contains all the diplomatic occurrences up to that date—only, of course, in so far as their publication was considered expedient. If England had comported herself in Paris and in Petrograd as the Belgian letter-writer reports from hearsay on July 30th, *Germany as the party chiefly concerned was bound to have known this on August 2nd*,

and could not have maintained the contrary in the White Book. If there had been so much as a grain of truth in these Belgian back-stair stories the German Government would have seized upon it with joy, and would have mentioned the relevant facts in their memorandum. England's participation in the war was directly imminent when the Chancellor on August 4th laid his White Book before the German Reichstag. We were at war with England the same evening. The Chancellor had every interest in saddling the responsibility in advance as far as possible on England, of whose participation in the war there could no longer be any doubt on the morning of August 4th after the violation of Belgian neutrality. If he did not do so, but contrariwise lavished praise on England, and indeed even emphasised in the declaration of war against Russia the efforts made by England in the cause of peace, we may regard it as fully proved that *he had nothing before him which could incriminate England*. The proof of this, as we have seen, can also be incontrovertibly deduced from the diplomatic publications of the Entente States, and it can never be disposed of by the unauthenticated gossiping tales of a *chargé d'affaires* who took no part in the proceedings. What Grey in fact did to preserve peace before and after July 30th, the date of this Belgian letter, is a historical fact proved by public documents; *he promised support neither to France nor to Russia*, but, on the contrary, in reply to repeated invitations from these Powers, he definitely and decidedly refused to give any promise on the subject. The Chancellor knows this as well as we do, and if, disregarding all authentic diplomatic occurrences and rejecting his own previous utterances, he cites a non-authentic, highly suspicious document in order unjustly to incriminate England, he is not acting like a gentleman, and speaks against his better knowledge.

The truth is contained in the sentences in the Eng-

lish Blue Book¹: "Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. . . . *We gave no pledge to our present allies*, but to Germany we gave three times—on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August—a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium."

That England acted as is here represented, and not in accordance with the knowledge professed by the writer of the Belgian letter, is proved by all the diplomatic documents. That, however, Germany, as is equally asserted in the letter, exerted herself in Vienna in the cause of peace, is not proved by anything since, as I have already pointed out, no correspondence between Vienna and Berlin has been published. We are referred to the unproved assertions of Germany, which deserve no belief, if only because the sincere intention of Germany to move Vienna to moderation was bound to have been unconditionally successful.

The Chancellor in his speech of December 2nd stated: "The Cabinet of London could have made this war impossible by declaring in Petrograd without ambiguity that England was not prepared to allow a Continental war in Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. . . . England did not do this. . . . England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace, London gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she

¹ Blue Book, p. xi.

was taking her stand on the side of France and Russia."

These sentences are untrue from beginning to end. They become true if everywhere in place of England we read Germany, and in place of Petrograd we read Vienna. The truth then runs as follows:—

The Cabinet of Berlin could have made this war impossible by declaring in Vienna without ambiguity that Germany was not prepared to allow a continental war in Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. . . . Germany did not do this. . . . Germany saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace Berlin gave it to be understood in Vienna that she was taking her stand on the side of Austria."

The events between the 1st and 4th August, between the German declaration of war against Russia and the English declaration of war against Germany, require a special discussion. The question to be answered in this discussion is no longer "Who brought about the European War?" For this already *had* broken out with the German declaration of war against Russia, which necessarily entailed a war between France and Germany and a war between Russia and Austria. In these cases there were binding treaties of alliance which made war inevitable between the four Powers mentioned.

I have already indicated the attitude assumed by Italy. The obligations of this country extended only to participation in a defensive war, and she declined to take part on the express ground that this war was on the part of Germany and Austria an aggressive war—a reason, be it observed, to which special weight must be attached in the mouth of an ally, and precisely for this reason it appears to have been taken very airily by Herr von Bethmann; for in his writings and speeches he glides over it in silence.

England was the only country which was not constrained by any kind of treaty obligations to take part in a war. I have already indicated in an earlier passage that England, it is true, had concluded special treaties with France and Russia on definite questions affecting their interests, but that she had not concluded any general treaty of alliance with either of these parties, and that consequently she was also not a party to the Franco-Russian Alliance. On the basis of these special treaties which had overcome the friction existing between England and the two other States, a political approximation had arisen which established *a relation of friendship without treaty obligations*.

England was thus free, and had to decide according to her own point of view whether she would or would not take part in the European War. The question of her participation or non-participation had not the slightest connection with the other and far more important question, both from a moral and historical point of view, the question of the *responsibility* for this war. In this respect, as in so many others, the logic of the German people, and especially of its leading men, has completely disappeared; they will not, or cannot, understand that what England did *after* the outbreak of war has nothing to do with what she had done *previously*. The one is entirely distinct from the other, and must be measured by an entirely different standard.

I will prove that, just as England before the outbreak of war had done everything to prevent it, so afterwards she did nothing to extend the war by participation in it, but *rather that she was compelled to do so, owing to the action taken by Germany*. But even supposing, as I will assume for the moment, that this could not be proved, it would not be demonstrated in the slightest degree that England was responsible for the *outbreak* of the European War. It is theoretically quite possible

that England may have caused the war and nevertheless later remained neutral, and, on the other hand, it is equally possible that she did not cause the war and yet later on took part in it. There is no logical connection between the two points involved in causing and participating in the war.

This private lecture on logic is directed in the first place to the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who in his speech of December 2nd treats all these things as being identical. An assurance given by England to France on August 2nd, that is to say, after the outbreak of war, a reason advanced in explanation of the English declaration of war on August 4th, these *subsequent* occurrences are for him so many proofs that the war was intentionally instigated by England. These proofs are defective, if only because they are contrary to the simplest logic. Acts which prove guilt can never be subsequent in time to the decisive event; they must precede it, or at least happen contemporaneously with it.

For this reason it is difficult to understand the purpose of these interminable and constantly repeated discussions in Germany on the ground which moved England to take part in the war. *These grounds are exclusively England's own business.* They may be more or less tenable, they may be more or less hypocritical, but they will not because of that remove one jot of the guilt and the responsibility which rests on Germany for having provoked the war. The question whether England should take part or should remain neutral in the war only arose *in consequence* of the war. The party then which bears the blame for the war is also responsible for its consequences, that is, for the participation of England in the war, even if he did not directly provoke this participation. This responsibility is, however, doubled if it can be proved that in addition to being the prime originator

of the war this party is also the originator of the participation of England in the war.

I summarise, then, as follows:—

(1) Germany and Austria are responsible for the world war; their guilt has been proved.

(2) Their guilt cannot be lessened by actions taken by England *after* the outbreak of war.

(3) Their guilt will be increased if they themselves provoked these actions.

Let us examine the facts in the light of these guiding principles.

England declared war against Germany on the evening of August 4th because Germany had furnished a negative reply to her demand to refrain from a further violation of Belgian neutrality. On the morning of August 4th German troops penetrated into Belgian territory after Belgium had refused to comply with the German request for a free passage.¹ England, as one of the guarantors of the Treaty of London of 1839, had the right and the duty to intervene, on the appeal made by the Belgian King on August 3rd, on behalf of the neutrality of Belgium, which it had guaranteed in common with Prussia and other Powers. Such a step on the part of England could surprise no one who had even a superficial knowledge of the history of Belgian neutrality. Herr von Bethmann was, however, so enraged at the action of England that on the last visit of the Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen, on August 4th, he was unable to control his agitation, and spoke in a contemptuous manner of the word "neutrality," which is so often disregarded, and of the "scrap of paper" on account of which England was about to begin a war.²

Herr von Bethmann appears to be badly informed in the history of his own country. Was he not aware of

¹ Grey Book, No. 22.

² Blue Book, No. 160.

the fact that Belgian neutrality had in 1870 been the subject of one of the finest diplomatic manœuvres of the Bismarckian statecraft? Did he not know that then also England intervened at the beginning of the war as the protector of Belgian neutrality, just as on the present occasion, only with the different result that Bismarck not only promised that he would respect Belgian neutrality, but also denounced the intended disregard of it by France, and thus brought England on to his side? Shortly before the beginning of the war, as is well known, he published an outline of a treaty drawn up by Benedetti, the French Ambassador, in which France claimed the annexation of Belgium as a return for compensation to Prussia in North Germany. The result of this astute move was nothing more nor less than the neutrality of England, and the conclusion of identical treaties between England on the one hand and Germany and France on the other (August, 1870), in which England expressly declared that, if either of the belligerent Powers violated Belgian territory, she would associate herself with the other in defence of Belgium. The treaty was so strictly observed and interpreted that Germany after the Battle of Sedan was obliged to give up the idea of transporting wounded troops through Belgium.

Is Herr von Bethmann completely ignorant of all these events? Or, if he knows anything of them, does he believe that he, the dwarf on whose shoulders the mantle of the mighty has fallen, can scatter to the winds the considerations to which his great predecessor, the giant Bismarck, willingly and profitably submitted? Was he not bound to have said to himself, when he allowed the General Staff to include in their plans the march through Belgium, that there would result from this strategic advantage political and military disadvantages for Germany incomparably greater? Had he learned nothing

from the past? Did he not know, as Bismarck knew quite well, that it had been from time immemorial one of the elementary principles of English policy to maintain and to protect the *inviolability of the neutral small States* in Northern Europe? Did no one remind him of the passionate words with which Granville and Gladstone—Liberal Ministers like those now in power—had intervened in August, 1870, for the inviolability of Belgium, and had described an attack on this country as “the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history”?

Herr von Bethmann appears to have been ignorant of all this when, in his speech in the Reichstag on December 2nd, he described the violation of Belgian neutrality, as not the ground, but the *pretext* for the English declaration of war. It was, in fact, the real ground to such an extent that England would have declared war against us forty-four years ago if we had dared to violate Belgium. What is not permitted to a Bismarck is certainly not allowed to a Bethmann—or else we must invert the well-known phrase, and say: “*Quod licet bovi, non licet Jovi.*”

What purpose is served by inquiring—as the present-day German professors love to do—whether the protection of Belgium was for England *a moral question or a question of interests*? Probably it is simultaneously a question of morals *and* of interests; in observing her pledged word England is at the same time protecting her own interests, which, as has always been openly admitted, imply in the nature of things that the coast of the North Sea lying opposite England should be in the possession of small neutral States. The man who acts honestly is not obliged to render to anyone an account of the extent to which his action corresponds to his own interests. *Qui jure suo utitur, neminem laedit.* We cannot scrutinise the souls of *men*, much less the souls of

States, which, indeed, as collective bodies, do not possess souls.

In any case, having regard to historical experience as well as to the earnest and repeated warnings communicated to the German Government, there could not be the slightest doubt that a violation of Belgian neutrality would so strongly affect the feelings of the English people and English interests that England could not stand aside in silence. In the course of his conversations Sir Edward Grey repeatedly drew the attention of Prince Lichnowsky to the consequences which would follow the violation of Belgian neutrality which had been brought into ominous propinquity by the evasive answer which Herr von Jagow gave to the English inquiry of July 31st. Grey had particularly drawn attention to the fact that "*the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country.*"¹ The German Government then endeavoured to assure the English Government that they had in no circumstances any intention of annexing Belgian territory²—a soothing pill which, as a matter of course, England could not swallow; for neutrality is not the same as "not being annexed," but signifies that the country which is neutral shall be spared the effects of war in *every* respect, and shall not be used even as a passage for troops. The demand for a right of passage as an innocent act was, in fact, more than naïve; the passage of German troops would also have justified France in entering the country, and Belgium would thus have fallen into as evil a plight as can be conceived; if she had yielded to the German ultimatum she would have run the risk of being obliged to surrender her country as a battlefield for the combatant Powers, and she herself would not have been in a position to do anything for the protection of her soil. She would have

¹ Blue Book, No. 101, 123, p. x.

² Blue Book, No. 157.

been crushed between the two armies, and would have been lost, no matter which side had been victorious.

It need therefore cause no surprise that England was not satisfied with the soothing assurances of Germany, but demanded *unconditional respect* for Belgian neutrality. Germany, however, was not in a position to give an assurance in this sense, since the long-prepared plans of the General Staff made the passage through Belgium an imperative requirement.

As late as August 4th, when the German troops had already crossed the Belgian frontier, Sir Edward Goschen, acting on the instructions of his Government, inquired of Herr von Jagow whether it was not possible *even then* to desist from breaking into Belgium and to withdraw the troops. When this inquiry was answered in the negative, the English Ambassador entreated the Secretary of State to consider the matter further, and to give him a satisfactory answer before 12 o'clock at midnight. Herr von Jagow replied that his answer must remain the same, even if twenty-four hours or more were given him for reflection; thereupon Goschen asked for his passports.

If we survey the whole behaviour of German diplomacy in this question of Belgian neutrality, there is only one possible explanation of the inexplicable, namely, that *diplomacy had completely resigned in favour of the chiefs of the army*. The military situation was without doubt improved by marching through Belgium; the diplomatic situation, however, and in consequence of this the military also in its turn, was enormously worsened by the danger that to the two enemies in the field there might be added a third, the most dangerous. Taken altogether, the disadvantages greatly outweighed the advantages. It was the duty of the statesman who was controlling the destinies of the Empire to balance these advantages and disadvantages against each other, and if

the calculation yielded an unfavourable result, he should have preferred to give up his office rather than bring his country into a deeper danger.

In the Germany of to-day it is not, however, possible to find men capable of decisions such as these demanding such strength of character. The Chancellor has failed either in character or in insight; either he failed to recognise the consequences which would flow from the violation of Belgian neutrality, or he did not possess the energy to give effect to the political point of view against the view of the military authorities, if need be at the sacrifice of his office. Now that the disaster has occurred he endeavours, supported by his faithful followers, to excuse himself with many "ifs" and "buts." "If we had not violated Belgian neutrality, France would have done so." I have already shown that there is nothing to indicate that this is the case. If, however, France in fact also intended to enter Belgium, the best course which Germany could have adopted was to wait for this to happen and allow the fatal consequences to ensue for France. There can be no doubt that England would have opposed an invasion of Belgium by France just as she did in the case of Germany; this may be definitely inferred from the treaties concluded in August, 1870, and from the identical inquiry addressed to France and Germany on July 31st. The situation of France with regard to England would have been morally still more unfavourable than ours, since France on July 31st had given a definite promise, whereas Germany had declined to do so. If a few days later France had broken her word, England, if she had not sided with Germany, would, at any rate, have remained neutral.

If, further, it is maintained in exoneration of our diplomacy that England would have taken the field against Germany, *even apart from the violation of Belgian neutrality*, it can only be observed that this asser-

tion is so completely untenable and unsupported that it does not even deserve consideration. What England *did* to maintain peace is a historical fact. What England *would have done* if this or that had happened or had not happened, is a mere supposition, which is not amenable to serious discussion.

To prove that it was not on account of the violation of Belgian neutrality that England took part in the war, but in order that she might under all circumstances lend assistance to France, the Chancellor invokes in his speech of December 2nd an occurrence which took place in London on August 2nd between Sir Edward Grey and Cambon, the French Ambassador.¹ What is the object of this demonstration? It is supposed, as Herr von Bethmann explains, to prove that England was now, as always, the perfidious Albion, and under the mask of moral action was pursuing only her naked interests. These interests, however, were said to be comprised in the destruction of the vital nerve of her greatest industrial competitor: "Thus England and Russia bear the responsibility for this world war."

A similar jumble of defective logic and of the perversion of truth has seldom been emitted in so pregnant a moment by anyone in such an authoritative position. We clutch our heads and seek in vain to follow the meanderings of this mind. What does it all mean? England is responsible for the world-war because she adhered to one of the two combatant parties *after* the outbreak of the war, which she did not cause, but which, on the contrary, she sought to prevent by all the forces at her disposal. Even if this adhesion took place *without any reason*, out of mere caprice on the part of England, it would be impossible to deduce any responsibility for the war. To make the antithesis comprehensible,

¹Blue Book, No. 148.

even for the dullest intellect, I formulate it in six Latin words:—

Culpa—ante bellum:

Participatio—post bellum.

England was in no way obliged to adduce to anyone grounds for her participation in the war. The grounds which she has adduced may be believed or disbelieved; in any case they are, and must remain, grounds for the participation of England after the war was begun; in no case can they be reasons which lay on England's shoulders the responsibility for beginning the war.

Certainly there was, as the Chancellor rightly emphasised, "no fraternal duty, no compulsion, not even any menace of their own country." No fraternal duty! So, then, fraternal duties justify an intervention in the struggle! Why, then, Herr von Bethmann, did you not recognise the fraternal duties of Russia to intervene on behalf of Serbia? Why did you seek to prevent Russia from fulfilling such a fraternal duty by advancing your proposal for localisation? Now that you recognise that fraternal duties may constrain to armed intervention, will you still try to persuade us that your attempt to keep back the big brother from the protection of the small was intended to be seriously taken?

There is said to have been nothing which *compelled* England *to war*. True, there was no material compulsion. But in what case is there really material compulsion except in a true, genuine war of liberation, not the counterfeit presentment of it? On the other hand, there was a moral compulsion, a solemn duty imposed by treaty, to which greater importance attached, inasmuch as its object was the protection of the small against the great, a treaty signed by all the Powers, the aggressor included, and at a later date sealed again by a new treaty. A duty imposed by treaty—a scrap of

paper! says Herr von Bethmann. Indeed, what has induced us to intervene on behalf of Austria in a conflict as remote from our own interests as any Albanian kingdom? Only a treaty, a scrap of paper, which imposed upon us obligations as allies. What is right for us must surely be allowed in the case of England. If in our case the scrap of paper was enough to justify us in setting the whole world in flames with this paper-lighter, why should it not be enough in the case of England to justify her in bringing further combustible material to extend the fire which had already broken out?

If, however, anyone urges against me the arguments in the White Book: "Yes, but *our* interests also were at stake—the Germanic races in Central Europe. . . . (please don't laugh!).—We dare not allow Austria to be weakened, &c."—I reply that *England also had her own interests to safeguard*, for England also the Treaty of London of 1839 was not only a moral tie, but also a guarantee of her interests, a hundred times more important for England than all south-eastern questions taken together are for us.

We also could have remained neutral in a war between Austria and Russia. Had we remained neutral the war would have been *really* localised, localised between Russia and Austria, and neither France nor England would have been drawn into the struggle.

We could not remain neutral, and did not wish to do so, because we were bound by a Treaty of Alliance, and the fulfilment of our duties under the Treaty was at the same time in agreement with our interests.

The position was precisely the same in the case of England. England could not remain neutral, and did not wish to do so when confronted with a violation of Belgian neutrality, because she was by the treaty obliged to the protection of Belgium, and this protection was at the same time in agreement with her interests. The rôles

are thus equally shared. *Germany and England from the standpoints proper to each adopted the same course of action for the same reasons.* The fundamental difference is to be found merely in the fact that England intervened on behalf of an innocent small State, whereas Germany took under her wings a guilty great State; that Germany thus provoked the world-war, whereas England sought to prevent it by every possible means.

But let us just make the attempt to follow the logic of Bethmann and examine the *fact* which is supposed to prove that Belgium neutrality was only a mask. Sir Edward Grey on August 2nd gave to Cambon, the French Ambassador, the following assurance based on a resolution of the Cabinet:—

“If the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action *until the above contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place.*”¹

In explanation of this declaration Grey expressly pointed out that even in the event of a war breaking out between France and Germany England could not bind herself to declare war upon Germany. Only in the case expressly foreseen, that is, if the *German Fleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea* and undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, only in this case would the British Fleet come to the help of France—all this, of course, being dependent on the approval of Parliament.

This is the latest missile by means of which Herr von Bethmann endeavours to despatch English statesmen

¹ Blue Book, No. 198.

from life to death (moral death, that is to say). He attaches special importance to the fact that this declaration of Grey's was given *before* the ultimatum was sent to Belgium, and he infers from this that England, even before the violation of Belgian neutrality, had taken the field as a belligerent, and in consequence that this violation was not the true ground for England's participation in the war. To all this I answer in popular phraseology: "I don't think."

Even if the whole of this deduction were just, it would be entirely superfluous. The decisive question, "Who is to blame for the European war?" is neither answered nor influenced by the events of August 2nd. On August 2nd the war was there, owing to the guilt of Germany and Austria and against the will of England. It could no longer be prevented. Its extension to France was inevitable, and in fact had already taken place, even if the declaration of war was not delivered at Paris until the following day. The ultimatum to France had expired at 1 o'clock on the afternoon of August 1st, and had been answered by France by a refusal. The declaration of war between Austria and Russia was a formality which was bound to take place at any moment, but which—*mirabile dictu!*—to increase the madness of the whole affair, was delayed until August 6th. In short, the war between the four Powers had come, and England was free to act as her interests required. If her interests required her to support France in general or in certain cases, well and good, she was free to act in accordance with these interests. If her interests required her to take part in the war only in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality, she was free to act in this way also. In either case not the slightest reproach can be made against England. If we took our stand beside Austria, England also could stand by France.

The fact that there existed between England and

France no alliance which imposed obligations did not prevent England from promising assistance to France on the ground of the friendly relations between them, and, above all, on the ground of her own interests. We also acted exclusively in accordance with our own interests, which, when occasion required, following the celebrated example of Austria, we designated as "questions of life and death." Thus the invasion of Belgium was for us a question of life and death (see the despatch of Jagow to Lichnowsky of August 4th¹), or, more modestly expressed, a question of our military interest. So also the neutrality of England, if not a question of life and death, was at any rate for us a question of far-reaching importance, and for this reason we endeavoured in every possible way to secure this neutrality both before and after the outbreak of war. *And earnestly as we desired peace with England, with equal earnestness and persistence we sought for war with Russia and France.* In the first place, our desire was to be lords on the Continent, and then—everything else would follow.

What, then, I again ask, is the object of this entirely superfluous discussion as to this or that reason which may have moved England to war? Is Europe a court of moral jurisdiction to pass condemnation on hypocrites and Pharisees? Woe to us, if such a court existed! How should we stand before such a tribunal? We should be unmasked, the conquerors in the mask of liberators, the aggressors in the mask of the attacked, the wolf clothed in sheepskin!

Yes, indeed, if we had only enough honesty to confess the unspeakable crime! If like the great conquerors of the past who took the world by storm, like Alexander the Great, or the Romans, or Napoleon the First, we openly proclaimed our right to possess and to rule the world, because we were better, more valiant, and stronger

¹ Blue Book, No. 157.

than the others! There would be something great in that, something fascinating, something which would compel respect, for everything that is great captures the imagination, even if it is in the service of pernicious ends. A Rinaldo Rinaldini, a Richard III., a Cesare Borgia are monsters, but they are great in their kind, and awake admiration like every human type which has achieved perfection. *But we, how petty we are!* In our writings and our speeches at home we preach a policy of world-power, of conquest, and of world-dominion—of course, only among the initiated—but to the stupid people and to foreign countries we profess that it is we who have been attacked and fallen upon, that we are the victims of treacherous enemies. We also “secretly preach wine and publicly drink water.” In the intimate circle of our Junkers, our courtiers, and our Generals we raise the intoxicating wine of enthusiasm for war, but in public before the people and beyond the frontier we drink the water of peacefulness, of meekness, and of innocence.

It therefore does not become us to reproach the English Government with double-speaking and with hypocrisy. In this case also we seek the mote in another's eye and do not see the beam in our own.

How complete a master Germany is of all the arts of hypocrisy is proved, apart from the events of 1914, by a series of declarations made by German diplomatists between the years 1911 and 1913 on the subject of Belgian neutrality. As far back as 1911, in connection with the discussion of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, the fear was frequently expressed in the Belgian Press that Germany would violate Belgian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war. In the interests of good neighbourly relations with Germany the Belgian Minister gave expression in Berlin to the desire that the Imperial Government might dispel these

fears by a public declaration in the Reichstag. Through Herr von Flotow, who was then Ambassador, Herr von Bethmann conveyed his warm thanks for the friendly sentiment of the Belgian Government, but replied that he could not make the desired public declaration for fear of weakening the military situation of Germany with regard to France. If she were assured against an attack from the north, France could concentrate all her energy on the eastern frontier, and thereby render invasion by Germany a more difficult undertaking.¹ This evasive answer of Bethmann is to-day comprehensible. It is clear that even then the plans for the invasion of Belgium were ready, and the Chancellor had in consequence scruples about declaring publicly in the Reichstag that he would respect a neutrality, the violation of which had already been decided upon.

Less prudence was, at any rate, shown by Herr von Jagow, who, in the financial committee of the Reichstag on April 29th, 1913, did not shrink from making the untrue declaration that the neutrality of Belgium was established by treaty, and that Germany intended to respect this treaty.² The utmost limit in unscrupulousness was, however, reached by Herr von Below-Saleske, who, as late as August 2nd, some hours before handing over the German ultimatum, gave to Davignon, the Belgian Foreign Minister, the most quietening assurances with regard to the intention of her German neighbour. When M. Davignon expressed his satisfaction on this point, but notwithstanding stated that, for the purpose of reassuring his country, he would be glad to receive from the German Government an official declaration such as France had already formally given on July 31st, Herr von Below contented himself with declaring that he had not yet received any instructions in this

¹ Grey Book, No. 12.

² Grey Book, No. 12.

sense.¹ On the same evening about 7 o'clock he handed over the ultimatum. This certainly is a model of "fair play" which cannot be excelled! But it is only in keeping with the whole.

In this chapter mention should also be made of a fact which is still quite unknown in Germany. In the summer of 1913 the Belgian King and Queen with their children paid an official visit to Liège on the occasion of some celebration or other. The Emperor William—
—made use of this opportunity to send a special envoy to greet the royal couple and to convey to the Royal Family an assurance of his sincere friendship. The envoy was not, as is usual in such cases, a General attached to the Court, but *General von Emmich*, who was later the conqueror of Liège.

Let us, however, return to the reproaches directed against England. England, it is suggested, by the assurance given on August 2nd had already abandoned her neutrality, and had placed herself on the side of France. The violation of Belgian territory is, in consequence, supposed to have been a negligible factor in moulding her decisions. What, then, in reality was the assurance given to the French Government? *It did not extend beyond a conditional and restricted protection.* The protection was linked to the condition that the German Fleet should come into the Channel or through the North

¹Grey Book, No. 19.

Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping. The protection was further subjected to the restriction that it should be given *only by the English Fleet*. It was expressly pointed out that this protection was not to be taken as being equivalent to a declaration of war against Germany.

This conditional and restricted promise on the part of England did not issue from the free will of the English Government, but from a treaty obligation which she had assumed with regard to France. The two countries had for a long time agreed that France should concentrate almost the whole of her Fleet in the Mediterranean for the protection of the common interests of France and England, and that England in return for this should assume the protection of these interests in northern waters. This agreement was not based upon *any kind of military designs* against any other Power, least of all against Germany. Had any aggressive tendency against Germany been influential in forming this naval agreement, the two fleets would probably not have been separated, but at least the greater part of their combined forces would have been united in northern waters. The Anglo-French agreement had as its exclusive object the protection of the commercial interests of the two countries.

The actual position, however, now was that the French Fleet, with the exception of a few units, was in the Mediterranean, where it was of service, not only to French interests, but also to the interests of England. The north and west coasts of France were consequently unprotected. In these circumstances it was the *duty* of England, in the imminent war between France and Germany which had already become inevitable on August 2nd, to take over the protection of the French coast, which France with her Fleet tied to the Mediterranean could not in fact assume. This was the meaning and the reason of Grey's promise of August 2nd.

In making this promise, England had not in the slightest degree departed from her neutrality, for it depended on the *free will of Germany* to refrain from attacking the coasts and the shipping of France, and thereby to avoid any ground for an intervention on the part of the British Fleet. It was open to the German Government to make the English promise to France ineffective, and Prince Lichnowsky, in fact, negotiated in London on August 3rd on the question whether England would remain neutral should Germany refrain from attacking the northern coasts and the shipping of France.¹ Had this been the only question which concerned England these negotiations might perhaps have been completely successful, but England had other and more important interests to defend which Germany could not, or would not, satisfy. These interests were of two kinds:—

1. the maintenance of France as a great Power in Europe and as a Colonial Power, and
2. the non-violation of Belgian neutrality.

On the question whether these English interests were legitimate or not, no one apart from England herself has the right to pronounce judgment. As we made it our task to maintain Austria-Hungary, so it was open to England to consider the maintenance of France and her Colonies as serviceable to her interests. Every great Power has the right to form an independent judgment as to what course it may or may not be expedient for her to adopt, and she is entitled to reject any tutelage from any other quarter. The interests of States also are in no way static, but vary according to time and circumstance. What to-day appears profitable may appear to-morrow to be disadvantageous or indifferent. Until the agreement of 1904 the maintenance of France as a Colonial Power was, at any rate, not more than a matter of indifference to England. After that agree-

¹ Grey's speech of 3rd August.

ment it became an element in English policy, and formed the central point in the Anglo-French agreement. This explains the question put by Goschen to the Chancellor when the latter made, on July 29th, his well-known bid for the neutrality of England, and offered in return for this to guarantee the integrity of French territory—the question whether this guarantee also extended to the French *Colonies*. From the negative answer of Bethmann it appeared that Germany intended to make Colonial acquisitions at the expense of France.¹ But even apart from any such intention England could not but fear that the crushing of France from a military point of view would profoundly shake her position as a great Power, her well-being, and independence.

If even in this case England's interests were imperilled, they were still more deeply involved in the question of Belgian neutrality. From the beginning of the negotiations the English Government had never left room for the slightest doubt that *the violation of Belgian neutrality would be a casus belli* for England. This was the only question which was bound certainly, unconditionally, and completely, to lead to a war between Germany and England, whereas the French question admitted of accommodation up to a certain point. In the Belgian question popular sentiment in England played a decisive part, whereas in the French question this was not the case. *If Germany had respected Belgian neutrality, and had at the same time refrained from an attack on the coasts and on the shipping of France, peace between Germany and England would have been maintained.* These conditions, however, Germany would not and could not fulfil, since in order to comply with them she would have had to renounce a naval war with France, and would have encountered insuperable difficulties by land.

¹ Blue Book, No. 85.

War became *inevitable* when German troops crossed the Belgian frontier, and the German Government rejected the English summons to withdraw them. That was on the evening of August 4th.

The war, however, could *still* have been avoided when the English Government on August 2nd gave the well-known assurance to the French Government. It could have been avoided by the passivity of the German Fleet against the coasts and the shipping of France, as this course would have excluded any intervention by the English Fleet. *It is therefore untrue, as is maintained by the Chancellor, that England had already departed from her neutrality on August 2nd.* England's resolutions had at that time not yet crystallised, and depended on circumstances which, it is true, were then immediately imminent, but which had not yet occurred.

How prudent the English Government was, and how imprudent the German, appears clearly from a consideration of the situation on August 2nd. England could have definitely decided as to her course of action on August 2nd had she not, up to the very last moment, clung to the hope that she would not be involved in the war; for there was then no longer the slightest possible doubt that the German Army would invade Belgium. The Chancellor attaches special importance to the fact that the assurance of August 2nd was given on the *afternoon* of that day, whereas the ultimatum to Belgium was only delivered in Brussels at 7 o'clock in the evening. Still starting from the false assumption that the English assurance amounted in itself to a participation in the war—which is not the case—the Chancellor draws the naïve conclusion that expression had already been given to this participation in the war at a time when nothing was or could be known in London of the intended violation of Belgian neutrality. This is indeed the

height of naïveté! Ever since July 31st, when Jagow so evasively answered the English inquiry, indeed ever since July 29th, when Herr von Bethmann made his bid for English neutrality, ever since the tortuous declarations of German diplomatists in Berlin and London, a blind man must have seen how matters stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. In addition to this, there was the entrance of German troops into Luxemburg early in the morning of Sunday, August 2nd, which put beyond all doubt the further advance towards Belgium.

When the English Government gave its assurance to France, it could therefore no longer have any doubt that the neutrality of Belgium would be infringed by Germany, as indeed was done a few hours later by the delivery of the ultimatum. If Germany regarded Russian mobilisation as in itself a *casus belli*, how much more justification was there for England regarding the position existing on August 2nd as a menace to Belgium. Had England sent an ultimatum to Germany as early as August 2nd her behaviour would not have been different from that of Germany on July 31st with regard to Russia. Instead of the sentence of Bethmann: "No mention was made of Belgian neutrality," we ought, if we are to conform with the truth, to say: "Belgian neutrality was even then mortally menaced."

From this it follows—in opposition to what is said by Herr von Bethmann—that even an *unconditional* promise of English assistance by land and by sea would at this moment have been already justified by the menace to Belgian neutrality; much more then was there justification for the conditional promise of assistance by sea to which Sir Edward Grey restricted himself.

I summarise, then, as follows:—

1. It is untrue that England had already departed from her neutrality on August 2nd. *The promise given*

on August 2nd is not equivalent to a declaration of war against Germany.

2. It is, on the contrary, true that England only departed from her neutrality on August 4th after the actual violation of Belgian neutrality.

3. Even if the assurance given on August 2nd had connoted a departure from English neutrality, this would have been justified by the certainty then existing that the neutrality of Belgium would be violated by Germany.

If England then asserts that it was the violation of Belgian neutrality which caused her to take part in the war, she merely speaks the truth.

The truth of this is in particular confirmed by the fact that Sir E. Goschen, the English Ambassador, asked on August 4th merely for the *withdrawal* of German troops from Belgium, and it was only when this was refused that he declared that England must take those steps imposed upon her by her treaty obligations. It was thus possible for Germany *as late as the evening of August 4th to avoid war with England*. This is the best proof which can be furnished that she cannot already have been in a state of war with England on August 2nd.

All the conclusions which the Chancellor believes that he can deduce from the incident of August 2nd are thus refuted. On the contrary, there is another conclusion which is justified, and which *I* will take the liberty of stating: the *conditional* and *restricted* promise of *contingent* naval support is a convincing *argumentum e contrario* in support of the fact that up to August 2nd more extensive promises of military support had not been given to France by England. For this reason the English declaration was greeted with great satisfaction in Paris as "a first assistance which is most valuable to us."¹ The first promise of assistance was thus the con-

¹ Yellow Book, No. 138.

ditional and restricted promise given on August 2nd! This is a striking proof that the assertion of the Chancellor that England had promised France her assistance even before the outbreak of war is a lie.

In concluding these observations I again desire to point out with the utmost emphasis that all these discussions on the participation of England in the war and the causes for her action do not touch the centre of the question, which is: "*Who is guilty of the European war?*" The object of these discussions is precisely to divert attention from the central question. The participation of England is a *consequence* of the war, with its own special reasons. It could not have occurred if war had not broken out. He who provoked the war is also responsible for its consequences. We are thus led back to the question: Who *did* provoke the war? and to this question there can only be one answer: Germany and Austria.

I am unable to frame any points in an indictment against England, because there are none. I can only summarise her defence in the sentences which I formulated at the beginning of this section. Without doubt history will concur in the words used by Mr. Asquith on August 6th in speaking in the British Parliament in honour of his colleague, Sir Edward Grey: "I am certain that this House and this country—and I will add, posterity and history—will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interests of all countries—universal peace."

D

RUSSIA

The attitude of Russia in the European conflict has been indicated with sufficient clearness in the account already given to make it possible to form a judgment on Russia's guilt or innocence.

What is the reproach which Germany throws against Russia?

I. Russia is supposed to have intervened without any reason and without any right in the conflict between Austria and Serbia, and is supposed thereby to have occasioned the European conflagration. I have already explained at length that Russia acted reasonably and within her rights in so intervening, and I have nothing to add to what I have said. No one in Europe could have been surprised at this intervention, which during the Balkan crisis had been clearly announced by Sazonof as inevitable in the event of an attack being made by Austria upon Serbia. The interest which Russia felt in Serbia was a fact with which European diplomacy was bound to reckon, and always has reckoned; above all, German diplomacy, as the White Book shows. It was "a commonplace in European diplomacy."¹

II. It is further asserted that the Russian military party from the beginning wished for war and pressed for it. If such a party really exists in Russia, which is still to be proved, it is at least certain that it encountered at the hands of the Russian Foreign Minister a more successful resistance than the German war party met in Herr von Bethmann. *From the beginning to the end of the crisis Sazonof served the cause of peace in the most zealous manner:—*

¹ Blue Book, p. v. White Book, p. 406.

1. He advised Serbia to assume an attitude of moderation, and his success may be seen in the submissive Serbian Note.¹

2. In common with England and France he endeavoured to obtain an extension of the time-limit prescribed in the Austrian ultimatum, but here he was unsuccessful.²

3. When the conflict began to assume a more acute form owing to the recall of the Austrian Ambassador, he claimed the assistance of Italy, in the hope that by refusing Austria support she might assist in moving her from her unaccommodating attitude.³

4. Notwithstanding the rupture in the relations between Austria and Serbia, he entered into friendly discussions with the Austrian Government. He pointed out in detail to Szápáry, the Austrian Ambassador, the points in the Austrian Note which could be accepted by Serbia, but he also indicated those which could not be accepted by any independent State, at any rate, in the form desired.⁴

5. He gave urgent expression to the desire to diminish by further direct negotiations the tension existing between Austria and Russia, and he pleaded in Vienna that the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd should receive the authority necessary for this purpose. This was on July 26th. The answer to this was the Austrian declaration of war of July 28th, and the strict refusal of Count Berchtold to enter into any discussion whatever on the Austrian Note.⁵

¹ Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 33, 40, 42. Blue Book, No. 55.

² Orange Book, Nos. 4, 5, 11, 12.

³ Orange Book, No. 23.

⁴ Orange Book, No. 25.

⁵ Orange Book, Nos. 38, 45, 50, 54, 77. On the 28th July Berchtold declared to the Russian ambassador that he could "no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."

6. After the failure of this attempt Sazonof supported in every possible way Grey's proposal for a conference of the four Powers.¹

7. He expressed himself as ready to stand aside, and submit to the proposals of the Powers.²

8. He induced the Emperor Nicholas to send to Prince Alexander of Serbia on July 27th a telegram urging upon him any solution designed to avoid the horrors of war.³

9. After the declaration of war against Serbia he urgently asked the English Government to use their influence in Berlin so that Austria might at least be induced to take part in further negotiations.⁴

10. He repeatedly and with increasing urgency sought the mediation of England in the sense of the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, and simultaneously he constantly expressed his readiness to take part in direct negotiations with Austria. The refusal of both these proposals in Vienna and Berlin did not deter him from constantly renewing them.⁵ Particularly urgent were the attempts made by Sazonof in a conversation with Count Pourtalès on July 29th,⁶ in which he endeavoured to obtain the support of Germany in one or other of these directions. He emphasised the expediency of *parallel discussions* on the principle of having two strings to his bow, that is to say, a conference in London of the four Powers not directly concerned and simultaneously direct conversations in Petrograd between Austria and Russia. He drew attention to the

¹ Orange Book, Nos. 32, 49, 55, 77.

² Blue Book, Nos. 55, 78. Orange Book, No. 32.

³ Orange Book, No. 40.

⁴ Orange Book, No. 43.

⁵ Orange Book, Nos. 25, 32, 34, 38, 39, 43, 45, 48 ("that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action"), 77.

⁶ Orange Book, No. 49.

favourable results which had followed such a double action during the last Balkan crisis, and he added that after the concessions made by Serbia it should not be difficult to arrange a settlement of the other points which still remained outstanding, if there were only *the least goodwill* on the part of Austria, and if all the Powers used their influence in the direction of conciliation. In reply to the earnest appeal of Sazonof, Pourtalès could only reply that Germany had exerted a "moderating influence" in Vienna, and that she would continue to do so. In Petrograd, London, and in Paris alike it was impossible to obtain more from Germany than such pretended efforts to exercise a moderating influence on Vienna; it was impossible to elicit from her any positive concurrence in the practicable proposals of peace put forward by the Entente Powers.

11. Sazonof, along with the other Entente Powers, repeatedly urged the German Government, which raised apparently only formal objections against the conference proposal, that she should herself propose a form which would be agreeable to her, and he accepted in advance any proposal of this nature.¹

12. On July 29th he prompted the Tsar to propose in a telegram to the Emperor William that the Austro-Serbian conflict should be submitted to the Hague court of arbitration.

13. On July 30th he dictated to the German Ambassador a formula of agreement, which aimed only at the protection of Serbia's sovereign rights, and which *pledged Russia to stop her military preparations*.²

14. After this formula had been rejected by Germany, he outlined, at the request of Grey, a new formula which went even further to meet Austria. This formula, indeed, permitted Austrian troops to remain on Serbian

¹ Orange Book, Nos. 53, 55, 64.

² Orange Book, No. 60.

territory during the further negotiations, and obliged Russia to maintain a waiting attitude.¹

15. On July 31st, when Austria at length declared herself ready to enter into discussions on the subject-matter of the Serbian question, Sazonof at once began these conversations in Petrograd, and in a telegram to London expressed the hope that a peaceful issue might yet be found.²

16. Even on August 1st, on the day of the German declaration of war, he declared himself ready to conclude an agreement in the sense of his second formula, provided that German troops had not previously crossed the Russian frontier. *In no case*, he added, *would Russia begin hostilities first*.³

17. Even at the last moment Sazonof moved the Tsar to give his solemn word to the Emperor William that the Russian troops would undertake *no provocative action*, so long as the negotiations on the Serbian question (resumed on July 31st) should continue with Austria.⁴

18. Even on the day of the declaration of war he moved his monarch to give a renewed assurance that the Russian mobilisation *did not mean war*, and to urge that the negotiations for the welfare of both countries and for universal peace should be continued.⁵

These were the exertions of the leader of Russian policy. Any impartial person may judge whether these exertions were directed to peace or to war. That these untiring efforts for peace had their origin in Petrograd proves that the so-called Russian war-party was *powerless* as against the responsible Minister. It is now a common reproach of all belligerent States to accuse their

¹ Orange Book, No. 67.

² Orange Book, Nos. 69, 73, Blue Book, Nos. 110, 111.

³ Blue Book, No. 139.

⁴ White Book, p. 411.

⁵ White Book, p. 413.

enemies of having been under the influence of a war-party; each denies his own, and places the responsibility on those of foreign countries. Here also it is true that by their fruits ye shall know them. The efforts of the Russian war-party—if such a party existed—remained fruitless; it was unable to influence the peace policy of the Tsar. The efforts of the German war-party, on the contrary, have yielded fruit only too abundantly—poisonous fruit—which they succeeded in concealing under a charm of guile and seduction so that the deluded people in their intoxication reached out their eager hands; now they must devour the fruit in all its bitterness, even though it may bring with it the bitterness of death.

III. A further reproach urged by the German Government against Russia is in effect that Russia by her military measures frustrated the negotiations for peace. This reproach also is without justification, for two reasons:—

1. because Russia concurrently with her military measures of security, maintained *uninterruptedly diplomatic efforts for peace*,¹ and

2. because these measures were merely measures of security, which, according to the solemn assurances given by the Tsar and his Government, had no aggressive character. It was impossible that they *could* have had an aggressive character, since, as I have already explained, they served only to support a defensive policy, and there was no *reason* whatever for aggressive action on the part of Russia. The partial mobilisation of July 29th, as well as the general mobilisation of the 31st, were the *answer to previous mobilisations on the part of Austria*, the dates of which I have already established from the documentary evidence.² Moreover, Russia was compelled to adopt military measures of security,

¹ Orange Book, Nos. 77, 78.

² Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49, 58, 77, 78.

not only on account of Austrian mobilisation, but still more owing to the diplomatic attitude assumed by Austria and Germany. The unaccommodating behaviour of Austria, and the frustration by Germany of all attempts at mediation, could not fail to arouse the overwhelming suspicion—which was, in fact, later confirmed—that Germany and Austria desired war *under all circumstances*. Against this menace Russia was bound to provide for her security, and the reproach, inferred from the Russian mobilisation, is also shown to be baseless.

The tales of the broken words of honour and of the crossing of the frontier before the declaration of war I have already characterised elsewhere by their proper terms.

There is thus no charge to be brought against Russia, and I can only conclude this section with the regret, which is certainly comprehensible in a German, that Russia is *wholly blameless* of the European war, and that the guilt rests exclusively on Germany and Austria.

E

FRANCE

German utterances, spoken and written, on the responsibility of France for the war are surprisingly restrained, and are supported on very scanty material. The German White Book accuses France merely of “military preparations” during the diplomatic negotiations, and asserts at the conclusion of the account which it contains that France on the morning of August 2nd, that is to say, before the German declaration of war, had “opened hostilities.”

The Chancellor adheres to this reproach in his speech

of August 4th, and cites in support of his assertion alleged French incursions into German territory. In his speech of December 2nd he rides off on the old *révanche* idea, but here also he is unable to produce anything more substantial against France.

I have already estimated the proper value of all these reproaches, and pointed out their flimsiness. In particular I was able to prove that the most serious violations of the frontier before the German declaration of war were committed by German troops, that these were of frequent occurrence, and resulted in bloodshed, whereas the counter-accusations of Germany against France are not only improbable but self-contradictory, and are therefore unworthy of credence.

A new accusation against France has been given currency for the first time in the recently published Note of the Chancellor dated December 24th, in which *the participation of France in the diplomatic negotiations* is subjected to criticism. We can only be grateful to the Chancellor that he has at length formulated a charge to which it is possible to submit a defence. This accusation is supported on the following assertions:—

1. France did not trust German assurances, and received all the steps of the German Ambassador with mistrust.

2. Germany's wish for mediating influence in Petrograd was not regarded.

3. The French Government did not take a single positive step in the interest of peace.

What is the truth with regard to these accusations?

It is true that the *démarches* of Herr von Schoen were received in Paris with a certain mistrust. This mistrust was, however, only too well founded. Herr von Schoen was called upon to play in Paris the same miserable rôle as fell to the lot of Herr von Jagow in Berlin. It was his task to thwart all the attempts of the Entente

Powers to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict, and to put forward threadbare reasons in defence of the astonishing and ambiguous behaviour of the German Government. He dared not associate himself with the endeavours of France to obtain an extension of the time-limit allowed in the ultimatum, but, on the contrary, he had to offer to the French Government a blind defence of the Austrian Note, and of all the later actions taken by Austria.¹ Grey's proposal for a conference of the four Powers, which had been immediately accepted by France, and was agreeable to all the other Powers, he was bound to reject, and in place of this it was his duty to recommend as a panacea the impossible German proposal for localisation.² He was bound to assert the insufficiency of the Serbian Note, which had conceded all the material demands of Austria, and he had to represent as justifiable the recall of the Austrian Ambassador; indeed, in compliance with Bethmann's instructions, he had to impress on the French Government the desirability of common Franco-German *pressure on the Petrograd Cabinet*, whereas, on the other hand, he was bound to decline any kind of pressure from Germany on Vienna. He had to listen in silence or could give only inconsequent answers during his frequent visits to the Quai d'Orsay, when M. Bienvenu-Martin, the French Acting Foreign Minister, pointed out to him the illogical nature of this proposal; for, as M. Bienvenu-Martin indicated, Austria had in nearly every point achieved her will, but had nevertheless begun a military action against Serbia; a cessation might therefore be asked for from Austria, but not from Russia; pressure might be exercised on Vienna, not on Petrograd.³ Russia was indeed ready to negotiate, either directly with Austria

¹ Yellow Book, Nos. 28, 36.

² Yellow Book, Nos. 56, 57, 61.

³ Yellow Book, Nos. 61, 62, 77, 78.

or by the mediation of the four Powers not directly concerned. Russia was ready to accept any proposal made by the conference of the four Powers. *What further pressure did he suggest should still be exercised on Russia?* Austria, however, was *not* ready either for direct negotiations or to accept proposals made by the four Powers. If, therefore, pressure had to be exercised in any quarter it must be in Vienna, and Berlin alone was in a position to accomplish this. An Ambassador, charged with the task of upholding the opposite view, is an object calculated rather to inspire compassion than to evoke condemnation.¹

But he had to go even further in revealing his nakedness. When in place of mediation he proposed direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, and was asked by the French Ambassador what was really the aim of the Austrian operations in Serbia (July 29th), he had to give the mortifying answer *that the German Government did not know, but that it hoped to learn from Austria.*² This answer also, as is known, must be laid at the door, not of the wretched Paris Ambassador, but of his Government, which up to the present day has not explained to the world what Austria really wanted from Serbia. Meanwhile the Serbians have given the answer which Austria was asked in vain to furnish: they have driven the Austrians out of their country, and presumably this was what the Austrians wanted.

Thus the whole action of Herr von Schoen in Paris is nothing but a continuous series of discomfitures which he personally had not merited. The constantly repeated request that he should indicate the form of conference agreeable to the German Government, which in principle had apparently been approved, he was obliged to leave unanswered, since no instructions in this sense had been

¹ Yellow Book, No. 85.

² Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 97.

sent to him from Berlin.¹ He had to maintain a passive attitude towards all Anglo-French attempts to arrive at a settlement between the conflicting standpoints of Austria and Russia by devising a formula of agreement, since his Government did not consider that such attempts were even worthy of a discussion.²

The worst rôle, however, did not fall to him until after the fruitless expiration of the ultimata; he had then to submit to further discomfiture at the hands of M. Viviani, who held up to him the criminal madness of the action taken by Germany, which *shortly before the solution of the dispute had, without any reason, driven Europe into the most fearful of wars*. Herr von Schoen was obliged to limit his answer to saying that he had received no official communication with regard to the favourable position of the negotiations, but that he was going to get information.³ Two days later he had to hand to M. Viviani a declaration of war based on the fact that France had *begun hostilities* and also that she had violated Belgian neutrality⁴—assertions which he, more than anyone, knew to be false: had he not himself witnessed the sincere efforts made by France for peace? Wretched Ambassador! The mistrust with which he was received in France was certainly excelled by the mistrust which he felt towards his own actions.

The further reproach put forward by Bethmann that the French Government had disregarded Germany's desire for mediating influence in Petrograd has already been deprived of all force by the previous discussion. Germany refused to exercise any influence on Austria, presumptuous beyond all measure and scoffing all considerations of European peace, and she demanded, on

¹ Orange Book, No. 55.

² Yellow Book, Nos. 101, 114.

³ Yellow Book, No. 125.

⁴ Yellow Book, No. 147.

the other side, that pressure should be exercised by France on Russia, which had already shown in the good advice proffered to Serbia an extraordinary conciliatory attitude, and which was ready to take any further step necessary to meet her opponent.¹

The demands addressed by Germany to France, and thus indirectly to Russia, were thus somewhat stiff, but nevertheless they were complied with by France up to a certain point. The French Yellow Book and the English Blue Book both bear witness to this. In a despatch of July 29th ² Bienvenu-Martin declared it to be essential that the Cabinet of Petrograd, whose peace intentions were manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the English proposal for a conference of the four Powers. This French initiative was at once attended by success. The French Ambassador in Petrograd telegraphed on the same day to his Minister that Sazonof accepted the proposal for a conference of the four Powers without attaching any importance to the title officially given to the discussions, and that he would *acquiesce in any measures taken by England in order to maintain peace.*³

Another and much more striking instance of French influence on Russian decisions in the sense of moderation may be given. On July 30th, when the Russian partial mobilisation against Austria had taken place, and Germany was already threatening to carry out a counter-mobilisation, Viviani emphatically pressed for prudence in Petrograd; it would be well, he said, even in taking measures for security and defence, that Russia should take no step which might offer Germany a pretext for a counter-mobilisation.⁴ Here also his efforts were

¹ Yellow Book, Nos. 77, 78.

² Yellow Book, No. 85.

³ Yellow Book, Nos. 86, 91.

⁴ Yellow Book, No. 101.

crowned with success: Russia suspended further measures of mobilisation¹ until she was compelled to act by Austria's general mobilisation.

A further instance of the success of French influence in Petrograd was seen on July 31st, when the efforts of the Entente Powers were directed to finding a middle path between the formulæ of Grey and Sazonof, in order to gain Austria's consent even at the last moment. In a Note,² distinguished by its penetration and inspired by a sincere desire for peace, Viviani proposed such a middle path, which could not fail to be equally acceptable to Austria and Russia, and authorised his Ambassador at Petrograd to make the following communication to Sazonof:

"Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Serbian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace."

There then follows a more detailed explanation of the modifications in the proposal of Grey and Sazonof, and he adds in conclusion:—

"I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed."

The French Ambassador, Paléologue, was able to report on the same day that Sazonof had accepted the proposals of Viviani, and that he had modified his original formula in the manner suggested by Grey.³ This new proof of French intervention for peace and of Russia's

¹ Yellow Book, No. 104.

² Yellow Book, No. 112.

³ Yellow Book, No. 113.

conciliatory disposition was furnished, although during the preceding night and day Belgrade had been bombarded by Austria and the whole of Russia had been brought to a high pitch of excitement by Austria's provocative and unaccommodating action.

Even after the German ultimatum was delivered in Paris on July 31st Viviani directed an urgent appeal to the Imperial Government in Petrograd that in the highest interests of peace they would do *everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis* (Je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Impérial dans l'intérêt supérieur de la paix n'évite pour sa part tout ce qui pourrait rendre inévitable ou précipiter la crise¹).

Many similar examples could be cited from the diplomatic correspondence. But Herr von Bethmann says that France did not exert her influence in Petrograd for peace, and that in fact she did nothing in the interests of peace, and—Bethmann is an honourable man.

When we survey the activity of French diplomatists during these critical days and compare them with those of other European Governments, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that their utterances, as given in the Yellow Book, excel the achievements of all other diplomatists in elegance of form and in plastic strength of representation. To English diplomacy fell the leadership in the negotiations, and it discharged this task with the sober quietness and clarity which is peculiar to the Englishman in all situations. Russian diplomacy also kept itself within the limits of fact, and expressed itself with moderation up to the last moment until the morning of August 1st, immediately before the German declaration of war. In this critical moment, however, Sazonof could not refrain from pouring out his heart to his French and English colleagues, and characterising in its true

¹ Yellow Book, No. 117.

light, without any varnish, the policy of Austria and Germany;¹ the policy of Austria had been both tortuous and immoral, that of Germany had been equivocal and double-faced, and she had been specially unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and Petrograd. The former was a violent Russophobe, who constantly poured oil on the flame; the latter an ignorant person, who allowed his Government to believe that Russia would never go to war, no matter how much they trod on her feet.

In contrast to these diplomatists of Russia and England, who, with few exceptions, remain sober in their views and confine themselves within the limits of fact, the genius of the French, their grace in form, their adaptability in ideas, their resource in devising new ways out of difficult situations, appears all the more brilliant. It is a pure pleasure for the literary connoisseur to read the French Yellow Book. What a brilliant type is represented by the two Cambons! How dexterous and fascinating is the Prime Minister Viviani! And even Bienvenu-Martin, who appears less in the foreground, how precise are his antitheses, how effective his refutation of German sophisms, how penetrating is his vision in framing a judgment on the tendencies of Austria and Germany!

And the diplomatists of Germany? *O du lieber Gott!* This is not a subject to speak about. Herr von Schoen was not the only one who was condemned to a tragic rôle. Herr von Tschirschky in Vienna, the Russophobe, Count Pourtalès in Petrograd, Herr von Flotow in Rome—what a miserable part they all had to play! There was Herr von Flotow, who knew so little of the mind of the Italian people and of the views of the Italian Government that he considered it possible that Italy might participate in an offensive war against Serbia and share in its further consequences—a view which one dared not

¹ Blue Book, No. 139.

have attributed to the most inexperienced German commercial traveller in Italy without running the risk of an action for personal libel. There was Count Pourtalès, who thought that a few manifestations of labour unrest in Russia was sufficient to cause the Russian Government to give way to Austrian efforts to establish a hegemony on the Balkans, and who had the thankless task of defending in Petrograd the ingenious theory of Bethmann that the conference of four Powers "required of the Austrian Empire just what they had not been willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that she should give way under military pressure." This is a theory which affords Herr von Bethmann so much pleasure that he exhibits it once more in his most recent circular note, which, however, unfortunately, forgets two things: firstly, that Serbia had already given way *beforehand*, so that military pressure was an irresponsible piece of presumption, and secondly, that the conference of four Powers did not aim at any kind of pressure or any military measures, but that—as even the thickest head must have begun to realise after the countless explanations which were given—its intention was merely to obtain the friendly advice of the four Powers unconcerned.

Herr von Tschirschky-Bogendorf in Vienna had also a truly thankless *rôle* to play, in that he had *in appearance* and outwardly to press for moderation at the Ballplatz; inwardly, however, in the room where Count Berchtold laboured, he could give free reins to the secret instructions of Herr von Bethmann, which at the same time corresponded to his own personal inclinations, and could there press for war. Sir Maurice de Bunsen was right when he saw through this double play of our Ambassador at Vienna, and from all the acts of omission and commission of Herr von Tschirschky—especially from his industrious and suspicious refusal of all common action for peace with the Ambassadors of the En-

tente Powers—drew the certain conclusion that our Ambassador at Vienna had from the beginning worked for war.¹

Of Prince Lichnowsky in London—the only one among our Ambassadors—we must say this in his honour, that he earnestly desired peace, and that he was only the innocent victim of those above him. He also had to resort to a hundred evasions in order to conceal the intentions of Germany on Belgium, and so keep England neutral, if this could in any way be achieved; he had to discuss with Sir Edward Grey the *hypothesis* that we might respect Belgian neutrality,² although he knew that our troops were already almost at the Belgian frontier, and that there was no longer any possibility of Belgian neutrality being respected. Again, two days later, after the ultimatum had been presented to Belgium, he had to run after Sir E. Grey—just as the latter was on the point of going to the decisive meeting of the Cabinet on the morning of August 3rd—and had to plead with him insistently to be so good as to be willing to remain neutral even if we should violate Belgian neutrality.³ Even at the very last moment he attempted to make an impression on public opinion in England by an article in the Press, in which he emphasised Germany's readiness to refrain from making the Belgian coast a *point d'appui* for naval operations.⁴ In all these desperate efforts at the eleventh hour the good will of our London Ambassador may indeed be observed, but even his best intentions could not prevent the representative of a bad policy from necessarily appearing in a bad light.

And now to come to the highest of all, to Herr von

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 141, 161.

² Blue Book, No. 123.

³ Grey's speech of 3rd August, Yellow Book, No. 144.

⁴ Yellow Book, No. 144.

Jagow! From this portrait gallery I omit the Chancellor, whom I have already sufficiently characterised. But Herr von Jagow! What a lamentable picture of pitiable helplessness! It is sufficient to observe how miserable he appears against his two chief opponents, the Englishman Goschen and the Frenchman Cambon; how he was constantly reduced to straits by their superiority, like a mouse in a trap seeking in vain for a way of escape. It is true that in his case, as in that of his German colleagues, we must make allowance for the fact that they had to defend a bad cause, and their opponents a good one. They had to resort to loopholes and ambiguities, whereas the others could advance openly and honourably to the end in view. But the worse their cause was, the more skill and efficiency was needed to defend it. Anyone who defends a bad cause with dexterity can at least, as they say in the East, "save his face." He, however, who by his inefficiency draws special attention to the weaknesses of his position makes his bad cause even worse, and forfeits all claim to personal respect. On a big merchant being asked why he retained two barristers for his cases, and why he paid one better than the other, he answered with a sly smile, "The good one is for the bad cases, and the bad one for the good." The badness of our case demanded that we should have the best diplomatists, not to win, but at least to avoid revealing it publicly to the whole world in all its hideousness.

In order not to appear unjust, I must support my judgment by a few examples from the diplomatic correspondence, although the whole course of the negotiations in its main features justifies in the fullest measure the most unfavourable judgment being passed upon our diplomacy. The present diplomatic publications give us for the first time an accurate insight into the activity of our Chancellories, which for the *profanum vulgus*

has hitherto been a book with seven seals. Now for the first time we realise *why* we have suffered diplomatic discomfitures, when the rattling sabre did not make good what the pen had corrupted. Formerly we saw only the effects; now we see the causes. Formerly we saw the gentlemen only in their gold-laced uniforms; now they stand naked before us, and their failures and weaknesses are seen with appalling clarity.

Let us take at random one of the conversations between Herr von Jagow and M. Cambon. On July 27th Cambon supported, in the presence of Herr von Jagow, Grey's proposal for a conference of the four Powers. Jagow gave expression to the well-known view, which is even yet disseminated by Herr von Bethmann, that it was impossible to subject Austria against her will to the decisions of a conference. M. Cambon replied that the matter was too serious to allow it to be wrecked on any question of form. The question here was of a work of peace, which could be restricted to *common démarches by the four Powers at Petrograd and Vienna*. Herr von Jagow had often expressed to him his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one other. Here there was an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit (*esprit européen*), if the four Powers belonging to the two groups succeeded in preventing a European conflict. Herr von Jagow, who was unable to make any reply to this illuminating explanation, took refuge in the vapid assertion that Germany had engagements with Austria. To this Cambon promptly replied that these obligations were no closer than those existing between France and Russia. Jagow attempted a new line of retreat: He was not refusing to act in keeping off an Austro-Russian dispute, but he could not intervene in the *Serbian* dispute. Whereupon Cambon observed: "The one is the consequence of the other, and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new

factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia." Jagow emphasised anew his engagements towards Austria. Thereupon Cambon asked him if these engagements were so far-reaching that he was bound to follow Austria everywhere with his eyes blindfolded? Had he, he asked, taken note of the reply of Serbia? "I have not yet had time to read it," replied Jagow on July 27th. (The answer had been handed to the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade as early as July 25th.) "I regret it," said Cambon. "You would see that, except on some points of detail, Serbia has yielded entirely. It appears, then, that since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine with Serbia the terms of her reply." Jagow, driven more and more into difficulties, was unable to give any clear reply. Whereupon Cambon asked him point blank *whether Germany wished for war*. On Jagow protesting energetically, Cambon answered: "You must then act consistently. When you read the Serbian reply, *I entreat you, in the name of humanity*, to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared." In the end the German Secretary of State condescended to return to the original subject of the conversation, the proposal of Grey; he considered, however, that it was necessary to find another "*form*" which he could accept. He based his hopes more on the "direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd," which Cambon urged on him to further accelerate by appropriate pressure in Vienna.

The direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd proposed by Jagow were, as is well known, *declined by Austria*. It is, as I have already pointed out, open to serious doubt whether Berlin exercised any pressure on Vienna in the sense of these negotiations. The

conference thus remained as the only expedient. Cambon put forward this proposal again on July 28th,¹ with the support of the English and Italian Ambassadors. Jagow, however, was even more inaccessible than on the previous day, and even the representations of his Italian ally could not prevent him from absolutely refusing the conference, although, as will have been gathered from what I have already said, he had meanwhile been clearly informed by Goschen (as had also Prince Lichnowsky by Grey) as to the true meaning and intention of the conference. M. Cambon was so much disconcerted by the passivity of Herr von Jagow that he again asked him *if by any chance he wished for war*. Renewed protest by Jagow, but also renewed passivity. After this ineffective conversation Cambon proposed an ingenious method of drawing Herr von Jagow out of his reserve by "putting him in a dilemma by asking him to *state himself precisely* how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about." This proposal was, as is known, taken up by Grey, and was zealously pushed by the Entente Powers as well as by Italy, but it came to nothing, since the *proposal which it was expected that Jagow would make, notwithstanding all the pressure put upon him, was never put forward*.

It is interesting to observe how Herr von Jagow had recourse to all possible subterfuges in the endeavour to avoid the moral obligation of making such a proposal. In most cases he took refuge behind inquiries in Vienna to which an answer had not yet been received.² This performance was constantly repeated like a musical theme with variations. Above all, Herr von Jagow was never in a position to answer any question as to what Austria really wanted after the opening of hostilities against Serbia. Until that was known it was, however,

¹ Yellow Book, No. 81.

² Yellow Book, Nos. 92, 109.

in his opinion impossible to think of a "mediation" in any form.¹ Every time when he was closely pressed on the question he took refuge behind the Austrian screen, or to express the matter in what is perhaps a more appropriate metaphor, he withdrew from one trench to another, until finally he disappeared behind the fortress of the "Russian mobilisation," never to be seen again. For the *quintessence of Berlin tactics* consisted in postponing as long as possible all proposals for peace until they could come out with the bogey of Russian mobilisation, and were thus saved the trouble of giving any reason or answer to proposals for peace.

The conversation between Jagow and Cambon on July 30th is characteristic of these tactics.² Cambon again inquired how the matter stood with regard to the formula of mediation which Germany desired to propose. Jagow's answer was that "to gain time" he had acted directly, and "had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her" (*de dire sur quel terrain on pourrait causer avec elle*). In other words, under the pretence of gaining time he pushed aside the Powers which were striving for peace, and commissioned the instigator of war, Herr von Tschirschky, to ask the Austrian Government on what grounds she could be treated with. *Can anyone believe, can anyone regard it as possible, that the German Secretary of State on July 30th did not even then know what Austria really wanted? Is it not shameful to see the diplomatic representatives of the German Empire playing such a part in an event which concerned the life and death of European civilisation, and indeed the fate of mankind?*

But to go further; scarcely had the proposal for a conference come to nought when Herr von Jagow, in the

¹ Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109. Blue Book, Nos. 98, 107, 112.

² Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109.

course of the same conversation of July 30th, trotted out the Russian mobilisation, stating that it would lead as a consequence to German mobilisation, and in answer to an objection advanced by Cambon that the Russians had mobilised only against Austria, he replied that this was indeed quite true, but that the *heads of the Army were insisting on German mobilisation*, for every delay was a loss of strength. This last observation is very significant, although in the mouth of the Secretary of State, at any rate, it was highly imprudent. It certainly proves, as is indeed apparent from many other facts, that the resolution to mobilise, which in the case of Germany was known to be "equivalent to war," had already been taken on July 29th in the meeting of the Council held at Potsdam under the presidency of the Emperor, in which the Generals had taken part.¹ The General Staff was indeed in a hurry. This also explains the special edition of the *Lokalanzeiger*, which announced the mobilisation as early as July 30th, but was seized because it was not considered expedient that the mobilisation should be made known on that day.² *Hinc illæ lacrimæ*. Hence the subterfuges and the retreats of Herr von Jagow, who in a spirit of self-sacrifice threw himself, like a second Curtius, into the abyss which the military party had dug for him.

Mention must still be made of an earlier episode, because it illustrates in an interesting way the intellectual and moral qualities of the diplomatists concerned. On July 29th³ Cambon ventured to allow himself to make a modest inquiry as to the position of affairs with regard to direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd on which Herr von Jagow had built so great hopes.

¹ Yellow Book, No. 105. Cf. the remark quoted above of Count Pourtalès to Sazonof. Red Book, No. 28.

² Yellow Book, No. 105. Orange Book, No. 62.

³ Yellow Book, No. 92.

Jagow was in a position to give confirmation of the gratifying fact that Petrograd seemed well disposed, but that from Vienna "he was awaiting the reply." Meanwhile he had at least read the Serbian Note, and saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. Why, then, did Austria not negotiate, but break off relations in an incomprehensible manner? asked M. Cambon. "Because, with Eastern nations," such was the view expressed by Jagow, "one could never obtain sufficient guarantees for carrying out their promises." (This was, as is known, the only important point at issue between Austria and Serbia: the co-operation of Austrian organs in Serbian police and judicial investigations.) M. Cambon at once dexterously suggested the establishment of an International Commission—such as frequently exists in Balkan countries—charged with the duty of controlling the Serbian police inquiry. The Serbian answer, as he rightly held, was on this point also a suitable basis for negotiation. Herr von Jagow was unable to make any reply to this proposal of Cambon's, which was certainly ingenious and practicable. Had he accepted this proposal and followed it up—there was no room to doubt but that Russia and Serbia would concur—we would not to-day have been involved in a European war.

Like master, like man! On the day on which the above conversation took place between Jagow and Cambon the same performance was being transacted between Herr von Bethmann and Sir E. Goschen.¹ There were peaceful assurances in abundance, but the idea of a conference was declined; no declaration was given with regard to the intentions of Austria; "efforts" to induce the Government of Vienna to direct conversations with Russia were mentioned—be it observed it is never more than *efforts* with ineffective means which Herr von

¹ Blue Book, No. 75. Yellow Book, No. 92.

Bethmann "*poussait autant qu'il pouvait*"—but above everything else there is a threatening reference to the Russian mobilisation.

Even as late as the night between July 31st and August 1st¹ Goschen, the English Ambassador, made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity, to which the latter coldly replied that the matter had then gone too far, and that they must now wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. In reply to Goschen, who asked in astonishment why they had made their ultimatum completely impossible of acceptance by asking that they should demobilise against Austria as well, Herr von Jagow gave the memorable answer "that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria." Thus in order to bar the possibility of Russia advancing an impossible objection—impossible because the general mobilisation had been publicly announced and admitted by the Tsar himself in his telegrams—*they demanded the impossible, that is to say, demobilisation against a State which had itself already mobilised.*

On August 1st Goschen had again a long and pressing conversation with Jagow.² He pointed out to him, in concert with Cambon, the incomprehensible fact that Germany, a Power not directly interested in the whole dispute, had made war inevitable by despatching an ultimatum, *although Austria and Russia, the parties to the dispute*, had just entered into negotiations with a view to effecting a settlement. In reply to this Jagow merely let it be seen that he considered that that was all very fine, but that since Russia had mobilised, war must come if the demand contained in the German ultimatum was not complied with.

¹ Blue Book, No. 121. Yellow Book, No. 121.

² Blue Book, No. 138. Yellow Book, No. 121.

Thus we find the *mobilisation as such* put forward as the ground for war! We have already seen elsewhere how matters really stood with regard to the Russian mobilisation, by what it was occasioned and justified. In France and Russia, at any rate, a view different from that current in Germany prevailed with regard to the significance of the mobilisation on both sides. Neither of these countries would ever have declared war on account of German mobilisation, as they had not, in fact, done on account of Austrian mobilisation. "*Mobilisation is not war*" we find in a communication of Viviani to Paul Cambon (Yellow Book, No. 127). "In the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and . . . the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. . . . We shall not cease to work towards an agreement. . . . We will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success of these *pourparlers*." These words we find elsewhere in the writings of Viviani on August 1st, that is to say, *after* the ultimatum, and *after* the French mobilisation.¹

This is but a brief epitome of the history of French efforts for peace. All the diplomatic books are full of them, only Herr von Bethmann remains in ignorance. He has—if we may use his own words—"had the courage as the responsible statesman" to accuse the French Government of not having taken a single positive step in the interests of peace. We, however, and impartial history will concur, throw this reproach back on Germany, on the shoulders of the statesman who, whether driving or driven—the guilt remains the same—did nothing for peace, and did everything that was bound to make this war inevitable. While others hastened to the

¹ Yellow Book, Nos. 125, 127. I have already elsewhere pointed out that Austrian diplomatists also did not regard mobilisation as equivalent to war (Blue Book, No. 118).

spot with fire engines and water-buckets to extinguish the beginnings of the conflagration, he poured oil on the flames and collected brushwood so that the smouldering spark might develop into a holocaust. And now that the fire of hell has broken loose, and the author of it all sees horror-struck the consequences of his fearful deed, he writes and talks and he talks and writes in order to charge others with his misdeed, like the burglar who runs down the street shouting out "Stop, thief."

Fortunately no one in the whole world believes him, and the more excuses he offers the more does he in fact accuse himself. With all his sophisms and perversions he cannot abolish the facts which lie patent to all eyes. And the eyes of even the German people, who now deceived and deluded patiently submit to the unspeakable horrors of war, will gradually be opened. Over the trenches and across the frontiers it will reach out its hand to the neighbouring nation whose president said with truth: "The German Empire will bear before history the crushing responsibility for the war."

F

APPENDIX

The Austrian Red Book

In the beginning of February, after the pages of this book were completed, there appeared an Austrian Red Book, which, consisting of an introduction and sixty-nine documents, gives an account of events from the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand down to the outbreak of the European war. This book offers no surprises, but only a *confirmation* of the conclusions which could not

but be drawn from the previously published diplomatic correspondence. It is a meritorious work, in so far as it unveils, by open self-confessions and with an appalling lucidity, the Austrian attitude, which hitherto could only be inferred indirectly from foreign publications.

What the Austrian book yields in the way of *positive facts* confirms the conclusion that Austria-Hungary was guilty of the outbreak of the war in a way which must leave even for the well-disposed no further room for doubt. What it *conceals in silence* proves that the Austrian Government is completely aware of its guilt, but that it still endeavours—though vainly—to conceal it from the eyes of the world.

As before the publication of this book, there is still a complete absence of any kind of evidence that the German Government, as is constantly emphasised in the White Book, *pressed the Viennese Government to assume an attitude of moderation and conciliation*. In the interval between July 28th and 30th, when all relations between Vienna and Petrograd were completely broken off, the German Government, as I have already indicated, “handed on” to Vienna individual proposals of the Entente Powers; they even got so far as to bring them before the Vienna Cabinet “*for their consideration*,”¹ but they never defended them, or gave them energetic support. The German Government, in the name of Austria and without any previous consultation with her ally, straightway declined certain other proposals. Others again she simply kept to herself without deigning an answer, and without transmitting them to Vienna.

The proposals which did arrive at Austria were *collectively so long refused by the Government in Vienna that in the end it was too late*, and thus all the efforts

¹ Red Book, No. 43.

of the Entente Powers to keep the peace of Europe failed.

I will now take up the various points in the Red Book which deserve discussion, and first I will deal with what the Red Book contains, and then with what it does not contain.

I

What the Red Book contains

I. It is now demonstrated by the Red Book itself that Austria *under all circumstances* desired war against Serbia—a fact already proved by the revelations of Giolitti, and by many other circumstances which have already been indicated. In the report from the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade, Freiherr von Giesl, dated July 21st,¹ that is to say, before the presentation of the Austrian Note, the Ambassador expresses his conviction:

“that a reckoning with Serbia, a *war* for the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, *cannot be permanently avoided*. If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavourable situation in any future war, which must, however, sooner or later be carried through. . . . Half-measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary’s reputation in Serbia and her position in Europe.”

¹ Red Book, No. 6.

This embodies the programme which governed all further developments.

2. As early as July 23rd, simultaneously with the delivery of the ultimatum to Serbia, Count Berchtold explains in instructions sent to Count Mensdorff, his Ambassador in London, that the short time-limit allowed in the ultimatum was necessary in order to make impossible the "dilatatory arts" of Serbia, and that the Austrian demands "*could not be made the subject of negotiations and compromise.*"¹

The Entente Powers only received information of the Austrian Note on July 24th, and then without the addition of the documentary evidence. Their representations that the period of time allowed in the ultimatum might at least be lengthened, to afford them an opportunity of studying the evidence and of bringing influence to bear on the Serbian Government, were flatly refused. It was indicated that an examination of the data was superfluous, and that the Austrian communication "*merely bore the character of a statement for information,*" which was regarded "as a duty laid upon them by international courtesy," and that the Austrian action was one which concerned the monarchy and Serbia alone, on which the Powers were not invited "to make known their own views on the subject." Count Berchtold disappeared from Vienna in the critical days between July 23rd and 25th, and issued his unaccommodating declarations from Lambach and Ischl.²

3. In an instruction despatched on July 25th to Count Szápáry, the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd, Berchtold already counted on the refusal of his demands by Serbia, and on the settlement of the conflict by force of arms at a time when the Serbian Note had not even

¹ Red Book, No. 9.

² Red Book, Nos. 20, 21.

been received.¹ In another Note of the same day to Szápáry he explains Point 5 of the Serbian Note in the sense that the collaboration in Serbia of Austrian officials in the suppression of the subversive movement was intended to mean the "collaboration" of a "bureau de sûreté" in Belgrade,² but he omits to give any explanations on Point 6, which was much more important (participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot). Explanations on the latter point were only given on July 27th in the declaration published by the Austrian Government after the recall of the Austrian Ambassador; it was then stated that the intention was that Austrian officials should take part, not in the Serbian judicial proceedings, but in the preliminary police investigations leading up to such proceedings (*recherche* as opposed to *enquête judiciaire*).

This raises the question why these explanations which were transmitted on July 25th to Petrograd, and were published on July 27th, could not have been included in the ultimatum, or at least communicated to Serbia, after the reception of the Serbian answer. It would certainly have been possible, and in view of the submissive attitude assumed by Serbia it was more than probable, that the Serbian Government, on the ground of these explanations, might have gone still further to meet the Austrian demands; since Points 5 and 6 were almost the only reservations made by Serbia, Austria might have received full satisfaction in the further negotiations, and the peace of Europe might have been maintained. Explanations were, however, omitted *because war with Serbia was regarded as necessary*, as so necessary, in fact, that they were resolved, if need be, to accept a European war into the bargain. Austria acted

¹ Red Book, No. 26.

² Red Book, No. 27.

according to the prescription of the man who, to get rid of bugs, burnt down his house.

4. The answer of Serbia produced, as is well known, the greatest disappointment in Vienna. It had not been expected that the influence of the Entente Powers in Belgrade could induce an independent State to accept such a humiliation. At a stroke all hopes of the desired war appeared to have vanished. A Government which can condescend to a public apology in its official gazette inserted in a prescribed phraseology at a prescribed place on a prescribed day—a King who allows an order of the day to his army to be dictated by a neighbouring State—a Sovereign State which subjects its public education to the control of another State, which dismisses and even arrests officers and officials at the command of its neighbour, which dissolves national unions, and suppresses the liberty of the Press, &c., &c.—such a State and such a Government had never before been seen in the history of the world. Truly it required great dexterity (such as Austrian statesmen did not have at command) or an extraordinary evil will (such as they certainly did have at command) to deduce a reason for war from such an attitude on the part of their small neighbour.

On July 27th, before he knew the Serbian answer, Sazonof himself in the course of a conversation with Count Szápáry, held that at least three of the ten points in the Austrian Note could not be accepted, namely, points 4, 5, and 6, and there can be no doubt that he was much surprised when he learned later that point 4 (removal of officers and officials) had been accepted by Serbia, and also that the two other points had not been flatly refused, but that it was suggested that they should be submitted for decision to arbitration.¹

5. I have already dealt in an earlier passage with the

¹ Red Book, No. 31.

process whereby the submissive Serbian reply was artificially transformed by means of miserable quibbles into a Note of refusal. In Berchtold's Note of July 28th intended for the English Government the Serbian submission was represented as being worthless, and as intended to deceive: "Serbia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, *trusting that she would not be required to fulfil her promises.*"¹ This is supposed to justify the action of Austria in ignoring the Serbian answer. I have already suggested the question: What else, beyond making promises, could Serbia do in forty-eight hours? Was it expected that the fulfilment of the promises should also be carried out in forty-eight hours? After all, the Austrian Government had only demanded from the Serbian Government an *obligation* that she would perform certain actions. This obligation was given in eight points, and in two points was made subject to further discussion. Clearly, in the first place, it was necessary to wait and see whether Serbia would fulfil her promises.

Guarantees in the form that Austria should herself collaborate in the fulfilment of the Serbian promises were asked for only in points 5 and 6. If Austria could have brought herself to discuss these points, these guarantees would presumably have been provided for in one form or another; they could, for example, have been provided, as proposed by Jules Cambon, in the form of an International Commission of investigation and control,² and guarantees in this form would have been much more practicable and far more effective than in the form demanded by Austria. The whole of this idea of collaboration of Austrian officials in Serbian investigations was, in view of the strained relations between Austria

¹ Red Book, No. 39.

² Yellow Book, No. 92.

and Serbia, an intellectual efflorescence, such as could only spring from the soil of Austrian diplomacy. Was it supposed that *in this way* peace could be established between Austria and Serbia? A perpetual daily state of feud would have arisen between Austrian and Serbian officials, numberless irritating incidents, perhaps involving bloodshed, would have taken place; in short, there would have been a situation which would indubitably have led in the sequel to war (this was also the view of Sazonof, Red Book, No. 14).

But notwithstanding all this, the alleged untrustworthiness of Serbia had to suffice to make valueless the answer which in fact had conceded nearly all the demands. This untrustworthiness, in the opinion of Austria, was supposed to be particularly confirmed by the fact that Serbia, as early as 3 o'clock on the afternoon of July 25th, had ordered a general mobilisation, that is to say, three hours before the answer was handed over to the Austrian Ambassador.¹ We find here that Austria, in connection with the question of mobilisation, plays the same game so successfully put into operation by Germany. Austria presented to Serbia demands which could not be complied with, and thereby gave expression to her indubitable intention to make war. Serbia concurred in the greatest part of these demands, but feared, not without reason, that the few reservations made by her would furnish the Austrian Government with a pretext for war, and took steps to protect herself against this possibility by timeous mobilisation, which had been carried out by Austria also, simultaneously with the presentation of the ultimatum. This defensive mobilisation on the part of Serbia was then treated by Austria as trickery and as an offensive action, whereby Serbia "publicly proclaimed her hostility," and showed that she had "no inclination for a peaceful so-

¹ Red Book, No. 39.

lution," and thus Austria construed the desired ground for war.¹

6. But the Austrian Government did not rest satisfied with this; she even raised the further reproach against Serbia—again in imitation of a celebrated example—that her opponent had been the first to begin hostilities. In the telegram sent by Berchtold on July 28th to his Ambassadors in Petrograd and London it is expressly asserted that Serbia had opened hostilities on the Hungarian frontier as early as July 27th, that is to say, before the Austrian declaration of war.² This assertion is, of course, unsupported by any facts or by any kind of evidence, and it is further much more incredible than the similar assertion which was later advanced by Germany against Russia and France. Why, indeed, should a small and weak country like Serbia intentionally provoke a war with Austria? The facts reported by Giesl, the Austrian Ambassador (removal of gold from the National Bank, withdrawal of troops from Belgrade, removal of official papers from the Foreign Office, &c.) prove—as, indeed, is in accordance with logic and reason, and requires no proof—that there was nothing which Serbia had less in her mind than an attack upon Austria; on the contrary, that it would have been glad if only her great neighbour would leave her in peace.³ But it appears to be the recognised custom in this war for the aggressor to accuse his victim of having fallen upon him.

All these pretexts furnished the Austrian Government with priceless material to justify the negative position which they assumed with regard to the peaceful proposals of the Entente Powers. The grounds of these refusals may be summarised as follows:—

¹ Red Book, Introduction p. 444, No. 29.

² Red Book, Nos. 39, 40.

³ Red Book, No. 22.

(a) Our dispute with Serbia concerns no one, and must remain localised.

(b) Serbia, by her unsatisfactory answer, by her mobilisation, and by opening hostilities has herself provoked the war.

7. I have already dealt in the previous sections of this book with the question of localisation. This subject, however, reappears in the Austrian Red Book with such definiteness and at the same time with so much naïveté that a further short discussion appears necessary. Austria simply took as her starting point the thought which Count Mensdorff had openly expressed to Sir Edward Grey on July 29th that *Serbia belonged to the Austrian sphere of interest* (Blue Book, No. 91). The fact that Russia, by a hundred years of history, by links of blood and religion, and also by her own interests was connected with Serbia by bonds more intimate than those between any other two allies, such, for example, as Germany and Austria, was intentionally ignored by the two Empires, and the ingenious distinction was constantly drawn that while they were quite prepared to negotiate with Russia on questions arising between Russia and Austria, they must be allowed to regulate the Austro-Serbian dispute as they thought fit. This artificial and meaningless interpretation is as if one party to a law-suit were to say to the other: "I am quite prepared to come to an understanding with you and have no evil intentions whatever against you, but we must absolutely refrain from speaking to each other about the subject in dispute; let us, therefore, talk about something else. What do you think about Russia? Fine weather to-day; very fine day to-day, indeed." The Serbian question was precisely the question at issue between Austria and Russia, and not, indeed, for the first time; it had been so for many years. Russia regarded her interests as

being identical with those of Serbia, and declared that, in the interests of Serbia as well as of her own prestige, she could not tolerate that the Slavonic brother State, after the deep diplomatic humiliation she had undergone, should also be crushed by Austria by force of arms and should be degraded into a kind of vassal State.¹ On this occasion the conflict had broken out more violently than ever, and threatened not merely to divide Austria from Russia, but also to set the whole of Europe in flame. *Only this question was at stake—no other.* If they were prepared to negotiate at all, it had to be on the Serbian question; if they were not prepared to discuss this question, it was superfluous and purposeless to suggest further negotiations. In reality the Austrian proposal that they were willing to negotiate with Russia on Russian interests was nothing but a pretext in order to avoid negotiations which could serve any purpose.

It was in vain that Grey and Sazonof endeavoured to convince the Austrian Government of their sophisms—sophisms which might be attended by the gravest consequences. Even Count Szápáry, the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd, could not refrain from observing that the instructions of Berchtold moved in a vicious circle.² All representations were in vain. Austria, supported by Germany, stood firm in her refusal until it was too late and war had become inevitable.

8. Proceeding from the fundamental principle that no one had any right to be heard in the Austro-Serbian dispute, Austria, in the first place, declined to permit *any discussion of the contents of her ultimatum* or of the Serbian answer. On July 27th a conversation, maintained in a friendly tone, took place between Sazonof and Szápáry, in which the former gave expression to the

¹ Red Book, No. 47. Blue Book, Nos. 48, 91.

² Red Book, No. 47.

desire to discuss the Serbian Note with the Ambassador. Szápáry explained that he was ready to receive the observations of Sazonof, but pointed out that he was not authorised either to discuss the text of the Note or to interpret it.¹ On July 28th Schébéko, the Russian Ambassador, made a formal proposition to Count Berchtold asking him to furnish Count Szápáry with instructions to continue with Sazonof the exchange of thought, and thus, if it were possible, to arrive at a direct understanding with the Russian Government; the latter would gladly meet them half-way with this object in view. *Count Berchtold emphatically declined the proposal of the Russian Ambassador:* No one in Austria could understand negotiations with reference to the Serbian answer, which had been designated as unsatisfactory, and, moreover, war had already been declared against Serbia on the same day. By way of providing a further ground for the declaration of war, Berchtold did not fail to refer to the Serbian mobilisation and to the hostilities alleged to have been begun by Serbia.²

Thus, all connections between Austria and Russia were broken off until further notice. All attempts to effect an understanding could reach Austria only indirectly by the mediation of the Entente Powers and of Germany.

9. On the same day on which Berchtold declined Sazonof's proposal for a direct understanding, he also rejected *Grey's proposal for a conference of the four Powers*. As is known, this proposal had already been declined by Germany, without previous consultation with Austria, under the threadbare pretext that she could not summon her ally before a "European Tribunal." Austria declined this proposal, which was simultaneously submitted by Grey to Count Mensdorff and by Bunsen

¹ Red Book, No. 31.

² Red Book, No. 40. Orange Book, No. 45.

to Count Berchtold (July 28th) on *quite different* grounds, namely, that the proposal came *too late*, and that in view of the state of war which had arisen it had been "outstripped" by events.¹ This certainly is a remarkable procedure! Germany, as Austria's guardian, considers that Grey's proposal is, so to speak, inconsistent with her dignity. Austria, however, the party chiefly concerned, is not sensible of this violation of her dignity, but only objects that the proposal was received too late, and apparently, therefore, she would not have been disinclined to consider it had it been submitted earlier. This, again, furnishes an indication of the incredible confusion which reigned in the minds of German and Austrian diplomatists and in the Chancelleries of the Empires. Both the reasons urged against the conference, that expressed by Berlin and that by Vienna, were, of course, merely pretexts. But it would, at any rate, have been more astute, in the first place, to have come to an agreement as to the reasons which they were to put forward to bring to naught one after the other the proposals of the Entente Powers for peace. It would then have been less easy to see through the game, and more difficult to establish guilt.

10. In an earlier passage I have already pointed out how Germany answered Grey's proposal for a conference with the counter-proposal of a direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd—a discussion *which was then declined by Vienna*. The German White Book naturally endeavours to conceal this position of affairs, which in itself offers a complete proof of the guilt of the two Empires; it was, however, possible to establish this fact beyond all doubt by reference to the other diplomatic books. The Red Book now presents us with the self-confession of Austria on this question in the crassest form, and, moreover, the statement contains highly ag-

¹ Red Book, Nos. 38, 41.

gravating amplifications. Not only did the Government of Vienna decline on July 28th to discuss the Serbian question directly with Russia as proposed by Germany, but they had already given expression to this refusal with the utmost definiteness *as early as July 23rd* (Red Book, No. 9). *This fact must have been, and was, known to the German Government.* The Government of Berlin thus declined, with full knowledge of the facts, a promising proposal put forward by the English Government in order to set in its place another, which, in view of the declaration made by Austria as far back as July 23rd, was known to them to be futile. Up till now it was possible only to show that the Berlin counter-proposal was, in fact, futile, and to *infer* that there was criminal collusion between the two Empires. Now—thanks to the Austrian publication—this collusion is *proved*, and the guilty are unmasked. *If of the hundred proofs of guilt only this one existed, it would suffice to lay upon Germany and Austria alone the responsibility for the war.*

II. On July 30th Count Berchtold, as we know, at last resolved, in view of the increasingly dangerous aspect of the dispute, to discuss with Sazonof the details of the Austrian Note. With this object he sent on July 30th two instructions to his Ambassador at Petrograd (Red Book, Nos. 49 and 50), and thereupon on July 31st negotiations in fact began *officially* for the first time in Petrograd on the contents of the Note. The conversation of July 27th between Sazonof and Szápáry was, as explained above, only an *unofficial* acceptance of Sazonof's observations.

Even in this critical moment Berchtold could not refrain from speaking of the Note as having been already "outstripped" by the outbreak of war, from describing the conversations in Petrograd as "subsequent explanations," and from emphasising that it had never been

Austria's intention "to depart in any way from the points contained in the Note."

The phrase about being "outstripped by the outbreak of war," which is ridden to death in the Red Book, deserves special consideration. What is it really supposed to mean? A insults B; A offers humble and plaintive apologies; nevertheless, B raises his sword to run A through. A third, C, a near relation of A, intervenes to restrain the lethal blow, and points out in A's favour that he has already offered apologies. B, however, deprecates this intervention with the observation that the discussion of the insult has been *outstripped by events*, and that the state of war which was produced by raising his sword must now pursue its course.

This is the point of view of the Austrian Government. It is incredible, but true! But even if this point of view were as logical and reasonable as it is illogical and unreasonable, it would not lead to the conclusion drawn by the Government of Vienna, that all attempts at mediation by third parties—which were promoted in the interest, not of Serbia, but of European peace—must give way. The state of war had been brought about by Austria *alone* (the Serbian hostilities are, of course, an invention). This state of war, however, like every war, could and must sooner or later come to an end. The Entente Powers desired to bring about this end sooner rather than later, in order to prevent an extension of the conflagration throughout Europe. How, then, was it possible to urge as an objection against these efforts for peace that war had already broken out? It was precisely *because* war had broken out that efforts were made in the cause of peace. One is almost ashamed to have to devote so much space to matters which are so obvious, but when we find constantly repeated in all the Notes contained in the Red Book from July 28th onwards the same idiotic ideas that all the efforts for peace

made by the Powers had been outstripped by the Serbian war, needlessly and criminally brought about by Austria—as may be expected the German White Book also (page 9)¹ is guilty of this idiocy—it is impossible to shirk the task of characterising such senselessness by its true name, as *a criminal gamble with the highest interests of the unhappy nations whose destiny is entrusted to such men as these*.

The worst feature in the whole business is, however, that the assertion that the peace proposals were outstripped by the outbreak of war *is not even in fact true*. The peace proposals—the Russian request for a direct understanding as well as Grey's proposal for a conference of the four Powers—were in reality made and communicated to the Government at Vienna *before the outbreak* of the Austro-Serbian war. As early as July 24th, immediately after being informed of the Austrian Note, Sazonof expressed the wish that the period of time allowed in the ultimatum should be extended, and that he should receive the Austrian evidence in support of their charges in order that the Austrian complaints might be examined, pressure brought to bear on Serbia, and negotiations opened with Vienna with a view to arriving at an understanding. In the following days this desire was constantly repeated by the Russian Minister to Count Szápáry, on the final occasion as late as July 27th.² As war was only declared against Serbia on July 28th, the assertion that the Russian proposal for an understanding was "outstripped" by the declaration of war is stamped as a *lie*.

The same holds true of Grey's proposal for a conference. The conference of the four Powers was recommended by Grey from the beginning of the crisis, as *early as July 24th*, and from that time the proposal

[¹ Collected Documents, p. 409.]

² Red Book, No. 31.

was constantly renewed.¹ As early as July 26th the proposal was submitted to the German Government, and was rejected under the well-known pretext that she could not call Austria before a European tribunal.² On July 27th Count Mensdorff reported at length on this proposal made and urgently pressed upon him by Grey.³ How, then, does Count Berchtold arrive at the conclusion that the proposal for a conference, which dated from July 24th, and which had since then been constantly renewed, was "outstripped" by the declaration of war, which took place on July 28th? This assertion also is a conscious lie, intended to hush up Austria's unswerving intention to make war. I resume as follows:—

(a) even if the Austrian assertion that the proposals for peace only arrived *after* the declaration of war were correct, this would not, in logic or in reason, constitute any ground for rejecting these proposals;

(b) it is, however, proved that these proposals reached Austria *before* the declaration of war; there is thus no support in fact for the premises on which is based the conclusion—in itself false—drawn by the Vienna Government.

12. On July 29th Sazonof rightly complained to Szápáry that Austria had flatly refused any further exchange of thought. This, however, did not prevent Count Berchtold from assuming a "stupid" air in conversation with M. Schebeko on July 30th, and from speaking of a "misunderstanding" on the part of Sazonof, as he and Schebeko "had discussed the practical questions two days before," and Schebeko had reported this to Petrograd (Red Book, No. 50). The exchange

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 10, 11, 24, 25, 36, 42, 43, etc.

² White Book, p. 409.

³ Red Book, No. 38. Blue Book, No. 48.

of thought of which Berchtold speaks consisted in the fact that Schebeko, in the name of Sazonof, desired the official continuation of the negotiations in Petrograd, whereas Berchtold *flatly declined* to concur in these. This is what Berchtold calls "*discussing the practical question*"!

13. The question of mobilisation was naturally also among the subjects discussed in the conversation on July 30th. Berchtold complained about the mobilisation of the four southern Russian army-districts, which had taken place on the previous day, and repeated again the false assertion that Austria had only mobilised against Serbia (three army corps), but against Russia "not a single man." M. Schebeko could have answered to this: "Not a man, it is true, but a 'Beth-mann.'" For Bethmann in his simplicity had chattered in the Reichstag on August 4th to the effect that Austria had mobilised, *not only against Serbia, but also two army-corps against Russia* at a time when Russian mobilisation was not even spoken of.

Noteworthy is the admission made by Berchtold in the conversation in question that Austria was now obliged "to extend her mobilisation too"—an admission which confirms the Austrian general mobilisation reported by the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers as taking place on the night from the 30th to the 31st July. That the Austrian mobilisation against Russia was, in fact, carried out during this night is also expressly admitted in the telegram sent by Count Berchtold on July 31st to his diplomatic representatives abroad' (Red Book, No. 53).

Both States—Austria and Russia—were, however, as I have pointed out elsewhere, at one in the view *that mobilisation was in no way equivalent to war*. Although both States had ordered general mobilisation on July 31st, Berchtold telegraphed as follows to his diplomatic

representatives: "Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and Petrograd appropriate to the situation *are meanwhile being continued*, and from these we hope that things will quieten down all round." They did, in fact, continue, or rather they only *began* at the moment when mobilisation on both sides had already taken place. They took place in Petrograd on July 31st and August 1st, even after the German ultimatum, and were only finally broken off in consequence of the German declaration of war.¹ On an earlier occasion also, in a telegram of July 24th to Count Mensdorff, Berchtold expressly pointed out that Austria had already mobilised twice (1908 and 1912) because of Serbia.² Russia also had mobilised on each of these instances, and, nevertheless, peace had been maintained on both occasions by diplomatic negotiations. This is a confession on the part of her own ally which is damaging to Germany! In spite of all mobilisations, peace could have been maintained on this occasion also if Germany had *desired* to maintain it.

14. In connection with the question of mobilisation there is one charming episode which I should not like to keep from the reader as it throws a ray of comedy into the dark tragedy; I refer to the history of Sazonof's broken word of honour which is dished up for us by Austrian diplomacy. Hitherto we have had knowledge of only three broken words of honour: the Russian Minister of War, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, and the Russian Emperor were the breakers of their word (see the German White Book). That was not enough for the Austrian gentlemen; they felt constrained to add a fourth breaker of his word, M. Sazonof. Count Szögyény, who appears in part to misunderstand all important occurrences, and in part to slumber through

¹ Red Book, Nos. 55, 56.

² Red Book, No. 17.

them, as we shall see later, reported from Berlin on July 27th that Sazonof had given the German Ambassador a "guarantee" that as yet no mobilisation had taken place, but only certain necessary military precautions (Red Book, No. 33). I have already shown that this declaration was in conformity with the truth. The declaration, however, was given, *not by Sazonof*, but by the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof (White Book, page 8).¹ It is amusing to observe how the imaginary declaration of Sazonof (of July 27th) develops in the Note of Berchtold (of July 28th) into *a broken word of honour on the part of Sazonof*, and in the Note of July 29th it is generously recognised that M. Sazonof "now no longer denies" what, in fact, he never had denied (Red Book, Nos. 42 and 48). Who can tell how many broken Russian words of honour might have been constructed had not the outbreak of war put an end to this criminal activity!

15. The telegram sent by Berchtold to his Ambassadors at London and Petrograd on July 31st deserves special consideration (Red Book, No. 51). As the two telegrams of July 30th to Count Szápáry (Nos. 49 and 50) appeared at last to pave the way for the acceptance of direct negotiations with Russia, so the telegram of July 31st appeared at last to reveal a certain readiness to accept Grey's mediation. The superficial observer who does not keep sufficiently in view the secret connections between Berlin and Vienna—and even the Entente Powers were such superficial observers until the behaviour of Berlin opened their eyes—is, in fact, compelled to assume that Austria had at last, with the terror of a European war in her heart, repented, and was endeavouring to maintain peace in both the ways proposed by the Entente Powers, by means of direct negotiations

[¹ Collected Documents, p. 408.]

with Russia and simultaneously by the mediatory action of the Powers.

Accurately viewed, the position is quite different. Austria was bound to know, and in fact did know, that in consequence of the question of mobilisation intentionally pushed into the foreground by Germany the tension between Berlin and Petrograd had meanwhile become greater than that between Vienna and Petrograd, and in consequence that even an apparent concurrence by Austria in the peace proposals of the Entente Powers could no longer prevent the coming of war.

This was one reason for Austria's sudden change of front. It was harmless; Berlin had already provided for all further developments.

The other reason, however—and this explanation is given us for the first time by the Red Book—was that the Austrian declarations themselves were so restricted and limited that even without the ultimatum-policy of Berlin they could not lead to a peaceful settlement. From this side of the question Vienna herself provided for all further developments. I have already pointed out the reservations which the Government at Vienna made in resuming negotiations with Petrograd. When a negotiating party declares from the outset that she is only prepared to give "subsequent explanations," and that she had no "intention to depart" from her position, negotiations are superfluous and futile.

Similar reservations were made by the Government of Vienna with regard to the English proposal of mediation. This proposal had its origin in Sazonof's telegram of July 29th, which, having regard to the categorical refusal of the Vienna Cabinet on the previous day to take part in further negotiations, asked the English Government for mediation in the interests of peace in any form that appeared advisable.¹ In the Note from

¹ Orange Book, No. 50. Blue Book, No. 84.

Vienna of July 31st we find the following surprising passage: "Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia he is *no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary.*" Is the phraseology here used in any way intended to indicate that Sazonof, for his part, had refused to enter into further negotiations? Such an implication would have been a gross falsification, refuted by the Austrian Red Book itself, as well as by all the other diplomatic publications. Sazonof was, in fact, no longer in a position to negotiate with Vienna, not through any fault of *his*, but because Vienna had since July 28th refused to take part in any further negotiations. Whom did they really expect to deceive by this ambiguous phraseology?

Grey at once communicated Sazonof's request to Prince Lichnowsky, and again put forward the proposal of a conversation *à quatre* in London, the form of which he left entirely to the German Government. The obvious presupposition of this, and of all other proposals for mediation, was naturally the preliminary suspension of hostilities against Serbia; it should, however, be observed that what was asked was only a cessation of operations, and not a withdrawal of Austrian troops from Serbia.

What attitude did Count Berchtold assume with regard to this proposal? Now on July 31st he for the first time declared himself "quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia," only, however, under the following conditions:—

(a) the military action against Serbia should meanwhile continue to take its *course*;

(b) the Russian mobilisation must be brought to a standstill, whereupon the Austrian counter-measures in Galicia would also be cancelled.

Was this an acceptance or a refusal of Grey's mediation? It was a *refusal in the form of an acceptance*. Could it be seriously asked of the Russian Government that it was for them to begin demobilisation while Austria was prepared to cancel partially in Galicia the general mobilisation which she had ordered in the previous night, only after the Russian mobilisation had been brought to a standstill? Could it be seriously asked of Russia that, during the proposed conference of Ambassadors in London, of which neither the beginning nor the term could yet be determined, she should allow Austria to proceed with her measures against Serbia, and thus in the meantime crush the tiny State? In addition to this, Austria had merely expressed *in general terms* her readiness to "entertain" (*näherzutreten*) Grey's mediatory action, but had not accepted a conference in this form or in that. Events might thus follow the same course as in Berlin during the preceding six days, that is to say, the Government of Vienna, on going more closely into the question, might raise on their side all manner of difficulties as to the form, while neglecting, just as Berlin had done, to propose any practical or acceptable form. In short, the Austrian answer to the proposal of Grey which Herr von Tschirschky "communicated in accordance with instructions," without in any way supporting it—this answer was so ambiguous and restricted that it was equivalent to a refusal of the proposal.

The Allied Governments could thus feel sure on both sides that the desired war could not escape them. There was as little hope of a peaceful issue of the negotiations with Russia as of the success of the English mediatory action, in consequence of the clauses and reservations attached by the Government of Vienna to their acceptance of both proposals. If, however, there was any danger of a peaceful issue, Berlin, by its ultimatum-

policy, was taking the necessary measures to secure that under all circumstances war was bound to come. The cards were, in fact, shuffled with such dexterity that the game could not be lost—the game of war which had so often been played in peace, and which now they wished to carry through in earnest.

.

So far our discussions have had reference to what is contained in the Austrian Red Book, and these have confirmed anew the points in the indictment framed against Austria.

Austria criminally provoked the Serbian war, and, as a consequence of that, the European war:—

- by addressing to Serbia demands which were impossible of fulfilment,
- by refusing an answer which accorded her almost complete satisfaction,
- by the recall of her Ambassador, and by the declaration of war against Serbia,
- by concealing her real objects in making war,
- by categorically declining all negotiations and all actions of mediation up to the last moment, when it was too late,
- by imposing conditions on her final consent which were necessarily bound to exclude from the outset the possibility of success.

II

What the Red Book does not contain

The above accusations may be inferred from the contents of the Red Book itself.

Much more serious, however, are the accusations

which may be inferred from what is *not* contained in the Red Book, accusations against Austria and Germany alike. The Red Book contains nothing, *not so much as a syllable*:

(a) of the alleged pressure which Berlin is supposed to have exercised on Vienna in the sense of peace;

(b) of all the proposals for mediation which were made by the Entente Powers, *apart from* the conference of the four Powers.

1. The White Book and the Blue Book are, as I have elsewhere shown, full of the emphatic assurances of the German Imperial Government that it had made every effort to exert a moderating influence on Vienna in the sense of arriving at a peaceful understanding. "Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia (this is the famous distinction dealt with above), we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two Powers. We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna. . . ." &c. "In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the monarchy. . . ." "Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured incessantly, and supported every proposal in Vienna," &c. "During the interval from July 29th to July 31st, whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy," &c.—passages such as these are to be found everywhere in the White Book. In his speech of August 4th the Chancellor assured his hearers that he had car-

ried his task of mediation at Vienna "to the utmost point which was compatible with our position as an ally."

Similar assurances were given in unfaltering succession to the English diplomatists in Berlin and London. It is everywhere said, especially by the Chancellor himself, that he had pressed the button in Vienna as hard as he could, that he had energetically preached peace and moderation, and that perhaps he had already gone too far.¹ Herr von Jagow even gives expression to the fear that the strong pressure which he had exercised on Vienna in favour of negotiations on the Serbian answer might have produced a contrary effect and hastened the Austrian declaration of war.² In short, Herr von Jagow and Herr Bethmann-Hollweg bubbled over with peaceful assurances and alleged efforts in the cause of peace in Vienna, and posed before the German people and the English Government as angels of peace constantly fluttering to and fro between Vienna and Berlin bearing the palm in their hand.

Even in reading the German White Book one cannot fail to be surprised that these efforts for peace remained always and everywhere completely unsuccessful. It is everywhere the same story: Vienna had refused on this or that ground. Either Vienna was not prepared to negotiate, or it was too late to do so, or the Russian mobilisation had intervened, and so on. Everywhere the total result was nil.

I have already pointed out that this negative result has in the highest degree a suspicious appearance; if Berlin had seriously wished, Vienna *was bound* to give way in everything without demur, for Vienna by herself was powerless in Europe. There was here a mysterious point in the relations between Vienna and Berlin which urgently called for an explanation. The assurances that

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 107, 108.

² Blue Book, No. 76.

efforts were made for peace must be clearly proved if they are to command credence. The failure of the efforts alleged to have been made by Berlin was so surprising that the efforts themselves became in a high measure unworthy of belief.

The matter assumed a more suspicious air in view of the personality of our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky-Bögendorf. He had the reputation of being an outspoken enemy of Russia and Serbia, who, instead of advising moderation at the Ballplatz, goaded on to war. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the English Ambassador, openly expressed the view that Herr von Tschirschky desired war from the first, and that he allowed his strong personal bias to colour his actions, that he was constantly dealing in secret with the Austrian Government, and that he never invited the co-operation of the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers. Sazonof also emphasised the strongly marked attitude of hostility towards Russia shown by the German Ambassador, who was suspected of having known the Austrian Note before it was despatched, and who openly declared to anyone who cared to listen that he endorsed every word of the Note, and regarded the Serbian answer as a sham.¹ When an Ambassador of this character receives instructions which in more than platonic form "transmit" English proposals, but neither support these proposals nor counsel energetic pressure, we can understand how matters stood with regard to the urgent efforts for peace of the Berlin Government in Vienna, and what the action of mediation looked like "which was carried to the utmost point which was compatible with our position as an ally."

All these indications and, above all, the unconditional failure of the alleged efforts of Berlin, compel us to entertain doubts as to the veracity of the Berlin assurances. *The certainty, however, that these assurances*

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 32, 95, 139, 141, 161.

are untrue, and consciously untrue, has for the first time been furnished by the Austrian Red Book. It contains nothing, not so much as a syllable, about all that Bethmann and Jagow so volubly claim to have done; it contains in all only a few communications from Herr von Tschirschky to Count Berchtold which took place "in accordance with instructions," and which only rise on one occasion to the observation that a British proposal "was brought before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration."¹ The question at issue here was the important and urgent proposal put forward by Grey on July 27th (Blue Book, No. 46) to the effect that after Russia, by the exercise of her conciliatory influence in Belgrade, had obtained so favourable an answer from Serbia, Austria should at least accept the Serbian answer as *a basis for discussion*, seeing that it went far beyond all expectation in meeting the Austrian demands. Let anyone read this urgent request addressed by Grey to Prince Lichnowsky on such firm grounds, his warm appeal to Germany's love of peace, his desire to keep closely in touch with Germany, his emphasis on the fact that after the success which had attended Russia's advice and the concessions made by Serbia it was now the turn of Vienna to show some spirit of accommodation, and that Berlin, in the first instance, could, and must, act in this direction. Let anyone read this, and compare it with the completely frigid manner in which Herr von Tschirschky brings Grey's proposal "before the Vienna Government for their consideration." No one will then be surprised that the proposal was declined with equal frigidity by the Government of Vienna on the ground that "after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the subsequent declaration of war the step appears belated."²

Such is the appearance of the efforts which Berlin

¹ Red Book, Nos. 43, 44, 51.

² White Book, p. 409; Exhibit 16.

made in Vienna in the interests of peace. Until to-day no instruction, no telegram, no note has been printed which offers the slightest proof that any such efforts were made in the cause of peace. The expectation that evidence on this point would be contained in the Austrian Red Book has been disappointed. *Where are the proofs*—we have the right to ask Herr von Bethmann—what evidence is there for your assertion that you earnestly used your influence in Vienna in the direction of peace? The German and the Austrian publications are silent on the question, if, indeed, they do not support a view directly opposed to your assertions. A communication is no recommendation. To bring forward a matter for consideration is not the same as giving it support. Where is the pressure which you say you asserted at Vienna? *When your printing press gives us a proof of the pressure you imprinted at Vienna we will believe you.* Until then we will give to these assertions, as to so many others for which you are responsible, the name which is properly theirs, and declare them to be *falsifications of the truth* which have sprung from your guilty conscience in the hope of concealing your crime.

2. I now come to a much more serious point. Where are the proposals for arriving at an agreement put forward by Grey and Sazonof which ought to have reached Vienna by way of London and Berlin, but which never elicited an answer from Vienna?

Let us recapitulate briefly the position of affairs before we formulate the charge on this point. On July 29th, after the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian war and the rupture of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, Grey proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, the well-known formula for agreement, which was to allow Austria to retain possession of Belgrade and the neighbouring territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, and from there

announce to the four Powers not directly concerned the conditions under which she was prepared to arrive at an understanding.¹ This proposal of Grey's was forwarded to Berlin by Prince Lichnowsky, and from there it was alleged to have been transmitted to Vienna.² *To this proposal, however, no answer was ever made either by Germany or by Austria.* The Berlin Government was repeatedly urged for an answer by Grey and Goschen, but it was constantly asserted that no reply had yet been received from Vienna.³ The most varied reasons, or rather evasions, were produced to explain the absence of an answer, although the time was pressing and the fate of Europe hung on every hour. Grey's proposal, which represented the utmost conceivable point to which it was possible to go to meet Austria, which secured for her in the fullest measure her diplomatic and her military prestige—this proposal received no answer, and is *not so much as mentioned in the Red Book*. The actual negotiations, so far as they are mentioned in the Red Book, come to an end with the conversation between Grey and Prince Lichnowsky on the *morning* of July 29th (Blue Book, No. 84), to which Berchtold's telegram of July 31st (Red Book, No. 51) has reference. Later events are not mentioned in the Red Book, apart from the two conversations which Count Szápáry had with Sazonof on July 31st and August 1st.

Now there were *two* conversations between Grey and Lichnowsky on July 29th, the first in the morning—to which Berchtold's telegram of July 31st relates—and *the second on the afternoon of the same day* (Blue Book, No. 88). The Red Book comes to an end with the discussion of the first conversation (Blue Book, No. 84),

¹ Blue Book, No. 88. Telegram of King George, 30 July [Collected Documents, p. 538].

² White Book, p. 411.

³ Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 108, 112.

and *not even a word is said of the second, or, for that matter, of any later events.* The significance of this may be gathered in figures from the fact that the English Blue Book contains 161 documents, of which only *about a half*, that is to say 84, are considered by the Austrian Government to be worthy of consideration or even of mention. All the events of decisive importance which took place between England, Russia, and Germany between the afternoon of July 29th and August 1st, that is to say, during the four critical days of the European conflict, have no existence for the Austrian Government—apart from the two repeatedly mentioned conversations between Szápáry and Sazonof on July 31st and August 1st. The interchange of diplomatic telegrams between the European capitals in these exciting days does not appear to have disturbed the composure of the gentlemen in the Ballplatz. They know nothing, or at least they wish to know nothing, of the untiring efforts of Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani to marshal whole series of formulæ, each going further than its predecessor in the direction of meeting the wishes of Austria, and all intended to preserve the peace of Europe even at the last moment. The gentlemen in Vienna continue their slumbers, or at least affect a slumbering posture, and this drowsiness is so infectious, even on their foreign representatives, that it is possible for Count Szögyény, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, to report to Vienna on August 2nd that “the Secretary of State has *just* informed me that no answer has been received from Russia to the German demand; Russian troops have crossed the German frontier; Russia has *thus* attacked Germany. Germany, *therefore*, regards herself as at war with Russia.”¹ This communication, remarkable both for its logic and style, was sent by the Austrian Ambassador to Vienna on August 2nd as the latest

¹ Red Book, No. 57.

sensational news, twenty-four hours after the delivery in Petrograd of the German declaration of war, which, however, was not in any way based on an attack by Russia, but on her failure to give an answer to the ultimatum. This is the only sign of life manifested by Berlin since the communication of the conversation between Grey and Lichnowsky on the morning of July 29th—this comedy of buffoonery lagging twenty-four hours behind the tragedy. This is the only proof of the superhuman efforts of the Imperial Chancellor to move Vienna to an attitude of compliance—the only proof of the strong pressure on the button which went to the utmost point compatible with an ally's position, which was, however, unfortunately insufficient to awaken the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin from his righteous slumbers.

3. Grey's formula of agreement was thus allowed to slip under the table undiscussed. *But where are the formulæ of agreement put forward by Sazonof?* Were they buried in Berlin, or transmitted to Vienna? If the second of these courses was taken, what attitude did Vienna adopt towards them? Were they ignored, refused, or amended? Nothing whatever is known on this point. Neither the German White Book nor the Austrian Red Book contains one iota about them. We are obliged to refer to the publications of the Entente Powers to trace the history of these formulæ. This history always leads as far as Berlin; of the further path from Berlin to Vienna we know nothing.

With regard to Grey's proposal, there is at least this much reported in the White Book, that it had been "forwarded to Vienna," and that Russia, as they "assumed," had accepted the proposal.¹ *We are not told what attitude was assumed by Vienna towards this proposal;* we only know from the publications of the Entente Powers that up to the last moment Berlin main-

¹ White Book, p. 411 [See footnote on p. .]

tained that no answer had yet been received from Vienna.

The White Book and the Red Book, however, make no mention whatever of the proposals of Sazonof; they simply do not exist for them. The first proposal of Sazonof (Orange Book, No. 60) was, as is known, verbally dictated to the German Ambassador on July 30th; it was transmitted to the Berlin Government by their own and the Russian Ambassador; it was supported by England and France, but was declined by Jagow without consulting Vienna on the ground that it was unacceptable to Austria. Among other points raised, we have a right to ask for a definite answer, Yes or No, to the question whether the Government of Vienna were informed of this formula of Sazonof which satisfied all their wishes. If so, what attitude did it assume? Why did not Austria accept the proposal, which required of her only what she had herself already promised, namely, that she should respect the sovereign rights of Serbia, and which, on the other hand, granted to her everything that she could in any way desire of Russia, namely, that Russia should stop her military preparations (*La Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs militaires*).

If, however, the Government of Vienna received no communication with regard to the proposal of Sazonof, *how is the German Government to justify this, their omission?* By what right does Herr von Jagow take it upon him to keep to himself and to decline in the name of Austria, without giving any reasons, a proposal which would assuredly have guaranteed peace? What reasons had he for this refusal, what inner grounds, if the reasons he had were not such as could be admitted to the world? Out with them! This is a serious, a desperately serious business. We are no longer dealing with a diplomatic puppet play, but with the fatal game of dice in

which the stakes are the destinies of nations. The White Book and the Red Book are silent, but the public conscience cries aloud, and calls on the guilty to give an account of their actions.

4. The fate of the second proposal of Sazonof's was even worse than that of the first. We have seen that, after unending trouble and the despatch of countless telegrams, the diplomacy of the Entente Powers succeeded in approximating to each other Grey's formula of July 29th and that of Sazonof of July 30th. The result was a second formula outlined by Sazonof on July 31st which, "in accordance with the English suggestion," expressly permitted Austria to leave her forces on Serbian territory, and only required her to *stay the march* of her troops (*arrêter la marche*). In return for this, Russia undertook to *maintain her waiting attitude* (*conserver son attitude expectante*), and the Great Powers would examine the satisfaction which Serbia could accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a Sovereign State or her independence.¹ This formula was at once telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors accredited to all the Great States, including the Ambassador at Vienna, and received the most energetic support both from Grey and from Viviani.

I have already pointed out that this proposal for agreement safeguarded in every way the military prestige of Austria, inasmuch as it allowed her, during the whole further course of negotiation with the Great Powers, to leave her troops in Serbia, and thus to retain the occupied territory as a pledge for the fulfilment of her demands. The proposal, in fact, contains precisely what the Austrian Government ask of the Entente Powers in the introduction to the Red Book (page 4),²

¹ Orange Book, No. 67. Blue Book, Nos. 120, 132.

² [Collected Documents, p. 445.]

namely, that they should assume a "*waiting attitude*." This waiting attitude was expressly provided for in the various formulæ of agreement; indeed, it represented the *essential foundation* of these proposals.

Between the second formula of Sazonof and the form in which Austria on July 31st declared her readiness to negotiate (Red Book, No. 51), there was only one difference, namely, that Austria desired to *continue* her military action against Serbia, whereas Sazonof desired that it should be brought to a standstill—a desire which, as is known, he later expressed in even more moderate form in stating that he regarded it only as "very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop *provisionally* to her military action."¹ Thanks to the Russian spirit of compliance, the difference between the two points of view had been reduced to so trifling dimensions that with the least good will a settlement could not fail to be brought about if—and that is the question—if this good will in fact existed. In this, however, Germany and Austria were defective. We know nothing of the fate of the Russian proposal in Berlin and Vienna. *The White Book and the Red Book again maintain an attitude of silence on this point.* Without doubt, the proposal got as far as Vienna and Berlin, but there is equally no doubt that in both places it remained unanswered. Only in one way can this silence be explained; it would have been impossible to accept the proposal, or even to discuss it, without bringing about the peace which they did not desire. It was, however, equally impossible to refuse the proposal, since it was much too conciliatory to make it possible to justify a refusal. And so it was decided that the proposal should simply be ignored, both then and now—then because peace was not desired, and to-day because they do not wish it to be recognised how criminally they avoided peace.

¹ Blue Book, Nos. 133, 139.

These are the facts revealed by the Austrian publication, the acts of commission and omission which are chargeable to the allied Empires.

The Red Book and the White Book taken together constitute the gravest indictment which could be written against Germany and Austria; they confirm anew the judgment pronounced on the ground of the earlier publications: that *Germany and Austria are alone and exclusively guilty of having consciously and intentionally brought about the European war.*

These things being so, it ill becomes the Austrian Government to take the field with the heavy artillery of their moral indignation against the "self-seeking policy of Great Britain" and the "desire for a *revanche* of the French Republic," and the unscrupulousness of Russia, and to reproach the Entente Powers with the fact that they provoked the European war by "ranging themselves beside the (Serbian) Kingdom with its load of guilt."

It is *untrue* that the Triple Entente intervened exclusively on the side of Serbia. The opposite is the case, and this fact is confirmed, not only by the publications of the Entente Powers, but also by the Red Book itself. From the very beginning the Governments of England, France, and Russia did not restrain their sympathy for Austria's justifiable demand for satisfaction, nor did they fail to express their deep horror at the assassination of Serajevo. At the same time, after the unprecedented humiliation of Serbia they could not, and dared not, omit to urge on the Government of Vienna precepts of moderation, and to warn them of the consequences which would ensue from the continuance of an unaccommodating attitude. The Entente Powers, by their moderating in-

fluence in Belgrade, had already elicited the submissive Serbian answer. They were ready at the conference proposed by Grey to do everything in their power to accord satisfaction, *even to those wishes of Austria which were of a more far-reaching character*. Bunsen and Grey, Sazonof and Schebeko repeatedly assured the Government of Vienna of their readiness to give effect at the conference to the justifiable wishes of Austria by every means in their power.¹ Where, then, is the political selfishness of the Entente Powers? Where is the one-sided participation on behalf of Serbia? Where is the effort to humiliate the Austrian monarchy?

The history and the antecedents of the European conflict clearly reveal which side was guilty of political selfishness, who it was who for her own interests gambled with the well-being of all civilised nations. Did not Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of the solemn obligations contained in the Treaty of Berlin, and thereby stir into full flame the Great Serbian national movement? Did not Austria, in pursuit of her selfish interests, push to such an extreme length the question of Skutari, the question of the Serbian harbour, the Albanian question, that on two or three occasions in the last ten years a European war, on account of Austria, was imminent? In August, 1913, was not Austria prepared to begin a war against Serbia, without any regard for the European consequences, and would have done so had not Italy refused to give her support? Austria, the accomplice and the tool of Germany in the present world-war, has indeed no reason to reproach the Entente Powers with the violation of "public morality and humanity." The accusation which the Austrian Government brings against the Entente Powers: "*It is they who must be made answerable before history for the*

¹ See Blue Book, Nos. 5, 12. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 40, 42, 43. Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 27, 30. Red Book, Nos. 41, 47, 50.

immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human race"—the full weight of this accusation falls back on Austria and Germany. To bring about a European war in order to rid herself of an inconvenient neighbour was at once a crime and a folly. The war against Serbia, whatever its issue, could only worsen Austria's position in the Balkans; it could in no way improve it. The European war, however, which Austria, at Germany's instigation and with her support, conjured up along with the Serbian war, could only be for Austria a case of driving out the Devil by Beelzebub, of decapitation as a cure for toothache; *c'était plus qu'un crime, c'était une faute*.

Like a bull with lowered horns, the Austrian Government plunged on against the red cloth of Serbia, without looking to the right or the left, without troubling about the consequences, which a blind man could not avoid foreseeing.

And now the consequences have come—now already, before the war is decided. With the blood oozing from her heavy wounds the double eagle is lying on the ground. Serbia is free. But Galicia and part of Bukovina are in the hands of the enemy. On all the frontiers of the many-tongued empire the neighbouring peoples are stirring to draw over to them their oppressed kindred by peaceful pressure, or, if need be, by force of arms. In every joint the decayed building of the Hapsburg Monarchy is creaking, and already the process of decomposition is beginning, which, but for the suicidal policy of the Government of Vienna, might have been deferred for generations to come. With the cry of war: "*Vivat Austria, pereat mundus*," the struggle began; with the cry of peace, "*Vivat mundus, pereat Austria*," it will come to an end.

IV

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED

I HAVE arrived at the end of my task. The terrible thing, which for long hovered before the eyes of the nations of Europe, but which was never regarded as possible, has come to pass. Prosperous seats of the old civilisation of Europe have been transformed into heaps of rubbish and ruin. The earth, covered with the snow of winter, has drained the blood of millions of the children of men in the prime of life. In common graves, far from their wives, their children, and their mothers, hundreds of thousands are laid to rest together without cross and without memorial—friend and foe united in death. Unending trains, filled with wounded, traverse the country from east to west and from west to east, and inside there they lie, the poor men with mangled limbs, with bruised bodies, with disfigured countenances, moaning and sighing in their pains, many disfigured beyond recognition, with arms or limbs wrenched off; those denied the light of truth have lost the light of day; they still live whom death has claimed. They form one vast bleeding wound in the body of humanity.

Millions of women and children weep out their eyes day and night for the dear ones whom they have lost, for the dear ones whom they receive back helpless and crippled for life. Countless dwelling-places of peaceful men, countless centres of industrial activity, countless memorials of the art of man have been burned down

and destroyed! The labour of generations, of centuries, is transformed into dust and ashes. The fields are trampled, the corps annihilated, the castles of the great and the cottages of peasants are levelled with the earth; the unfortunate inhabitants, women and children, grey-headed men and women, wander along the country-roads without shelter, without a home, in rain and in wind, in snow and in hail, onward anywhere in the hope that somewhere there may be a corner where they may still their hunger and obtain a wretched shelter in their misery.

And still onward goes the struggle and the task of murder. Like the ebb and the flow of the tide, the armies of millions move backwards and forwards, and every step forward and every step backward costs new hecatombs of human lives, inflicts new wounds and new pains, creates new widows and new orphans.

And what sort of a life do they lead who are still living? They are buried in holes in the ground, day and night, weeks and months, like cave-dwellers of pre-historic times; indeed, their lot is worse than theirs! The water is up to their knees, often they are days on end without food, crouching down before the bullets of the enemy, overwhelmed by shrapnel and shells, which at a stroke destroy their earth-dwellings reared with so much labour, and cast them down in the trenches dead and wounded. And then from time to time there is the signal to attack! Out of the trenches! Fix bayonets! Then there is the rush across the open field, while exposed to the blattering machine-guns, which, the scythe-man of these days, mow down those who are advancing to the attack. And then comes the struggle of man to man! Then they throw themselves at each other with blows, with kicks, and thrusts with their sabres or with the butt-end of their guns, one peaceful man against another—peaceful, that is, until they have been turned

to beasts under the influence and the incitement of their leaders,

under the roll of the drums, the fanfare of trumpets, under the encouraging summons

"How beautiful to die the death of a hero for the Fatherland."

And they die like flies. Hundreds, thousands of bodies fill up the trenches, and furnish a support across which those who are following may advance to the attack. And there are wounded lying among the dead. And the battle rolls past over their heads. And the horsemen tramp on them. And the cannons tear them to pieces. And there is no help. Often for hours and for days they must lie in the mud, exposed to the fire of the shrapnel, poor men who cannot move, to whom no help can be brought. How many bleed to death there! How many are there who are only lightly wounded, but who, in their helplessness, are delivered over to death!

All reports agree that it is impossible to picture in words the horrors of modern battles. I have spoken to doctors, to people, that is, who are certainly, by their profession, accustomed to what is horrible, and they told me that the impression made by a battlefield and by a hospital behind the Front is enough to drive anyone mad. It can only be compared with a gigantic slaughter-house, many thousand times larger than the largest slaughter-houses in the world. It is impossible to give correct treatment to each of the thousands of wounded who are brought in at the same time, impossible on account of their gigantic number, impossible also on account of the interruption caused by the shells which constantly imperil those hospitals situated in the

neighbourhood of the battlefield. What descriptions I received from other doctors who have received the wounded at the base hospitals or on their return home! How many wounds, in themselves slight, end fatally or at least involve amputation because they cannot in time receive aseptic treatment!

In a report of Surgeon-General Körte we find:—

“In the recent fights on the Yser, on the canals as well as round about Ypres, the most of the wounds, often even those wounds caused by rifle-fire, are infected. The soldiers lie in wet trenches, and in consequence of the violent artillery fire they can in many cases be picked up only after days have elapsed; *some have lain five or six days in turnip-fields or in deserted trenches* before it was possible to bring them to the field hospital. Serious infections are then not uncommon, such as phlegmon and tetanus. . . . I have seen some recover who have been lying for days (6-8) in stables, barns, or hay sheds in the most wretched external conditions. There was one who had been lying helplessly for five days in a turnip field and had kept himself alive by eating turnips. . . . The roads are broken up, and the villages have been so knocked to pieces in the battles which have been going on for weeks that we have difficulty in finding suitable rooms for hospital purposes.” (*Berliner Tageblatt*, 13th December.)

Another report, also from a doctor, says:—

“It is a depressing rainy morning; in the bottom of the oozy bed of the canal there is the dirty water-channel and in the slime and the gurgling water lie our brave men, who died the death of heroes for the Fatherland. This picture has imprinted itself too deeply in our souls for it ever to be obliterated. I have them constantly before my eyes as they lay down below us in their neat uniform, stiff and pale with their bodies in the attitude in which death surprised them, down below in the muddy canal-bed with its miry clay.” (*Berliner Tageblatt*, 24th December.)

Life in the trenches is described in one report as follows:—

“One has to be listening all the time until at last we reach our own section of the trenches; on the left and the right, before and behind, there is the terrible roar of artillery. Lucky for you if none of the shells burst in the trenches. Quite close to me two of my chums were lying quietly together under a blanket in the shelter. One was hit in the stomach by shrapnel:—dead! The explosion was very defective; the other was only burned in the face and the hands. . . . Some days ago we stormed and took a village; in the fields around about many of my chums are still lying unburied. They are within reach of the enemies’ fire and we cannot get to them by day or by night. . . . Among our fallen chums there are heaps of dead cattle which are now swollen. In the farmyard the sows are eating their own young; *two children are lying among them, a boy and a girl*. Everywhere the holes caused by the shells are gaping in the ground, some are so big that 30 to 40 men could find room in them.” (*Berliner Tageblatt*, 23rd December.)

A member of the Landwehr writes from Russian Poland:—

“Necessity knows no law, and our provisions could not always be got after us quick enough in the country. But it was not only their victuals, etc., but often also the protection of their roof and their cattle as well that the inhabitants lost when we advanced. The military flooded into the needy houses and into barns and lofts like a wild stream, and took possession of their rooms and their fire-sides, and often the population with all their youngsters wandered about outside in the pouring rain. . . . I never learned what the family did that night, but for long I have been unable to forget that impression, for I have myself got children at home and I thought with horror that they also might some day be in the same position, unless we suc-

ceeded in protecting the frontier. As though by chance the words turn up in my brain with an ironic sound: '*War is glorious, war is beautiful.*' If I could only catch a sight of the writer of these lines, I would soon drive his theory out of him." (*Vorwärts*, 8th December.)

A First Lieutenant in the Reserve describes what happened in the beautiful church at Becelaere, in Belgium:—

"On the evening of the same day I was lying in this beautiful Church along with hundreds of other wounded men. A bullet fired by English Infantry had gone through my breast and my lungs, broken some ribs, and pierced the pelvic bone. Mattresses were ranged alongside of each other on the stone floor of the Church, and on each there lay a wounded soldier. The doctors were binding up and examining the wounded. More and more came in, and by nightfall the Church was quite full. *All night long there could be heard a subdued groaning and moaning and quiet prayers and supplication to God* from every corner and from every shady nook. . . ." A wounded man has just been bandaged by a doctor when a shell finds its way through the open Church door. The head of the wounded man sinks back, the shot has penetrated his forehead and killed him. "Two severely wounded soldiers are lying together; both have wounds in their stomach and neither will come through with his life; the shadow of death already flits over their faces." The chaplain gives them the Holy Communion. The setting sun breaks with gentle radiance through the stained church windows and illumines the features of both the soldiers dying of their wounds. Then suddenly there is a deafening uproar. The walls fall down upon the wounded men. "Fragments of shells come whistling down. . . . Shrieking and groaning is heard. . . . There is a hopeless tangle of men, débris and mattresses . . . those who are slightly wounded creep out of the chaos on all fours; those who are severely wounded are brought into the open air by people belonging to the Medical Corps. Some of the dead are recovered. . . . The

Church of Becelaere is left standing, lonely and deserted, a picture of desolation." (*Berliner Tageblatt*, of the 19th of December.)

From a letter from the front written by an infantry officer:—

"We suffered very serious losses in men, but also in officers and in non-commissioned officers. It tugs at one's heart to remember all our dear comrades with whom we have so often been happy together. *Often the bodies of those who fell could be buried only after many days, on one occasion not until 12 days after being hit.* You can imagine the condition in which they were then. But the enemy gave us no time and no peace to collect the bodies. Lieutenant S., with whom in our careless days we drank together in beautiful K.—you remember him,—and Lieutenant W. fell two weeks ago. They were found only a few days ago in a little wood, and their bodies were already completely decayed. . . . The harvest which death has reaped here from us and from our enemies reminds one of the fearful time which Ypres and the surrounding country experienced five hundred years ago, when the plague reduced the population from 200,000 to a tenth of that number." (*Berliner Tageblatt*, 14th December.)

A soldier of the Landwehr from Charlottenburg reports as follows with regard to a fight at close quarters on the Yser Canal:—

"*The horrible groans of the wounded resounded through the night.* In hunger and in cold we awaited the morning. One detachment lay in the trenches; the rest of us were standing in the entrance hall. In the grey of the morning a Belgian Major came out of the house with his bicycle. . . . He had just gracefully lit his cigarette, when a shot from the trenches put an end to his life. This was the signal for the fight in the streets. . . . We were only four metres distant from the enemy. The enemy wanted to press us back into the canal. The leaders of our company and the

other officers soon fell. The command passes from one of us to the other. The enemy threw sulphur bombs, which lit up the whole canal, and poisoned the air for us. Our men fell one after the other. It was an unending struggle of man against man. The enemy pressed us more and more closely. *It was no longer a fight, it was a mutual butchering.* . . . With the butt-end of the rifles we beat the enemy out of the trenches, and made the dust fly. The rage was indescribable. Every centimetre of ground was here bought with blood. . . . The dead and the wounded lay together in heaps; those who could still walk sought to get back to the hospital over the bridge, but it was a sorrowful business for the poor fellows who had been shot in the legs, and who could not go with them. They had to put up with the heavy shrapnel fire of the enemy." (*Vorwärts*, 24th December.)

Here is a little *genre* picture from the *Wiener Arbeiterzeitung*:—

A Reservist born in Warnsdorf had had both his feet frostbitten in the Carpathians; he was brought back, and he asked his wife to meet him at the station at Reichenberg. As his wife was about to go up the stairs at the station she saw "an old, broken-down man with white hair painfully coming along the platform, supported on two sticks with a bundle in his arm. Out of pity she was going to take the bundle from the man and help him to walk." In this moment she recognised him: "it was her own husband; the woman collapsed unconscious."

A very interesting contribution to the solution of the question whether war "develops the noblest virtues of man" (Field-Marshal Moltke) or whether conversely, "it makes more bad people than it takes away" (Kant), is furnished by a report of a battle published in the *Jauer'sche Tageblatt* of October 18th, 1914. The writer of this report is the subordinate officer Klemt, of

the First Company of the 154th Regiment, and his statement is expressly confirmed at the conclusion by his Lieutenant and the leader of the Company, von Niem. The heading of the article is "*A Day of Honour for Our Regiment, September 24th, 1914.*" As a human, or rather as a bestial, document the report deserves to be reproduced *in extenso*; I regret that for reasons of space I must content myself with an extract:—

"The first Frenchmen were already discovered; we brought them down like squirrels, and gave them a warm reception with blows of the butt and bayonet: they no longer needed doctors; we are no longer fighting loyal enemies, but treacherous brigands. By leaps and bounds we got across the clearing. They were here, there, and everywhere hidden in the thicket. Now it is down with the enemy! *And we will give them no quarter.* Every one shoots standing, a few, a very few, fire kneeling. No one tries to take shelter. We reach a little depression in the ground: here the red trousers dead or wounded lie in a heap on the ground. *We knock down or bayonet the wounded,* for we know that those scoundrels fire at our backs when we have gone by. There was a Frenchman there stretched out, full length, face down, pretending to be dead. A kick from a strong fusilier soon taught him that we were there. Turning round, he asked for quarter, but we answered: "Is that the way your tools work, you—," and he was nailed to the ground. Close to me I heard odd cracking sounds. They were blows from a gun on the bald head of a Frenchman, which a private of the 154th was dealing out vigorously; he was wisely using a French gun so as not to break his own. Tender-hearted souls are so kind to the French wounded that they finish them with a bullet, but others give them as many thrusts and blows as they can. Our adversaries had fought bravely, we had to contend with picked men; they let us get within thirty, even ten metres of them—too near. . . . At the entry into the screen of branches they lay groaning and crying for quarter,

but whether wounded slightly or severely the brave fusiliers spare their country the cost of caring for many enemies.”¹

The report concludes with a description of how the tired troops, after their labour of blood, lay down in slumber. “The god of dreams paints for one or the other a pleasing vision. With a prayer of thanks on our lips we slumbered on to the coming day.”

What makes this report so horrible is not so much the occurrences which it narrates as the brutal naïveté with which they are represented as glorious actions of heroism, specially attested by their leader, and published in the most prominent place of the official newspaper of the district. It may be that brutalities have also been committed by the other side—when the beast is let loose in man it need cause no wonder if bestialities occur—but I have looked in vain for the *publication* of such “heroic” deeds in the foreign Press. That anyone should sit down in cold blood after his work of murder is over and vaingloriously narrate in glowing colours horrors of this sort to his townsmen at home, his friends, his own wife and children, makes the matter much more pitiful even than it is in itself. The “prayer of thanks” to God could not, of course, be wanting in a German report of battle. His Royal Highness Prince Oscar of Prussia is also quoted by the under-officer Klemt as an admirer of the heroic deeds narrated: “With these Grenadiers and with the 154th we could take hell by storm,” exclaimed the Prince, and he assured both the regiments that they were worthy of the name of “Royal Brigade.”

The report in the Jauer newspaper unites in itself—like the horse afflicted with every conceivable malady of which a picture appears in veterinary schools—all the

¹ [As translated in the English edition of M. Bedier's *German Atrocities*.]

“noblest virtues” which war can and must produce: bestiality, boastfulness, false piety, and so on. Whether the world “would stagnate and lose itself in Materialism,” if these qualities remained undeveloped, I leave to be decided by people who are cleverer than I am.

The Russian poet Valerij Brjussow describes as follows his impressions of the battlefield at Lowitz:—

“The trenches are empty, but near them lie here and there the bodies of German soldiers on their backs, face downwards, or on their side, their arms stretched out or held tight to their breasts, with strangely peaceful faces. The most of them are wearing their dark-grey uniforms, some, however, are in their soldiers’ cloaks, which have clearly been used to protect them against the cold. Among the dead I see young men with soft faces, with the first down on their cheeks, but I also see older, graver men who have entered the forties, who have probably long ago established their life on a firm basis, and certainly never thought that it would be their fate to close their life on a snow-covered field in foreign lands, in far-off distant Russia. . . . Our soldiers accompany us in our walk along the side of the trenches, and look at the faces of the dead in solemn thought and contemplation. In war one becomes accustomed to the appearance of death. Death is so constantly before one’s vision that it ceases to awake a feeling of terror.” (*Vorwärts*, 16th December.)

An infantry soldier thus describes the fearful battles in Flanders in which he took part:—

“The soldiers were standing up to their ankles in water in their protected positions when they received the order to attack. The enemy belched against us their destructive shells from 20 mouths of fire. Many were literally torn to pieces. . . . All the time our rage grows more terrible. . . . There was a thick black powder smoke; we thought we should choke; scarcely anything could be seen of the

men. These were the shells from the English Navy, which was taking part in the battle. . . . Across the middle of the field eight horses were galloping, still attached to the gun-carriage, when a shell burst in the middle of them. A heartrending shriek followed from the animals, and then there was nothing to be seen but a quivering, tangled mass weltering in a puddle of blood. . . . Listen, what is that? A trumpet signal. The sound quivers, as if it also felt the pain. 'Fix bayonets.' The clean steel now shines on the barrels of the gun which spits out fire. . . . A shell burst beside the third man on my right; he was killed, my neighbour was thrown out and severely wounded. The same thing happened on my left. The drummer beat his drum.—Up! Charge! Hurrah! I believe that our cheer drowned the thunder of the artillery. Then we went for the enemy with the bayonet. I will not describe to you the bayonet charge. *It was a butchery.* Twice we had to retreat; on the third attack we won. When you at home hear of the victory: 'Fall of Dixmuiden!' will you shout hurrah? We thought of the sacrifices; many, many were lying on the field bleeding." (*Vorwärts*, 11th December.)

HOW BEAUTIFUL TO DIE FOR THE FATHERLAND

That is what war looks like, as it is, and as it is felt by those who are taking part in it. I seek in vain in all the hundreds of letters from the front, and in the war correspondence which daily fills the columns of the newspapers, for any expression of the sentiment: "*How beautiful it is to die for the Fatherland.*" I find represented everywhere merely the unspeakable horror and the barbarity of the struggle between men, who nourish against each other no sentiment of hostility, who have all left mothers at home; many, very many, wives and children; and who are all filled with the one thought: "Oh, that it were peace again! Oh, that you were but home among your dear ones, caressed and nourished by

your children, in the arms of your wife and mother, free for ever from this horrible task of murder."

The great men behind the front have, of course, different views on the subject. Their bones are not broken. Their houses are not burnt down. Their wives and children are not driven out of house and home. Their castles and their domains are not destroyed. They hunger not, neither do they thirst. They sleep in their beds, not in holes in the earth like wild beasts. When they have a pain in their heart or their liver they can go home and get cured by a course at the springs or the baths; their wives and fathers and children can hasten to them, tenderly embrace and care for them, until after weeks and months they can return once more with renewed vigour to their posts of security behind the battle-front.

While in front of the enemy death and destruction are sweeping away the flower of the youth of all countries, the prosperity of many generations, the great men sit far behind

¹ Kant in *Perpetual Peace* (p. 145) censures as illogical and blasphemous the common conception of a co-operation or a concurrence (*concursum*) on the part of the Deity, as, for example, when we say that the physician has restored the sick with the help of God. "God created the physician as well as his means of healing, and we must ascribe the result wholly to him." [This footnote appears to refer to the censored passage.]

"Forward! forward! Up and at them!" is the call . And those at the front answer with moaning and groaning, with pains and torments, with longing thoughts of peace and home, which still illumine their last faltering look. "Gee up! gee up!" calls the driver, and lashes the poor horses who are straining to move the heavy wagons forward on the clammy roads. They sink in the mud, but he knows no pity. Only forward, forward! Hold on! No slackening! And he would drive the poor brutes to death if there were not a league for the protection of animals which shields the wretched beasts against their tormentors. *But where is the league for the protection of men?* It is high time that such a league were founded.

PRESTIGE

What does a war mean to the great men of the earth? A new emotion added to countless others. A drama of chivalry played out in earnest, a question of ambition and of vanity, which they designate by the word "prestige"; a "great event in their life,"¹ like the victory of their colours at the Hoppegarten or of their yachts at the Kiel Regatta. "The glory of the ruler consists in this, that, without his requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands stand at his command ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no concern to them. The difference between the savages of Europe and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while many tribes of the latter have been entirely devoured

¹ See the telegram of the Crown Princess Cecilia to the Governmental President in Danzig after the battle of Longwy: "Please tell all our dear people in Danzig and West Prussia of *my husband's* victory north of Metz, knowing how much interest the Province which is so near to us will take *in this great event in his life*. God protect you all."

by their enemies, Europeans know a better way of using the vanquished than by eating them; and they prefer to increase through them the number of their subjects, and so *the number of instruments at their command for still more widely spread war.*¹

To sacrifice many thousands for a matter of no concern to them! That is the true meaning of this and of most other wars. What does prestige mean to these millions of poor devils who are to-day called upon to lay down their lives on the battlefield of Europe? They do not even know the word, let alone the idea. *Prestige is a luxury for him who is already surfeited with all the other gifts of life.* It is the obstinacy which refuses to give way even when one feels oneself in the wrong, because one is strong enough not to *need* to give way. For the common citizen, however, for the peasant and the labourer, prestige is the daily bread which he must bitterly earn in the sweat of his face, his health which renders it possible for him to achieve his labour, his family which brings sweetness and light into his hours of his leisure. That is *his* prestige, and for it he would fight voluntarily and with enthusiasm if these blessings were imperilled.

It is for this reason that they try to persuade him that *they are in danger.* The "cunning of a policy that shuns the light" exercises the arts of *Probabilismus*: it "attributes evil intentions to others, or even the probability of their possible superiority."

"It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, and to bring the false advocates of the might of the earth to confess that it is not right but might in whose interest they speak. . . . In order to do this, we must first *expose the delusion by which they deceive themselves and others*" (Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, p. 174, 175).

Does that not read as if it had been written to-day?

¹ Kant: *Perpetual Peace*, p. 130.

Is not every word applicable to our position to-day and to our present-day leaders? And if the gentlemen who signed the "Appeal to the civilised world" do, in fact, "hold the inheritance of Kant as sacred as their hearth and their soil," then they should read this wonderful essay on *Perpetual Peace*, which, amid all the storms of the French revolutionary wars and under the dominance of a Prussian military autocracy, dared to utter revolutionary truths which to-day would be suppressed as seditious, and exposed to the persecution of blood at the hands of the supreme commanders in the Mark of Brandenburg.

It is for a *phantom* that millions to-day are bleeding, that millions are hungering, and that inestimable wealth is being destroyed. It is for the phantom of prestige, of world-power, which has been tricked out in the guise of the deliverer of the Fatherland. The *gesta Dei per Francos* are from now to be transformed into the *gesta Dei per Teutones*. The "worshipful" German people—as a privatdocent writes (how will he express himself when he becomes a professor?)—is, in fact, to be worshipped by all others as the super-nation. The Germans are to advance "to the front of the world," and all these hallucinations of an endemic swollen-headedness are then designated "defence against the enemy's attack," in order thereby to make them palatable to the sound sense of the simple people.

PROLETARIANS OF ALL COUNTRIES, MASSACRE EACH OTHER!

To beguile the labouring classes to change their peaceful battle-cry, "Proletarians of all countries, combine with each other!" into the bloody battle-cry, "*Proletarians of all countries, massacre each other!*" is a political *tour de force* which demands careful preparation,

great dexterity, and a fabulously brazen forehead. I must admit that our leading men possess these qualities in the fullest measure. Here, indeed, their achievement is brilliant, unsurpassable.

The attitude of the Social Democratic party on August 4th in approving the first war credit of £250,000,000 has rightly been subjected to sharp criticism abroad, and especially by allied international parties. It ought to be emphasised that in the meeting of the party, which decided on concurring in the war-credit, there was a minority distinguished, not in numbers, but by the *importance* of its members. The attitude of the majority is explicable by reference to those reasons which have been active in drawing the whole of the German people into this war, to the false illusion produced by the Government that this is a war of defence, and not of offence. Ever since July 31st Germany has been barred from all communication with foreign countries. No one knew what took place in the world, and especially in Germany, in the four days between July 31st and August 4th. The German White Book which was laid before the members of the House maintained that the Russians and French had fallen upon us from the east and the west, and that they had already penetrated into Germany. The same assertion recurred in the speeches of the Emperor and the Chancellor. No one was in a position to establish what was true and what was false. Under the impression that Germany was compelled to fight for her security and her independence, the majority of the Social Democratic Party supported the war-credit, and, according to the statutory regulations of the party, compelled the minority to adhere to this decision.

The second approval, given on December 2nd, was merely the consequence of the first, and since "it is the curse of evil deeds, That to all time they still engender

evil," the group in the party which had approved the first credit again secured a majority. Nevertheless, the struggle within the party was more violent, and the minority had grown stronger. As is well known, Liebknecht alone had the courage and the strength of character to refuse to subject himself to Party-discipline and to record his dissentient vote in the sitting of the Reichstag.

This action has very properly met with the approval of all comrades in the whole world, with the unfortunate exception of the Social Democratic Party in the Reichstag. I regard as extremely regrettable the vote of censure passed by the Party on February 2nd. It is universally regarded abroad, not as a disciplinary measure due to an offence against the internal order of the party, but as a condemnation of the *substantial* point involved in the dissension of Liebknecht, and therefore as an emphatic approval of the war-credit and of the whole war policy of the Government. As a matter of fact, it would have been more expedient, having regard to the future reconstruction of the international party, if in this fundamental question party discipline had been ignored; such a course would have avoided the appearance that it was unworthy of a member of the German Social Democratic Party to vote against the war-credit.

It would appear that in Berlin no account was taken of the effect which such a party resolution was bound to exercise on their comrades abroad. Above all, they do not appear to realise that the *sympathy of all foreign comrades are on Liebknecht's side*, and not on the side of the nationalist majority of the Social Democratic Party. By his action on December 2nd Liebknecht has become the most popular German socialist abroad, and in saying this I have in mind neutral countries rather than enemy countries, whose approval might appear suspect. The reconstruction of the International Party

will be built on the attitude of Liebknecht, not on the attitude of those members of the house who, once deceived, were not possessed of the insight or the courage to acknowledge or confess their error, and who have gradually rolled down the slippery slope of opportunism into the camp of the Nationalists and the Imperialists. They have entangled themselves so strongly with the "National," that they will not again find their way back to the "International," and the International Party herself will not, as I hope and trust, later on spread out her motherly arms and exclaim: "Bring back my bonny to me." The prodigal sons—and it is better so—will hereafter also remain in a far country.

It is, however, necessary to compliment the German Government on the fact that they have understood in a masterly manner—at least for the present, the consequences will be revealed later—how to put in operation the policy of "*divide et impera*." "That is to say, if there are certain privileged persons among the people . . . bring about a quarrel among them, and make mischief between them and the people" (Kant, p. 171). They have succeeded in bringing about a quarrel among these leaders, but it is to be hoped that the people will be one when the day of the great reckoning comes, the "day of judgment," when all guilt will be uncovered, and every crime will find its expiation.

POLITICAL MORALITY—MORAL POLITICS

As in matters of foreign policy the German Government appears to have taken the instructions of Bernhardi as their guiding principle, so, in internal affairs, they have chosen as their model Kant's description of what a *politician should not be*. Where moral politics cease, says the sage of Königsberg, political morality begins. Political morality, however, which is equivalent

to non-morality, acts according to the following "Sophistical maxims":—

"1. *Fac et excusa*. Seize the most favourable opportunity for arbitrary usurpation—either of the authority of the State over its own people or over a neighbouring people; the justification of the act and extenuation of the use of force will come much more easily and gracefully *when the deed is done* than if one has to think out convincing reasons for taking this step, and first hear through all the objections which can be made against it. . . . Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman even lends him a certain semblance of inward conviction of the justice of his action; and once he has got so far the god of success (*bonus eventus*) is his best advocate."

"2. *Si fecisti, nega*. As for any crime you have committed, such as has, for instance, brought your people to despair and thence to insurrection, deny that it has happened owing to any fault of *yours*. Say, rather, . . . in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring State, that human nature is to blame; for if a man is not ready to use force and steal a march upon his neighbour, he may certainly count on the latter forestalling him and taking him prisoner."¹

Is that not a photographically true, almost prophetic, picture of Bethmann's method of action, which, moreover, has been characterised, not merely by the philosopher in his chair, but also by the philosopher on the throne? "When Princes desire war they begin it, and then summon an *industrious lawyer* to prove that they were right" (Frederick II). You begin a war and then prove that the other side began it, or at least that he was on the point of beginning it, and that it was necessary to anticipate him. In adopting such a course your external honour can never be injured—that is, if you are believed—for either you are compelled to be the

¹ Kant, p. 170.

defender of the Fatherland or else you are the prudent guardian of the peace, who anticipated the certain attack. Morality, however, which ought to govern the actions of States as well as of individuals, thereby comes to grief, and no words appear to the philosopher of Königsberg to be sufficiently strong to characterise the perniciousness of such politicians. "But it seems that by no theodicy or vindication of the justice of God can we justify Creation in putting such *a race of corrupt creatures* into the world at all. . . . Politics in the real sense cannot take a step forward without first paying homage to the principles of morals. And, although politics, *per se*, is a difficult art, in its union with morals no art is required." He who subordinates moral politics to political morals, that is to say, the principles to the end, puts the cart before the horse, and acts against the categorical Imperative.¹

That is the "inheritance" of Kant, and anyone who exalts this inheritance thereby utters a condemnation of the policy which has led to this, the most horrible of all wars, a policy which has perhaps acted according to "political morality," but which certainly has not been an instance of moral politics.

Meanwhile, however, the work of blood, the hated task, goes on, and the life blood of our nation is being sucked dry as though by gigantic leeches, and drained in the insatiable vengeance of the moloch of war. "To visit a battlefield is a horrible business," wrote the Emperor Frederick III. "It is impossible to describe the fearful wounds presented to the eye. War is, in spite of everything, a terrible affair, and those who, sitting round a council table, conjure it up by a stroke of the pen, do not know what they are doing." "The most horrible side of war should, however, be seen by those who have frivolously brought it about, by those diplo-

¹ Kant, pp. 182, 175.

matists who regard it as a factor in their calculations, with the same lightness of heart with which a merchant allows in his calculations for the possibility of a chance of gain; these men should themselves help to storm such a canal-bridge exposed to the enemy's shell fire"; these are the words of a doctor writing from the scene of operations.¹

How do you feel, Herr von Bethmann, when you read such things as these? How did you express it in your last circular note?² The "idea of a conference," you say, was not "sympathetic" to you; the "form" of a conference was "disagreeable." And now—are the fearful consequences which have sprung from your refusal more sympathetic to you? Do you find them less disagreeable? Do you still dare, even to-day, to speak of your sympathies and your antipathies, of your scruples as to this or that form, when your antipathies and your scruples have plunged Europe in a sea of blood, and have made our famous European civilisation the laughter of savage nations? "We savages are, after all, the better men!" may be the rightful boast of the Red Indian to-day. And if, as I recently saw in an allegorical picture, all the yellow, black, and brown primitive nations were to assemble on the edge of Europe, and, seeing the scenes of murder and destruction, the smoking villages and towns, were to exclaim in derision: "*Voilà votre célèbre civilisation*," Europe could only hide her head in shame, and in justice admit the higher culture of savage peoples. Have we, the nations of Europe, still any legal title—such a title has, indeed, never been recognised by morally thinking men—to embark on colonial conquests when the only pretence that we can advance for our predatory excursions, that we are the bearers

¹ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 24th Sept.

² See Circular Note of the Chancellor of 24th December (Appendix III).

of culture and civilisation, has so miserably come to nought?

It is to you, Herr von Bethmann, that we owe all this. *Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.* The mountains are in travail, and a little mouse is born. Here it is the other way about; from the little mouse of your antipathies and scruples there have arisen gigantic mountains of human unhappiness. Go to the battlefields, go to the hospitals; see the wounded, the dead, and the dying; go into the wasted cities, and pray before the ruined altars, entreating your Saviour for forgiveness, that you, in place of the words "Peace on earth, goodwill to men," have brought about "Murder on earth, and for men fire and destruction." Then beat your breast and confess aloud and in public, so that all the world may hear it: "*I am the guilty, I alone!*" This would not bring you righteousness, but it would be the first step towards it—the penitence which in itself is half atonement.

If the Emperor had not found a Chancellor to make this "war of liberation," Germany would have remained *unliberated*, that is to say, peaceful, molested by none, developing her culture and her well-being in the labour of peace. And what is now our position?

still happy if we can keep from our frontiers the enemy, whom we ourselves called into being; we should be fortunate if we could to-day occupy the position we held half a year ago, possessed of our colonies, our wealth, and the youth of our country, now murdered, and daily wasting away.

QUIDQUID DELIRANT REGES, PLECTUNTUR ACHIVI

But just for this purpose men are needed, not courtiers; men full of character, who can oppose the royal will, who can take the side of the Achæans against the King. "Immunity from punishment is a special privilege of the kingly dignity, but it in no way excludes the possibility of *deserving* punishment." The task of men who stand beside kings as their responsible advisers is to keep them from deserving punishment. "Nor can there be a worse service either to the prince or his people than enabling a monarch to rule in his own person, dictating the commands of his own violence or caprice through servants who disapprove of his measures, and yet suffer themselves to be made instruments for carrying them into execution."¹

What in the case of a prince is, at any rate, explicable becomes in the case of a responsible statesman an unpardonable crime. The prince who from his early youth is brought up in the mystery of statecraft by the grace of God is surrounded by flatterers and panderers, by courtiers and parasites, who are apparently his servants, but are in reality his masters, a prince who seldom hears the truth, and who never *desires* to hear it, notwithstanding the words of Mirza Schaffy:—

"The sage needs not the smile of those in high estate,
The wise man's sage advice is needed by the great."²

—a prince who regards the constrained silence of the people as a token of unprecedented harmony, because no one tells him what is living and stirring in the depths of the nation's soul—such a prince is more easily ex-

¹ Brougham. *Statesmen* [Essay on Lord North].

² "Der Weise kann des Mächtigen Gunst entbehren,
Doch nicht der Mächtige des Weisen Lehren."

cused than a Chancellor, if he confuses his ambition for wider fields of conquest for fame and glory with the well-being and the happiness of his people. The counsellors of a prince exist, however, for the express purpose of protecting him against the consequences of his own passions, and of reminding him in the words of Junius: "Before your Majesty subdues the hearts of your subjects, you must gain a noble victory over your own."¹

They must be, not the servants of their lord, but the first servants of the State. A personal attachment to the monarch can furnish no reason or defence for the public behaviour of a minister; for the former rests on sentiment, but the latter on duty, on the categorical imperative. In the choice between sentiment and duty the latter only must be decisive. The alternative, "*se soumettre ou se démettre*," can only be decided in favour of the latter resolution.

Worst of all, however, is when a minister, not only covers with his shield the actions of his monarch, but endeavours to justify them by Machiavellian manœuvres. We have become almost more Machiavellian than Machiavelli himself, and we have quite forgotten that our great ancestor Frederick II. wrote the *Antimachiavel*. "The promise given was a necessity of the past; the broken word is a necessity of the present." Does it not sound as if the clever Florentine had expressly coined this phrase for the Belgian question? "A Prince must have no other object, and no other thought, and he must make nothing else his study than war, its preparation and conduct." Has this not been from time immemorial the policy of the Kings of Prussia? "Let the Prince take care to conquer and to maintain his domination; the means will always be declared honourable, and praised by everyone." Is that not the thread of Ariadne, by which we

¹ [Letter 35. 19th December, 1769.]

hope to escape out of the labyrinth of our present situation, that we may not fall victims to the Minotaur of universal condemnation? Machiavelli has usurped the place of Kant, and in our case also the end justifies the means.

DREAMS OF WORLD POWER

What is the object and the aim of this war? I have already repeatedly pointed out that the object of our rulers is the establishment of a new *dominium mundi*.

The Prussian Eagle is to spread his pinions over every sea; a new age in history is to dawn; the Roman, the Spanish, and the English world-empires are now to be followed by the German.¹ The saying of Virgil is adapted for German use: "*Tu regere imperio populos Germane memento.*" As Aristotle expected a trans-

¹ Now, of course, when the grapes have become sour, everyone denies the existence of these plans of world power; here again "it was nobody." On the same day, however, on which it was declared from a high quarter that the supposed intention to found a world-empire was "nonsense," an "*Imperial Journal of the Eastern Army*" was issued by the Press Authorities of the German Military Government in Lodz, in celebration of the Emperor's birthday. In this we find the following:—

A victorious war—and God be thanked, no one in our German Fatherland, from the oldest Field Marshal down to the youngest cobbler's apprentice, has any doubt that such will be the issue—will create for us a German Colonial Empire by the annexation of Belgian and French Congo, and if Portugal should transform into action her hostile attitude towards us, the Portuguese Colonies on the East and West Coasts of Africa as well. This will be an empire such as our fathers who sneered in laughter at our first colonial beginnings could never have imagined. . . . The most important point, however, in this not improbable division of the African Continent is

formation of the Eastern world, a domination of Hellenic culture, as a result of the expedition of Alexander the Great, so we expect from this war the transformation of the Western world, a domination of German culture. What a childish, unhistoric view! If wars in long forgotten ages, wars between civilised nations and barbarians, may at times have been the means of bringing culture, their effect to-day among peoples of equal culture is precisely the opposite; they are destroyers of culture, promoters of atavistic barbarism. The future of the human race to-day can lie only in the nations of the world living peacefully together. All plans of world-domination, which even in earlier times bore within them the seeds of their own destruction, must to-day, even before they achieve realisation, be wrecked on the feeling of equality among all nations, on the common consciousness that all are striving after the same ends in culture and well-being, *on the intimate relations which bind corresponding classes of different nations with each other*. As geological strata and veins of iron and mineral are not directed to the surface according to the dividing lines between properties, but un-

that we shall thereby have given the final stroke to English efforts to establish a sole dominion in Africa, from the Cape to Cairo; for between Egypt and East Africa and the Anglo-Boer South Africa (which to-day are still English), there will then lie the *unending girdle of our gigantic colonial positions from the Indian Ocean to the Central African Lakes, and from the Congo to the Atlantic*. Of North-East and South Africa we say that to-day these are still English; but who knows what will happen if the word of the poet is fulfilled: "*For the world will one day find Healing in the German mind.*" (*Denn es muss am deutschen Wesen, einmal noch die Welt genesen.*)

The Newspaper which contains the foregoing remark is *officially* published by the military authorities as a birthday-present for the Emperor: *sapienti sat*.

derneath these boundaries pass from one property to another, so the strata of modern human society are not broken up by territorial frontiers, but pass from one country to another. *Horizontal interdependence has taken the place of the vertical line of division.* And if there is only *one* truly organised International, there exist beside it a hundred others unorganised, held together by equally firm internal bonds. Of such are the Internationals of trade, of industry, of the technical and moral sciences, and of literature and art, all of which constitute the indestructible spiritual bond connecting the nations; we may say that even crime has become international. Wars may loosen, but they cannot destroy these bonds. Nature itself, as Kant once said, "through the natural course of human propensities guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, the future of which we are not, indeed, enabled to prophesy, but for which it is the duty of mankind to labour." The path to perpetual peace lies, not in the domination of one over others, but in a life lived together with equal rights.

The dreams of our world-dominion will thus remain dreams, even if we had the power to subject other nations to our will. The aims which a Bismarck kept in view were reasonable and attainable, because they lay within the limits of the historical development of our age. The formation of national States must first be achieved before humanity is ripe for other more comprehensive formations. The effort of the German people to attain unity was a logical historical development, and was therefore successful. The effort of recent Germany, however, to attain world-dominion represents historical retrogression, a falling away from the aims set before civilised nations, and is, therefore, necessarily bound to end in failure.

Our aim is therefore unattainable, and the means

adopted to attain it are criminal. Military success alone, even if it were probable (which it is not), would not bring us nearer to our aim by so much as a hairbreadth. In the twentieth century *there can no longer be a world-dominion*, and if one were possible we would be the last to be recognised as rulers of the world. Any peace which might more or less accord to us such a dominion would be but an armed truce, and, as in the case of the treaties of peace between Greeks and Persians, would be concluded only with the clause "for the time being." One war would continuously give birth to another, and Europe unrestrainably and inevitably would be driven into the abyss.

There is still time to avoid the worst fate; it is still possible to

"Bind up the wounds inflicted on your country,
Rebuild the devastated homes of men,
And raise once more the pride of lofty towns
From smoky ruins. Spring will return again
And clothe the wasted fields with lushy green.
But they who fell the victims of your quarrel,
The dead, rise up no more; the bitter tears
Shed in the issue of your controversy
Will be for ever shed. Another race
In God's own time will prosper, but the past
Will still remain the prey of misery.
The joys of generations still unborn
Cannot recall to life the long-gone dead."¹

¹ "Des Landes tiefe Wunden heilen
Die Dörfer, die verwüsteten, die Städte
Aus ihrem Schutt sich prangender erheben,
Die Felder decken sich mit neuem Grün—
Doch die das Opfer eures Zwist's gefallen
Die Toten stehen nicht mehr auf; die Thränen
Die eurem Streit geflossen sind, sie bleiben
Geweiht! Das kommende Geschlecht wird blühen
Doch das Vergangene war des Elends Raub,
Der Enkel Glück erweckt nicht mehr die Väter."

The dead rise up no more. But even the wounds which have been inflicted on the economic life of all nations will only be slowly healed in many decades.

WHO WILL PAY THE COST OF THE WAR?

The cost and the damage caused by the war during the first six months have been estimated by authoritative writers at more than four thousand million pounds, apart from all private expenditure and losses, apart from the value to the nation of the dead and the mutilated, and apart from the labour lost to the State represented by the soldiers who are under arms. There can be no question of compensation being paid for these costs and losses of war by the defeated party to the conqueror—if, indeed, a victory of one side or the other is conceivable. In Germany, apart from the Empire, the individual States and communes have also incurred millions of debts. Who is to pay these gigantic sums? Who is to labour and pay even the interest on them? “When I see Princes and States fighting and quarrelling, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a china-shop” (Hume).¹ The fellows with the cudgels are the belligerent nations; the china-shop is the economic organisation of the world, and it will not be long before all the china in the world is broken into fragments.

QUOUSQUE TANDEM?

How is it to go on? How is it to end?

¹ [In the *Essay Of Public Credit.*]

Every victory is a Pyrrhic victory. "One more such victory and I am lost." Among the sixty-seven millions of Germans is there not a single soul who will dare to brave the thunderbolts of Jupiter and exclaim, as Themistocles did to Eurybiades: "Strike, but listen!" Must subservient newspaper writers continue to let their scandalous reports run through the Press,

—while outside on the snow-covered fields, in the damp earth-huts, the children of their country perish and bleed to death, while the widow and the fatherless pour forth a rising flood of tears?

How long will all this still go on? How is it to end? The nations are not advantaged if after peace the "right trusty cousins" fall into each other's arms in emotion, embrace each other, and once more assume each other's uniforms which they have discarded in the interval. The nation is not advantaged by solemn entrances through the Brandenburger Tor,

with crowns of laurel and the blare of trumpets.

It is peace the people want; *peace they are craving for, peace for which they hunger and thirst.* There are enough dead and mutilated; there is enough misery and ruin. The conscience of the world is stirring; the words now being raised in accusation will find the sword of fulfilment if the stern accents of the voice of the people remains unheard. *Vivos voco, mortuos plango, fulgura frango;* I call the living, I lament the

dead, I defy the lightning—such is the call of the bell of the world's conscience to the mighty ones.

And on your head
Turns he the widows' tears, the orphans' cries,
The dead men's blood, the pining maidens' groans
For husbands, fathers and betrothed lovers,
That shall be swallow'd in this controversy.¹

They have suffered enough, the Achæans
The nations have never been
enemies. From all letters written at the front it is clear that the feelings of hatred and of revenge are unknown in the trenches. These are the dragon's eggs which are hatched at home at the writing-tables in the coziness of editors' rooms. From trench to trench friendship and brotherhood are concluded. They visit each other, make each other small presents, and shake hands in friendship. And then they return to the trenches, and shoot at each other on commands from above. Is that not unspeakable, incredible?

If we had not known long ago that none of the belligerent nations desired war, that a few hundred, at the most a few thousand, criminal men had desired and engineered this murder of the nations, the fraternisation between the trenches would prove that between the nations no enmity exists. But just *because* it proves this, just because it might be prejudicial to the energy of murder, and gradually make it clear to those who are fighting that they are fighting for *nothing* which concerns *them*, that they are urged on against each other by higher powers who are pursuing *their* interests—for this reason, just as I am writing these lines, a strong prohibition against these scenes of fraternisation has been issued by the supreme German Command.

¹ *Shakespeare, Henry V.*

There must be no fraternisation, no hand-shaking, there must be no pause in the firing, for God's sake, no! The task of murder must go on without loss of time. *Nulla dies sine linea*, there must be no day without murder and arson.

But all army commands will be of no avail. *La vérité est en marche*. Every hour, every day, brings the illumination nearer. And if they *will* not—the gentlemen behind the front—in the end they *must*.

Peace *will* come—soon, as quickly as possible, for it *must* come. Woe to the generals who still throw their sword into the balance—woe to those rulers who will still refuse to hear the subdued, forcibly restrained voice of the nations! Under the placid surface of internal peace¹ the seething waters are in agitation, boiling and bubbling. Woe to those who refuse to hear the subterranean noises, and who still confide their bark to the treacherous waters. They will be devoured by the waves!—*Discite moniti!* Learn, you have been warned!

¹ [Burgfrieden.]

V

THE FUTURE

WHAT SHOULD PEACE BRING US?

THE matter is not ended on the mere conclusion of peace. *What should peace bring us? What will peace bring us?*

It ought to bring what for centuries has been the object striven after by most enlightened minds: not an armed truce, but *an enduring state of peace, founded on a sure basis of law*. The system hitherto in force whereby peace was balanced on the bayonet's point has gone bankrupt, bankrupt for ever. The insanity of military preparation, which in 1910 cost the States of Europe, in direct expenditure alone, provided for in the Budgets—apart, that is to say, from indirect expenditure not so provided—a sum of approximately 500 million pounds, and which since then has become at least 20 per cent. more costly each year, this insanity has not fulfilled the purpose which was supposed to justify its existence. The fact that the States of Europe endeavoured to outbid each other in an unholy emulation in armaments by land and by water, in the air and under the sea, constituted a menace to peace, not a security against war. A perpetually increasing feeling of distrust has sprung from this iron seed. All diplomatic negotiations became to the nations of Europe an object of fear and anxiety on account of the distant clang of arms, and everyone was swayed by the oppressive feel-

ing that this condition of affairs could not continue, that at length we would be compelled to alter our course or be driven to disaster.

The catastrophe has now arrived, the catastrophe which has been so long the object of prophecy and of dread. But it has dragged into its whirlpool not merely the life and the well-being of nations; it has engulfed also the *system*, which, it was imagined, afforded to the nations a deceptive security.

THE SYSTEM OF ARMED PEACE

On the system of armed peace judgment has been passed. In peace it devoured the marrow of nations, and it has failed in preventing war. The system of European equilibrium has revealed itself to be even more fatal than the previous system, when individual States, armed to the teeth, confronted each other. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was mere child's play in comparison with the struggle of the nations in 1914. A mistaken system cannot be corrected by being drawn on a large, instead of a small, scale. On the contrary, the weaknesses and the defects inherent in it must thereby be made more patent. The guarantee of peace supposed to be afforded by military armaments must work with more fatal effect the greater the number of States allied with each other in the two scales of the balance. What in the ratio of 1 : 1 was already unreasonable and pernicious must be thrice as unreasonable and pernicious in the ratio of 3 : 3—pernicious in peace, even worse in war. By the concatenation of alliances and ententes a position has now been reached which enormously surpasses all the visions of horror foretold by far-seeing sociologists.

The prophecies of Johann von Bloch with regard to the character, the extent, and the horror of a future

European war have all been realised—only the realisation is far worse than the gifted Russian statesman could possibly have foreseen. He could not have imaged to himself the development of aeronautics, of submarines, of the gigantic siege-artillery, and of all the other recent triumphs of culture. But in his monumental work of 1899 he already prophesied that on the occasion of the next European war there would be shown to have taken place in the years since 1870 a greater progress in the mechanism of war than that represented by the development from the age of bows and arrows down to the Franco-Prussian War. Even then he had prophesied that the new artillery would exercise such a murderous effect that it would scarcely be possible to speak of a battle in the former sense of the word or of personal bravery, and that war must develop into a continuous fortification-war between trenches. He characterised in all its details the horror and the terror of the modern war of machinery, and he expressed doubts—and his doubts have to-day been frequently confirmed—whether modern civilised Europeans could bear all these fearful impressions on their mind, on their senses of seeing and hearing, without giving way to insanity. In such a war—so prophesied Bloch—there would no longer be a conqueror and a conquered, there would no longer be any possibility of giving proper attendance to the gigantic number of the wounded, unless the Army Medical Service was made almost as strong numerically as the combatants. There would be no possibility of obtaining sufficient supplies in the exhausted countries in which the battles took place. There would be no possibility of the belligerent States raising for any length of time even the bare daily cost involved in the maintenance of such enormous armies. All this was foreseen by the pacifist Johann von Bloch, not in virtue of any special gift of second sight, but merely by rea-

son of his profound study for many years of these questions of so vital importance to the civilisation of Europe.

And now we are experiencing what he foresaw—a swaying backwards and forwards of these armies of twenty million men—without end, without result, without even the possibility of a final decision, notwithstanding all the inspiring appeals of kings and of the leaders of armies. Forwards! Backwards! Backwards and forwards! Such are the constantly changing rallying cries. Only for the dead is there no retreat. A village, a farmyard, a trench, a hillock demands thousands of sacrifices. A single well-directed shrapnel can—with luck—kill or mutilate a hundred men. The worst of all, however, is that this massacre *en masse* represents a *suicide* of the nations, which must gradually perish from loss of blood and from exhaustion; it has but one favourable consequence, in so far as it is *at the same time a suicide of the political system* out of which the war was born—a suicide of this system, not only in internal, but also in foreign affairs.

After the war it will not be possible—as even the most infatuated militarist will admit—to effect an increase in armaments. Even in the past the burden of European armaments had become an intolerable weight. Emile de Girardin was right when he said forty years ago: “Misery could be abolished with the half of present-day European expenditure on war.” The insanity of this system may be illustrated by the following example: In the primitive ages of human society, two neighbouring occupiers of the soil, when each had to provide his own protection, become suspicious of each other. Each fears that he will be attacked by the other, whereas in reality neither entertains evil intentions against his neighbour. Instead of tilling their fields and increasing their herds, they call upon all their people, their women and chil-

dren, their peasants and servants, to devote their whole time, day after day, month after month, year after year, to the preparation of entrenchments and barricades against their neighbour, to the forging of arms, to the creation of bows and arrows and slings. Their supplies are gradually used up. The means of obtaining such supplies elsewhere are exhausted. Both are on the verge of starvation. At last, in the moment of supreme need, the distrusting neighbours resolve to discuss matters with each other, and, behold! neither of them has ever had any intention of attacking the other, and all the time each has dreaded only that the other was going to attack him. At a stroke the shadows of distrust disappear. But the dark shadows of the insane dissipation of their strength will long hover about their house and their home, and for long years to come will prevent them from regaining their former state of prosperity.

The nations of Europe have not been able to discover in time the pathway to reason, and consequently in the nature of things the other solution of the intolerable tension was bound to come about—the solution of unreason, the substitution of an open for a latent state of war. We have already seen in the course of this discussion who is responsible for the fact that this solution by force had to come, that all attempts to bring about an enduring state of peace were bound to fail. But even the guilty party will now realise that all his military preparations, all his opposition to every proposal to bring about an understanding, have brought him no advantage, and that there has to come to pass what we pacifists have always prophesied: the relative strength of the various nations—notwithstanding the ruin of them all—has in essential matters remained unaltered.

And so judgment is passed on the system. The possibility of resuming or strengthening this condemned system is excluded, and—after the final wreck of anarchy

based on force—the only course open to the European system of States is to return to the thought which for centuries the most distinguished minds in Europe have preached as the only means of salvation, whereby the old world of our culture can be preserved from complete destruction.

That thought is:

A COVENANT OF PEACE BETWEEN FREE NATIONS

based on a mutual recognition of their rights and on mutual confidence—a federation of free States, as Kant calls it. This would be a federation of nations, not a *State* of nations (*Ein Völkerbund, kein Völkerstaat*), a covenant which would leave to the States enjoying membership their full sovereignty with only the one limitation, that they should not abuse this sovereignty by making war against any of the covenanting States. This federation would be based, not on force, but on mutual confidence, on the feeling of duty, on the *categorical imperative*. The sage of Königsberg considered that even in his time such a covenant of peace between European States was possible, without internal political organisation, without a supreme law-giving power, since it corresponded to the interests of all alike, and since it was for all alike a command of duty. True, the higher and stronger unity, the positive idea of a *world-republic*, hovered before his vision as an ideal worthy to be pursued, but, seeing that the world was not ripe for that great ideal, the man of “practical reason” contented himself with the “negative substitute for it, a federation averting war, maintaining its ground, and ever extending over the world.” Kant had no doubt about the practicability of this Covenant of Peace (*fœdus pacificum*), and he only longed for the moment when a “powerful and enlightened people” would make themselves

the central point of such a federal union, and by the further adhesion of other nations would extend this federation more and more among civilised nations.¹

This Kantian thought, apparently so simple, is the most profound ever conceived on the subject of the formation of a European family of States on a basis of international law. This is not the offspring of an ideologist dwelling in the clouds, but of one who knew his fellow-men and looked with undimmed vision on the world around him, drawing practical conclusions from the experiences of history and from the conditions of his own time—the references to contemporary political affairs may often be traced ironically between the lines. He expressly states that he is not concerned with theoretical constructions, but he only desires that the philosopher should be heard by the King, because “the possession of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise of reason.” He is, it is true, content with the *rôle* which statesmen, with their worldly skill, commonly assign to philosophy—the *rôle* of a handmaid—but he indicates that this handmaid’s *rôle* should be to bear the torch before her mistress, not to carry the train behind her. *For the time being* he renounces his more far-reaching ideal, and contents himself, in the first place, with ends which are practically attainable.²

These ends are to-day infinitely more desirable than they then were, and at the same time they are infinitely more easy of attainment. They are infinitely more desirable because the condition of lawlessness and anarchy which Kant even then deplored must necessarily involve to-day much more fatal consequences, in view of the present-day greatness and the development of strength of the States of Europe. If the consequences of war could imperil the existence even of States of a few mil-

¹ Kant, p. 134.

² Kant, p. 160.

lion inhabitants, such as then existed, economically organised in essential matters on a national basis, with production and consumption of goods taking place for the most part within the territorial limits of the country, what suicidal catastrophes await the European States of to-day involved in the war, comprising as they do, within and without Europe, a population of 890 million souls, or 53 per cent. of the whole population of the world, indissolubly linked together as they are like the organs of a vast body by thousands of the finest nerves and sinews of a spiritual and material nature! What Kant regarded as necessary for the world of his time to preserve it from gradual destruction is to-day a million times more necessary; for then each of the belligerent nations could at need still continue to pursue its own independent life—like the separate sections of a lizard—whereas to-day the gigantic body of modern civilised humanity is struck to the heart by a world-war, and the whole organism perishes.

While it is thus true, on the one hand, that the condition of the modern world infinitely increases the evils of war, it must, on the other hand, be remembered that it offers infinitely more possibilities, in comparison with the past, of meeting these evils. To-day preparations have already been made in very great measure in all fields of international relations for the realisation of the Kantian federation of free States. Apart from what are properly regarded as treaties between States, there exist innumerable international organisations in all spheres of intercourse, trade, agriculture, and learning, ranging from the Postal Union to the agreement for the protection of seals in the Behring Sea; and there are innumerable international institutions for carrying out and supervising the agreements in question. Arbitration treaties in very great number are already in existence, with and without the obligatory duty of summon-

ing the court of arbitration, and these are in part so far-reaching that even so-called questions of life and honour have to be submitted to the decision of arbitration. There exists in the Hague an international court of arbitration, the constitution, procedure, and jurisdiction of which have been approved by the signatures of all civilised States in the world. In short, in every possible sphere the bonds of international community are already being drawn more closely together; only in one province, *the most important of all, affecting all vital interests of the nations alike*, only on the one question of war and peace between the great States of Europe, Anarchy and Lawlessness still hold sway; here Dame Diplomacy still rules with her out-worn methods, with her tricks and intrigues of unregenerate days,¹ with her antiquated devotees, who instead of keeping in view the common interests of all, seek only by all the means of political morality—that is to say, immorality—to make petty profits for those from whom they receive their instructions. This diplomacy is a fossil from long-gone ages of history, an anachronism which is as much at home in these present times as an Indian medicine man is in a modern hospital. As the medicine man stands helplessly before the sufferer with his hocus-pocus (notwithstanding that he may perhaps create the *appearance* of being able to help him), so the diplomatists, as has again been proved, stand helplessly before the dangerous malady of the nations, incapable of preventing the outbreak of the fatal evil. This is unaffected by the personal efficiency of many individuals in diplomatic circles (belonging to foreign nations!); it is a consequence of the *system* on which diplomacy is based.

For hundreds of years now, from the *Outline of Perpetual Peace* (1713), written by the Abbé de Saint

¹ [*aus vormärzlicher Zeit*: before the Revolution of March, 1848, hence reactionary.]

Pierre, down to Rousseau and Kant, and on to the voluminous modern literature of peace, *an organisation of modern States* has been sought for, which would, in effect, render superfluous the activity of diplomacy in the former sense. When the possessions of the contracting States are mutually guaranteed, when their spheres of interest are apportioned by friendly agreements, when their commercial relations are regulated by treaties, and when international intercourse is ordered in accordance with the march of progress, and when any disputes that may arise are submitted to arbitration—when mutual confidence takes the place of former distrust, and on this sure basis military preparations are first brought to a standstill, and then gradually reduced in all nations alike—all points which in the interests of all parties concerned are desirable and attainable—then the old diplomacy may be peacefully allowed to rest in the cabinet of curiosities, and in its place a new diplomacy can be established, corresponding to the needs of the time, a diplomacy which needs no secret arts, no spies in uniform, no palace and back-stairs-intrigues, to fulfil its useful purposes. Then diplomatists will discharge almost the same functions as those fulfilled to-day by the plenipotentiaries to the Bundesrat in Berlin. In saying this, however, I desire expressly to guard against any misunderstanding which would be involved in the assumption that I consider that the Covenant of Peace of Free Nations should in any way be comparable with the political organisation of the German Empire. This Covenant of Peace is to be nothing more than a kind of union for an end, a *union whose end is the maintenance of peace* and the promotion of common interests, but *without the slightest sacrifice of sovereign rights*.¹

Common interests are already in existence to-day.

¹ See also Fried: *Kurze Aufklärungen über Wesen und Ziel des Pazifismus* (Berlin, 1914).

They are regulated by international agreements, and protected by international Commissions. The circle of common interests will automatically extend ever wider under the logical compulsion of the development of civilisation, of technical science, of the conquest of time and space, in spite of the present world-war, and in spite of those of limited vision who shriek themselves hoarse in acclaiming Germany as the mistress of the universe in the realms of intellect and of science, or those who desire to repress Germany into an antediluvian national State. The international relations between the nations may be for a time interrupted by the criminal short-sightedness of their leaders and rulers, but they will again revive like the earth in spring-time when the snow has melted and the storms of winter have passed away.

The links which already exist to-day between the nations, and which after peace will sooner or later be strengthened anew by the might of facts, can only be extended in *one* direction; the contracting Powers must pledge themselves to the maintenance of peace and to mutual respect for the independence and the possessions of each other.

IS THIS A UTOPIA?

Is this impracticable? Is this a Utopia?

Bertha von Suttner once said: "There are three phases through which every spiritual movement has to pass; in the first men scoff at it, in the second they fight against it, in the third the reproach is hurled at it that it is forcing an open door."

If anyone 400 years ago had said to the Italians of the sixteenth century: "The day will come when there will be a united Italian Fatherland, no longer Florence nor Pisa, nor Genoa, nor Venice," they would have scoffed at the speaker as a Utopian, or would probably have shut him up in an asylum. If anyone had said in

the Middle Ages to those living in the fortresses or cities of Germany that there would come a time in which they would no longer possess the right to look after their interests according to their own strength and their own caprice, they would with a shrug of the shoulders have left the foolish visionary to his own dreams. But if anyone had gone further and said that not only they, the lords of the castle and the town, but even the lords of wide territories, of whole kingdoms, would one day lose their right of declaring war, and that only the whole German Empire would possess such a right as against foreign countries, they would have had doubts as to the sanity of the speaker, or, what is even more probable, they would have chopped off his head for high treason. What! Were they one day to lose the right of declaring war, the most important and the most essential part of their sovereignty? Would they have to lay aside their darling plaything, their soldiers, or place them under the command of a supreme lord? Impossible! Such a thing could not possibly be. Sovereignty without the right of arms does not exist.

And yet it has come to pass, and the world has not perished in the process. And the small and the great lords in Italy and Germany and elsewhere are all still in existence—except in so far as they have disappeared for other reasons. And they lead a better and happier existence than they did then, when they were obliged to expend a large part of their income on their personal security, and, notwithstanding this, were constantly threatened by the presumptuous pride of evilly-disposed neighbours. The community of peace in which they have taken their place has afforded them greater security and increased well-being, and what they have lost in sovereign rights is abundantly outweighed by what they have gained. *The Utopia has become a commonplace*, and if the prophet who saw these things afar off would then

have been the object of mockery and condemnation, to-day the *laudator temporis acti* would be regarded as a person of irresponsible judgment.

Countless instances of similar cases of development may be found in history. It may, indeed, be said that history is in reality nothing more than a continuous chain of evidence that the impossibilities of yesterday become the possibilities and the realities of to-day.

Why, then, should a Covenant of Peace, corresponding to the interests of all nations alike, be regarded as an impossibility? If it was possible for the States included in the present German confederation, after being opposed to each other in 1866 in an embittered civil war, to conclude four years later "a perpetual alliance in defence of their territory, and of the law in force within their frontiers, and for the promotion of the well-being of the German people," why should it be impossible to fashion a league of nations with much more restricted ends, without any organisation between the States, only with the external aim of preserving the peace? Is such a league not reasonable? Does it not correspond to the vital interests of all the nations concerned, of all in equal measure? Is a league resting on the immovable foundation of the need for peace, common to all after so fearful a world-war, not infinitely more tenable than any organisation based on force? What would be sacrificed by the signatories to a treaty establishing such a covenant of peace? They would lose merely the right to wage war amongst each other, nothing more. They have truly allowed this right sufficient exercise in the course of the present war, and have become acquainted with its unspeakable consequences. Has this right brought them, or any one of them, any advantage whatever? Has it not brought them all, conqueror and conquered alike, to the verge of ruin, and inflicted on them wounds which will not be healed for generations to come? *What,*

then, do they surrender in renouncing this right? They surrender the possibility of ruining themselves and others—nothing more.

And what do they gain in exchange? In the first place, in return for the surrender of his right, each one will receive a corresponding duty from the other parties. Rights and duties are compensatory, and to this extent, then, a balance is effected. But now comes the credit side. Everyone will be secure from hostile attack. For an unlimited time each nation will be able to allow full play to its energies in trade and commerce, in art, literature, and science; it will be able to develop without restriction and without opposition all the capacities given to it by nature; in common with the allied States it will be able gradually to reduce expenditure for military purposes, which can no longer serve for attack and is no longer needed for defence; and it will be able to apply the money so economised to education, the general well-being, and to social purposes. *A new world would arise within the old.* Millions of pounds will gradually be liberated each year for the struggle against poverty, to ameliorate the condition of the working classes, to disseminate well-being and happiness on all sides; and thus by the creation of a general spirit of contentment, European society would be assured against inner catastrophes.

It is impossible to describe the measure of the blessings which such a league of nations would pour out on all peoples. With material well-being, with the feeling of security against a repetition of such fearful events as this war has brought in its train, with the enormous means which would be set free for the objects of culture and social reform, a nightmare would simultaneously be removed from the spirits of our European world of culture. In every country a new day of spiritual life

would dawn. Hatred and revenge would disappear from the hearts of men, and all nations, sharing in what would now have become a *true* community of European culture, reconciled and made brothers, would go forward to meet their future lot with pride in their eyes and with gladness in their hearts.

I hear myself hailed as a Utopian, as a visionary. Naturally; the Utopian of to-day is the realist of to-morrow. There is nothing Utopian in my proposal, which has the advantage that it is merely a revival and an extension of Kantian ideas; even then it was no Utopia; to-day it is more practicable than ever.

A treaty of peace which rejects every idea of annexation, of security based on force! The fulfilment of this condition will come about automatically, since the war will remain indecisive, and in the most favourable issue will lead only to the exchange of the objects pledged on both sides; each side will be glad if it can only get back its former possessions. Thank God that it is so; for if a decisive victory of the one side or the other—but especially of the *one!*—were conceivable, the victor would certainly merely annex as much territory as possible inside and outside Europe, crush his enemies to the utmost extent from a military, political, and economic point of view, and on the ruins of the other States rear a hegemony based on force. Such a result would inevitably contain the germs for constantly renewed wars; such a treaty of peace would be concluded with the stipulation “until later,” and then—Farewell, League of Nations! Adieu, Guarantee of Peace!

Fortunately, however, for the blessing of mankind such a result cannot ensue. The struggle will end with a *non liquet*. And what reason would not have dictated to the great the power of circumstances will force upon them. It will be impossible for them—for any of them

—to dictate the conditions of peace, and thus the record of the treaty will at least not place in the way of European peace obstacles on which it could not but stumble straightway.

This result, however, is unfortunately, only a negative one. If nothing more than this is attained, the whole tale of tribulation will recur. Armaments and distrust, distrust and armaments in a perpetual vicious circle—further exhaustion of the nations, already completely anæmic, a renewal of diplomatic tricks and dodges, to enable each to get by stealth as many fat scraps as possible out of the great soup-dish of the world. There will be new conflicting interests, new causes of friction, and in the end new explosions, each worse than its predecessor.

In the event of the victory of one side, the policy of force and oppression would lead to the new explosion. In the event of the struggle being indecisive, the revival of competing interests, the renewal of the competition in armaments will result in a new state of tension and new discharges.

The result will remain the same, unless one thing is added. In addition to a renunciation of any new order of things based on force, there must be a *fœdus pacificum*, a covenant of peace of free nations, honourably and sincerely intended, and as the most important consequence of this Covenant there must be a *gradual proportionate reduction in the strength* of the existing armies and navies so far as is compatible with an assurance of the requisite security against those nations still standing outside the Covenant of peace. The more this Covenant is externally extended and internally strengthened, the more possible will it be to make progress with the diminution of armaments, and to take in hand the transformation of the standing armies into militias. The development in this direction will take place with logical neces-

sity. Since the league will correspond to the interests of all, without doing violation in any way to the character of their sovereignty, since the sovereignty of each individual member will remain absolutely unimpaired in its *true* and *essential* content, and thus all the advantages of the league of peace would be bought *gratuitously* by each, it is logically inevitable that the league should become more intimately knit together, that confidence in its existence should constantly increase, and that the good example thus given should more and more evoke imitation throughout the world.

The only right given up on every side, the right to wage war against others, appears in the new organisation as a *Right to commit Wrong*, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a true right, and thus its loss cannot be regarded as a true loss. Thus the league with every year of its existence will become stronger internally and more comprehensive externally. From a league of four or five it will grow to be a league of six or seven, and finally a multiple-entente, embracing the whole civilised world. What the wise men have dreamed, what the nations have constantly striven after, will *at last* become the Truth—not at a stroke, but in the consciously directed course of historical development, and a new golden age, which has hitherto appeared to us only as the dream of a distant past, will blossom into reality in a future, which it may be hoped is not far removed from us.

The pathway to this beneficent goal is neither new nor difficult. If it has hitherto been possible to conclude such a league of peace between two or three States, it must also be possible to do so between four or five or more States. That the hitherto existing alliances have only served the purpose of creating an enormous war apparatus for common use is entirely due to the fact that they were not sufficiently *comprehensive*, and that the allied groups as collective communities were opposed to

each other in a hostile, or, at least, in a distrusting attitude. The moment this opposition disappears and the groups as such become members of a greater community, every ground for further military preparations disappears, just as it has already ceased to exist *within* the various groups.

If we assume that Germany and Austria, closely allied with each other, had existed alone in the world without having the Triple Entente or any other group of Powers in opposition to them, further military preparations on the part of these two empires would have been void of purpose even from the military point of view, since neither of the allies had any reason to expect that she would be attacked by the other. The same holds good in the case of the Powers of the Triple Entente, if we assume that Germany and Austria had not been opposed to them. Thus if all five Powers had been united together in a league of peace, such as now exists *within* the two groups, competition in armaments would have been deprived of all reason and purpose, and in the logic of things would have automatically ceased. German principalities and kingdoms, so long as they were not united to the "perpetual league" of the German Empire, were obliged to be armed against each other. With the creation of the German Empire this military preparation disappeared at a stroke, and now only exists in so far as it is directed against the outside world in the interests of the protection of the German Empire and of its various constituent members. Italy also has passed through the same development in various stages in the course of its transition from the sovereignty of the individual city-territories to the more comprehensive sovereignty of the individual kingdoms, and finally to the all-comprehensive kingdom of Italy. The same process can be traced in Switzerland and in the United States of America.

In this discussion it is irrelevant whether the alliances

concluded led to a unified State, to a federate State, or only to a federation of States. It is equally irrelevant whether such an alliance remains at the stage represented by the loosest form of a union which would serve to prevent war. The central point, which we are here discussing, is everywhere the same: *the exclusion by treaty of every war between the allied States*. Whether beyond this immediate object the league should fulfil a greater or smaller number of other objects as well, or whether it will even develop into a unified State, depends on innumerable factors, which vary according to the various forms of the league, and which will thus lead to different results. It is unnecessary here to discuss these factors (community of speech, of race, of historical development, of culture, &c.). Our idea of a union in the service of peace represents a *minimum*, which appears worthy of our endeavour, and appears also attainable, even if all the other factors which lead to a more intimate union may not be present. This minimum is attainable, no matter how greatly the various States associated in the union may differ in race, language, development of culture, and historical growth. For this minimum of an international union all modern civilised nations are ripe, no matter how greatly they may diverge from each other in the character of their civilisation.

The more limited the aim and content of such a league of peace, the more easy must it be to call it into being. If it has been found possible to weld together sovereign States into unified States, confederated States, and federations of States, and if in this process they were obliged to make a greater or less sacrifice of their sovereign rights, it follows that it must be a much easier matter to unite sovereign States into a union created with a certain end, in which, apart from the right to wage war against each other, they are not required to make any

surrender of their sovereign rights. *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

In my opinion these are all practical considerations which it may be hoped are not diminished in value because they are firmly supported by logic. And let no one again speak to me here of Utopias and perpetual peace, and so on. The question is not of perpetual peace, since the idea of perpetuity is not applicable to human things, but is a reservation of God himself. Even the German Imperial Constitution, which is designated as a perpetual alliance, will succumb to the fate of human transitoriness. The question is to create human institutions which as far as possible will avoid human evils. The institution represents the ideal postulate; human life furnishes the exceptions. It is no argument against the necessity or the usefulness of a political constitution that a king may indulge in a *coup d'état*, or that the people may carry out a revolution. It is no argument against the necessity of a criminal code that crimes are committed. The prevalence of immorality is no contradiction of the moral law. Hygiene does not signify the abolition of death; education does not imply the production of saints and angels.

The Covenant of Peace between the nations, then, is not intended to guarantee, and cannot guarantee, perpetual peace; it should, and can, prevent wars *as far as possible*, and it *will* exercise this effect because abstinence from war corresponds, not only to a moral requirement, but also to the true vital interests of the nations.

THE COERCIVE FORCE.

This at once disposes of the usual question as to the *coercive force* which is to bind the league together. This coercive force is in the first place, duty, and in the sec-

ond place, interest. What is the coercive force which keeps the German Empire together? Who could prevent Prussia from overrunning Bavaria and putting it in her pocket? Could the other States in the federation, in union with Bavaria, by any chance prevent her from doing so? What these States could accomplish against Prussia was seen in 1866, when Prussia, moreover, had to fight against Austria, her present ally, as well. If, therefore, the King of Prussia observes the Treaty of German Federation, he does so, not because he is constrained by any force, but because his *duty* and his *interest* demand that he should do so. On the same grounds all treaties between States or nations, howsoever wide or restricted be their subject-matter, are observed so long as duty and interest alike demand that they should be respected—interest, not, indeed, in the base sense of a momentary gain, but in the higher sense of a permanent advantage, such as can spring only from respect for Right and Morality. Who could prevent the strong and prosperous cantons of German Switzerland from falling upon and annexing the weaker Italian cantons, which, further, belong to another community in race and speech, and therefore, in the “nationalist” view, are inferior, and therefore destined to subjection? No physical force would stand in the way of such an undertaking; nevertheless, only a madman would entertain such an idea, since reason, duty, and interest impose on the Swiss people the necessity of remaining true to their Treaty of Federation. Why are commercial, customs, and shipping treaties observed, even in those cases in which they run counter to the interests of one of the contracting parties? Why does not the stronger party denounce a treaty which is unfavourable to him instead of waiting till it expires or is terminated? Because the duty of fidelity to engagements demands it, and because even a transitory loss would not outweigh the

greater disadvantage involved in the fact that no one would ever again conclude a treaty with one who had not observed his engagements. Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely. Analogous cases are further to be found, not only in the external, but also in the internal life of a State. If a private citizen gains his case against the authorities in an administrative action, what physical force compels the authorities to submit to the unfavourable verdict? There is none. The authorities alone possess the physical force, but the moral power of the verdict, and the higher interest of the State, the interest of a State based on law, compel acquiescence in the judgment.

Exactly the same will hold in the case of the obligations imposed on its members by the League of Peace. Duty and interest will impose on the members the necessity of observing their obligations, and if, notwithstanding, these should be violated, the close relations existing between modern States will offer innumerable means whereby without having recourse to bloodshed the treaty-breaker may be recalled to a sense of his duties. Among such methods we may note the discontinuance of commercial relations, boycott of wares, exclusion from the existing international organisations; stoppage of post-office, railway, and financial intercourse, &c. All these means will not, however, be necessary; for the interest of continuing to be a member of the league and of enjoying its advantages, and, on the other hand, the dread of the public stigma, which would make it impossible for the breaker of the peace to have ever again any other relation of alliance, will prevent even the most powerful member of the league from frivolously acting contrary to his duties as a member.

The justice of this view is proved by what has actually happened in the case of awards of arbitration. Of the 212 decisions in the course of the nineteenth cen-

tury, not one remained unobserved, although there was no compulsion making it necessary to submit to these awards, and although many of these decisions were only accepted with disapprobation by the public opinion of the country concerned,¹ on no occasion has a State opposed an arbitration award and refused to give effect to it. Here, again, the moving considerations have been the duty of submitting to the decision which had been voluntarily sought, and the interest of accepting an unfavourable award rather than risking a war, and being revealed to the world as a breaker of one's word.

So also the Covenant of Peace of Free Nations which, after the horrors of this war, is intended to guarantee a true and enduring peace and not merely a cessation of hostilities, will rest securely and immovably on the *mutual confidence of the contracting nations, on the holiness of the pledged word, and on the common interest which has welded the league together.*

WHAT WILL PEACE BRING US?

Is such a large-hearted peace policy to be expected of Germany? Is it possible, having regard to the internal conditions of Prussia and Germany? In my view it is not. So long as Prussia continues to live under the most reactionary constitution which is to be found in any civilised country in the world, so long as a laborious, patient, and intelligent people still continues to be ruled as it has been for centuries by reactionaries, Junkers, soldiers, and priests, who find their profit, not in peaceful development, but in military adventures, so long will it be impossible to think of a sincere and upright peace policy on the part of Prussian Germany. A family of soldiers, like the Hohenzollerns, put in the equivalent of 1 line, whose rise was due to their

¹ Fried, Vol. 1, p. 156.

military efficiency, will be convinced only by a strong counterpoise in the people that the age of military conquests is past, and that to-day it is only in the peaceful competition of the nations that laurels are to be gained. As is known, this counterpoise in the people does *not* exist. The absolutism which dominates in Prussia, which is only imperfectly masked by an outworn constitution—a constitution without even a lawful origin, having merely been granted to the people—this Prussian absolutism extends its influence even to the German Empire, notwithstanding the democratic imperial electoral law and the presence of confederated States which are governed on democratic principles. The preponderance of Prussia in the Government of the Empire and in the Bundesrat, the fact that the offices of the Imperial Chancellor and the President of the Prussian Ministry are held by one person, the exclusive military power of the Prussian King in his capacity of German Emperor, and, above all, his right to declare war and conclude peace in the name of the Empire—in certain circumstances even without the consent of the Bundesrat—all these facts operate in such a way as to make the German Empire in reality only a *branch-establishment of the Prussian Kingdom*.¹

¹ Amongst the minimum demands to be insisted on in the domain of constitutional law must be included the amendment of Article 11 of the Imperial constitution. In future it must be made impossible for the fate of the German people to rest on the resolutions of one individual man. Even if the concurrence of the Bundesrat were required before war could be declared, this would be insufficient to guarantee a people, who are of full age, against a repetition of catastrophes such as we are now experiencing in horror. Even to-day it has not become publicly known whether the Bundesrat was consulted with regard to the declaration of war against Russia and France. Reasoning from the false assumption that an attack on the territory of the Union had been committed, the consent of the Bundesrat would not have been in any way required. Nevertheless *in future it will and must be arranged that war will*

All the defects and the faults inherent in the Prussian constitution exert their influence, like contagious diseases, on the body politic of the Empire. The privileges of the governing social classes, which from time immemorial have skimmed the cream from the milk in Prussia, have been extended to the German Empire. Here, also, the nobility is dominant in the military and official world; or if the crown of nobility is wanting, its place is taken by those of trustworthy conservative views. The agrarian classes from the provinces east of the Elbe have left their imprint on the laws of Germany dealing with agriculture and taxation, and have most ruthlessly made them subservient to their interests at the cost of the other classes of the population. The Prussian land-councillors, whose influence before 1870 was dominant only in Prussia, have pressed over the Elbe, the Weser, and the Rhein as far as the Vosges, and Herr von Köller and Herr von Dallwitz¹ have been called to impart true Prussian discipline and efficiency of thought to the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. The Chancellor shows towards the resolutions of the Reichstag the same sovereign indifference which Presidents of the Prussian Council, in accordance with an ancient tradition, have always shown towards Parliamentary resolutions—although they have had no reason whatever to complain of Parliamentary resolutions in Prussia, at least since the time of the conflict; here, also, the Chancellor means to be nothing more than the faithful servant of his lord.

Thus, then, there is Absolutism in both cases—in Germany, Absolutism ashamed; in Prussia, unashamed.

be declared in the name of the Empire only by an Imperial law, that is to say, by concurrent resolutions of the Reichstag and of the Bundesrat.

¹ [E. M. von Köller, a native of Pommern, Staatssecretaris for Alsace-Lorraine 1901-8; Johann von Dallwitz, born in Breslau, became Minister of the Interior in 1910.]

There is only this difference, that Prussian absolutism, with its complaisant majority, achieves evil according to its arbitrary will, whereas German absolutism, face to face with a majority of a different character, is obliged in most cases to restrict itself to preventing the good.

Equal rights of religious confessions is, in Prussia and in Germany alike, merely a provision on paper, which is daily violated!

Ministerial responsibility in Prussia has not yet been introduced, notwithstanding solemn promises for sixty-four years; in Germany it has not even been promised!

The Prussian electoral law is still unaltered, notwithstanding a solemn promise in a speech from the throne; and no effective alteration can be hoped for, if we are to judge from the most recent utterances of conservative party-leaders and ministers! On the other hand there is the imperial electoral law, which is already undemocratised by an atrociously unjust arrangement of constituencies, and which is constantly in danger of being assimilated to the Prussian law, so that in this respect also Prussia and Germany may, as far as possible, pursue the same paths!

It is superfluous and impossible to enumerate here all the points in which Prussia is behind the times; they are only too well known to all the world. The only question which is of interest to us in this connection is whether a State which is still politically in a primitive condition is capable of grasping great aims, which extend far beyond its black and white frontier posts, and are designed to bestow a blessing on the whole of civilised humanity, and whether its leaders will be prepared unerringly to pursue such aims as may be recognised as true, in opposition to all the internal resistance of the governing classes and cliques.

These aims could have been attained before now with-

out the policy of the mailed fist, without the insanity of military preparations, and without the outbreak of the present world-catastrophe. They could have been attained by a radical change in those views which have hitherto controlled Prussian-German policy. The German Government had only to grasp the hand so often offered by England—from the first Hague Conference down to the last proposals of Grey at the end of July, 1914—and all that we are to-day hoping, longing, and striving for would have been gained before now without shedding a drop of blood, without kindling a spark of fire, without spreading death and destruction. Europe would have stood in unity to-day, prosperous, wealthy, and happy, with a brilliant present, a still more brilliant future, if it had only pleased the German Chancellor to listen to the English Minister's exhortations to peace, and to consider that the proposed alliance of peace at least merited a trial.

This alliance of peace which was proposed by Grey was the embryo out of which the Kantian League in the service of peace would have issued, without the pains and the dangers of travail, in the normal course of development.

It was not to be so. The itch for world-power had seized our leaders and governors; the aims of their ambition—which were at the same time the aims of our privileged classes, since they held out to these classes a prospect that their privileges, endangered through the rise of new national forces, would be maintained intact—these aims could only be achieved by *force*, and on this "*rocher de bronze*" all the barks of peace were bound to encounter hopeless shipwreck.

Those, however, who by their lack of comprehension or their evil will, by their madness or their criminality, prevented the work of peace *before* the outbreak of this war must take care, *after* the fearful storm is overpast,

that they do not deny the sunshine of a lasting peace to the nations panting for rest and happiness. Let him who bears the responsibility of having provoked this war, let him who has committed a crime for which no punishment on earth or in heaven offers sufficient reparation, be warned against taking upon his head the further curse of having denied unhappy nations the blessings of an enduring peace—a peace which, no matter who is victorious or defeated, *can never be built on force, but only on the free will of free peoples.*

The man who treads this pathway to an enduring peace cannot recall the past, but he can at least make the unfading palm of peace spring from the blood-drenched fields; he will not free himself from his guilt, but many will think in extenuation of his offence that he at least showed himself to be a “part of that force which aye wills evil, but brings forth the good.”

SHOULD IT HAPPEN OTHERWISE

Should, however, it happen otherwise, should those who counsel the German Emperor again fail, should the hopes and expectations of the nation once more be deceived and the reaction within begin anew, perhaps stronger than ever—and of this there are already many indications—should peace without once more be supported on cannons and bayonets, then—we may safely say—as Bebel prophesied, the great general march will be followed by the great crash, *then the death-knell will have struck, not for the Government alone, but also for the monarchy.*

“Destruction and blood have ne’er blessed a nation!
The curse of the down-trodden vanquished—appalling—
Will rest on the victor, exalted in station,
His forehead adorned with the green laurel wreath.

But the strong arm of vengeance is not swift in falling,
To smite and destroy the misguided mortal;
She waits long and watches, and stands at his portal
And appears to his eyes as he wrestles with death.”¹

The nations have long seen the horrible thing drawing near, they have long urgently warned the mighty ones of the earth against the crime of a European war of the nations, which, for those guilty of the outrage, must necessarily bring in its train the punishment of destruction. This warning was nowhere uttered so insistently and so passionately as in the great *peace manifesto of the International Party*, adopted at Basel on November 25th, 1912, in which it is stated:—

“The great nations of Europe are constantly on the point of being urged against each other, while it is impossible to advance the slightest pretext of national interests in justification of these attacks against humanity and reason.

“The Balkan crisis, which has already produced such a terrible tale of horror, would, if extended still further, constitute the gravest danger for civilisation and for the proletariat. It would also be the greatest crime in history in view of the *glaring contrast between the magnitude of the catastrophe and the insignificance of the interests involved*.

“The Congress therefore notes with satisfaction the complete unanimity of the Socialist Party and of the working classes of all countries in conducting

¹ [“Kein Volk noch beglückten
Blut und Plünd’rung! der Fluch fällt entsetzlich,
Auf den mächtigen, lorbeergeschmückten
Sieger von dem Besiegten Zurück!
Wohl ergreift den Bethörten nicht plötzlich
Eh’rnen Armes die ewige Rache,
Doch sie wartet, sie folgt, sie hält Wache
Sie tritt ernst vor des Sterbenden Blick.”]

War against War. . . . A war between the three great leading civilised nations on account of the dispute about a harbour between Serbia and Austria would be an act of criminal madness. . . . The Governments should not forget that in the present condition of Europe, and in view of the attitude of the working classes, they cannot, without danger to themselves, embark on a war. . . . It would be madness if Governments should fail to realise that the mere thought of the *enormity of a world-war* must in itself arouse the horror and the indignation of the working classes. The proletariat feel it as a crime to shoot against each other in the interests of the profits of capitalists, the ambition of dynasties, and for the greater honour of diplomatic secret treaties.

“If the governing powers cut off the possibility of normal continued development, and thereby incite the proletariat to desperate measures, they would themselves have to bear the whole responsibility for the consequences of the crisis provoked by them.”

The speeches delivered to the assembled multitude in the venerable minister at Basel by the representatives of the working classes of all countries, Germany, Austria, England, France, with Jaurès at their head, were in agreement with the spirit of this manifesto. It was not merely socialist leaders, but also strictly orthodox preachers, and Swiss Government officials, who uttered earnest words of warning against the folly of a European war, against this inexpressible crime against humanity. It was urged that no treaty of alliance could oblige Germany to shed even a drop of German blood for the foolish and ambitious policy of certain Austrian cliques. All the consequences would recoil on the heads

of those guilty of engineering a butchery such as the world had never seen. Jaurès clearly prophesied that *the more terrible the European war, the greater and more terrible would be the revolution which would ensue.*

THE TWILIGHT OF THE GODS

And now that has come to pass against which the representatives of the people of all countries raised such insistent warnings. Then the warning could still achieve success; to-day, however, it must fail because their tongues are paralysed, their hands are bound, their footsteps are hampered. It is not because of a squabble between Austria and Serbia about a harbour, but because of other trifles, which are far more petty in character, that twenty million men in the flower of their age are to-day rending each other's flesh. It is because of a misunderstanding, a question of legal interpretation, which could have been solved by half an hour's consultation between experts. Had we not experienced all this, it would have been regarded as the insane product of a brain in the last stages of advanced paralysis. Whether it was to be an *enquête judiciaire* or *policrière*, whether the Austrian should be allowed to collaborate in Serbia in judicial or police investigation—these and similar world-shaking questions—according to the assertion of the guilty parties themselves—for they do not yet acknowledge their secret intentions to make war—it is such "vital" questions as these which have enabled death to reap her harvest to-day and to pile up mountains and mountains of bodies. Confronted with such a situation, even the most placid of our "contemporaries" cannot fail to become revolutionary. Even a Philistine must say that a political or social organisation which leads to such results is ripe for destruction. Even his love for the governing powers must be transformed

into hatred; even in his atmosphere Herwegh's words of a "Living Man" must penetrate:—

"Love cannot help us! Thrust behind
Love's vision of salvation!
Hatred! Break thou these chains that bind;
Judge, and speak forth damnation!

And if proud tyrants still hold sway,
We'll hurl them to disaster.
Love long enough has had her day;
Now, Hatred, be our master."¹

From the International of Labour there was bound to arise, and there must now arise, the International of hatred, hatred against imperialism and the doctrine of the blood, hatred against the policy of blood and conquest. The voices of the people are still paralysed and suppressed, the sparks are still glowing under the ashes, but the tongues will be released, the flames will leap up, and the corrupt building of our present-day State will perish in fire, like so many other glorious works of man which have been less deserving of a fiery destruction. The blessing will come, not, however, from above, but from below, and there will pass into fulfilment Bebel's prophetic word, the swan song which he uttered shortly before his death: "*They will reap what they have sown, the twilight of the gods of the civil world is breaking.*" Once before in the history of mankind deliverance came

¹ ["Die Liebe kann uns helfen nicht,
Die Liebe nicht erretten;
Halt Du, O Hass, Dein jüngst Gericht,
Brich Du, O Hass, die Ketten!

Und wo es noch Tyrannen gibt,
Die lasst uns keck erfassen;
Wir haben lang genug geliebt
Und wollen endlich hassen."]

from the depths of the people in Jesus of Nazareth, the Carpenter's son, the Preacher of Love and of Compassion in a time of bloody conquest and oppression, the protector of all the weary and heavy laden, the great *revolutionary of peace*; to-day He also would have stood in the ranks of those fighting for peace, and would have turned away with sorrow and indignation from those who call themselves by His name and yet so contemptuously despise all His commands.

If the prophecy of Bebel has not yet been realised to-day, will it be realised to-morrow? It will the more certainly be realised the more our leaders continue to pursue, after the war is over, the criminal blindness which has misled them to this war. Radical repentance within, organised assurance of peace without, these are the means which *perhaps* may even yet postpone the day of vengeance and of retaliation. But as matters are with us in Germany it is impossible to imagine such a repentance or such a change. The system which has led to the war, the consequences of which were prophesied, not only by representatives of the labouring classes, but also by many men of penetrating vision from other social ranks—this system will be pursued with increased energy, and will not end until the people utters its word of might

Then, indeed, and *only* then, will an enduring condition of peace be assured among the nations, as the presupposition of which the sage of Königsberg stated a hundred and twenty years ago that the civil constitution in each State must be republican. For him the institution of a monarchy was necessarily and inevitably connected with the danger of ever-renewed holy warfare. The grounds for this thought hold to-day with undiminished force:—

“Now the republican constitution, apart from the soundness of its origin, since it arose from the pure source of the concept of right, has also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely, perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well before undertaking such a bad business. For in decreeing war they would of necessity be resolving to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new wars which are always impending. On the other hand, in a Government where the subject is not a citizen holding a vote (*i.e.*, in a constitution which is not republican), the plunging into war is the least serious thing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen, but the owner of the state, *and does not lose a whit by the war, while he goes on enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or of his pleasure palaces and gala days.* He can, therefore, decide on war for the most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure party. Any justification of it that is necessary for the sake of decency *he can leave without concern to the diplomatic corps, who are always only too ready with their services.*”

So said Kant. . . .

Was he right? It is for the German people to decide.

But if he was right, what follows?

EPILOGUE

"They who do not feel the darkness will never look for the light."—BUCKLE.

THE man who wrote this book is a German.

He is not a Frenchman, a Russian, or an Englishman. He is a German who is uncorrupted and incorruptible; who is not bought, and is not for sale.

A German who loves his Fatherland like anyone else; but, just *because* he loves it, he wrote this book.

Born on German soil, trained in German culture, German in his ancestry, his speech and his thought, he knows all the virtues of the German people, but he also knows their failings and their weaknesses. In the German people, as everywhere, virtues produce weaknesses. From the virtue of fidelity there springs the blind confidence which does not inquire whether the good faith of the nation has been deceived, and from the virtue of attachment there springs the unconditional adherence which does not ask whether the path pointed out leads to guilt and destruction.

The confidence of the German people has been basely abused by its leaders and rulers. Their eyes, which once saw so clearly, have been wrapped in the gloom of ignorance. Her citizens who loved peace have been transformed into combatants full of hatred and vengeance; the representatives of high culture and of intelligence have been changed into blind and benighted worshippers of success; men whose vision comprehended the universe have become narrow-hearted, clinging to the soil of their country; the lights of art and of science have

been replaced by "the spirits of the barrack-yard tricked out in academic freedom."

The German people has been corrupted and blinded that it might be driven into a war which it has never foreseen, never intended, and never desired. In order that it might be liberated, it has been put in chains.

It was to break this charm, to liberate the people from its "liberators," to fight against falsehood, that I wrote this book of Truth.

From the *populo male informato* I appeal to the *populum melius informandum*.

A true son of Germania, I see my blinded Mother tottering to the abyss; I leap forward to save her from the fatal plunge.

May truth still be spoken in the Germany of to-day?
Or have things already advanced so far that it is counted moral to utter falsehood, but immoral to speak the truth? Does the good old song, which we used to sing to the sound of the rapier, no longer hold:

"A pitiable wretch is he
Who knows the truth and yet can silent be." ¹

Has this ancient glory for ever departed? Should it now read:

"A pitiable wretch is he
Who knows what's false and cannot silent be." ²

Do you dispute what I have declared to be the truth? First let me speak, and then disprove what I say. If you can do so, so much the better for you! But bear this well in mind: the spoken word is *sometimes* dan-

¹ Wer die Wahrheit kennet und saget sie nicht
Der ist fürwahr ein erbärmlicher Wicht.

² Wer die Lüge kennt und verheimlicht sie nicht
Der ist fürwahr ein erbärmlicher Wicht.

gerous; more dangerous at all times is the suppressed word.

*Your security within?*¹ Must the peace within endure until it becomes the peace of a churchyard? "Not now—later," you exclaim. "Precisely now—*only* now," I tell you. What is later but a word, an unavailing word, is now an *act*, an act of salvation. Hundreds of thousands could be saved from death, the German people could be saved from destruction—even now, even at this very moment—if Truth could but force her way into the German people, for *Truth would mean a pause, but Falsehood is an advance on the path that leads to destruction.*

You say that the Truth helps our enemies? You great children, who shut your eyes to escape danger. Long ago the enemy knew the truth; there is no one in the whole world who does *not* know it. It is everybody's secret.

But you, Germany, you incorrigible, trusting dreamer, you alone still slumber, you alone continue to sleep, in all your unrighteousness, the sleep of the righteous. It is long since the sun rose and spread her beams. But you see it not, in the stillness of your night, behind the closed shutters of your citadel.² . . . How long must Truth stand outside begging and shivering before the doors of your castle, entreating in vain for admission, while within Falsehood sits at the garish table? Open the doors! Long enough has Truth been waiting. It is time to admit her, and to prepare for her the place of honour. In admitting such a guest, you would honour yourself.

¹ [Burgfrieden. See footnote p. 108.]

² [Burgfrieden.]

Make peace without, and within you will not need peace. Open the doors to the free word, to the light that it may illumine your darkness, to the air that it may blow away the unclean vapours! You are choking within. Throw open the doors!

Do you believe that the sun would not rise if you were to wall up your windows? Do you believe that the day-star would not shine, because your bat's eyes cannot bear its radiance? Be sure that Truth, in spite of all obstacles, will penetrate into your closed dwellings, through chinks and crevices, like motes of dust; she will force her way into the house by the chimneys or the keyholes; she will gnaw the floor from under your feet; she will strike away the roof from over your head. Open and let her in; thus at least your house will be saved.

If, however, you do not hear, if you *will* not hear—even now—your house will fall, and you will be buried under the ruins. For I tell you that *if Germany continues to gain "victories" such as she has attained up till now, her victories will lead to her death. . . .*

To prevent this I wrote my book, a book of *enlightenment for the German people*.

History, which weighs guilt and innocence in its iron scales, will, I am firmly convinced, confirm the judgment which, with pain and shame, I as a German have been compelled to pass on Germans, in honour of truth and for the well-being of the German people. History also with letters of flame will inscribe the verdict: *weighed in the balance and found wanting*.

So I finish my book as I began it, with a clean conscience, with the sure feeling of having done a good work, and, if justice is done, of having deserved the thanks of my country.

APPENDICES

I

SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE CHANCELLOR, DR. VON
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, IN THE SITTING OF THE
GERMAN REICHSTAG, ON AUGUST 4TH, 1914.¹

A STUPENDOUS fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years, since the time we fought for and won the German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In the works of peace we have become strong and powerful, and have thus aroused the envy of others. With patience we have faced the fact that, under the pretence that Germany was desirous of war, enmity has been awakened against us in the East and the West, and chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now broken loose. We wished to continue our work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated everyone from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier was this: Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword fly from its scabbard.

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavours. Russia has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France—a war that has been forced upon us.

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during

¹ [As translated in Collected Diplomatic Documents.]

the pressure of these last eventful days, is before you. Allow me to emphasise the facts that determine our attitude.

From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict we declared that this question must be limited to Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this end in view. All Governments, especially that of Great Britain, took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in the settlement of this matter.

Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening head.

As soon as the first definite information regarding the military preparations in Russia reached us we declared at Petrograd in a friendly but emphatic manner that military measures against Austria would find us on the side of our ally, and that military preparations against ourselves would oblige us to take counter-measures; but that mobilisation would come very near to actual war.

Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and Petrograd.

On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Tsar asking him to take into consideration the fact that it was both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to defend herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which threatened to undermine her existence. The Emperor drew the Tsar's attention to the solidarity of the interests of all monarchs in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked for the latter's personal assistance in smoothing over the difficulties existing between Vienna and Petrograd. About the same time, and before receipt of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Emperor to come to his aid and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands. The Emperor accepted the *rôle* of mediator.

But scarcely had active steps on these lines begun when Russia mobilised all her forces directed against Austria, while Austria-Hungary had mobilised only those of her corps which were directed against Serbia. To the north she had mobilised only two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier. The Emperor immediately informed the Tsar that this mobilisation of Russian forces against Austria rendered the *rôle* of mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar's request, difficult, if not impossible.

In spite of this we continued our task of mediation at Vienna and carried it to the utmost point which was compatible with our position as an ally.

Meanwhile Russia of her own accord renewed her assurances that she was making no military preparations against us.

We come now to July 31st. The decision was to be taken at Vienna. Through our representations we had already obtained the resumption of direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd, after they had been for some time interrupted. But before the final decision was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had mobilised her entire forces, and that her mobilisation was therefore directed against us also. The Russian Government, who knew from our repeated statements what mobilisation on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilisation, nor did they even offer any explanation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31st that the Emperor received a telegram from the Tsar in which he guaranteed that his army would not assume a provocative attitude towards us. But mobilisation on our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July 30th-31st.

While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance with Russia's request, Russian forces were appearing all along our extended and almost entirely open frontier, and

France, though indeed not actually mobilising, was admittedly making military preparations. What was our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a single reservist. Were we now to wait further in patience until the nations on either side of us chose the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 31st we called upon Russia to demobilise as the only measure which could still preserve peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd was also instructed to inform the Russian Government that in case our demand met with a refusal, we should have to consider that a state of war (*Kriegszustand*) existed.

The Imperial Ambassador has executed these instructions. We have not yet learnt what Russia answered to our demand for demobilisation. Telegraphic reports on this question have not reached us even though the wires still transmitted much less important information.

Therefore, the time-limit having long since expired, the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our forces on August 1st at 5 p.m.

At the same time we had to make certain what attitude France would assume. To our direct question, whether she would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German War, France replied that she would do what her interests demanded. That was an evasion, if not a refusal.

In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order, with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. France, who mobilised at the same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometres on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry

detachments appeared on the territory of the Empire! Though war had not been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually attacked us.

Regarding the one exception on our side which I mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as follows:—

“Only one of the French complaints about the crossing of the frontier from our side is justified. Against express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2nd. They seem to have been shot down, only one man having returned. But long before this isolated instance of crossing the frontier had occurred, French aviators had penetrated into Southern Germany and had thrown bombs on our railway lines. French troops had attacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht Pass. Our troops, in accordance with their orders, have remained strictly on the defensive.” This is the report of the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (*Notwehr*), and necessity (*Not*) knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained.

He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his

highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through (*durchhauen*).

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.

As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday show the standpoint assumed by the British Government. We have informed the British Government that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against French commercial shipping.

Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of the Emperor: "With a clear conscience we enter the lists." We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle—behind them stands the entire German nation—the entire German nation united to the last man.

Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them quickly.

II

SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE CHANCELLOR, DR. VON
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, IN THE SITTING OF THE
GERMAN REICHSTAG ON DECEMBER 2ND, 1914.

GENTLEMEN, His Majesty the Emperor, who is at the front with the Army, has requested me to convey his best wishes and heartiest greetings to the representatives of the German people, with whom he knows that he is at one until death, in storm and danger, and in the common care for the well-being of the Fatherland, and he has asked me at the same time to express to the whole nation in his name and from this place his thanks for the unexampled sacrifice and devotion, for the stupendous task which is being achieved at the front and at home, and will still further be achieved, by all ranks of the nation without distinction. Our first thought, also, turns to the Emperor, to the Army, and the Navy, to our soldiers who on the battlefield and on the high seas are fighting for the honour and the greatness of the Empire. We look upon them full of pride and with firm confidence, but at the same time we look upon our Austro-Hungarian brothers in arms, who faithfully united with us fight the great fight with brilliantly maintained bravery. In the struggle which has been forced upon us we have recently been joined by a new ally, who knows quite well that with the destruction of the German Empire her political independence also will come to an end; I refer to the Ottoman Empire. If our enemies have summoned up against us a powerful coalition, it is to be hoped that they will also have learned that the arm of our courageous allies reaches to the weak points in their world-position. On August 4th the Reichstag showed the unyielding will of the whole

people to take up the struggle forced upon us, and to defend our independence to the uttermost. Since then great things have happened. Who will count the acts of glory and of heroism of the armies, the regiments, the squadrons, and the companies, of the cruisers and the submarines, in a war which flings its battle-line over the whole of Europe and over the whole world? Only a later age will be able to tell of these things. For to-day it must suffice that in spite of the enormous superiority of our enemies, the war is being carried on in the enemies' country, thanks to the unconquerable bravery of our troops. There we stand firm and strong, and we may with all confidence look to the future. But the enemy's power of resistance is not broken. We are not yet at an end of our sacrifices. The nation will continue to bear these further sacrifices with the same heroism which it has hitherto shown, for we must, and we will, conduct to a happy end the struggle which, surrounded as we are by enemies, we are waging for right and freedom. Then, also, we will remember the wrongs, some of which have been in violation of all the dictates of civilisation, done to those of our defenceless countrymen living abroad, for, Gentlemen, the world must learn that no one can touch unavenged so much as a hair of a German.

When the meeting of August 4th was at an end, the British Ambassador appeared here to deliver to us an ultimatum from England, and, in the event of a refusal, a declaration of war. I was not then able to express myself on the position finally assumed by the British Government, and I propose to-day to offer some observations on the point.

Where the responsibility rests for this, the greatest of all wars, is, for us, clear. The external responsibility is borne by those men in Russia who inspired and carried out the mobilisation of the entire Russian Army.

The inner responsibility, however, lies on the Government of Great Britain. The Cabinet of London could have made this war impossible by declaring without ambiguity in Petrograd that England was not prepared to allow a continental war in Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. By speaking thus, France would also have been compelled energetically to advise Russia to desist from measures of war. This would have smoothened the path for our action of mediation. England did not do so. England knew the intrigues for war of a small clique, of an irresponsible but powerful group about the Tsar. England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace London gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was taking her stand on the side of France and Russia. This is proved clearly and incontestably by the publications of the various Cabinets, and especially by that of the English Blue Book itself. Then, indeed, it was impossible to hold things back in Petrograd.

On this question we possess a witness who is entirely above suspicion, the report of the Belgian *chargé d'affaires* in Petrograd, written on July 30th. He reports: "To-day in Petrograd the people are firmly convinced, indeed they have assurances, that England will stand by France. This support has an extraordinary influence, and has done not a little to gain the upper hand for the war party."

Up to this summer the English statesmen have repeatedly assured Parliament that there was no treaty, no convention, no alliance which bound the freedom of action of the English Government in the event of war breaking out. England could freely decide whether it would or would not take part in such a war. It was, then, no fraternal obligation, no compulsion, not even a menace to their own country, which caused the Eng-

lish statesmen to stir up war and then participate in it themselves. There thus remains only one other possibility: the Cabinet of London allowed this world-war, this enormous world-war, to arise because it appeared a favourable opportunity, with the help of her comrades in the Entente, to destroy the vital nerve of her greatest economic competitor. Thus, then, England and Russia bear the responsibility for this world-war, for this catastrophe which has broken over Europe and over the world. And Belgian neutrality, which England professed to protect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock in the evening on August 2nd we communicated in Brussels the fact that the French plans of war, which were known to us, compelled us in self-defence to march through Belgium. But even on the afternoon of the same day, August 2nd, that is to say, before our *démarche* was or could be known in London, England had promised France her support, unconditionally promised it in the event of an attack by the German Fleet on the French coast. There was no mention of Belgian neutrality. This fact is established by the declarations made by Sir Edward Grey on August 3rd in the House of Commons, and which was not known to me on August 4th. This fact is confirmed by the English Blue Book itself.

How could England maintain that she had seized the sword because Belgian neutrality was violated by us? This is said by English statesmen to whom the past history of Belgian neutrality was known. When on August 4th I spoke of the wrong that we were doing in invading Belgium, it was not then clear whether the Government in Brussels might not in the hour of need agree to spare their country, and to withdraw under protest to Antwerp. You will remember that after Liège was taken, on the proposal of the Army Authorities, a renewed request in this sense was directed to Brussels. On military grounds the possibility of such a develop-

ment had, in all circumstances, to be kept open on August 4th. We had, indeed, indications that the neutrality of Belgium had fallen to pieces, but positive proof in writing was lacking. English statesmen, however, knew these proofs quite well. As a result of the documents found in Brussels it has been established how and how far Belgium gave up her neutrality in favour of England, and two facts, consequently, are now well known to all the world. When our troops marched into Belgium in the night of August 3rd to 4th they were in a country which had long ago riddled its neutrality, and the further fact is clear that it was not on account of Belgian neutrality, which she had herself broken long ago, that England declared war against us, but because she believed that with the help of two great military continental Powers she could become our master. Since August 2nd, since she promised to support France in war, England was no longer neutral, but was, as a matter of fact, in a state of war against us. The reasons advanced by English statesmen for this declaration of war were of the nature of a spectacular show, intended to confuse their own country and neutral States with regard to the true grounds of the war. Now that the Anglo-Belgian plans of war have been unveiled in all their details, the policy of English statesmen is characterised for all time in the history of the world. English diplomacy has, indeed, accomplished one other achievement. On her summons, Japan tore from us the heroic Tsingtau, and thereby violated Chinese neutrality. Did England take any steps with regard to the violation of this neutrality? Has she shown in this case her concern for the maintenance of the rights of neutral States? Gentlemen, when I was called to my present office five years ago, the Triple Entente stood firmly opposed to the Triple Alliance. This was the work of England, intended to assist in giving effect to

the fundamental principle of English policy, pursued for centuries, that is, to oppose the strongest Power on the continent for the time being. In this fact lay from the outset the aggressive character of the Triple Entente as opposed to the purely defensive significance of the Triple Alliance; for a nation as great and as strong as the German cannot be hampered in the free development of its forces. In view of this political constellation the way to be followed by German policy was clearly indicated. We had to endeavour, by arriving at an understanding with the individual Powers of the Entente, to banish the danger of war; we had at the same time so to strengthen our defensive forces that, if war should come, we would be strong enough to carry it through. As you know, we have done both. In the case of France we always encountered the old thoughts of revenge. Nourished by ambitious politicians, these thoughts showed themselves to be stronger than the desire for neighbourly relations with us which was doubtless entertained by a part of the French people. In the case of Russia it is true that we arrived at particular agreements, but the firm alliance between Russia and France, the opposition of Russia to our ally Austria-Hungary, and a hatred of Germany nourished on Pan-Slav ambitions prevented any understanding designed to avoid the danger of war. The freest position, comparatively speaking, was occupied by England. Speaking in Parliament, English statesmen have again and again with the greatest emphasis defended and boasted of the freedom enjoyed by the British Government in arriving at a decision. This was the first place in which an understanding could be sought, which would then, in fact, have guaranteed the peace of the world. In this direction I was bound to exert my efforts, and I did so. The way was strait, as I well knew. In the course of centuries the insular manner of English thought has es-

established a political principle with the force of an axiomatic dogma, the principle that an *arbitrium mundi* belongs to England, which can only be maintained by the uncontested control of the seas on the one hand, and on the other by the balance of power on the continent, which has been so often mentioned. I never hoped to be able to break this ancient English principle by force of persuasion. What appeared to be possible was that the increasing strength of Germany, the increasing risk involved in a war, would have enabled England to see that this principle, so long represented by English policy, had become out of date, and was no longer practicable, and that a peaceful settlement with Germany was to be preferred. This dogma was, however, so firmly rooted that it paralysed all efforts to arrive at a decisive understanding. The negotiations received a new impulse in the crisis of 1911. The English people recognised overnight that it had been standing before the abyss of a European war. Compelled by popular sentiment, the English statesman desired to approach Germany. By long and painful labour it was possible to arrive at agreements with regard to economic interests, which, in the first place, affected Asia Minor and Africa, and were intended to diminish possible sources of political friction. The world is wide, it has room enough for the free development of both nations side by side, if only the attempt is not made to hinder and restrict them in their free development. That is the principle which our policy has always defended. But, Gentlemen, while we were so negotiating, England was incessantly intent on drawing closer her relations to Russia and France. The most decisive point in this is that, apart from the sphere of politics, closer military agreements were being concluded to meet the case of a continental war. England conducted these negotiations as far as possible in secret. When anything of this nature trickled through

to the public, as has happened more than once, the English Government endeavoured to represent the matter to Parliament and in the Press as entirely innocent. We did not remain ignorant of these agreements of England. I have laid papers on the subject. The whole situation was, in fact, that England was ready to come to an understanding with us on particular questions, but the chief and the first principle of English policy remained unaltered: in the free development of her powers Germany had to be kept in check by the balance of power. That represents the frontier line of friendly relations with Germany. For this purpose the Triple Entente was elaborated to the utmost. As her friends desired military assurances, the English were at once ready to give them. The ring was thus completed. England is sure of France's adherence, and therefore of Russia's also. But as a result of all this, England also binds her will. If France or Russia, where the existing chauvinistic circles find their strongest support in the military connivance of England, if France or Russia desire to strike, England is morally delivered into the hands of her friends. And what is the object of all this? Germany must be kept down. We have not been remiss in warning the English Government. Even at the beginning of July of this year I indicated to the English Government that their secret negotiations with Russia with regard to a naval convention were known to me. I drew their attention to the serious dangers which this policy on the part of England involved for the peace of the world. Fourteen days later my prophecies were fulfilled. From all these facts bearing on the general situation of affairs we drew the consequences. In rapid sequence I brought before you the greatest defence proposals known in German history, and in full knowledge of the dangers which surrounded us you have willingly and in a spirit of self-sacrifice granted to our country what was needed for

her defence. As soon as the war had broken out, England threw aside all external show. It was openly and loudly proclaimed that England would fight until Germany was crushed economically and by force of arms. The hatred of Germany nourished by the Pan-Slavs exultingly applauds the sentiment; France, with the whole strength of an old soldierly nation, hopes to be able to wipe out the stain of 1870. Gentlemen, on this we have only one answer to give to our enemies: Germany cannot be annihilated.

Like our military forces, our financial forces also have given a brilliant account of themselves, and have without any reservations placed themselves in the service of our country. Our economic life has been maintained; unemployment is relatively small. Germany's power and skill in organisation constantly seek in new ways to avoid coming evils, and to wipe out existing injuries. No man and no woman seeks to avoid sharing in the common and voluntary task; no recruiting drums need to be beat for this purpose. Everything in life and in wealth is surrendered for the only, and the great object, for the land of our fathers, for the hope of our children and descendants. A spirit is being manifested, a moral greatness of the nation, such as has hitherto never been known in the history of the world. If this spirit of sacrifice shown by millions of our nation in arms against a world of enemies is despised by our opponents as militarism, if they abuse us as Huns and barbarians, if they scatter cursed lies throughout the whole world—we are proud enough to remain unconcerned. This wonderful spirit, which glows through the hearts of Germany in unprecedented unity, in the unquestioning surrender of each to each, this must and will be victorious. When a glorious and a happy peace has been achieved, we will maintain this spirit as the holiest inheritance from this fearfully earnest and great time. As if by the power of

magic the barriers have disappeared which during a barren and dull age have separated the various parts of our nation—the barriers which we reared together in misunderstanding, in envy, and distrust. It brings a sense of freedom and of bliss that at last the whole of this rubbish and trash has been swept away, that only the man counts, each equal to the other, each holding out his hand to the other in a single and a holy cause. I again use the words of the Emperor on the outbreak of war: "I no longer know any parties. I know only Germans." Gentlemen, when the war is past parties will return; for without parties, without political struggle, there can be no political life, even for the freest and the happiest nation; but, Gentlemen, we will struggle to see—and I for my part promise to do so—that in these struggles there may be only Germans.

I bring to a conclusion my few observations;—this is no time for words—I cannot discuss all the questions which move most profoundly the nation and myself. One word more: faithfully and with a feeling of warm gratitude we think of the sons of Germany who on the battlefields in the east and the west, on the high seas, on the shores of the Pacific, and in our colonies have given up their life for the Fatherland. Before their heroism, which is now stilled, we unite ourselves in the vow to endure till the last breath, in order that our descendants and our sons may be able to labour in the service of the greatness of the Empire in a stronger Germany, free and assured from foreign menace and force. This vow will ring out to our sons and brothers who are still fighting against the enemy, to the heart-blood of Germany which springs up in countless and nameless acts of heroism, for which we are prepared to give up all that we have; it will ring out to our countrymen abroad, to those kept back, to those in peril, to those who care for us afar off, to those who are in prison

and to those abused. We will persevere, Gentlemen, and I ask you to confirm this by accepting these measures. We will persevere, until we have the assurance that no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in which we mean as a free nation to tend and develop our German character and our German strength.

III

CIRCULAR NOTE OF THE CHANCELLOR, DR. VON BETHMAN-HOLLWEG, TO THE IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS, DATED DECEMBER 24TH, 1914.¹

HEADQUARTERS,

December 24th, 1914.

IN the speech made by Minister President Viviani in the French Chamber is contained a passage that France and Russia had on July 31st agreed to the English proposal to stop military preparations and to begin negotiations in London. If Germany had given her assent, peace could have been maintained even at this last hour.

As I cannot at the present moment contradict from the Tribune of the German Reichstag this false statement made in the French Parliament, I see myself compelled to send the following exposition to you with the request to make an extensive use of it.

The British proposal for a conference which is printed in the English Blue Book, No. 36, arises on July 26th.

Its contents say that representatives of Germany, France, and Italy should meet with Sir Edward Grey in London for the purpose of discovering an issue from the difficulties which had arisen in the Serbian matter.

¹ [As translated in the Appendix to Mr. J. W. Headlam's *History of Twelve Days.*]

From the beginning Germany took its stand on the point that the Serbo-Austrian conflict was an affair which only concerned the two States immediately indicated. Sir Edward Grey himself also later recognised this point of view.

Germany was obliged to reject the English proposal for a conference, for it could not allow that Austria-Hungary should be subjected to a tribunal of the Great Powers in a question which concerned its national existence and which only concerned Austria-Hungary. It is clear from the German White Book that Austria-Hungary looked on the proposal for a conference as unacceptable. By the declaration against Serbia it gave evidence of its firm will to regulate the Serbian question alone without the intervention of the Powers. At the same time, however, it declared, in order to satisfy all just claims of Russia, its complete territorial disinterestedness as regards Serbia. As Russia was not satisfied with this assurance, European questions sprang out of the Serbian question, and this first found its expression in a difference between Austria-Hungary and Russia. In order to prevent a European conflict developing out of this difference, it was necessary to find a new basis upon which immediate action of the Powers could be begun. It was Germany to whom belongs the merit of having first trod this ground.

The Secretary of State, von Jagow, in his conversation with the British Ambassador on July 27th pointed out that in the wish of Russia to negotiate directly with Austria-Hungary he saw an improvement of the situation and the best prospect for a peaceful solution. From the day on which it was first expressed, Germany supported in Vienna with all the energy which stood at its command this desire by which the English conference idea was according even to the Russian opinion for the time put aside. No State can have striven more honestly

and with more energy to maintain the peace of the world than Germany had.

England also now gave up the idea of pursuing her conference idea and on her side supported the conception of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd (Blue Book, No. 67).

These negotiations, however, met with difficulties, and difficulties which did not arise from Germany and Austria-Hungary, but from the Entente Powers.

If Germany's endeavour was to be successful, it required good will on the part of the Powers who were not immediately engaged; it required also that those who were principally engaged should hold their hand, for if either of the two Powers between whom mediation was to be made interrupted by military operations, action which was proceeding, it was from the beginning clear that this action could never attain its end.

Now how did it stand with the good will of the Powers? The attitude of France is clearly shown in the French Yellow Book. She did not trust German assurances. All the steps of the German Ambassador, Freiherr von Schoen, were received with mistrust. His wish for mediating influence of France at Petrograd was not regarded, for they believed that they must assume that the steps taken by Herr von Schoen were intended "*à compromettre la France au regard de la Russie.*" The French Yellow Book shows that France did not take a single positive step in the interest of peace.

What attitude did England take in the diplomatic conversation? She gave the appearance of mediating up to the last hour, but her external actions were directed to a humiliation of the two Powers of the Triple Alliance. England was the first Great Power which ordered military preparations on a great scale and thereby created a feeling, particularly in Russia and France, which was in the highest degree adverse to mediatory

action. From the report of the French Chargé d'Affaires in London on July 22nd (Yellow Book, No. 66), it follows that as early as July 24th the Commander of the English Fleet had discreetly taken steps for the collection of the Fleet at Portland. Great Britain, therefore, mobilised sooner even than Serbia. Moreover, Great Britain refused just what France did, to act in a moderating and restraining manner at Petrograd.

On the warning from the English Ambassador at Petrograd from which it was clearly to be seen that only a warning to Russia to hold back her mobilisation could save the situation, Sir Edward Grey did nothing but let matters go their own way.

At the same time, however, he believed that it would be useful to point out to Germany and Austria-Hungary, if not quite clearly, still sufficiently so, that England could also take part in a European war. At the same time, therefore, when England, though letting drop the idea of a conference, gave the appearance of wishing that Austria-Hungary should show itself conciliatory under the mediation of Germany, Sir Edward Grey directs the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in England to the mobilisation of the English Fleet (Blue Book, 48), gives the Russian Ambassador to understand that England also could take part in a war, and at once informs the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente of this warning which he had addressed to Germany, by which action the victory of the war-party in Petrograd was sealed.

This was just the attitude, which according to the better informed opinion of the English Ambassador Buchanan was the worst adapted for bringing about good feeling between the Powers.

Under these difficulties it would be regarded as a special success that Germany succeeded in making Austria-Hungary inclined to follow the wish of Russia and enter

into separate conversations. Had Russia, without on her side taking military measures, continued the negotiations with Austria-Hungary which had only mobilised against Serbia, the complete prospect of maintenance of the world's peace would have been maintained. Instead of this Russia mobilised against Austria-Hungary, by which Sazonof was quite clear (see Blue Book, 78) that with this all direct understanding with Austria-Hungary fell to the ground. The laborious result of the German negotiations for mediation was thereby overthrown by a single blow.

What happened now on the part of the Entente Powers in order to preserve peace at this last hour?

Sir Edward Grey again took up his conference proposal. In accordance also with the view of M. Sazonof, the suitable moment had now come in order, under the pressure of Russian mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, again to recommend the old English idea of quadruple conversation (German White Book, page 7).

Count Pourtalès did not leave the Minister in doubt, that according to his view the Entente Powers thereby were requiring from Austria-Hungary just what they had not been willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that she should give way under military pressure.

Under these circumstances the conference idea could not possibly be sympathetic to Germany and Austria-Hungary. Notwithstanding this, Germany declared in London that she accepted in principle the proposal for the intervention of the four Powers, but that it was merely the form of the conference which was disagreeable to her. At the same time the German Ambassador at Petrograd pressed Sazonof on his side also to make concessions in order to render a compromise possible. It is well known that these efforts remained fruitless.


Russia herself seemed to take no more interest in the further mediatory activity of Germany at Vienna, which

was continued until the last hour. She ordered the mobilisation of all her forces in the night between July 30th and 31st, which must have the mobilisation of Germany and the later declaration of war as its consequence.


In view of this course of events it cannot be understood how a responsible statesman can have the courage to maintain that Germany, who found herself confronted by Russian mobilisation, military preparations of France, and the mobilisation of the English Fleet, could on July 31st still have saved peace by the acceptance of a conference which was to be conducted under the arms of the Entente Powers.

It was not Germany, who continued to mediate up Vienna up to the last hour, who made the idea of mediation by four Powers impossible; it was the military measures of the Entente Powers who spoke words of peace while they determined to make war.

V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.









THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

This book is DUE on the last date stamped below

LD
URL

REC'D 10-11-78
AUG 4 - 1978

DISCHARGE-URL
LD
URL AUG

JUN 19 1978

R.A



3 1158 00316 7953

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA 000 751 540 6

D511
G86jE
cop.2

